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Abstract 
 
This thesis explores the nature and extent of convergence and divergence in cannabis control 
in England & Wales and the Netherlands through an examination of the policy-making 
process. Over the past couple of decades a number of sociological theories of crime control 
have pointed towards converging tendencies in the growth of ‘punitiveness’ across advanced 
Western countries. One of the most influential accounts put forth has been David Garland’s 
The Culture of Control which suggests that the transition to late-modernity has brought with 
it new and reconstructed risks and threats, and ambivalent strategies of responding to issues 
of crime and security.  
 
However, despite the usefulness of such bodies of work which attempted to map the ‘master 
patterns’ of crime control, there is a need to empirically examine how a culture of control 
unfolds across different national and subnational spheres. An under-examined area of 
criminological research is the very nature of policy development and negotiation, with 
tendencies to read off policy outcomes without a deeper exploration of how such responses 
come into being and unfold across different national and subnational spaces. 
 
The area of drugs policy, and specifically regarding cannabis, provided an interesting focus in 
which to test and build upon The Culture of Control, and particularly so in England & Wales 
and the Netherlands who have traditionally exhibited differences in their approaches to 
cannabis policy. Recent policy changes regarding cannabis suggest a toughening of 
approaches in both jurisdictions, with the reclassification from Class C to Class B in England & 
Wales in 2009, and the modifications to the ‘coffeeshop’ gedoogbeleid (‘tolerance policy’) in 
the Netherlands in 2012/13.  
 
A thematic analysis was conducted on empirical data from ‘elite’ semi-structured interviews 
(n=62) as well as key policy documents. The findings suggest that there have been convergent 
patterns in the way in which problems and policy alternatives have been constructed and 
molded to fit particular political agendas which shifted policy in a more repressive direction; 
but there are crucial differences in institutional and political cultures which still generate 
significant points of divergence across and within these jurisdictions. Consequentially, 
although ‘contrasts in tolerance’ may not be as marked as once described before (Downes 
1988), there are still key components of the policy process in the Netherlands which more 
readily enable resistance against overly punitive policy movements, and foster the potential 
for a more pragmatic approach towards cannabis control. 
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Exploring Explanations of Contemporary Crime Control 
 
This study explores the issue of inter- and intra-national policy convergence and divergence in 
crime control, and how similarities and differences in the policy-making processes of different 
nations may be best understood and explained. It does this through an empirical study of 
legislative changes in relation to cannabis control in two Western European states, England & 
Wales and the Netherlands. 
Over the past century, and particularly the past forty years or so, it has become 
increasingly clear that the conditions of human existence have undergone rapid social, 
economic and technological transformations that have changed the way in which humans 
interact and counter-act across all types of social life. During this period, social scientists have 
alluded to vast changes in societal organisation which have become tied to processes of 
‘globalisation’ and a shift away from modernity (see Giddens 1999; Bauman 2000; Beck 2000; 
Castells 2001). The exact nature of contemporary configurations of social life are deeply 
contested with such theorists arguing that the shift is one towards a more ‘fluid’, ‘reflexive’, 
‘high’, or ‘late’ form of modernity. Such conceptualisations are premised upon the continued 
existence, and lingering historical residues, of modern social institutions and arrangements 
which have adapted, reacted and transformed in the wake of a changing social landscape 
rather being replaced through an entirely new and distinct epoch. 
But what do such a wide-ranging set of changes mean for crime and its control? How 
do we attempt to understand and conceptualise what appear to be quite dramatic 
transformative processes? And how useful are such endeavours at capturing social reality? 
The field of crime and its control is no exception to these patterns and is used to further 
indicate such tectonic movements. New threats have been generated and old risks 
exacerbated which have fundamentally questioned ‘modern’ responses to crime, and in their 
wake, have given rise to a more risk-conscious set of strategies which attempt to manage and 
control deviant populations through ever more punitive means. 
For sociological criminologists, attempts to map the contours of the contemporary 
landscape of crime control have been no mean feat, and a number of accounts have 
attempted to identify the ‘master patterns’ characterising the field (e.g. Cohen 1985; Young 
1999; Christie 2000; Simon 2007; Hallsworth and Lea 2011; Wacquant 2009). One of the most 
influential criminologists who took on the challenge of such an endeavour was David Garland 
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who suggested that we have shifted towards a ‘culture of control’ (Garland 2001). The impact 
of this particular piece of work has had a profound impact upon criminological 
understandings, with the influential Loic Wacquant (2010:206-207) describing it as ‘…the 
most sweeping and stimulative account of the nexus of crime and social order put forth since 
Foucault’.  
This research project critically tested this particular theoretical framework to explore 
in depth the nature of how a culture of control unfolds across different national and local 
contexts in relation to the policy-making process. It is worth stating clearly here what this is a 
study of, and what it is not. It is an empirical study of the policy-making process in two 
jurisdictions which focuses on two exemplifying cases in the arena of cannabis control, with a 
view to demonstrating the limitations, as well as contributions, of Garland’s The Culture of 
Control. Thus, it is not intended to be an over-arching study of all aspects of cannabis 
regulation from transnational agreements to the details of policing and sentencing at the 
local level. Given this premise, it is worth outlining the core features of Garland’s arguments. 
 
 
1.2 The Culture of Control 
 
The culture of control thesis has had an authoritative appeal within the academy, and pulls 
together an array of seemingly disparate theoretical approaches into a singular master 
narrative. A ‘theoretical scaffold’ is constructed through drawing upon structuralism, 
functionalism and interpretivism; and exemplary theorists are combined, such as Marx, Hirst, 
Foucault, Freud, Weber, Durkheim, Geertz, Elias and Bourdieu (Garland 2004). At the heart of 
Garland’s work is the notion that wide-ranging social, political and economic transformations, 
amounting to a shift to late-modernity, have altered fundamentally the field of crime control 
and criminal justice. For Garland, such a shift has brought with it new and altered risks, 
threats, ways of being and ways of thinking, which have led to the eclipse of ‘penal-welfare’ 
responses by a set of ambivalent ‘schizoid’ strategies. These attempt to both ‘adapt’ to 
increasing administrative burdens, whilst simultaneously reaffirming the ‘myth’ of state 
sovereignty in the provision of law and order through ‘denial’ and ‘acting out’ (Garland 1996; 
2001). 
 
 
Penal-Welfarism 
 
The starting point of Garland’s (1996; 2001) analysis of developments in crime control lies in 
the assertion that from the early 20th century up until c.1970s, responses to crime were 
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enveloped within a system of ‘penal-welfarism’. Loader and Sparks (2007:79) outline three 
interlocking axioms of this paradigm. First, it was assumed that crime was conceptually 
unproblematic and geographically and socially delimited; second, that policy and practice was 
based upon a causal theory that understood crime as a presenting symptom of deep-seated 
social problems; and finally, that there was an attachment to the idea of crime control as the 
province of ‘experts’ and expert knowledge. 
 The leading experts at this time broadly agreed on the basic principles of ‘modern’ 
criminology, ‘…with its faith in instrumental reason, its vision of the technocratic state and its 
commitment to social progress and social engineering’ (Garland and Sparks 2000:194). Due to 
the ‘deferential’ nature of British political culture at the time which emphasised a top-down 
approach to governance (Almond and Verba 1989), this gave elites, such as practitioners, and 
academics, working within and around government substantial room for manoeuvre in 
advancing programmes for social reform without being questioned by citizens (Ryan 2003). 
Thus, much decision-making was done behind closed doors by liberal ‘platonic guardians’, 
hidden away from public scrutiny (Loader 2006). 
The dominant explanatory perspective in this period was based upon a positivist and 
‘rehabilitative ideal’, and responses aimed to reduce crime through identifying the cause of 
the criminal behaviour and treating it through individualised programmes of reform. A 
dominant belief was that through social reform and treatment, criminality could be reduced 
and ultimately eradicated. Such correctionalist criminology ‘…assumed without question the 
possibility and desirability of reintegrating delinquents and deviant individuals’ (Garland 
2001:44). Thus, the use of imprisonment in a retributive sense was seen as counter-
productive to the hegemonic principles of penal-welfarism. 
 
 
The Crisis in Penal-Welfarism and the Shift to ‘Schizoid’ Crime Control Strategies 
 
Garland (2001) suggests that from around the 1970s onwards, the dominant ideal of 
rehabilitation was increasingly questioned which led to a policy predicament of how best to 
respond to crime and deviance. This predicament was conditioned by two social ‘facts’ that 
occurred from this period onwards: the normality of high crime rates and the acceptance of 
state limitations in providing ‘law and order’. 
 Crime rates had been steadily rising since the early 1950s in England & Wales and 
from the mid-1960s they grew exponentially until the mid-1990s (Maguire 2012). Whilst 
doubt has been shed on the use of officially recorded crime statistics as a representation of 
the crime problem, there was another important dimension that was exacerbated regardless 
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of its true extent: fear of crime. Garland argues that crime transformed into an organising 
principle of everyday life, as something to be ‘kept in mind’ and ‘normalised’ into our social 
existences (Garland 1996; 2001). It is in this sense, that high crime rates became accepted as 
a normal social fact. 
Faced with the overriding sentiment that ‘nothing works’ (Martinson 1974), and an 
aetiological crisis of how to respond in a vastly changing social, cultural, economic and 
political landscape, Garland suggests that this created a ‘policy predicament’. On the one 
hand, the state could no longer continue its role as the sole provider of law and order as 
responses were doing little to counter the social strains of late-modernity. However, in an 
increasingly politicised and open territory of crime control, where citizens’ fear and 
experience of crime had grown substantially, the political ramifications of withdrawing state 
sovereignty over such issues would be catastrophic. 
The arguments presented by Garland suggest that contemporary responses to crime 
are caught within a contradictory and ambivalent strain between taking heed of its own 
limitations whilst also endeavouring to be ‘tough on crime’. Emerging out of the vast social 
changes experienced, and in response to this predicament, is a culture of control. Garland 
(2001:174-190) argues that this is formed around three central elements: First, a re-coded 
penal-welfarism, in which the penal aspect has become ‘more punitive, more expressive, 
more security-minded’, whilst the welfare aspect has become ‘more conditional, more 
offence-centred, more risk conscious’ (ibid:175). Second, a criminology of control, which has 
seen the rise of competing conceptualisations of criminality in reaction to the perceived 
failures of the rehabilitative ideal. The ‘criminologies of everyday life’ have become less 
concerned about a person’s welfare, and more centred on managing risk and space, whilst 
the ‘criminologies of the other’ assume a deeply divisive position between ‘us’ hardworking, 
upstanding citizens, and ‘them’ ‘opaquely monstrous creatures beyond or beneath our 
knowing’ (ibid:184). Finally, the culture of control is characterised by an economic style of 
reasoning, whereby managerialist concerns of costs and efficiencies have replaced a more 
social welfare concern. In producing his analysis, Garland (ibid:6-20) points to a number of 
changes in crime control which are indicative of a culture of control based upon ‘adaptive’ 
and ‘non-adaptive’ strategies. 
 
 
Adaptation 
 
In the former sense, significant developments have occurred across the criminal justice field 
which have attempted to reframe and reorganise responses to criminality to take account of 
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the limitations of state interventions. This has involved ‘defining deviance down’ to divert 
offences away from the formal criminal justice system and a shift away from the 
rehabilitative ideal to one counting ‘outputs’ rather than ‘outcomes’. Influenced by neo-
liberal managerialism, the new objectives are to ‘manage’ risky populations through actuarial 
tools rather than seeking to eradicate criminality (Feeley and Simon 1992; 1994). In this 
sense, performance measurement has become more important, centred more on how 
efficient ‘services’ are for ‘clients’ than how effective they are in reducing crime; with 
discourses, practices and provision of security imported and supplied through the private 
sector (Jones 2012; Shearing and Stenning 1981). In addition, the state also attempted to 
‘adapt’ to the changing landscape through becoming more professional and bureaucratised. 
The use of technology has facilitated smarter ways of targeting criminal activity, to identify 
‘hot spots’, whilst also providing more powerful tools for data analysis and identification of 
criminal activity. 
Importantly, a subtle shift of official conceptualisation has ensued, moving away from 
positivism and drawing more upon the ‘criminologies of everyday life’ which treat crime as a 
normal social fact in society. The logic is that if crime is not considered an exceptional 
phenomenon caused by external or pathological conditions, then measures should focus on 
neo-classical notions of cost-benefit analysis which minimise opportunities and maximise the 
chances of being caught. 
But there have also been important shifts away from centralised state-centred 
responses to crime and drugs. A weakening of the nation state has led to recognition that 
crime control requires partnership working. Thus, we have witnessed a growing 
diversification in crime control above, below, beyond and within the state, whereby a 
plethora of social actors are responsibilised in the governance of security (Jones 2012; 
Hughes 2007; Crawford 2012). Such developments indicate a ‘temporal shift’ towards a ‘pre-
crime’ society where there is ‘…calculation, risk and uncertainty, surveillance, precaution, 
prudentialism, moral hazard, prevention and, arching over all these, there is the pursuit of 
security’ (Zedner 2007:262). 
 
 
Non-Adaptive Strategies: Denial and Acting Out 
 
But whilst attempts have been made to deflect attention away from traditional state 
responsibilities of providing security for its citizens in the face of inevitable failure and 
scrutiny, Garland also suggests that there has been a simultaneous renewal of the ‘myth’ of 
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sovereign control. The need to be seen as though the ruling government can provide the 
fundamental necessity of safety has allowed a darker and more punitive side of crime control 
to flourish. This has been driven by increased media coverage and interest (enhanced by 
technological changes such as the ‘digital revolution’), a more fearful and demanding public 
encountering the ‘reality’ of control deficits, and a combination of shifts in political 
philosophy and social demography whereby neo-conservative conceptions of morality and 
law and order have come to the fore against the backdrop of perceived ‘softness’ under 
earlier left-wing administrations. 
 The politicisation of crime has led to a questioning of liberal elite dominance in 
policy-making (Loader 2006; Ryan 2003) and split the post-war political consensus on crime 
issues. There is now an influx of varying positions on how best to respond to crime, varying 
from commonsensical understandings to ‘scientific’ analyses (Garland and Sparks 2000). In 
the place of the rehabilitative ideal and quest for offender reintegration has come a more 
expressive and emotional tone on crime policy. Retributive punishment has come to 
dominate discussions with ‘just deserts’ being a generalised policy goal. Incarceration has 
become the preferred mode of punishment and has seen significant increases in both the 
extent of custodial sentencing and in the average length of sentences given1 (Liebling and 
Crewe 2012).  
In reaction to the perceived failures of the penal-welfare state, political parties are 
dependent on strong policies which claim to be able to save the nation from the perpetual 
crises created by a ‘moral underclass’. A pertinent aspect of this is that policy tone on crime 
has changed to a central discourse centred on fear of crime and insecurities about the 
‘dangerous other’, and in this crime-ridden society victims are now prioritised and feed into 
the policy-making process. As Wacquant (2001) demonstrates, such perceptions are innately 
linked to issues of social class and ethnicity, with disadvantaged individuals becoming 
‘suitable enemies’ who are further demonised, managed and controlled (Wacquant 1999; 
2004; Christie 1986). 
 
 
1.3 Beyond the Culture of Control 
 
The arguments put forth in The Culture of Control marked an important contribution to 
criminology and wider social science disciplines and sparked a series academic debates 
around Garland’s work. There is not space here to fully cover the range of critiques posited 
                                                          
1 Indicative of this, the prison population has more than doubled since 1992 to over 85,000 in England 
& Wales at the time of writing (Howard League for Penal Reform 2014). 
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(see Hudson 2004; Gelsthorpe 2004; Matravers and Maruna 2004), but I shall concentrate on 
three key interlinked agitations relevant to this research project. Notably, methodological 
weaknesses in comparative design and the downplaying of national differences; the 
understating of conflict and resistance; and of being overly pessimistic and deterministic in 
outlook. 
 The Culture of Control is explicitly focussed on trajectories of crime control in the UK 
and USA. One of the most significant challenges made is that Garland employs a 
methodologically weak comparative design which glosses over points of divergence to 
concentrate on elements of similarity between these two national jurisdictions. As such, 
‘…the search for commonality tends to blot out basic structural qualities’ (Young 2002:232). 
Most prominently, commentators have pointed to significant historical and cultural 
components of the USA such as race relations, the ‘American Dream’, protestant 
fundamentalism, constitutional structure, high levels of gun ownership, and levels of 
inequality (Western 2004; Tonry 2009; Young 2002).  
It is such facets which arguably make the USA ‘exceptional’ in crime control, 
indicated, for example, by their vastly higher incarceration rate. By focusing on the 
similarities between the UK and USA, there is a danger that The Culture of Control fails to 
comprehend how distinct structural and cultural systems in each jurisdiction contribute 
towards movements in crime control. This problem is then furthered through an assumed 
extrapolation of the explanation to cover all late-modern societies, further masking the 
messy contingencies of responses across different states, leading to ‘false universalism’ 
(Edwards et al. 2013a).  
Relatedly, a further critique posited against The Culture of Control is that Garland 
understates conflict and resistance in shaping policy development. In a fundamental way, this 
strikes at the heart of Garland’s genealogy method, as commentators suggest that Garland 
presents an all too tidy account of the rise of neo-liberal and neo-conservative agendas. 
Matthews (2002:219) argues that Garland does not grapple with processes of ‘…struggle and 
conflict involving changing modalities of power, truth and subjectification’, and as such the 
culture of control becomes a ‘quasi-teleology’. Jock Young (2002:234) builds upon this by 
suggesting that critical narratives, including those of the feminist movement (see Gelsthorpe 
2004), were restricted in importance, with ‘…the emergence of critical criminology in the 
1970s written up almost as an anomaly [sic]’.  
The neglect of resistance also goes deeper than with individuals and groups lying 
outside of officialdom, but it also relates to the power struggles over ownership and 
conceptualisation of problems by policy actors operating across different institutional 
8 
settings and at different levels of governance. In these settings, with the empowered ability 
to shape crime control in varying degrees, there is scope for negotiation, resistance, and 
reworking of policy (Edwards and Hughes 2005; Stenson and Edwards 2004; Muncie 2005). 
Whilst Garland (2001:22) does note differences between different aspects of policy, warning 
researchers to ‘not mistake talk for action’, there is admittedly absent specificity on the 
dynamics of how policy develops and unfolds, with Garland brushing aside the ‘empirical 
particulars’ (ibid:vii). 
These criticisms then link to a final critique of relevance here, that The Culture of 
Control is a ‘grimly pessimistic’ and ‘determinedly dystopic’ ‘criminology of catastrophe’ 
(Zedner 2002; O’Malley 2000; Loader and Sparks 2004; Hutchinson 2006). By concentrating 
on the similarities of two late-modern societies, there is an assumption that a culture of 
control is determinedly imposed by virtue of structural economic, political and social shifts. 
The consequence is not only that ‘…little room is left for the impact of contestation and 
resistance’ (O’Malley 2000:162), but that it leads to a type of thinking whereby ‘…processes 
of social control appear to have a logic of their own which leads ineluctably towards an ever 
more restrictive system of regulation’ (Matthews 2002:220). 
In sum, critiques of Garland amounted to fears that the culture of control was viewed 
as a ‘bleak’ homogenous phenomenon, present across all late-modern societies, and 
seemingly irreversible. However, in response to such criticisms, Garland (2004) revised his 
initial analysis and opened up a path for future research inquiries which this project 
attempted to take forward.  
First, Garland dismisses accusations of a deterministically dystopian outlook by 
reiterating the complex nature of the field, as a whole, under study. Thus, whilst critical 
commentators have tended to focus on the ‘punitive turn’, Garland (ibid:170) argues that 
such a perspective ought to ‘…reflect on the non-punitive modes of managing crime that 
these deep transformations make possible’. 
Second, there is an acknowledgement of the under-emphasis of ‘counter-doxic 
struggles’ which tended to ‘…misrepresent the real nature of the field, which is composed not 
of fully settled practices and firmly established policies but rather of competing actors and 
ongoing struggles, often with delicately balanced forces and power ratios whose equilibria 
are subject to change’ (ibid:167-168). As such, through greater attention paid to such 
dynamics, it would be possible to not only develop a more realistic representation of the 
current state of crime control, but that it would provide ‘…a more adequate basis for thinking 
about future possibilities’ (ibid:168). 
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Finally, Garland disputes the idea that The Culture of Control was a comparative study 
in a methodological sense, which would have paid more attention to points of divergence if 
so. Rather, Garland examined the overall developments in crime control in the USA and UK 
because despite marked differences between the two countries, there was the presence of 
similar pressures and types of responses. For Garland then, this is not a closing off of inquiry 
under a generalised deterministic explanation, but the construction of a springboard from 
which a series of further empirical studies could critically examine how other countries and 
geo-political spaces have ‘…adapted and reacted to the new risks, insecurities and 
opportunities inherent in the social organisation of everyday life under late modern 
conditions’ (ibid:179-180). 
Thus, in utilising and advancing the valuable contributions of The Culture of Control, it 
is necessary to consider its limitations. Principally, that whilst there may indeed have been 
some convergence in crime control strategies in societies transitioning to late-modernity, 
there exists the potential for the culture of control to take a number of guises; to be 
contested, resisted and reworked across and within particular contexts by a myriad of actors 
and agencies. In order to better understand these dynamics, this requires malleability of the 
criminological gaze, to move beyond a narrow criminal justice focus on policy outcomes to 
consider the political processes which generate policy responses (Jones and Newburn 2007).  
Thus, this research project sought to clarify and build upon how control cultures 
unfold across two different advanced European societies, at national and subnational levels, 
through an empirical examination of the policy-making process in a specific policy domain: 
cannabis control. 
 
 
1.4 The Challenge of Cannabis Control 
 
The sphere of cannabis control provides an interesting focus of inquiry precisely because it 
lies within a grey area of societal moral tolerance. Cannabis is perhaps the most contentious 
of all illicit drugs by virtue of the contestation of its dangerousness, and by the volume of its 
consumption globally. For some, the ‘gateway theory’ (Kandel 1975) still holds significant 
weight and it is adjudged as intrinsically harmful to those who use it (see the International 
Narcotics Control Board, TNI 2014). For others, it is seen as relatively harmless, with most 
harms emanating from a morally dubious suppression and oppression of users who become 
objects of criminal control and societal marginalisation (e.g. Becker 1963; Young 1971).  
Regardless of standpoint on the harm of cannabis, in recent years it has become clear 
that alongside other social transformations, cannabis activities have undergone changes 
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which have brought it firmly into the public and political sphere. Most notably, from the 
1960s the numbers of those who had used cannabis increased significantly, amounting for 
some a ‘normalisation’ of the drug particularly for youth (Parker et al. 1998). Moreover, long-
standing arguments regarding mental health have been reinvigorated by a wave of studies 
driven primarily from psychiatry, and new challenges have surfaced such as large-scale 
domestic cultivation and supply. 
In the context of a culture of control, it would appear that patterns regarding 
cannabis and other illicit drugs demonstrate policy ambivalence. On the one hand, there is 
evidence of a reactive and morally driven so-called ‘war on drugs’ which fuels a spiralling 
recourse to punitive criminal justice-led responses (Wacquant 2004); and on the other hand, 
we have witnessed the growth of a preventative ‘harm-reduction’ agenda which implicitly 
accepts the ‘normality’ of drug use and seeks to ‘adapt’ through the introduction of measures 
which better manage and control the problems created by drug use (O’Malley 2004). 
But whilst these broader trends may indicate and confirm the relevance of the 
culture of control, the discussion earlier alerts us to the need to take a closer empirical 
examination of the political processes and factors which facilitate or resist how it unfolds 
across different geo-political spaces. This is particularly pertinent given the ‘silence’ of The 
Culture of Control in explicitly discussing drugs policy beyond a handful of references to the 
‘war on drugs’ (O’Malley 2002). O’Malley (ibid) is on point here, arguing that such an 
important omission requires analysis beyond the UK and US. Certainly, despite overarching 
frameworks of prohibition which of themselves indicate a punitive approach towards 
cannabis, there are still varying responses across different jurisdictions. 
For example, it is clear that the style and nature of the ‘war on drugs’ apparent in the 
US, which has contributed towards mass incarceration of users and dealers from ‘ghetto’ 
neighbourhoods (Wacquant 2004), has not been experienced in the same way in other 
jurisdictions. Even within England & Wales, the number of custodial sentences for cannabis 
possession offences remains relatively minuscule, with a mere 308 given immediate custody 
in 2009 (Sentencing Council 2011). More startling in this wider context though, is the 
continued existence of tolerated ‘coffeeshops’ in the Netherlands which openly sell cannabis 
to consumers. 
This is not to refute the existence of punitive tendencies, which as will be argued are 
present in both of these jurisdictions, but that there is a need to examine the drivers, 
struggles and adaptations relating to policy development which have contributed towards 
convergence and divergence in the trajectories of cannabis control. 
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1.5 Framing the Research 
 
This research study attempted to provide a layered understanding of the cannabis policy 
process through a multiple-embedded case study design which examined both national and 
subnational levels in England & Wales and the Netherlands. Thus, there is not only a focus on 
two national contexts, but the research also delved down into one case site in each national 
context (Cardiff and Utrecht) to capture the dynamic and contested spaces of how cannabis 
policy was constructed and translated. 
To provide a point for comparison, two recent policy ‘movements’ were selected: the 
2009 reclassification of cannabis from Class C to Class B in England & Wales; and the changes 
to the coffeeshop gedoogbeleid (‘tolerance policy’) that occurred in 2012/13 in the 
Netherlands. It is important to stress that an analysis of these changes is not intended to 
typify everything about cannabis control in the two jurisdictions, but rather to exemplify and 
illuminate the uncertainties and contingencies around policy-making in this area. This is not 
to disregard the broader trajectories and context of cannabis control, as the particular ‘cases’ 
under examination are placed within a broader context of cannabis regulation over a longer 
period in Chapter 3. However, as an empirical study of policy-making, there was a need to 
have a relatively narrow focus to allow for a more rigorous explanation of how and why 
particular things happened at a particular time. To have a broader empirical focus to cover all 
aspects of cannabis control over a longer period of time would have reduced the 
methodological rigour of an inter- and intra-national comparison. 
Prima facie, the recent changes seem to indicate a more repressive shift in both 
jurisdictions, but to assume the validation of punitive tendencies on face value obfuscates a 
more complex picture. Taking into consideration the notion that ‘policy’ is not a singular 
concept but can be distinguished at different ‘levels’ of ‘talk’, ‘decisions’, and ‘action’ 
(Brunsson 1989; Pollitt 2001), the research primarily examined the policy ‘process’ (i.e. the 
genesis of changes) at the levels of talk and decisions.  
This is not to underplay the significance of policy at the level of ‘action’ or 
implementation, but that the research was centred on how shifts in policy come into being 
and are negotiated across different spaces. Given Garland’s effective dismissal of nuanced 
policy differences, there was a need to provide an empirical representation of policy making 
in particular contexts. Set within a comparative design, this inevitably required a focus on the 
‘higher’ levels of policy (i.e. talk and decisions) but the analysis remains consistent, and 
contributes towards, critique of Garland’s original approach. If it is possible to find and 
explain important points of convergence and divergence at these levels, it is safe to assume 
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that such patterns exist, perhaps in even more greater contrasts, at the level of ‘action’ on 
the ground. These concepts form an important component of the analytical frameworks used 
and will be discussed further in Chapter 4.  
The research set out to address four central research questions which aimed to 
illuminate the complex and diverse nature of how a culture of control unfolds: 
 
1. How did the policy responses come into existence? 
 
2. To what extent is there intra-national divergence between national and subnational 
levels of governance? 
 
3. To what extent is there inter-national convergence in the responses to cannabis? 
 
4. What factors and mechanisms conditioned how the policy responses unfolded? 
 
This set of concerns parallels the call of the European Society of Criminology who argued in 
2013 that moving beyond some of the supposedly dystopic implications of grand theories, or 
‘sparkling funeral oratories’, entails the identification of ‘…what factors influence the trends 
in crime control and actual policy-making mechanisms in various countries’ (ESC 2013:3). To 
this end, there are a number of original contributions of this research: 
 
 The nature of the policy responses in both countries demonstrate ‘structured 
ambivalence’ (Garland 2001:111) which creates, in Brunsson’s (1989) terms, 
‘hypocrisy’ both between policy talk and decisions, and between national and 
subnational spheres of governance. The need for politicians to be seen to be 
acting on a problem is in tension with the likely administrative and negative 
burdens of applying punitive responses. Such relations suggest that punitive 
tendencies rest dominantly in the construction of policy problems and the 
desires for change, but become less meaningful in the actual concrete 
manifestations of policy, especially at the subnational level. 
 
 More central to the thesis though is the assertion that there are a set of 
structural and cultural mechanisms existing at national and subnational levels 
which either facilitate or ‘mellow out’ punitive aspects of policy. These 
included, inter alia, ownership of the issue at a national level; relations of 
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power between central and local authorities; political and constitutional 
culture; the role of expertise and the ‘national mood’; and political 
representation and individual political figures at distinct moments. 
 
 Consequently, the thesis provides a rich insight into the messy and dynamic 
processes by which cannabis policy is generated and negotiated which has 
contributed to varying degrees of convergence and divergence across 
England & Wales and the Netherlands. The novel comparative approach 
used, being both international and intra-national, has allowed for an 
adaptation and progression of The Culture of Control. These findings can then 
be utilised to further test and corroborate the identified factors mitigating 
the policy process in other areas of crime control and across different 
settings. Such endeavours are thereby better placed to explore how else 
problems of cannabis, drugs, crime and security could be governed, to work 
towards a more just and humane approach. 
 
 
1.6 Outline of the Thesis 
 
Before going on to outline the structure of the thesis, it is worth briefly reflecting upon the 
significance of how the thesis was written and is presented. Although the position adopted in 
this research strived for a ‘best approximation’ of the truth (Layder 1998:142), it is also 
accepted that it in itself can be considered as socially constructed and mediated through 
particular rhetorical techniques. The implication then is that this has a performative function 
in constituting a social reality; one which does not claim to be infallible, but is open to 
revision and change. Nevertheless, the thesis employs a loose ‘empiricist repertoire’ which 
presents the research process as neat, tidy and following a logical progression (Gilbert and 
Mulkay 1984; Burchell 2007). The consequence of doing so is that it disguises the ‘mess’ 
inherent in the research process (Law 2004). The purpose is not to intentionally hide the 
messy realities or to deceive the reader, but to provide a clear and rational set of arguments 
which accord with the ‘formative intentions’ of being a criminologist as social scientist 
(Edwards and Sheptycki 2009). Thus, overall the structure sets out the research ‘problem’, 
the way in which the research was designed, how the problem was answered, and the 
implications produced forthwith for conceptualisations of the social world. 
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Chapter 2 provides an overview of the socio-political context in England & Wales and the 
Netherlands. The main features of constitutional and political institutions are mapped on to 
the changing political landscape to understand the nature and extent of convergence or 
divergence in this realm which provides a useful backdrop for the subsequent analysis of 
policy change. 
 
Chapter 3 builds upon this contextual overview through a brief exploration of international 
governance frameworks before turning to an in-depth examination of developments in 
cannabis control in each jurisdiction through the lens of a culture of control.  
 
Chapter 4 discusses the methodological approach employed in the research. The chapter 
outlines the research aims, objectives and questions before discussing the analytic 
frameworks of Kingdon’s (1995) ‘Multiple Streams’ model and Pollitt’s (2001) policy ‘levels’ 
which were used to frame and organise the empirical findings. From there, the research 
strategy is discussed as well as issues pertaining to the comparative and case study elements 
of the research. Following this, the specific techniques of data generation and analysis that 
were utilised are reflected upon before ending with a consideration of the ethical and 
political dimensions of conducting research in this area. 
 
Chapters 5 and 6 present the substantive empirical findings of the thesis, with each chapter 
based around the national and subnational spheres of England & Wales and the Netherlands 
respectively. The chapters initially outline the policy changes under examination before giving 
an account of the policy process. This main facet of the chapters is organised around 
Kingdon’s model of the ‘problem’, ‘policy’, and ‘political’ streams, interlacing and comparing 
the national level with the subnational level at each distinct stream. The aim of these 
chapters is to address three of the research questions: of how the policy changes came into 
being; the preliminary identification of factors and mechanisms which conditioned the policy 
responses; and the examination of convergence and divergence between national and 
subnational levels of governance. 
 
Chapter 7 then provides a cross-case analysis of the two jurisdictions, taking into account the 
nature of national-to-subnational relations, to grapple with the final research question of 
interest: to critically assess the nature and extent of convergence and divergence. In this way, 
the mechanisms identified in chapters 5 and 6 are compared and contrasted across the two 
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jurisdictions as a whole, critically relating the findings of the thesis back to the propositions of 
the culture of control thesis. 
 
Chapter 8 concludes the thesis through a recapitulation of the main findings in relation to the 
original research questions, demonstrating how, and identifying why, responses to cannabis 
have unfolded across variegated and uneven landscapes. The chapter then goes on to reflect 
on the methodological approach of the research, highlighting aspects which could be 
improved and further areas for empirical examination. The thesis then concludes through a 
reflexive discussion of the normative dimension of criminological research, highlighting a set 
of policy implications. 
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Chapter II 
The Socio-Political Context in England & Wales and the Netherlands 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The primary aim of this chapter is to set out the broad institutional and cultural context 
within which policy is made in order to provide a richer understanding of developments 
within the area of cannabis policy (which is discussed in Chapter 3). This is provided through a 
historical overview and backdrop of the major patterns and developments that have occurred 
within the socio-political sphere in England & Wales and the Netherlands over the past 
century.  
 
 
2.2 England & Wales 
 
The political architecture of England & Wales2 is structured around a ‘first-past-the-post’ and 
adversarial system which has witnessed the growth and dominance of two main political 
parties split traditionally along the cleavage of social class. The socio-political sphere has been 
one in which a large, centralised ‘welfare state’ developed in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries, with local authorities waning in their powers to shape political mandates. Since 
around the 1970s, the welfare state has broadly diminished, and in its wake, 
responsibilisation of the individual and a marketisation philosophy has become far more 
dominant. Moreover, this has taken shape within a much greater politicised and volatile 
environment. 
 
 
2.2.1 Political Characteristics of the United Kingdom and the Growth of the ‘Welfare State’ 
 
The development of political institutions in the United Kingdom followed a gradual transition 
from monarchic to parliamentary and democratic rule during the 19th and early 20th century. 
The appearance of political parties were largely organised around the main cleavage of social 
class, and by the end of the First World War, two main parties emerged as the dominant 
                                                          
2 Hereafter the ‘United Kingdom’ is used for the purposes of this section. 
17 
forces of British politics – the Conservatives and the Labour Party – who broadly represented 
the interests of employers and employees respectively3. 
 With the growth of mass political party membership following male (and limited 
female) enfranchisement at the end of the First World War (with universal suffrage achieved 
in 1928), these two parties have since dominated the political landscape. British political 
culture has developed around such developments, and has also been shaped by a set of 
institutional practices which have become collectively known as the ‘Westminster system’. In 
this model, a first-past-the-post system of elected representation takes place which (usually) 
results in one political party holding office with the other forming the main ‘opposition’.  
Politics in the United Kingdom has thus been characterized by an adversarial and 
competitive system between two main political parties. Within this framework, the Prime 
Minister has a pivotal role in the directing and management of the executive branch of 
government, to co-ordinate policy across the different departments and act as a spearhead of 
the government. Pertinently, these features led to Lord Hailsham describing the UK system as 
producing an ‘elective dictatorship’, which grants considerable power to the dominant party 
and Prime Minister in government. 
 A striking characteristic about the British constitution as a whole is that it is largely 
‘uncodified’, meaning that there is a lack of a singular formal doctrine which determines 
political culture and behaviour. Political behaviour both at national and local levels 
‘…depends heavily on constitutional understandings’ (Moran 2005:71), which has allowed for 
differing and shifting interpretations over the years. Two striking characteristics often 
attributed to the British constitution are parliamentary supremacy and the rule of law 
(Bogdanor 1999). 
 Such characteristics have also shaped relations between central and local 
governments, whereby parliamentary supremacy has led to a ‘culture of disdain’ towards the 
local sphere (Cole and John 2001). Up until the Second World War local authorities had 
significant and genuine responsibilities in providing major services. Nevertheless, the ‘golden 
age’ of local government declined following the war which saw the centralisation and 
nationalisation of key services emanating from a broad political consensus centred on the 
importance of the ‘welfare state’ (Wilson and Game 2011). 
Despite intrinsic class differences between the two main political parties, the Second 
World War had left Great Britain in a state of disrepair which individuals from all backgrounds 
                                                          
3 Of course the particular ideologies of these two parties are vastly more complex than presented here. 
For Conservative ideology, the ideas of Edmund Burke and Friedrich von Hayek have been historically 
influential; whilst Labour ideology was shaped by individuals such as Sidney Webb, R.H. Tawney and 
George Orwell (see Moran 2005). 
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recognised the need to be socially responsible for all individuals regardless of status. One of 
the aspects of ‘public acceptance’ was the growing role of the state in public life (Thomson 
1965).  Following the 1945 election of the Labour Party to office, there was a programme of 
state interventions which saw the nationalisation of key industries such as the Bank of 
England in 1946, coal and railways in 1947, electricity and gas in 1948, and steel in 1951 
(Pugh 1994). 
 Another key facet to this period was the development of welfare provisions for the 
sick, elderly, unemployed, injured and those with housing and education needs. By around 
the time of the Second World War the concept of welfare changed from one based upon 
provisions made to those unable to care for themselves, to one based upon the principle of 
‘…unified universal contributory insurance to ensure at all times to all men a subsistence 
income for themselves and their families as of right …without any form of means test or 
inquiry about what means they had’ (House of Lords 1953). One of the most influential 
moments which solidified the welfare state was the publishing of the Beveridge Report in 
1942 which proposed the introduction of insurance to provide universal protection against 
unemployment, poverty and illness (Moran 2005). 
Added to this milieu of social interventions was a growing economy which reaped the 
rewards of the post-war economic boom and improved living conditions. As a result, this 
period enjoyed high employment, stable social conditions, and a broad political consensus 
shared between the two dominant parties which centred on the notion that the state had a 
significant role in providing universal welfare to its citizens (Thomson 1965). 
Combined with the characteristics of democratic governance outlined earlier, this 
contributed towards a political culture which has been described as a ‘deferential civic 
culture’. As Almond and Verba (1989:30) argued in relation to British politics in the latter half 
of the 20th century: 
 
‘…the civic culture is an allegiant participant culture. Individuals are not only oriented to 
political input, they also are oriented positively to the input structures and the input process.’ 
 
Moreover, British political culture was further characterised as deferential, in the sense that 
whilst a balance is struck between active and passive roles of citizens, it is slightly weighted 
towards the subjective role. This feature again speaks to the constitutional characteristics of 
the United Kingdom, that parliament is supreme in ensuring the liberty of its citizens (or 
‘subjects’) through the rule of law (Aughey 2001). It was in this climate that the policy process 
was more heavily aligned with experts, civil servants and elected representatives, with the 
public having little direct influence on policy decisions. 
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2.2.2 Rise of the Political Right 
 
From around the 1960s onwards, social, economic and political conditions started to shift 
with vast changes in societal organisation which have become tied to processes of 
‘globalisation’ and a shift away from modernity. These developments are explored in far 
more depth elsewhere (see Beck 2000; Giddens 1998; Bauman 1998; Garland 2001; Castells 
2001; Friedman 1986; Simmel 1964), but include: changes to family life and identity through 
organised civil disobedience, greater ‘democratisation’ and empowerment of oppressed 
groups; shifts in work patterns and organisation; technological developments which have 
facilitated instantaneous communications and representations of the social world; the 
uprooting of traditional communities and the rise of the urban ‘metropolis’; mass migration; 
and particularly in the late 1960s, a rejection of ‘traditional’ norms and values, with 
accelerated secularisation. 
In the 1970s the welfare state began to be questioned which coincided with a major 
restructuring of the labour market following the decline of traditional industrial 
manufacturers and an economic recession. From this point, work became a lot more insecure 
and was splintered mainly between highly trained professionals and those who were largely 
unskilled. At the time, the social changes of the 1960s were seen as indices of progress and 
development; as steps towards a more socially democratic utopia. The economic recession of 
the 1970s triggered the collapse of the post-war political consensus as the Conservatives’ 
vision of how best to counter the economic troubles was explicitly anti-welfarist, focussed on 
a backlash against ‘big government’ and the ‘permissive culture’ of the 1960s (Garland 2001; 
Newburn 1991). By the end of the 1970s, British politics had shifted from one based 
predominantly on welfarism, to one increasingly influenced by the realm of neo-liberalism4 
with the election of Margaret Thatcher to prime minister in 1979.  
The impact of this was that it signified a complete reversal of what came before, in 
that the state withdrew responsibility for market regulation whilst also advocating strong 
moral tones on perceived idyllic norms and values of the past. As Garland (2001:100, 
emphasis in original) notes, ‘…[i]f the watchwords of post-war social democracy had been 
economic control and social liberation, the new politics of the 1980s put in place a quite 
different framework of economic freedom and social control’. 
                                                          
4 Harvey (2005:2) defines neo-liberalism as ‘…a theory of political economic practices that human well-
being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an 
institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade’. 
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Margaret Thatcher ‘…did not have much time for local councils, which she expected 
to be the agents of central government’ (Baker 1993:111, in Wilson and Game 2011), and 
again attempted to assert parliamentary supremacy in the face of a weakened Europeanised 
state. In the latter sense, the government privatised national industries and services to 
compete in the emerging European marketplace whilst simultaneously curbing down on 
costly welfare provisions. But Garland is quick to note that the political changes from the 
1970s onwards were not as far-reaching and retracting as they claimed to be. Thus, ‘…in 
reality its assault upon late modernity took a very particularized form and left the major 
social arrangements largely untouched’ (Garland 2001:100). 
 
 
2.2.3 The Reinvention of the Political Left 
 
Although social institutions may have retained their institutional architecture, the socio-
political environment in which they now resided had shifted considerably. With the 
Conservatives in power from 1979 to 1997, the need for the Labour Party to reformulate 
itself and adapt to the contemporary landscape led to a rebranding of the party under the 
leadership of Tony Blair. This highlights a crucial element of the political dimensions in the 
United Kingdom, that in a majoritarian two party system, the success of one party creates an 
impetus for the other party to react to regain political support.  
With the crippling decline of trade union power and membership that occurred 
during the 1980s, and a broad public shift towards more neoliberal and conservative values 
concerning welfare and public policy, the Labour Party reacted by becoming less left-wing on 
many issues, from economic policy to social policy (and as we will later see, also on crime 
policy). The watchword of ‘New Labour’ was the quest to find a ‘Third Way’, between the 
success of the New Right and traditional allegiance to the Old Left (Giddens 1998).  
This opened up and allowed self-critique of ‘Old Labour’ which was adjudged to have 
‘…marginalised individual empowerment and local control’ through a commitment to a 
centralised state as a means of emancipation (Hain 1999). Moreover, this approach was 
critiqued on the basis that it was seen to overly promote individual freedom to the detriment 
of collective responsibility. The New Labour project attempted to reconstruct a new ‘govern-
mentality’ which responsibilised citizens and communities in the construction of identity and 
values which aimed to reinvigorate the moral civic duty of citizens (Rose 2000). 
As part of this shift, New Labour adopted and advanced a neoliberal-inspired agenda 
of ‘modernising government’ which attempted to increase government efficiency and 
effectiveness through managerialist reforms (Cabinet Office 1999). A dual process became 
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evident, with increasing powers given to local authorities, multi-agency partnerships and 
private entities, alongside a simultaneous renewal of centralised control through national 
performance management targets. This relationship, whilst premised on ideals of local 
governance and democratic frameworks, seemingly further confirmed the role of local 
authorities as service delivery organisations within a ‘hyper-centralised’ model of control 
(Chandler 2001).  
At the same time of depolarisation with a shift of the political left towards the centre, 
the political sphere purportedly became more politicised and competitive. The advent of 
mass communications and media, and later the ‘digital revolution’, brought with it a series of 
strains and pressures upon politicians through elevating social issues more firmly into the 
public domain which were once the remit of professionals and experts. As a result, there 
appeared to be an ambivalent mix of strategies within New Labour, balanced between 
pragmatism and populism (Powell 2000). On the one hand, there were desires to ‘woo’ the 
electorate and demonstrate the departure from outdated Old Labour philosophies on issues 
such as welfare and crime. As Lister (2001:429) notes, the influence of conservative ideology 
led to ‘…a reading of public opinion as conservative and reactionary, which needs to be 
pandered to rather than challenged’. But on the other hand, pragmatic strategies of ‘what 
works’ were employed in policy development which chimed with the new economic 
reasoning and managerialist agenda that had come to the fore in the 1980s Conservative 
governments. The consequence was that there appeared to be a tension generated between 
expertise in guiding policy decisions, and the need to ‘woo’ the public through populist 
policies. 
 
 
2.2.4 The ‘United’ Kingdom and Welsh Devolution  
 
Alongside reforms which saw a firmer centralised grasp on public policy, the reinvention of 
the Labour Party simultaneously attempted to emphasise ‘decentralisation, democracy and 
popular sovereignty’ (Hain 1999). In some senses, this appeared to mark a shift away from 
the constitutional value of Westminster parliamentary supremacy. New Labour instigated a 
programme of devolution, under the guise of embedding socialist democratic values in the 
active citizen at the local level (ibid). 
 Power sharing amongst the United Kingdom’s constitutive polities stretches back 
much further than the reforms made under New Labour. For example, Scotland retained a 
quasi-separate legal system throughout the period following the Union in 1707. In Ireland, 
the Parliament of Northern Ireland was established under the Government of Ireland Act 
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1920, and it sat between 1921 and 1972. However, in both these polities further genuine 
powers were not made under devolution settlements until the Good Friday Agreement and 
Scottish referendum held during New Labour’s initial term, in which both Northern Ireland 
and Scotland established an Assembly and Parliament respectively. 
 Although developments in Ireland and Scotland are equally worthy of attention, given 
the focus of the research on England & Wales, selected due to reasons of depth and also 
following the research designs of previous comparative studies (e.g. Downes 1988), our 
attention shall primarily concentrate on devolution in Wales. The dominant political 
philosophy running through Wales is one which has favoured social democratic principles, 
with historic support for the Labour Party (Drakeford and Gregory 2011). In part, this can be 
related to the industrial heritage of the country, which shares features similar to that of 
regions in the north of England and of Scotland, but can also be traced to a sense of ‘internal 
political solidarity’ embodied in the Welsh language and traditions (Osmond 2007).  
The degree of willingness to become autonomous has historically been markedly 
lower than that in Ireland and Scotland, and the willingness of Westminster to cater for 
Welsh needs has lagged behind these other countries. For example, the Welsh Office only 
came into being in 1964, which has been attributed to a lack of tradition in a particular Welsh 
administrative unit (and referring back to the constitutional characteristic of parliamentary 
supremacy) (Deacon and Sandry 2007). However, the momentum for devolution increased 
from the late 1980s with disillusionment setting in with the Conservative governments which 
had deindustrialised the coal industry in the south-east of Wales. A feeling grew that the 
London-centric Westminster system was not adequately recognising the needs of the Welsh 
populace, and this became coupled with the changed position of the Labour Party within 
Westminster (Chaney et al. 2001). 
 The culmination of both domestic Welsh pressure, and the somewhat opening up of 
centralised control under New Labour, led to a narrow but successful referendum in which 
the Welsh Assembly  was established under the Government of Wales Act 1998 (Tomaney 
2000). The result of which was the transferral of some powers to Wales5, but these co-existed 
within a complex legislative arrangement whereby Westminster still had the possibility of 
legislating in them. Under the Sewel Convention it was agreed that Westminster would not 
normally legislate without consent from the Assembly (Trench 2008). Since this initial 
devolution package, further powers have steadily been granted to Wales – under the 
Government of Wales Act 2006 and a further devolution referendum of 2011 – which has 
created a distinct executive branch (‘Welsh Government’) separate from the legislature 
                                                          
5 Including education, health, local government, cultural matters, public transport and agriculture. 
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(Welsh Assembly) and allows for full law-making powers in twenty fields as proscribed in the 
2006 Act6. 
Whilst these developments have built upon previous powers, it should be noted that 
criminal justice remains a non-devolved issue which is important to bear in mind when 
examining the policy process in relation to illicit substances. Moreover, devolution has 
created an interesting dynamic in this specific field between the two governments, as other 
areas pertaining to ‘substance misuse’ (such as health and education) have been fully 
devolved. But whilst the trends appear to demonstrate power-sharing between Westminster 
and Cardiff (and Edinburgh and Belfast), the upper-hand still remains with central 
government which affirms Enoch Powell’s maxim that ‘power devolved is power retained’. 
Nevertheless, the project of the Welsh Government has sought to carve its own 
‘Brand Wales’ in the areas it does have control over, and this marks a significant point of 
departure from previous relations of governance, with opportunities to generate more 
tailored policy responses and resist unfavourable shifts at the broader UK level of policy-
making. 
 
 
2.3 The Netherlands 
 
A key contrast of Dutch politics with that in England & Wales is that ruling governments are 
always comprised of at least two political parties in a coalition due to a system of 
proportional representation. Moreover, the local sphere has traditionally held an important 
position in Dutch governance, with municipalities granted significant powers. One of the 
major arguments that arises from this different political architecture is that the political 
culture has facilitated a traditionally more tolerant and compromise-based approach to 
governing. Despite such features, the overall picture suggests a shift from one based upon 
accommodation and consensus politics to one purportedly now based more upon adversarial 
and politicised modes of governance.  
 
 
2.3.1 Political Characteristics of the Netherlands and the ‘Politics of Accommodation’ 
 
                                                          
6 Agriculture, fisheries, forestry and rural development; ancient monuments and historic buildings; 
culture; economic development; education and training; environment; fire and rescue services; food; 
health and health services; highways and transport; housing; local government; public administration; 
social welfare; sport and recreation; tourism; town and country planning; water and flood defence; 
welsh language. 
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Since its official formation in 1814 at the Congress of Vienna, the Netherlands (including both 
Holland and Belgium prior to 1839) was ruled under a monarchy, but important reforms 
occurred in 1848 which introduced a parliamentary democracy. Although such changes 
facilitated the opening up of the governance process beyond the ruling King, the democratic 
process was still very much limited to ruling elite liberals until the end of the 19th century. 
In addition to the 1848 parliamentary reforms which were devised by the well-
respected statesman, J.R. Thorbecke, he also engineered further Acts which established local 
governments in the shape of municipalities and provinces (Daalder 1955). This ‘House of 
Thorbecke’ framework granted considerable autonomy to these different layers of 
government, which although existing within a broader centralised unitary state, allow for 
local differentiation. The position of the local is an important and continuing characteristic of 
the Netherlands which is consistent with inter-related tendencies to refrain from over-
centralised authoritarian control and instead to defer decision-making to the complex set of 
groups and layers existing in Dutch society. 
The make-up of Dutch society in the 19th century was a set of distinctive groups or 
‘blocs’ which were based primarily along religious and class lines (Catholic, Protestant, and 
secular). These ‘blocs’ were defined as ‘…a section of the population that bands together in a 
multiplicity, an integrated complex of organisations or institutions based on a common 
ideology’ (Lijphart 1971, in Blom 2000:154). Due to fundamental conflicts between these 
different groups, there was a constant struggle to advocate policies which benefited each 
groups’ interests. Lijphart (1968), who is one of the most authoritative authors on this 
subject, suggests that there were three main divisive issues between the different ‘blocs’ at 
the end of the 19th century. First, the issue of state and church with regards to education; 
second, the problem of franchising and the ability to vote; and finally, the rights of labour. 
 The result of these conflictual issues culminated in heavy tensions, and the resolution 
of these problems7 under the ‘great pacification’ by elite political bargaining by the main 
parties8 was made in 1917  (Andeweg and Irwin 2005). This marks an important departure 
from a majoritarian style of democracy which then ensured that governments would always 
be ruled through coalitions. 
The result of this pacification was that it firmly established social ‘pillars’ (zuilen) 
which were headed by powerful elites. Up until the mid-1960s, most people lived their lives 
                                                          
7 According to Lijphart, the leaders of the different religious and political groups agreed to put aside 
ideological problems to work together to find a compromise. Commissions were set up with regards to 
the education and franchising issues, and their recommendations were accepted virtually without 
change.  
8 The main parties organised around the ‘blocs’ were the KVP (Catholics), ARP (Protestants) (who later 
combined to become CDA), VVD (bourgeois liberals/conservative), and PvdA (socialists). See figure 2.1 
in Appendix. 
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within one of the 3 (or 4) pillars of Roman Catholics, Orthodox Calvinists, and secular (which 
was sometimes divided according to class lines in bourgeois liberals/conservatives and 
socialists)9. For Lijphart (1968), ‘pillarisation’ was made possible due to the flourishing of a 
‘politics of accommodation’ which was supported by three facets: first, the role of the elite 
leaders of the represented groups who made compromises and found realistic solutions; 
second, that all blocs were represented; and third, because proportionality was ingrained into 
the solutions of the settlement. 
In order for this potentially conflictual relationship to work between groups, Lijphart 
(1968) highlights the ‘rules of the game’ which led to the ‘politics of accommodation’ being a 
success. First, there is a duty of proportionality, which allows all groups to be represented. 
This presents a clear contrast with the ‘Westminster model’ of the UK which is based upon 
power concentration rather than power-sharing (Lijphart 1999). Thus, a system of 
proportional representation and coalition rule requires parties to share power and work 
together, unlike in a majoritarian democracy which (usually) concentrates power in the single 
largest party. Moreover, the power and role of the Prime Minister in the Dutch setting is 
much more limited than that under a majoritarian regime, with ministers serving with, rather 
than under, the leader (Daalder 1955). This also accords with the fact that the Prime Minister 
could only come from one particular pillar and therefore not fairly represent the interests of 
all (Andeweg and Irwin 2005). 
Following on from this, a further rule is the agreement to disagree, as political parties 
in a deeply divided society have to accept that they are based upon fundamental ideological 
differences and other groups have to be respected. Moreover, depoliticization allows the 
state to refrain from engaging in conflictual politics by relying on constitutional and legal 
principles. Andeweg (2008:255) suggests that ‘…political parties allow decisions to be taken 
by other actors than party politicians, and/or on other grounds than party programmes of 
ideologies’. This is aided by the constitutional statute which prevents cabinet ministers from 
being members of parliament, thus allowing a high proportion of policy specialists10. 
Furthermore, summit diplomacy refers to the idea that serious problems have to be 
resolved at the elite level. Decisions would be made as a result of inter-elite bargaining 
between the leaders of each pillar. Again, these political features are supported by the 
political institution. Elite accommodation and summit diplomacy are made possible in a 
                                                          
9 Being part of one these vertical pillars meant that individuals would rarely come into contact with 
individuals from other blocs, and so from birth to death the path of an individual would largely depend 
on their belonging to a particular strand and thus live in a type of ‘apartheid’ (van Mierlo 1986, see 
Appendix, Figure 1.).  
10 72% had technical expertise when first appointed between 1946 and 1967 (Bakema and Secker 
1988, in Andeweg 2008:263). 
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system which guarantees multiple-party rule, and the need to work together also 
encapsulated the role of expertise in informing judgements. This points to a further ‘rule’: the 
business of politics. This centres on the notion that Dutch politics is results-orientated and is 
prepared to make clinical decisions in a business-like manner. Thus, Andeweg (2008:255) 
argues that ‘depoliticisation is a specific mechanism to deal with conflicts that do not lend 
themselves to resolution by compromise or proportional allocation of resources’. Expert 
committees were perhaps the modus operandi of the ‘business of politics’, which developed 
pragmatic and non-partisan ideas which could further stabilise coalitions. 
Furthermore, secrecy aids in the overall process by shielding the compromising 
decisions made by elite leaders from publicity. This allowed the elites to make pragmatic 
decisions without external pressures. This is supported by a lengthy negotiation process 
which provides greater distance between what is decided as government policy and the 
preferences of voters, which serves to insulate the policy process from crude populism. 
Finally, the government’s right to govern is the notion that those in power (in the cabinet) 
should be allowed to govern without harassment from others (such as those in parliament). 
The political culture has importantly been shaped by structural arrangements which 
fostered the ‘politics of accommodation’ and somewhat insulated it from threats to the 
system, but political stability during this period has also been attributed to its historical roots. 
This not only refers to the ‘polder model’ and cultural and religious tolerance (see Buruma 
2007; Luiten van Zanden 2010), but also to a ‘regent mentality’ (Daalder 1966). Prior to the 
Netherlands being officially formed, the central decisions of the Dutch Republic were made 
by the leaders of the different provinces and municipalities through the process of 
consensus-building and consultation of adherents (van Mierlo 1986; Bax 1990). The attention 
on local and regional levels of governance is also useful to understand how the politics of 
accommodation unfolded within the ‘House of Thorbecke’ model which granted considerable 
autonomy and power to these levels. As Blom (2000:159) notes:  
 
‘Administrators at [local and regional] levels would seem to have played an important role in 
conflict control, looking for compromises, damping down the inclination towards conflict and 
channelling it into moderate paths.’ 
 
However, Blom (2000:158) critiques Lijphart’s account through deconstructing the notion of 
monolithic ‘blocs’, and suggests that ‘entities’ changed over time and space, with elite 
behaviour changing from one case to another.  
But despite such criticisms, Lijphart’s The Politics of Accommodation has come to be 
seen as the key study on early to mid-20th century Dutch political culture, which more or less 
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captured the essence of how the Netherlands was able to remain politically stable whilst 
deeply divided. The ‘rules of the game’ allowed elites to reach compromises on difficult 
issues, which led to a relatively peaceful political climate from 1917 until the late 1960s and 
importantly, facilitated the growth of a generous welfare state.  
Initially, the Dutch welfare state was rather limited and consisted of a patchwork of 
uneven welfare programmes based within the different pillars. As Blom (2000:160) notes, 
‘…many functions of the modern interventionist or welfare state came into being at local 
level or in the private sector rather than at national level’. But following the Second World 
War, the welfare state expanded substantially, taking inspiration from both the Beveridge 
Report and the van Rhijn Report, which suggested that ‘society, organised in the state, is 
liable for the social security and protection against want of all its members, on the condition, 
that citizens themselves do all that can be reasonably expected in order to acquire such 
security and protection' (van Rhijn 1945, in van Oorschot 2006:59). As a result, the post-war 
period saw vast increases in public expenditure on pensions, widows and orphans, child 
benefits, medical insurance, and disability programmes, culminating in a process of 
collectivisation and solidarisation, further reinforcing the politics of accommodation 
(Andeweg and Irwin 2005; van Oorschot 2006). 
 
 
2.3.2 The Collapse of the Zuilen 
 
From around the late-1960s there began to be serious challenges to the pillarised structure in 
the Netherlands which can be related to a similar set of social forces experienced in England 
& Wales. It was during this period that Holland began to flourish economically, socially and 
culturally following post-war prosperity. Following the war, a ‘baby-boom’ created a new 
generation who were tired of the formal controls of the zuilen. Bryant (1981:61) suggests that 
‘…in a climate of economic and cultural expansiveness, the traditional social controls of the 
zuilen were no longer tolerable’.  
 A key aspect of this was that the Netherlands underwent a process of secularisation 
which accelerated the urge for reform in the shape of voter mobility. As new political parties 
such as D’66, DS70, and PPR emerged, the pillar parties (and particularly the religious ones) 
lost their stranglehold on voters, which allowed a doorbraak (‘breakthrough’) of the pillar 
monopoly in government (Andeweg 2008; Pennings and Keman 2008). Thus, the loosening of 
traditional controls allowed a blurring between the religiously-based cleavages (Lijphart 1977; 
1989). In a similar fashion to patterns elsewhere, Daalder (1987) argued that Dutch society 
was becoming more heterogeneous and as a result the ‘rules of the game’ were changing to 
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become more politicised, more open to public scrutiny and the relationship between the 
elites and the mass had become increasingly strained. 
In addition to considering macro societal changes, van Schendelen (1978) and van 
Mierlo (1986) demonstrate that there is scope to believe that changing elite behaviour also 
contributed to the process of depillarisation in the sense that elite behaviour influences 
voting behaviour. Van Mierlo distinguishes four groups of changing elite behaviour: 
increasing coalition problems and instability; increasing problems in relations between top 
and middle elites; increasing party competition; and changes in policies pursued. Each of 
these issues both interacts with and shapes the social processes occurring around it. 
The result of these changes, both macro and micro, has meant that Dutch politics has 
become a lot less predictable, with changes in social organisation and voting behaviour 
becoming much more complex and interwoven leading to a real lack of clarity between how 
‘us’ and ‘them’ were defined (van Mierlo 1986). Broader social processes of secularisation, 
individualisation and democratisation all served to weaken the pillarised system in which 
political actors reacted to a changing landscape in which they sought survival. The result was 
the dismantling of the politics of accommodation, and a shift towards a more Anglo-American 
model of conflict and politicisation (Pennings and Kema 2008; Jones 2002).  
Moreover, related to these changes in the political and social landscape was the 
retrenchment of the Dutch welfare system which had grown exponentially following the 
Second World War. This has been termed the ‘Dutch disease’, as the cost of welfare 
provisions was outstripping the capacity of the government to pay for them. Increased labour 
costs (due to high insurance premiums) placed strains on the Dutch to be able to compete 
with other countries, and the reliance on sales from natural gas supplies was a limited source 
of revenue to be able to finance expenditure. By the 1980s the burden of the welfare state 
was becoming clear and even worsening, with both unemployment and government 
borrowing increasing (Andeweg and Irwin 2005; van Oorschot 2006). These developments 
placed further pressure on a political system that was under attack on a number of fronts, 
further disintegrating the consensual and collectivist spirit of the politics of accommodation. 
 
 
2.3.3 Post-Pillar Politics 
 
The shift away from consensus towards a more adversarial form of politics is supported by 
empirical evidence. Political scientists have attempted to measure such trends through 
looking at several proxy indicators, such as the concentration of executive power vs. power 
sharing; inclusivity of coalitions; the politicisation of ministers (through proportion of 
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ministers with ‘political experience’); and types of coalitions (see Andeweg 2008). All these 
measurements point towards a more politicised and less accommodating form of politics. 
 Although it is agreed that depillarisation has firmly taken place, the question of when 
the shift occurred is debated. Lijphart suggested that it started in 1967, whereas Daalder 
(1987) and van Praag (1993) noticed changes in the ‘rules of the game’ during the late 1960s 
to late 1970s with one of the main elements being a shift from depoliticisation to 
politicisation of party interactions (Pennings and Keman 2008). But in addition to this initial 
shift formed during depillarisation, most authors also agree that further changes occurred at 
the turn of the millennium. 
 Following the initiation of depillarisation, which created conflict in the context of 
declining religious and trade union affiliation, the confessional parties reacted by merging 
together under the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) in 1977, and through the fusion of 
confessional and secular trade unions into the FNV. Thus, it is argued that such a move 
prevented further destabilisation and provided some balance during the 1980s (Pennings and 
Keman 2008). This points to a further way in which the system adjusted; not only through 
political conflict but also with institutional consolidation (Jones 2002). For Jones (2002), the 
economic situation of the 1980s (following the oil crisis) forced a depolarising type of politics 
to return, due to the potential dangers with distributive conflict in an economic context of 
dependency on world markets, and between the mid-1980s and late-1990s CDA and PvdA 
elites depolarised substantially on social welfare (Adams et al. 2011).  
In response to the ‘Dutch disease’ associated with the welfare state, neo-liberal 
philosophies came to the fore in governmental responses which attempted to reduce welfare 
spending and increase competitiveness in the global marketplace (Andeweg and Irwin 2005). 
But additionally, neoliberalism also presented itself in the responsibilisation of local 
municipalities. As previously mentioned, the position of the regional and local level has 
traditionally had a strong position in the Netherlands, but reforms from the 1980s onwards 
saw the adoption of an official policy to decentralise hitherto national tasks to local 
municipalities (ibid.). This need to adapt signalled and reaffirmed a key attribute of Dutch 
politics: ‘the business of politics’ which recognised the reliance of the Dutch economic system 
on trade and exports. 
 Thus, the ‘myth’ of the ‘polder model’ emerged during the mid-1990s as a way to 
reconstitute consensus politics in a positive way.  For Jones (2002), this also served to solidify 
the legitimacy of Wim Kok as Prime Minister of two successive ‘purple cabinets’11 (1994-
                                                          
11 The ‘purple coalition’ consisted of the social democrats (PvdA), conservative liberals (VVD) and 
progressive democrats (D’66), and was the first coalition comprised of socialists and liberals. Another 
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2002). But the adaptation of traditional elites to the changing landscape during the 1980s and 
1990s through the ‘myth’ of the polder model also served to open up polarisation of the 
party system on emerging and prominent issues which the traditional parties did not seem 
well equipped to deal with. Thus, ‘the convergence of the two dominant parties… opened up 
the possibility for political entrepreneurs to gain traction by mobilizing new policy issues, 
such as immigration, in order to reap electoral gains’ (Adams et al. 2011:104). Jones (2002) 
further notes that such patterns generated a dearth in political legitimacy, as emerging 
parties on both sides of the political spectrum sought to question and simplify the lengthy 
negotiation processes of consensus politics whilst also showing dissatisfaction towards a lack 
of clear choices. This was exemplified in the grey area of legal tolerance where there were 
accusations of governmental indifference in major disasters (Uitermark 2004; Pakes 2004). 
 So whilst the rise of the purple cabinets did signal a balancing out and return to 
consensus-building in the Netherlands during the 1990s, an important further shift then 
occurred at the turn of the millennium which further weakened the ‘consensus-model’ and 
drove it further towards an adversarial and politicised model of governing. As Pennings and 
Keman (2008) argue, a similar set of forces that punctured the politics of accommodation in 
the 1970s re-emerged in a heightened form at the end of the 1990s, which led to a 
questioning of all the major parties (not just confessional parties as had been the case 
earlier), which gave support to new parties. Whereas the attack on the political system in the 
1970s was from the political left, the attack in the late-1990s came predominantly from the 
extreme right (Keman and Krouwel 2007), who were ‘…able to mobilize voters on issues that 
are linked to (the loss of) national identity and outside ‘threats’ like immigrants and the EU’ 
(Pennings and Keman 2008:158). 
 In a growing political vacuum, new populist challengers arose which sought to 
challenge the political elite. As van Kessel (2011:69) argues, from the view of these populist 
parties, ‘a new way of decision-making is required; one that is straightforward, transparent 
and effectively copes with the people’s problems’. Of particular notoriety and (short-lived) 
success was that of Pim Fortuyn who emerged initially as part of ‘Liveable Netherlands’ (LN) 
in 2001 before breaking off to form his own party (LPF – List Pim Fortuyn).  
Fortuyn positioned himself as anti-establishment and against what was the perceived 
threat of Islam and immigration towards Dutch social life. The growing success of Fortuyn was 
rooted in a section of White working class voters (particularly from Rotterdam) who had 
become disaffected with the political establishment and the perceived threats of 
                                                                                                                                                                        
important note about this coalition is that it was the first time since the 1920s that the Christian 
Democrats (CDA) had been excluded from government. 
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immigration, and was further bolstered by Fortuyn’s blistering attacks on the larger 
established parties in the run-up to the election. 
These developments of course lay in tandem with tragic events of 9/11 in the USA, 
which only served to heighten tensions and the risk consciousness associated with Muslim 
ethnic minorities. But a further component also served to catalyse a highly toxic political 
arena, when Pim Fortuyn was assassinated by an environmental activist shortly before the 
elections. 
Despite Fortuyn’s assassination, LPF still successfully broke through into government 
following the May elections of 2002, by gaining 26 seats and becoming the second largest 
party (Irwin and van Holsteyn 2004). However, the turbulence experienced surrounding the 
2002 elections continued into the following year which saw the collapse of the coalition 
between CDA, LPF and VVD in the Balkenende I cabinet due to the growing internal conflicts 
in LPF following the demise of their charismatic leader.  
Despite the seemingly more politicised and polarised turn in Dutch politics, the return 
of the CDA during the 2000s signalled ambivalence in Dutch politics between reform and 
stability. On the one hand, dissatisfaction with the consensus model and unresponsiveness of 
established parties generated availability of the electorate towards credible reformative 
parties such as LPF (van Kessel 2011); but on the other hand, the re-emergence of the CDA as 
a historically stable and established party  suggested that the electorate wanted stability. The 
re-emergence and influence of the CDA also had implications towards social and welfare 
policy, and demonstrated continuance from the 1980s of a shrinking welfare state (Green-
Pedersen 2001). If at first retrenchment was based upon saving money, it was then further 
justified through a more moralistic framing. As van Oorschot (2006:60) summarise: 
 
‘The national and collective nature of the system is assumed to undermine feelings of 
responsibility and to promote calculative behaviour among all actors involved… Since the 
collective foots the bill, none of the actors has an incentive to limit the system’s use.’ 
 
Although LPF was relatively short-lived, its effect on Dutch politics was substantial and longer 
lasting, with tensions particularly over European integration and immigration remaining at 
the forefront of political debate. The spiralling tensions over ethnic minorities were also 
bolstered by a further cataclysmic event in 2004, when film-maker Theo van Gogh was 
murdered by a Dutch-Moroccan Islamic activist (Aarts and van der Kolk 2007). In the space 
left by Fortuyn, a new extreme right-wing party emerged in the form of the PVV (Party for 
Freedom) which grew to become the third largest party (with 15.4% of the vote) in the 2010 
elections. As a result, the party was reluctantly included in the Rutte I government in a 
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parliamentary support capacity to the main coalition partners of the CDA and VVD (Aarts and 
van der Kolk 2011). 
 Whilst much more could be said over the specificities of trends in Dutch politics, and 
indeed will be covered in later substantive analysis chapters (see Chapter 6 and 7), it suffices 
here to conclude the section and to draw out the main patterns that have occurred in the 
socio-political landscape of the Netherlands. Overall, it has been suggested that Dutch 
political culture during the early to mid-20th century was characterised by a ‘politics of 
accommodation’ (Lijphart 1968), whereby ‘pillars’ co-ordinated social and political life 
according to the main cleavages that existed in society. This system was shaped by 
constitutional and institutional configurations which allowed the consensus model to take 
shape. Importantly, characteristics such as proportional representation, coalition rule, and 
the separation of powers from the executive and legislature all supported the blossoming of 
the ‘rules of the game’, central to the success of ‘consociational democracy’ in pacifying, and 
tolerating, deep societal divisions. However, from around the late 1960s to 1970s a process of 
depillarisation took place due to a raft of social, economic and technological forces associated 
with a move towards globalisation and late-modernity.  
The effect of these macro relations has shifted the ‘rules of the game’ in different 
periods, evidencing a ‘pendulum consociationalism’ (Pennings and Keman 2008, see 
Appendix, table 2.2), which has reflexively weakened, strengthened and then further 
weakened the consensus model over the past few decades. The result of internal politics in 
reacting to external events has for most commentators signalled a shift away from 
consensus-driven governance and towards a more conflictual and adversarial system, 
characterised by polarisation and politicisation. But whilst the ‘rules of the game’ may have 
indeed changed, it is imperative to note that formal institutions have changed very little over 
this period, which still have a self-preserving effect on the political establishment. 
So whilst there may have been a weakening of ‘historically shaped domestic 
structures’, such structures still offer ‘…an institutional mechanism for mobilizing the 
consensus necessary to live with the costs of rapid economic change’ (Katzenstein 1985:200). 
Moreover, whilst patterns in the social and political landscape seem to suggest increasing 
convergence towards politicisation and a retreat from the welfare state in favour of 
neoliberal and neoconservative ideologies concerning markets and morals, there still remains 
a gap between the Netherlands and England & Wales, with the latter much more heavily 
embracing these shifts than the Netherlands. 
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2.4 Summary 
 
Overall then, there appears to be both signs of convergence and divergence in the socio-
political sphere. In the former sense, both jurisdictions show signals of a more volatile and 
politicised landscape; a shift away from welfare-oriented perspectives to neoliberal and 
neoconservative framing of problems and responses; and the responsibilisation of actors and 
agencies above, beyond and below the nation state in the provision of services. However, the 
degree of convergence remains questionable given that there are still clear points of 
difference which are rooted in the ‘…residues and continuations of older arrangements’ 
(Garland 2001:167) which have an important impact on the development of policy responses. 
Namely, this can be seen in terms of political institutions (first-past-the-post ‘Westminster 
system’ vs. proportional representation and guaranteed coalition rule), political cultures 
(conflictual and adversarial vs. negotiation and bargaining), and relations between central 
and local authorities (largely centralised system vs. ‘House of Thorbecke’ model). 
From this chapter it has become apparent that there have been varying degrees of 
convergence and divergence in the way in which, at a national level, these states have 
adapted to the changing social conditions associated with a transition from modernity to late-
modernity. In turn, it appears that there has been some degree of convergence around the 
transformation of older social democratic forms of governing towards neoliberal 
philosophies. Next, there is a more specific focus on how such patterns have been felt within 
the area of cannabis control, which sets up the central propositions of the study: that it can 
be expected that there has been both inter-national convergence and intra-national 
divergence in how responses to cannabis are created and managed. 
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Chapter III 
Crime and Cannabis Control in England & Wales and the Netherlands 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter seeks to lay the foundations for the substantive empirical analysis through an 
examination of developments in illicit drugs and cannabis control in England & Wales and the 
Netherlands. The purpose here is to critically apply the culture of control thesis in the policy 
sphere of concern, before going on to later empirically scrutinise and clarify the conditions in 
which such tendencies are realised or resisted in relation to the policy making process of 
recent changes to cannabis policy. Before doing so, however, it is first worth outlining 
developments in the international sphere which have established important governance 
frameworks pertaining to illicit drugs control. 
 
 
3.2 The Governance of Drugs from Above 
 
Contemporary control of cannabis in England & Wales and the Netherlands is largely based 
upon a set of international regulations governing how signatory states should respond to 
cannabis. However, whilst such arrangements have largely stunted the diversity of options 
available for regulating the production and supply of illicit substances, there is significant 
scope for individual countries to carve their own responses to sale and possession. 
Developments at this level demonstrate features indicative of an emergent culture of control, 
with evidence of adaptation, denial, and the facilitating of new risks and threats. 
 
 
Developments in the Early 20th Century 
 
The control of cannabis at a global level stems from a history of diplomatic obligations and 
bargaining between countries, from which the 1925 International Opium Convention was 
seen as a starting point for the prohibition of cannabis in European countries. Claims were 
made primarily from the Egyptian consulate that their mental asylums were full with 
individuals who had smoked hashish (TNI 2014; Mills 2012)12. As cannabis was of little 
                                                          
12 On further inspection however, Mills (2012) notes that the genesis of this data on links between 
hashish and insanity were based upon the observations of an Englishman who did not understand or 
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concern amongst the majority of Western countries at this time due to scarcity of the plant, 
the pressure from the Egyptians ultimately led to the inclusion of cannabis under substances 
to be prohibited. 
Following these early links of cannabis to mental health problems, narratives of 
cannabis as a dangerous drug emerged in the USA, where cannabis use was becoming more 
widespread particularly amongst Mexicans and African-Americans, with the latter’s use 
becoming synonymised with the growing jazz scene. Importantly, and perhaps not surprising 
given race relations, the use of cannabis by such individuals became integrated into fears 
about the properties of the drug, leading to the widely publicised  ‘reefer madness’ campaign 
with fears centred round the notion that cannabis caused sexually violent behaviour. In 
addition to these concerns, it is contended that there was a challenge by a number of 
individuals who had vested economic interests against the growth of cannabis, due to 
technological advancements allowing easier and cheaper processing of industrial hemp into 
paper and other useful products (See Herer 1985). 
As a result of these factors, the U.S Marijuana Tax Act 1937 introduced a tax on the 
selling of cannabis which effectively destroyed the industrial hemp industry and further 
shaped the dominant perspective on cannabis (ibid.). The implications of these developments 
are that the international construction surrounding cannabis was based upon a racially-
discriminating, moralistic, and ill-informed research base combined with other economic 
interests. Given the domineering power of the USA on a global level, these types of narratives 
took prominence in shaping subsequent international frameworks (TNI 2014). 
 
 
Global and European Governance Frameworks 
 
Whilst it has been noted that international agreements stretch back to the early 20th century 
and earlier, such collaboration has increased significantly in the latter half of the 20th century. 
Placed within the context of globalising theses and the culture of control, it is possible to see 
overall developments at a supranational level as evidence of both adaptive and non-adaptive 
strategies.  
In the former sense, the relinquishing of state sovereignty to supranational bodies 
signals an acceptance of state limitations in responding to illicit substances. The production, 
supply and consumption of drugs takes place across multiple states, and such activities have 
only been facilitated further in a global age of expeditious transportation and 
                                                                                                                                                                        
speak the local language and whose methods were somewhat amateur in comparison to today’s 
standards. 
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communication. Thus, it has become increasingly necessary to co-ordinate overarching 
responses to be more effective in the allocation of resources and to work in collaboration 
with others.  
However, such responses also take place within a deeply moralistic conception of the 
place of certain drugs within society. Such evaluations have been shaped by the socio-
political histories of dominant players in the international sphere, which in relation to 
cannabis, have conceptualised the substance as inherently dangerous. In this sense, the 
continued and enhanced supranational commitment to the eradication of its use 
demonstrates a form of denial; that despite alternative conceptualisations and the challenges 
of trying to control a naturally-occurring plant, nation states have an obligation to protect 
their citizens from a perceived threat to social order and individual wellbeing. 
The 1961 United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs remains the most 
pivotal international treatise as it elevated the prohibition of cannabis to a global level 
including 73 original signatories. According to the International Narcotics Control Board 
(2012), ‘[t]he principal objectives of the Convention are to limit the possession, use, trade in, 
distribution, import, export, manufacture and production of drugs exclusively to medical and 
scientific purposes and to address drug trafficking through international cooperation to deter 
and discourage drug traffickers’. There are four schedules included in the convention, with 
cannabis considered one of the most dangerous drugs13. It is listed both in schedule I and in 
schedule IV as a drug which poses significant dangers and has few therapeutic characteristics. 
Thus, based upon the history and skewed scientific knowledge present at that time, cannabis 
was adjudged as a very harmful drug to which countries should adopt tough prohibitionist 
tools to prevent its misuse.  
However, Ballotta et al. (2008) point to the fact that the 1961 convention does give 
individual states the potential to deviate from a strict prohibitionist model. For example, 
article 2.5a states that countries should adopt special measures if considered necessary 
(United Nations 1961:3). As this is more obligatory than required, it leaves countries 
discretion to carve their own drug policies as has been seen with the Netherlands. Thus, 
whilst the 1961 convention stipulates that cannabis should receive the most stringent 
                                                          
13 Ballotta et al. (2008:102) concisely differentiates between the different schedules: ‘Schedule I —
those substances which are, inter alia, having, or convertible into substances having a liability to abuse 
comparable to that of cannabis, cannabis resin or cocaine; Schedule II — having addiction-producing or 
addiction-sustaining properties not greater than those of codeine but at least as great as those of 
dextropropoxyphene; Schedule III — preparations which are intended for legitimate medical use, and 
which the WHO considers not liable to abuse and cannot produce ill effects, and the drug therein is not 
readily recoverable; and Schedule IV — substances that are particularly liable to abuse and to produce 
ill effects, and such liability is not offset by substantial therapeutic advantages not possessed by 
substances other than drugs in Schedule IV’. 
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control, there is also scope for countries to negotiate on the necessity of such control, leading 
to ‘soft defections’ from international frameworks (TNI 2014). 
 Further conventions of 1971 and 1988 have reinforced global prohibition. The 1971 
convention placed THC in schedule I with its use prohibited except for scientific and limited 
medical purposes (United Nations 1971). The 1988 convention is much more focussed on the 
trafficking of illicit drugs and sets in place a series of repressive standards that signatories 
should follow. Notably, that possession with intent for trafficking and possession for personal 
consumption should be criminalised (United Nations 1988; Ballotta et al. 2008). Despite 
continued suggestions from the World Health Organisation (WHO) to move THC into lower 
schedules which would allow further scope for liberalisation and medicalisation, there has 
been little support for this (TNI 2014; World Health Organisation 2006). 
In a European context, developments have been balanced between a policy 
harmonisation project, envisaged with the creation of the European Union under the Treaty 
of Maastricht in 1992, whilst simultaneously granting autonomy to member states to develop 
drugs policy as they see fit (keeping within the broader UN Conventions) (Chatwin 2013). 
Whilst the Maastricht Treaty placed drug addiction and drug trafficking under the justice and 
home affairs pillar, the extent to which the EU has forced member states to become 
harmonised has remained limited (Edwards and Galla 2014).  
The context of the European Union provides particular challenges for illicit drugs 
control, and developments at this level should also be seen as contributing towards the 
generating of new risks and threats which feed into a culture of control. Most prominently, 
the opening up of European state borders under the Maastricht Treaty has had profound 
consequences for how to respond to, and manage, illicit drugs markets. This is particularly 
relevant when considering overt points of divergence, such as with Dutch cannabis policy, 
whereby differences in policy across member states has the potential to create substantial 
problems and political tensions.  
Further legislative developments in the EU have seen the provision of greater powers 
in the area of justice and home affairs under the Treaty of Amsterdam 1999, with a particular 
focus on combatting organised crime and drug trafficking, whilst public health interests 
increased under the Treaty of Lisbon 2009, granting the European Commission to start 
initiatives in this area (ibid.). 
 Over the past two decades a series of action plans and strategies have attempted to 
improve European drugs policies through a focus on increased co-ordination (through 
research and data sharing by the EMCDDA and Europol), demand reduction, and supply 
reduction (e.g. EU 2004; 2008). These latter components echo familiar discourses about drugs 
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and its use, and there are significant challenges in reducing the problematic effects of drugs 
production and trafficking that have become synonymous with organised criminality. 
However, in respect of users, it is particularly noteworthy that all member states have now 
adopted harm-reduction measures, and increasingly are experimenting with other forms of 
drugs control, such as medical access for heroin and the decriminalisation of some, or all, 
drugs for possession offences (Chatwin 2007; Hughes and Stevens 2010; 2012). Thus, in the 
European context there is again evidence of adaptive and non-adaptive strategies which 
display a bifurcation between harm reduction and punitivism. Notably though, such 
strategies appear to target different activities, with users being subject to more adaptive 
responses, whilst production and supply activities are targeted through punitive approaches. 
 
 
3.3 England & Wales 
 
Developments in illicit drugs and cannabis control in England & Wales are usefully 
understood through the culture of control lens. This is especially the case when considering 
arguments for the ‘normalisation’ of cannabis use and the crisis circulating heroin addiction; 
but as O’Malley (2002) rightly argued, Garland is rather silent on the topic, and his analysis 
therefore fails to capture the contingent aspects which have inevitably been glossed over by 
a ‘birds-eye’ perspective. Following the spirit of Garland’s analysis, the section critically 
examines the place of illicit drugs and cannabis in the transition of penal-welfarism into a 
culture of control. 
 
 
3.3.1 A Penal-Welfare Approach to Illicit Drugs Control? 
 
The ‘British Model’ and Early-20th Cannabis Control 
 
The history of drugs policy in England & Wales over the past couple of centuries has been 
marked by moral and racial castigation, trade interests linked with colonialism, and 
medicalisation. A distinct moral imperative of drugs policy developed throughout the 
Victorian era and was shaped largely by quasi-religious conceptions that drug use is in itself 
wrong due to a corruption of mind and body, and therefore efforts have always been 
committed to its eradication on a moral basis. 
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However, although current drugs policy in England & Wales is based upon prohibitive 
laws, this was not always the case as only a century earlier Great Britain, and her colonies, 
were large producers and exporters of opium. The dominance of Great Britain in the world 
between the 17th to 19th centuries allowed her to develop significant trade routes in opium 
throughout the colonies. The British cemented a monopoly on the market following the end 
of the ‘opium wars’, and as a result, the opium trade was legalised alongside other trade 
impositions made by the British (Beeching 1977). 
 The importance of this is that it allowed opium and later heroin (diamorphine) to be 
established as the dominant solution to many medical problems within Great Britain. As 
opiates became firmly established into physician’s practices, this also led to the creation of a 
small population of dependent users existing largely in professional circles. Given the 
importance of the opium market in British trade, this allowed drugs policy, and specifically 
regarding more addictive substances, to be marked by a paradigm of ‘medicalisation’14 which 
accords with Garland’s notions of penal-welfarism (Shiner 2003). This ‘British system’ of drug 
control was affirmed in the 1926 Rolleston Report, which attempted to define contexts in 
which prescription should be advocated, primarily for heroin and morphine, to enable 
gradual withdrawal or to prevent serious disruptions to people’s lives (Measham and South 
2012; Ministry of Health 1926). 
 The place of cannabis within this largely medicalised context of drugs control is one 
of relative obscurity. The use of cannabis as a medicine in Britain can also be traced to the 
19th century, with evidence that the first recorded extract of hashish in alcohol was made and 
sold in a chemist’s shop in 184215 (Booth 2003). However, the extent of the use of cannabis in 
medicine during this period was very limited and can be attributed to the dominance of 
opiates in treatment, a lack of regular supply, and uncertainty over its action in different 
patients (Berridge 1981; Taylor 2008). Thus, cannabis has not always been seen as dangerous, 
and indeed beyond medicinal uses, industrial hemp has long been recognised as a very 
valuable fibre (for example, to make rope, sails, clothes and paper. see Herer 1985). 
But as its use as a medicine remained limited, and in combination with pressure from 
Egypt and the lack of knowledge or willingness to object (the UK abstained from the vote on 
cannabis in 1925), cannabis became maligned from a medical framework and shifted towards 
                                                          
14 However, this model has been questioned on its apparent dominance by some for its position within 
moral and penal discourses, and that comparisons between British and American models between the 
1930s and 1950s represent differences in widely differing social circumstances rather than showing the 
benefits of a medical model of drug control (Kohn 1992; Berridge and Edwards 1987). 
15 Moreover, its therapeutic benefits were written about in the 19th century by Queen Victoria’s 
physician, who claimed that cannabis is ‘…a most valuable medicine in the nocturnal cramps of old and 
gouty people; it in some cases relieves spasmodic asthma, and is of great service in cases of simple 
spasmodic dysmenorrhea’ (Reynolds 1890:38). 
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a system of control and restriction. In ratifying the Second International Opium Convention, 
cannabis was prohibited in 1928 following an amendment to the Dangerous Drugs Act. 
Throughout this period of early international developments and experiences 
regarding cannabis, the (mis)use of cannabis in Britain remained rare up until the 1950s 
(Booth 2003), thus not presenting any significant issues for criminal justice agencies in 
responding to its use. But in the context of growing international cynicism and in some cases 
outright moral propaganda against cannabis, and combined with a prevailing medical 
approach which was entrenched in the use of opiates, the issue of cannabis became side-
lined from the dominant medical approach to drugs and instead lay relatively dormant within 
a criminal justice perspective. These early patterns appear to lie in tension with the broader 
narrative of a penal-welfare approach to illicit drugs, but instead evidences the underlying 
presence of a politics of fear, ignorance and moral indignation about a substance which did 
not correspond with how opiates were viewed and ‘treated’ within a medical model. 
 
 
Establishing the Contemporary Framework of Illicit Drugs Control 
 
Given the framing of cannabis in an international context preceding the 1961 UN Convention, 
it is unsurprising that cannabis was placed in the highest schedule alongside other highly 
addictive substances. But in the same year of the 1961 treatise, the Brain Committee argued 
that ‘…In our view cannabis is not a drug of addiction; it is an intoxicant’ (Brain Committee 
1961, in Booth 2003:370). However, in 1965 the Dangerous Drugs Act came into force, 
ratifying the UN convention and consolidating the previous Dangerous Drugs Acts (Measham 
and South 2012). As with the UN categorisations, cannabis was equated with opiates, with no 
distinction between possession and trafficking of the drug. Following this piece of legislation, 
the reconvened Brain Committee reported similar findings from four years prior, and added 
that there was a ‘…risk that young people may be persuaded to turn to cannabis’ (Brain 
Committee 1965, in Booth 2003:370). 
The report of the second Brain Committee was published amid growing use of 
cannabis beyond ethnic minority groups largely from the Caribbean, and its increase was 
influenced by its popularity in celebrity circles and the growing counter-culture youth 
movement (Young 1971). Set within this context, cannabis came to be highly symbolic and 
indicative of a zeitgeist centred on individuality and liberty. 
The increase in use particularly amongst the middle class shifted attention onto 
cannabis and gave concern to political elites wishing to protect their own from a perceived 
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external threat. The reaction from law enforcement bodies was one initially of hostility, with 
the number of convictions for cannabis offences rising from 4 in 1945 to 2,393 in 1967 
(Advisory Committee on Drug Dependency 1968)16. Such observations were certainly 
pertinent in labelling explanations which saw the ‘agencies of social control’ as contributing 
towards deviancy amplification and social exclusion (Becker 1963; Young 1971). 
In reaction to the perceived over-zealous actions by law enforcement, a campaign 
was initiated in 1967 by The Society of Mental Awareness (SOMA). SOMA took out a full-page 
advertisement in The Times newspaper with the headline: ‘The law against marijuana is 
immoral in principle and unworkable in practice’. The advertisement was accompanied by 65 
signatures from famous individuals from various backgrounds, such as music, psychiatry and 
art (Booth 2003). 
As a reaction to criticism of the government for its stance on cannabis, an Advisory 
Committee on Drug Dependency was established with a sub-committee headed by Baroness 
Wootton created in 1967 to investigate the position of cannabis within the legal framework. 
The UK was not in isolation in reflecting upon cannabis legislation at this time, with similar 
committees established in the Netherlands (Werkgroep Verdovende Middelen 1972), the 
USA (National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse 1972), and Canada (Commission of 
Inquiry into the Non-Medical Use of Drugs 1972). 
The Wootton Report questioned the approach the government had taken with 
regards to criminal sanctions for cannabis offences and suggested that ‘…the long-term 
consumption of cannabis in moderate doses has no harmful effects’ (Advisory Committee on 
Drug Dependency 1968:9). They went on to argue that ‘…the present penalties for possession 
and supply are altogether too high’ (ibid:27), and as such prison terms for possession should 
be very limited. In some ways this corresponds with the characteristics of penal-welfarism. 
Wootton herself was an esteemed and respected critical social scientist, typical of liberal 
‘platonic guardians’ seeking to provide freedom and protection from the state. Moreover, the 
influential position of expertise upon policy-making during this period placed the commission 
in good stead to make changes to legislation. 
But despite the recommendations made by the Wootton Committee the government 
largely ignored the advice. As the Home Secretary at the time, James Callaghan, noted: 
 
‘…to reduce the penalties for possession, sale or supply of cannabis would be bound to lead 
people to think that the Government take a less than serious view of the effects of drug-
                                                          
16 However, it should be noted that recording of cannabis use and police action at this time should be 
interpreted with caution as changes in recorded rates could be partly due to the formation of drugs 
squads and more rigorous enforcement. 
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taking. That is not so. …Because we have a number of social evils in this country at present it 
would be sheer masochism to add to our evils by legislation to make it more easy for people 
to introduce yet another one.’ (The Times 1969:8) 
 
Thus, some patterns in this period parallel with the dominance of a penal-welfare paradigm 
and were perhaps also prevalent in influential circles in civic society. However, political 
ideologies, conceptions and pressures faced towards particular forms of substance use 
showed a continued commitment to a tough prohibitionist position, labelling cannabis use as 
an ‘evil’. 
In the wake of these debates, the Government introduced the Misuse of Drugs Act in 
1971. This piece of legislation remains the foundational framework of contemporary illicit 
drugs control in the United Kingdom, and split illicit substances into three categories, A, B and 
C, which are based upon ‘…the social harm attributable to a drug when it is misused’ (House 
of Commons 2000). Cannabis was placed in the Class B category, which carries with it a 
maximum of five years imprisonment and/or an unlimited fine for possession, and up to 
fourteen years and/or an unlimited fine for production or supply. So despite the government 
refutation of the Wootton Report, it is plausible to suggest that it still had an influence in 
shaping the Misuse of Drugs Act in that there was a distinction between different types of 
offences (possession and supply etc.). 
The Misuse of Drugs Act was accompanied by the introduction of the Advisory 
Council on the Misuse of Drugs (ACMD), whose purpose is to review the situation of drugs, 
and make recommendations to government based upon research. The establishment of the 
ACMD occurred at the purported pinnacle of penal-welfarism and prima facie indicates the 
dominant role of scientific and independent advice on policy decisions. However, the ACMD 
encounters a rather paradoxical position in that it can only discuss recommendations within 
the framework in which it was established. Thus, to suggest that some drugs be legalised or 
otherwise controlled or to dissolve the Misuse of Drugs Act would not be possible within its 
remit. Whilst seemingly set up to support and foster expert-driven policy, the ACMD is 
arguably confined within a moralistic ideology about drug use.  
An important point to note is that the link between drugs and criminality (beyond 
proscribed drug offences) was still not apparent at this time, and it was not until the 1980s 
that a distinct change occurred which firmly aligned illicit drug use with acquisitive crime and 
anti-social behaviour. Since this initial period, surface developments in the drugs policy field 
as a whole seem to indicate the existence of a schizophrenic culture which balances ‘populist 
punitive’ insecurities, managerialist discourses and techniques, and adaptations to the 
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administrative realities of dealing with a new drug ‘policy predicament’ (Garland 2001; 
Seddon 2008). 
 
 
The Emerging ‘Crisis’ of Illicit Drugs Control 
 
Following the Misuse of Drugs Act in 1971, legislation specifically concerning the classification 
of cannabis remained the same for the next 33 years. However, there were important shifts 
in the way in which illicit drugs and criminality more broadly were reconceptualised and 
framed as objects of control.  
An important facet connected to both changes in the recorded prevalence of crime, 
as well as fear of it, lies in relation to the increase in illicit substance use both by ‘respectable’ 
middle-class youth as well as by individuals in lower social strata and from ethnic minorities. 
The aftermath of the hippie counter-culture, which embraced cannabis and other 
psychoactive drugs such as LSD, saw the rise of a new zeitgeist in the late 1970s and 1980s 
with greater availability of heroin and cocaine. It has been noted that heroin was used in 
small circles of dependent professionals prior to this time, but in the context of increased 
flows of people, goods and cultures, heroin became more widely available and appealed not 
only to the hippie generation, but also, and more worryingly for the state, to lower social 
classes and ethnic minorities in urban communities already experiencing social problems 
associated with deindustrialisation (Seddon 2006; 2008). It is at this point that the link 
between drugs, community degradation, violence, and anti-social behaviour became more 
firmly established (e.g. Jarvis and Parker 1989; Parker and Newcombe 1987), and contributed 
towards a broader questioning of the penal-welfare system and the ability to maintain a 
medicalised system. 
 The rise of heroin and continuation of other forms of illicit drug use correlate with 
Garland’s broader arguments about the ineffectiveness of traditional responses in dealing 
with issues of law and order. Such increases challenged the ability of penal-welfarism to 
successfully reduce crime and prevent drug use. More specifically, the prohibitionist 
framework solidified in the 1961 UN Convention appeared to be doing little to stem the 
increases in drug use, and as a result, alarming new challenges surfaced. This can be seen 
both in the sense of public health with the spread of AIDs and other blood-borne viruses 
amongst injecting drug users, and also in the arena of crime control, with the upsurge in 
criminal activity having become intrinsically related to the new wave of drug addicts. As such, 
this feeds in to Garland’s (2001) notion of a ‘policy predicament’ as the state was faced with 
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the need of adapting to failures of traditional approaches, whilst being wary of the political 
ramifications of withdrawing the projection of sovereignty in the provision of law and order. 
 
 
3.3.2 The Shift to ‘Schizoid’ Drug Control Policies 
 
The Culture of Illicit Drugs Control? 
 
In relation to the illicit drugs field, the culture of control appears useful in explaining the 
bifurcation between the preventative ‘harm reduction’ approach and the reactive ‘war on 
drugs’ which has come to characterise the field.  
In the sense of denial, this has been intimately connected with the rise of heroin and 
politically tough rhetoric of the New Right. During the 1980s, Republican president Ronald 
Reagan regurgitated Nixon’s ‘war on drugs’ rhetoric to signal a tougher, law enforcement-
focussed approach to dealing with the increasing drugs problem. The political and moral 
rhetoric was to some extent transferred and shared in British drugs policy under the Thatcher 
government. As Seddon (2006; 2008) suggests, heroin, and later crack-cocaine, became 
linked with an undeserving and socio-economically deprived group of individuals with links 
made to acquisitive crime. There is not the space here to fully delve into such issues, but in 
relation to cannabis it is crucial to state that the ‘epidemics’ of drug use became explicitly 
linked to a ‘gateway theory’ (Kandel 1975) which suggested that the use of cannabis then led 
onto the use of more dangerous substances which was causing serious disintegrative and 
criminal effects.  
Following Garland’s (2001) and Young’s (1999) analyses, illicit drug users became 
further excluded and marginalised from society, seen as a ‘dangerous others’ who posed 
threats to the core of society, and in response, punitive measures of segregation, 
incarceration and control were imposed to manage such risky populations. Although most of 
the attention prior to the 1980s had centred on the rebellious use of cannabis, political and 
public attention largely shifted onto the new and rising problems of heroin and crack cocaine. 
Again, given that problematic (in the sense of being related to criminality and community 
degradation) use of these substances was largely located in the lower strata of society, 
commentators have argued that drugs policy has become a means through which to govern 
and manage problematic populations (Simon 2007; Wacquant 2004). 
Tougher measures were introduced under several pieces of legislation, notably the 
Controlled Drugs (Penalties) Act 1985 and the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986, which 
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increased maximum penalties for Class A trafficking to life imprisonment and allowed the 
police to seize assets. Moreover, other pieces of legislation were introduced which placed 
more stringent conditions on drug offenders, such as mandatory treatment and monitoring 
(e.g. Crime and Disorder Act 1998 and Drugs Act 2005).  
A further point to make is that since the inception of the Misuse of Drugs Act, only 
one substance has travelled downwards in its classification (cannabis in 2004), with other 
substances either moving upwards or being added to the list of prohibited substances. A final 
component to note in this vein relates to the impact of ‘moral panics’ in relation to drug use. 
Much attention has been paid to heroin, but equally important are the waves of drug use that 
have risen in particular cultural zeitgeists, each with accompanying panics over their effects 
and reactions which have sought to criminalise and prohibit their use17. 
But whilst such developments may indicate ‘knee-jerk’ type reactions which have 
attempted to renew confidence in the model of prohibition as an effective tool in combating 
the purportedly moral and criminal evils of illicit drug use, there have been simultaneous 
developments more adaptive in nature. In perhaps the most prominent sense, there has 
been a departure from the dominant view that drugs eradication is a viable goal with moves 
towards drugs management. With the rise of heroin in the 1980s and the proliferation of 
serious health problems, a ‘harm reduction’ movement arose. Rather than seeking to stop 
users from using illicit substances through traditional and failed law enforcement methods, 
there was an implicit acceptance that individuals will use drugs, and as such, measures should 
seek to minimise the harms associated with injecting drug use. One of the most important 
responses was the introduction of needle-exchange programmes and public health 
campaigns which effectively reduced the transmission of blood-borne viruses. 
 A further notable example of the adaptive and preventative shift in drugs policy can 
be seen in relation to the development of multi-agency partnerships. Whilst multi-agency 
working developed during the 1980s, it was not until the 1995 drug strategy that Drug Action 
Teams were created to specifically look at problems created by illicit drugs (Home Office 
1995; MacGregor 2006). These early incarnations were then given more prominence under 
the New Labour government which established statutory Crime and Disorder Reduction 
Partnerships (Community Safety Partnerships in Wales); the premise of which was to bring 
together all relevant agencies who deal with substance misuse (most notably health and 
criminal justice) to find more effective solutions and to promote joined-up working. 
                                                          
17 Examples here include the media storm over the death of Leah Betts after her use of ecstasy in the 
late 1990s; the criminalisation of ‘magic mushrooms’ in 2005; and more recently the furore over ‘legal 
highs’ or ‘new psychoactive substances’. Certainly in the case of ecstasy and ‘magic mushrooms’ which 
were made Class A drugs, the scientific evidence suggests that their relative harmfulness is far lower 
than other drugs in this category (Nutt et al. 2007). 
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 The election of Tony Blair’s New Labour to office in 1997 marked an ambivalent mix 
of strategies in drugs policy. One of the primary goals of the early Blair administration was to 
tackle the vast increase in crime which had occurred over the past 50 years. Central to this 
was the connection between problematic Class A drug users and acquisitive crime. Significant 
investments were made to deal with these dual problems through methadone maintenance 
programmes and tough criminal justice interventions as envisaged in the drug strategy 
Tackling Drugs to Build a Better Britain (Home Office 1998; 2002a; 2004). But whilst the 
approach towards Class A drugs has seemingly shifted away from medicalised control and 
towards an increasingly repressive and risk management approach over the past 40 years, 
the place of cannabis in the early Blairite years reveals a different side to the purported 
‘culture of illicit drugs control’. 
 
 
The Case of Cannabis 
 
Whilst the issue of cannabis did not disappear in a policy sense, the gaze of political and 
public attention was largely focussed on heroin, crack cocaine, and stimulants of the rave 
culture until the mid-1990s. Following the arguments set out above, prohibitive efforts 
appeared to do little to stem the rising prevalence of use and it became the most widely used 
illicit drug. Estimates suggest that lifetime use in England & Wales increased from 
approximately 0.5% in 196818, to around 6% in 1982, and then rapidly increasing to 29.5% in 
2000 where it has remained relatively stable since (Advisory Committee on Drug Dependency 
1968; Young 1971; Home Office 1982; Home Office 2012a).  
For some, this indicated the ‘normalisation’ of recreational drug use in the 
experiences of youth during the 1990s (Parker et al. 1998). This age group typically uses illicit 
substances more than the general population, and by the end of the millennium the 
proportion of 16-24 year-olds reporting lifetime and last year cannabis use was 46.2% and 
27% respectively (Home Office 2013a). Whilst this concept became deeply contested within 
the criminological academy surrounding arguments of more active trends of use and the 
number of individuals who ‘just say no’ (see Shiner and Newburn 1997; 1999; Wibberley and 
Price 2000; Measham and Shiner 2009), it is fairly undisputed that the policing of cannabis 
possession offences became burdensome for law enforcement agencies. 
                                                          
18 This approximation is based upon the largest estimation provided in the Wootton Report, 300,000, 
and the population at the time, approximately 55 million. However, Young (1971:11) contends these 
figures by arguing that ‘[t]here can be little doubt that the actual number is considerably larger than 
the latter figure and that this number is steadily growing’. 
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By the end of the 1990s, the policing of cannabis was a serious task, with 93,190 
officially recorded seizures in 1998, most of which were for low-level possession offences 
(Mwenda et al. 2005). Research found that one in seven offenders were cautioned or 
convicted for cannabis possession, and it was estimated that the policing of cannabis equated 
to the time of 500 full-time police officers and cost £50 million per year (Warburton et al. 
2005; May et al. 2002). However, recognising that policing involves a set of working ‘rules’ 
which allow for discretionary behaviour (Reiner 2010; Smith 1986), research found that two-
thirds of police officers interviewed ‘turned a blind eye’ to possession offences (Warburton et 
al. 2005). Moreover, the research by May et al. (2002) found that 3% of police officers who 
had made any arrests for possession of cannabis accounted for 20% of all arrests. Such 
evidence suggests the possibility of divergence between tough talk and decisions (as 
enshrined in political rhetoric and the Misuse of Drugs Act), and policy action ‘on the ground’. 
But additionally, it points to further divergence amongst policy practitioners, highlighting the 
uneven performance of policy. 
As prevalence and consumption of recorded cannabis figures rose significantly 
throughout the 1990s, pressure began to mount on the government to reconsider its position 
on cannabis which diverged from the broader approach to other illicit drugs. This 
demonstrates the other side of the ‘drugs policy predicament’ outlined by Seddon (2008), not 
only highlighting the ineffectiveness of current responses but also raising questions of the 
administrative capacities of the criminal justice system in dealing with such a large processing 
of offences. This echoes Garland’s suggestion that rising crime (and drug use) levels became a 
‘normal social fact’, to which the state faced a predicament of either ‘adapting’ or ‘acting 
out’. 
In 1997, the British newspaper The Independent on Sunday launched a media 
campaign to decriminalise cannabis. Following this, in 1997 the Police Foundation established 
an independent inquiry into drugs legislation, led by Dame Ruth Runciman (Police Foundation 
2000). The Runciman Report proposed several fundamental recommendations concerning 
cannabis. Importantly, it was advised that cannabis should be reclassified to Class C, and that 
possession should not be an arrestable offence19. The reasoning behind this was based upon 
a growing body of evidence supporting the medical uses of cannabis (House of Lords 1998), 
                                                          
19 Under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, only drug offences which carried a maximum 
custodial sentence of 5 years or more were an ‘arrestable offence’ (see Lloyd 2008). Although note 
that from 2005 this distinction was eroded following the introduction of the Serious Organised Crime 
and Police Act which gave police constables the authority to use the power of arrest on ‘reasonable 
grounds’ if suspecting an individual had committed an offence. 
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its relative risks to other illicit substances20, and that it would lead to greater efficiencies in 
policing. This latter aspect certainly chimed with the concurrent managerialist ‘modernising 
government’ agenda of New Labour (Monaghan 2008). 
As such, the Runciman Report suggested that out-of-court disposals should be the 
preferred option. Relatedly, another dimension which was considered was that 
reclassification might remove a source of friction between the largely young cannabis 
consumers, ethnic minorities and the police (Police Foundation 2000). Certainly, after the 
strained police-community relations exacerbated by the Brixton riots and the handling of the 
murder of Stephen Lawrence there was much scope for improvement between the police 
and ethnic minority communities; especially so when considering the vastly disparate use of 
stop and searches (mainly for drugs offences) for young black males and evidence showing 
that cannabis use is no higher amongst this ethnic population as compared to white 
individuals (Woolner and Thom 2003; Eastwood et al. 2013; Home Office 2013a). 
 Following the publication of the Runciman Report, which received a mixed response 
in political networks but broadly positive reviews across different segments of the media, 
there was increased attention given to the debate on cannabis classification with the sense 
that the government had been caught out of tune with public sentiment. Importantly, the 
rise and influence of a liberalising agenda challenges the notion that liberal ‘platonic 
guardians’ have all but disappeared in the face of a punitive turn, but rather points to a 
perhaps rare, but apt ‘window of opportunity’ in which alternative policy voices became 
seriously considered in the policy debate (Kingdon 1995; Monaghan 2011). 
Alongside these developments, a pilot project was introduced by the Metropolitan 
Police Service in 2001. The Lambeth Cannabis Warning Pilot Scheme introduced on-the-spot 
warnings for cannabis offences with the hope of alleviating time which could be spent on 
policing Class A drugs and related offences such as burglary. The results of this experiment 
showed that approximately 3 hours were saved in each case by issuing a ‘street warning’, and 
there was a 110% increase in detection rates for cannabis offences (Metropolitan Police 
Authority 2002). Additionally, surveys were conducted surrounding public opinion on 
cannabis and proposed changes to policing, which showed broad support by both residents 
and in the general population (Ipsos MORI 2002). 
 As the debate continued, the then new Home Secretary David Blunkett asked the 
ACMD to review the scientific evidence on cannabis. The Council recommended that cannabis 
be reclassified to Class C as it believed that ‘…the current classification of cannabis is 
disproportionate in relation both to its inherent toxicity, and to that of other substances 
                                                          
20 Although it is still important to note that links between cannabis and mental health continued to be 
stated (see World Health Organisation, 1997). 
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(such as amphetamines) that are currently within Class B’ (ACMD 2002:1). Such views were 
further cemented in the findings of the Home Affairs Committee (2002). 
 On the basis of support for reform, the evidence provided, and not withstanding 
individual political goals, David Blunkett announced in July 2003 that cannabis would be 
reclassified to Class C. Although the reclassification progressed, eventually coming into force 
in January 2004, there was wide-spread confusion over how it would be policed. In response 
to media and police concerns, a compromise was made to keep the arrestable element for 
possession where ‘aggravating factors’ were present, but ‘street warnings’ (later termed 
Cannabis Warnings) were introduced as an out-of-court disposal (Home Office 2002b; ACPO 
2003).  
Additionally, sentences for production and supply were retained at the same levels as 
Class B drugs, with a maximum of 14 years imprisonment, further dissolving the divide 
between the classification of cannabis and other drugs21. Relating back to Garland’s and 
Seddon’s arguments, it is possible to suggest that the 2004 reclassification was an adaptation 
to the ‘drugs policy predicament’ which allowed police officers legitimacy to deal with 
cannabis in a more informal way which would reduce pressure on resources throughout the 
whole criminal justice system. This is characteristic of Garland’s notion of ‘defining deviance 
down’.  
However, this is far too simplistic a characterisation of the 2004 reclassification as it 
also had a darker side which massively increased the number of possession offences recorded 
by the police. Indicative of this, Cannabis Warnings increased from 40,138 in 2004/05 to 
107,241 by 2008/09 (Home Office 2012b). This was due to a perverse incentive structure 
linked to the use of Cannabis Warnings and the Offences Brought to Justice performance 
indicator which encouraged police forces to target low level cannabis offences as easy 
sanction detections (see Sosa 2012; Home Office 2013b). 
 Given that the substantive empirical analysis of the thesis examines developments 
surrounding and immediately following the 2004 reclassification, in order to account for how 
and why cannabis was reclassified back to Class B in 2009, it suffices to draw this section to its 
conclusion. Next, we turn to examine the nature and extent to which a culture of control has 
unfolded in the Netherlands before reflecting upon the usefulness of Garland’s meta-
narrative in explaining changes in the field over time. 
 
                                                          
21 Under the Criminal Justice Act 2003, the Police and Criminal Evidence Act was amended to make 
possession of cannabis (as a Class C drug) an arrestable offence as well as increasing the maximum 
penalties for Class C trafficking offences to 14 years, the same as Class B offences. This was partly 
fuelled by  the fact that moving cannabis to Class C would have meant that trafficking penalties would 
have been less for cannabis than for tobacco offences. 
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3.4 The Netherlands 
 
On the face of it, the Netherlands provides a critical case in the examination of cannabis 
policy in relation to the culture of control thesis. Historically, the Dutch have followed a very 
different approach to dealing with the selling and possession of small amounts of cannabis 
through the ‘toleration’ of coffeeshops and possession. However, in the field of crime control 
as a whole, and including drugs policy, there are increasing tendencies by criminologists to 
turn to a ‘Garlandian’ discourse to explain the changes that have occurred (Downes and van 
Swaaningen 2007; van Swaaningen 2005; Pakes 2004). Given that The Culture of Control was 
written in relation to the UK and USA, more attention is paid here to developments across 
the field of crime control as a whole, as well as a specific focus on illicit drugs and cannabis 
policy.  
 
 
3.4.1 Dutch Tolerance and the Ideal of ‘Resocialisation’ 
 
The development of crime control in the Netherlands is in some ways quite similar to that of 
England & Wales, with the rise and dominance of a penal-welfare state which came to the 
fore following the end of the Second World War. Whilst it is important not to ‘mythologise’ 
Dutch exceptionalism towards criminality and social life more generally22, the post-WW2 
period saw a distinct paradigm come to dominate crime control. Similar to England & Wales, 
crime policy was largely shaped by liberal practitioners and academics. The influence of such 
experts meant that crime control was dealt with through a process of decarceration and an 
ideal of ‘resocialisation’, which suggested that punishment should be orientated towards the 
successful reintegration of an individual back into society (Boone 2011).  
An important component of why the ideal of resocialisation took hold must be placed 
within the context of the ‘trauma’ of the war and occupation by Nazi Germany (Withuis and 
Mooij 2010). The period immediately following it gave reformers a perfect opportunity to 
                                                          
22 Franke (1990) produced a damning critique of Downes’ (1988) comparative study for over-
emphasising and glamorising the ‘myth’ of Dutch tolerance, reproduced by a lack of a more robust 
historical analysis of pre-World War 2 trends. As Franke (ibid:87) points to, ‘only someone who is not 
familiar with the history of The Netherlands can write that Dutch colonialism “did not rest” on racism 
or racial feelings of superiority’. 
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inscribe long-lasting change on penal institutions based on notions of freedom and 
humanism. This was shaped by the moral entrepreneurship of a group of elites, comprised of 
criminologists, lawyers and psychiatrists, who came to be part of the ‘Utrecht School’ (van 
Swaaningen 2006; Junger-Tas and Junger 2007). 
In order for this philosophy to be put into practice, a series of ‘shields’ had to be in 
place which involved several pragmatic measures to ensure that the prison population did 
not increase, such as parole and pardons and limited expansion of the penal estate (Downes 
1988). Added to these socio-legal characteristics, Downes (1988) further alludes to the socio-
cultural developments in the period as described in Chapter 2. Rising prosperity and stable 
political conditions led to a healthy welfare state which was able to function on the basis of 
social ‘pillars’. A final reason posited for the dominance of penal-welfarism in this period is 
attributable to the fact that the crime rate rose later than in other European countries, and 
when it did rise it rose less sharply than in Britain. 
The result of such dynamics was that the Netherlands managed to instigate a 
programme of decarceration. Indicative of this, between 1965 and 1975 average sentences 
were reduced from 12.8 months to 5.1 months for burglary, with also an increase in the 
percentage of prosecutions waived from 31% in 1960 to 59% in 1979 for the same offence 
(Downes 1982:330). What makes this even more exceptional is that this occurred in a period 
where the crime rate more than doubled. 
 
 
The Seeds of Pragmatism and Medicalisation in Drugs Control 
 
In relation to drugs control, the paradigm of resocialisation bears some importance, 
especially when considering the crucial demarcation between cannabis and other illicit 
substances in the revised Opium Act of 1976. But prior to this, there are other developments 
preceding this landmark Act which are somewhat more independent and relate to other 
cultural tendencies of the Netherlands, such as the prioritisation of trade interests and 
pragmatism. For example, the Netherlands had vested interests in trade it wanted to protect, 
notably in the far east, where it maintained a monopoly on opium in the Dutch Indies until 
1942 (de Kort 1994). 
 But in these early years of illicit drugs control, there was also a pragmatic recognition 
of the fallacies in attempting to enforce prohibitive regimes: ‘The simplicity of the restriction 
notion is, however, only superficial: one will encounter virtually unsurmountable difficulties 
in any attempt to implement this notice into practice’ (Tan Tong Joe 1929:13-14, in de Kort 
1994: original author’s translation). In light of such practices and sentiments, opium addicts 
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were not typically prosecuted with a medical approach to illicit drug use preferred. Whilst 
trade interests formed an important aspect of this early approach, de Kort also points to the 
size of the addict population which existed in similar proportions to that of the UK. Moreover, 
and correlating with the development of a medico-legal approach to acts of deviance, the 
role of the medical profession was influential in policy development and implementation, 
with the task of enforcing the Opium Act balanced between the health and justice 
departments. Health was focussed on allowing doctors to prescribe drugs to addicts whilst 
justice was focussed on illicit trafficking and smuggling. 
 With regards to cannabis during this period, as in the UK its use remained limited, 
located primarily within small circles of artists and writers who would access it through the 
major port cities. After the Second World War use became associated with jazz musicians in 
some of the more cosmopolitan areas of Amsterdam and Rotterdam. Although trade in 
cannabis cigarettes increased after the war, the police were unable to do anything about it as 
possession was not made illegal under the Opium Act until 1953, and it was not until 1955 
that the first arrests took place amongst smugglers and users (de Kort 1994). 
 
 
The Development of the Cannabis Gedoogbeleid 
 
From the 1960s onwards, cannabis had started to become more available and was consumed 
in an underground market mainly by those involved in a youth subcultural movement from 
well-educated backgrounds (Korf 2008). Cannabis use came to symbolise a counter-culture in 
which a new generation were keen to make a doorbraak (‘breakthrough’) (Andeweg 2008). At 
first, the police would rigorously enforce the laws on cannabis, searching for those in 
possession of small amounts (de Kort 1994). This highlights a similar pattern to events in 
England & Wales, seemingly demonstrating the separation of cannabis from a penal-welfare 
and medical approach. But following scenes of violence between the police and youth 
groups, an informal system of tolerated cannabis consumption and sales through ‘house-
dealers’ located predominantly in youth centres began to take shape (Korf 2008). 
In attempting to account for why the Netherlands started to adopt a different 
position on cannabis at this time, there are several important contributory factors. In 
comparison with the USA, de Kort (1994:17) argues that ‘[t]he Netherlands… lacked a specific 
ideology associated with marihuana… [and they] also lacked a moral entrepreneur’ willing 
enough to criminalise the drug. As a result, the Netherlands was not committed to adopting 
the dominant ideological perspective shared elsewhere. When cannabis use spread 
throughout society, this was framed as a predominantly youth counter-culture issue, and as 
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such was treated with the same type of permissiveness granted to other ‘deviant’ practices at 
the time such as the diversity in sexuality and the legalisation of abortion (Leuw 1994).  
As the police and other actors within the criminal justice system encountered and 
processed more cannabis users, there was a disjuncture between what was expected of 
cannabis users, through a US-dominated ideology assimilated earlier in the decade, and the 
stark reality of largely peaceful Dutch-Caucasian hippies using cannabis to express their 
feelings for a more democratic and equal society (ibid.). 
Importantly, Uitermark (2004) argues that a significant aspect of why the Dutch 
followed an alternative route in cannabis policy can be attributed to the way in which the 
religious and other established mainstream parties responded to these growing divisions 
across society. As support for these political parties began to wane in the initial stages of 
depillarisation, there was a need to concede issues to the younger groups in society in order 
to not exacerbate the generational conflict. 
 Free from a dominant ideological perspective on cannabis, and in the spirit of a 
research-enlightened compromise-based approach to policy-making at a national level, two 
commissions looking at the issue of illicit drugs and specifically cannabis were established. 
The first, in 1969, was a private commission led by the penal abolitionist Professor Hulsman. 
With regards to cannabis, it suggested that it was less addictive than tobacco, and dismissed 
the ‘gateway theory’ by arguing that criminalisation of the drug would be one of the most 
important factors in leading users to turn to harder drugs, making it harder to return to 
socially accepted lifestyles (Leuw 1994; Buruma 2007). The spirit of the report was very much 
based within the zeitgeist of the time, drawing upon the ideals inscribed in the ‘Utrecht 
School’ and other established ‘radical’ philosophies: ‘The government should not take a 
censuring position based on the fact that a certain behavior does not fit into the life-concept 
of those who are holding state-power’ (Stichting Algemeen Centraal Bureau voor de 
Geestelijke Volksgezondheid 1971:40, in Leuw 1994). From a philosophical position, Leuw 
(1994:29) argues that it was ‘…based on the principle that the state should refrain as much as 
possible from interference with behaviors that have consequences for the individual person 
only’. 
Again, the history of the regent mentality coupled with the context of war trauma is 
of relevance. In their wake it allowed for a flourishing of autonomy from over-zealous state 
intervention and the promotion of individual freedoms which contributed towards the 
articulation of alternative paradigms to cannabis policy (Pakes 2003). This liberal perspective 
was especially prevalent in the larger, more urbanised cities, with the colloquial name of 
‘Amsterdam Republic’ referring to the city’s status as independent from national rule. But it 
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also demonstrates how cannabis became politically normalised through liberal expertise; a 
key component of the penal-welfare paradigm. 
Whilst the Hulsman Report may have been viewed as a more radical perspective 
about drugs and prohibition, it provided an influential context to the government-sponsored 
committee, headed by Professor Baan (who as noted earlier performed a key role in the 
‘Utrecht School’). The findings of the commission were communicated in much more 
pragmatic terms; there was no engagement with ideological or philosophical issues as had 
been the case with Hulsman. It examined the legal framework surrounding illicit drugs and 
suggested that cannabis should not be included in the same classification as those that pose 
‘unacceptable risks’. There was an acceptance that individuals will use cannabis, and as such 
it proposed that integration of the drug into society was possible, arguing that ‘…[t]his does 
not mean that no risks are involved, but that those risks could be acceptable’ (Werkgroep 
Verdovende Middelen 1972:66, in Leuw 1994). Sharing a broadly similar perspective to 
Hulsman, this commission also suggested that most drug use consists of short-term 
experimentation by young individuals (Buruma 2007). 
Through a dominant penal-welfare paradigm, which attempted to prevent 
stigmatisation and marginalisation, there was a concern to protect young people from the 
dangers of criminalisation. Consequentially, there was a desire to drive drugs policy through a 
variety of institutions that were not limited to criminal justice, primarily health, but also 
education and welfare, following in the same vein as the two-track approach ingrained earlier 
to the use and supply of opium (Leuw 1994). 
 Given the changing political context at the time, the findings of this report were 
almost all accepted by the centre-right government. But whilst the two commissions of 
Hulsman and Baan were clearly significant in granting legitimacy to the political normalisation 
of cannabis, it is perhaps more telling that these were indicative of a range of practices that 
were already apparent in Dutch society which sprouted from the local level of policy-making. 
It is at this level in which practitioners found pragmatic solutions to accommodate what was 
considered a relatively harmless substance. Thus, existing practices formed a base unto which 
scientific expertise via respected commissions legitimised and shifted cannabis into a health-
driven framework away from more reactive and repressive criminal justice responses. 
Following a de facto decriminalised experimentation with house-dealers, the state 
formalised its approach to cannabis control through the revised Opium Act of 1976 which 
distinguished between schedule 1 (‘hard’) and schedule 2 (‘soft’) drugs. Despite the Opium 
Act’s official inception in 1976, its initial drafting originated three years earlier. As informal 
activities had been going on during this time, it allowed premises to refine their practices to 
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be united under the new legislation. The idea of this was also inherent in the Baan report 
which suggested that experimentation should form an important part of drugs policy 
evaluation, so ‘…when sufficient faith in the safety of new positions exists, then the old ones 
can be left’ (Werkgroep Verdovende Middelen 1972:74, in Leuw 1994). As will later be seen, 
this flexibility has left an important mark on contemporary policy-making. 
The government proposed to have a 30g limit for cannabis possession before it would 
be considered a criminal offence. Whilst the 1976 Opium Act had officially incorporated a 
policy of gedogen (‘tolerance’) towards house-dealers, the rules concerning their operation 
did not come into force until 1980 (Jansen 1994), and thus grew out of existing practices that 
many of the youth centres had been enforcing on those selling cannabis over the previous 
decade (see Figure 3.1).  
The Guidelines for Investigation and Prosecution were based upon the expediency 
principle, meaning that prosecution would be 
waived for certain offences under certain 
circumstances if it was in the public’s interest. 
Notably, Buruma (2007) argues that there was 
an important reframing of this principle in 
1970 which shifted it from ‘prosecution, 
unless it is in the public interest’, to 
‘prosecution, only if it is in the public interest’. 
The implication therefore, is that law 
enforcement agencies should refrain from 
prosecuting cannabis offences unless they contravene the dominant underlying principles of 
the health-driven policy. Thus, although the revised Opium Act ratified the UN Convention of 
1961, the unique policy regarding cannabis was made possible on the basis that it was 
‘necessary’ in order to protect public health through a separation of markets (see section 
3.2). 
These guidelines stipulated that the selling of cannabis would be tolerated (have a 
low prosecution priority) if the house-dealers abided by a set of criteria which later became 
known as the AHOJ-G criteria in 1991: no overt advertising (Affichering); no hard drugs (H); 
no nuisance (Overlast); no underage clients (18, or 16 in some towns)(Jongeren); and no large 
stocks (Grote hoeveelheden) (Buruma 2007; Korf 2002; van der Stel et al. 2009). Moreover, 
and quite significantly, in 1977 it was established that local tripartite consultations (mayor, 
chief of police, chief prosecutor) would determine the approach to cannabis retailers in 
municipalities (van der Stel et al. 2009). Again, this reiterates the implicit notion in Dutch 
Figure 3.1 Early House Rules, in Jansen (1994:171) 
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politics that local municipalities should have the authority to determine policies that fit the 
local context and thus empowered local practitioners to tolerate the selling and consumption 
of cannabis. By the end of the 1970s, the house-dealer became a powerful force in the 
cannabis scene and overtook the role of street dealers and the underground market (Korf 
2008). 
 
 
3.4.2 The ‘Crisis in Penal-Welfarism’ and Drugs Control 
 
A Period of Uncertainty in Crime Control 
 
The changes to drugs policy occurred at a crucial moment in the Netherlands which saw 
increasing strains placed upon a penal-welfare paradigm and the ideal of resocialisation. 
From around the mid-1970s onwards, cracks began to appear in the surface of a largely 
successful decarceration project. Similar to England & Wales, there were rapid increases in 
recorded crime from approximately 4,500 per 100,000 in 1980 to 7,000 in 1985. This 
challenged elitist views on penal philosophy that penal-welfarism was an apt model for the 
prevention of crime and resocialisation of offenders (Downes and van Swaaningen 2007).  
The rise in crime has been attributed to processes of depillarisation, social and 
economic expansion, and notably large waves of immigration from former Dutch colonies. 
Specifically in relation to the latter aspect, Downes and van Swaaningen (2007) suggest that 
immigrants were mainly unskilled and often ended up unemployed, living in ‘ghettos’, with 
some becoming problematic heroin users. Thus, ‘…enough anomic strain was generated to 
fuel a steepening rise in the crime rate from the mid-1970s on, with drug-related crime 
coming to symbolise newly emergent problems, which began to test the penal consensus to 
destruction’ (Ibid: 45). Certainly, the crimes and those committing them began to be more 
serious with the advent of heroin importation, and drug-related crimes committed by these 
new ‘outsiders’ challenged the traditional views about resocialisation and were largely 
responsible for an increase in those sentenced to imprisonment (Grapendaal et al. 1997, in 
Pakes 2000; 2005). 
For advocates of the culture of control thesis, the consequences of this period 
questioned the tolerant approach towards crime and criminals as it caused a rupture in how 
the state should respond to the new threats of late-modernity due to rising crime and rising 
levels of fear of crime (van Swaaningen 2005). Official discourse became much more centred 
on policy-relevant analysis employing the ‘criminologies of everyday life’ and looked to crime 
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prevention and penal expansion in responding to public insecurities surrounding ethnic 
minorities and ‘hard’ drug users (van Swaaningen 2005; Pakes 2000). 
 These developments culminated in a distinctive point in Dutch criminal justice policy 
with the 1985 Society and Crime report (Ministerie van Justitie 1985). The main purpose of 
this report was to restore credibility back into the criminal justice system through 
distinctively managerialist measures to improve the efficiency and co-ordination of the 
system. This also correlates with the political and economic programmes that emerged 
during this period (see Chapter 2). Moreover, it signalled a shift towards the promotion of 
crime prevention measures led by local municipalities, highlighting responsibilising strategies 
in crime control (Jones 1995; van Swaaningen 2005). It was from this point forth that culture 
of control proponents suggest that the heart of Dutch criminal justice policy started to shift 
from one centred on the values of resocialisation and penal-welfarism, to one balancing 
efficiency and management of offenders with increased penal expansionism. However, it 
should be noted that proponents such as van Swaaningen (2005) have had tendencies to read 
off policy talk as evidence for the emergence of a shift to punitiveness. Although indicative of 
change in some sense, it does not reveal the full picture of policy change, highlighting the 
need to examine the different layers of ‘policy’ and the ways in which it is realised across 
different spaces and different fields. 
 
 
The Rise of the Coffeeshop Phenomenon 
 
Curiously, such accounts championing the decline of tolerance/increase in punitiveness 
argument during this unsettling period do not seem to encompass developments in cannabis 
policy. Even when Downes (1988) was writing in the late-1980s, his discussion of Dutch drugs 
policy brushes aside the issue of cannabis to focus mainly on heroin to support his argument 
of the ‘limits of tolerance’. 
Since the 1980s, there has been a major shift away from so-called house-dealers to 
commercial outlets known as coffeeshops which have become the image of cannabis 
gedogen in Dutch society. The establishment of cannabis coffeeshops was in part an 
accidental and unforeseen development. Again, rather than this being an invention of 
national policy-makers, coffeeshops started at a grass-roots level in the major cities, and 
most notably Amsterdam. Whilst the revisions to laws regarding cannabis primarily 
considered the role of house-dealers to perform the social function of separating markets, in 
the late 1970s café-style places began to tolerate the selling of cannabis. As the income from 
this source became more important to proprietors, and in combination with the publishing of 
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the prosecutor’s guidelines, local governance ‘triangles’ recognised these outlets as a viable 
way of maintaining the market separation policy. As a result, the number of coffeeshops rose 
exponentially during the 1980s. 
 However, there are also other important factors to consider when looking at why 
numbers of coffeeshops grew so rapidly during this period. Even before the legislation of 
1976 was established, which de facto legalised the sale of cannabis, the issue of heroin had 
become a prominent issue in Dutch society. As health issues became more pressing with the 
spread of AIDs, there was increased attention paid to heroin and how best to combat its 
negative effects.  
Thus, it is possible to see how attempting to separate cannabis from ‘harder’ drugs 
became a pertinent policy goal. With heroin becoming the major threat, the issue of cannabis 
was shifted aside, seemingly being dealt with through tolerated outlets. Although heroin-
related offending was linked to increases in punitive approaches, cannabis offences remained 
fairly well tolerated and siphoned-off through the distinction in the Opium Act.  
It is also worth noting that whilst low-level sales and possession offences were dealt 
with through what MacCoun and Reuter (1997; 2001) describe as a model of ‘de facto 
legalisation’, the approach towards supply assumed a much more aggressive form. Indicative 
of this, seizures of cannabis by the Netherlands accounted for 44% of the total for the 
European Union in 1995 (ibid.). 
This suggests then that whilst in some areas a hardened tone was beginning to take 
hold, the decline of tolerance was not experienced evenly across all policy areas, and in the 
case of low-level cannabis offences, it seemingly flourished at a local level. This alerts us to 
the dangers of assuming that a punitive turn has fully taken shape at different levels of 
governance and its impact upon different policy areas. 
 
 
3.4.3 The Emergence of ‘Schizoid’ Crime and Drug Control Policies 
 
A Dutch Culture of Control? 
 
From around the mid-1980s there were distinctive changes in the broader penal and social 
climate of the Netherlands which led to a rapid expansion of the use of imprisonment up until 
2005, particularly in relation to ‘hard drug’, violent and sex offences. At one point, the 
Netherlands was proportionately expanding its prison population faster than the USA (Tak 
and van Kalmthout 1998).  
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Downes and van Swaaningen (2007) attribute the sudden emergence of a culture of 
control to several reasons. First, continuing increases in recorded crime spurred a challenge 
to the ideal of resocialisation. But not only did crime continue to rise, but there was a 
qualitative shift in the types of crimes experienced, as offences such as drug-trafficking and 
frauds became more widespread. Additionally, there was a process of ‘net-widening’ and ‘up-
tariffing’ of minor offences, with more offences processed that would have previously been 
dismissed. Moreover, Grapendaal et al. (1997) and Berghuis (1994) suggest that violent and 
sex crimes were treated more severely, with the judiciary under pressure to sentence more 
heavily. This was also mirrored in penal capacity expansion, which from 1985 to 1997 more 
than doubled from 4827 to 12,224 (Pakes 2000). 
Related to this was a distinct change in attitudes to crime and punishment following 
the publication of the first International Crime Victims Survey of 1989 which showed that the 
Netherlands had the highest crime rate of the 14 countries involved (van Dijk et al. 1990:41). 
Whilst the survey was critiqued on a methodological basis, the effect on public opinion 
further tipped the politics of crime control in a more punitive direction resulting in the Law in 
Motion report of 1990, which emphasised managerial instrumentalism (Ministerie van Justitie 
1990; Downes and van Swaaningen 2007; van Swaaningen 2005). 
 From the early 1990s, crime control in the Netherlands became a central issue as 
more attention was paid to it, and these debates concerned immigration which was seen to 
be posing problems to Dutch social order. For van Swaaningen (2005), this signals a shift from 
community safety as primarily dealing with the social causes of crime, to one which now 
depends on risk profiles and tough political rhetoric. Downes and van Swaaningen (2007:57) 
further note that ‘crime was implicitly portrayed as a problem outside of Dutch society rather 
than as a problem rooted in social and economic relations, as was hitherto the common 
vision’. The problem of multiculturalism posed ever-constant problems for a country which 
had moved away from previous patterns of segregation based primarily along religious 
cleavages, and crime was seen as a problem transgressing these traditional blocs (Pakes 
2005). Indicative of this, in 1992 over 40% of the prison population was occupied by 
foreigners or second-generation immigrants (Boin 2001). Utilising Garland, it would seem 
then that in the face of an emergent crisis (of both crime and social identity) the state has 
attempted to affirm legitimacy in the provision of law and order through recourse to punitive 
means and a stripping back of the tolerant principles underlying the resocialisation approach.  
 Such issues have been exacerbated in recent years following the three key catalytic 
events outlined earlier in Chapter 2: First, the 9/11 terrorist attacks by Muslim extremists; 
second, the murder of right-wing political leader Pim Fortuyn; finally, the murder of the film 
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director Theo van Gogh by a Muslim fundamentalist. These developments were associated 
with growing ‘Islamophobia’, leading to panic across the Dutch population and subsequent 
reactionary efforts against Muslim communities which included proposals to ban the wearing 
of headscarves and arson attacks on Muslim buildings. 
 The effects of these problems in Dutch society have led to an increase in the penal 
estate, whereby from around the 1990s there was a massive shift to using imprisonment as a 
means in itself, rather than attempting to divert and resocialise individuals. Pakes (2005) 
suggests that the most important factor behind this rise in imprisonment is significant growth 
in average sentence length. For example, those who had committed a violent or sexual crime 
in 1985 received on average 280 and 250 days of imprisonment respectively. By 1995, this 
had increased to 471 and 501 days. Moreover, the number of prisons increased and the 
amount of prison sentences given has also increased rapidly since the 1990s leading to a peak 
in Dutch imprisonment in 2005 at around 120 per 100,000 (Downes and van Swaaningen 
2007; Boin 2001; Pakes 2004).   
It is within this climate that commentators argue that the liberal ‘shields’ (such as 
judicial discretion and diversion) which once protected the enlargement of the penal estate 
and served the tolerant approach have become unstuck and replaced with a spiralling fear 
about crime and safety. To some extent, whilst the growth of coffeeshops in the 1980s 
somewhat refutes the decline of tolerance theory, developments from the 1990s onwards fit 
into this master narrative of a punitive turn and ambivalent control strategies. The state has 
simultaneously attempted to confront growing problems through tougher denial responses, 
whilst also promoting adaptive strategies and reaffirming the separation of markets 
philosophy that underpins Dutch drugs policy. 
 
 
The Case of Cannabis: Tightening Controls in an Insecure Landscape 
 
Looking critically at the handling of the AIDs and heroin crisis which started to decline in the 
early 1990s, law enforcement agencies took this to be a sign that their increased 
enforcement had been successful (despite a widely accredited harm-reduction programme). 
As concerns about heroin receded, other drugs such as ecstasy and cannabis came back into 
the frame as objects which required further social control. At the same time, there was an 
on-going crisis within the Dutch police, with evidence of corruption and malpractice following 
a more moralistic ‘zealous mission’ of the then Minister of Justice targeting drug-related 
crime (Ossebaard and van der Wijngaart 1998:266).  
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In this regard, and coupled with heightened fears surrounding issues of crime and 
disorder, the issue of cannabis became increasingly constructed as a problem which required 
stricter regulation. However, that is not to say that there was not some ‘reality’ in there being 
issues with coffeeshops. A fundamental problem with the policy was that whilst the ‘front 
door’ of selling and consumption was officially tolerated, the ‘back-door’ of production and 
supply remained unregulated. 
 Alongside internal concerns about the back-door problem and the widespread 
growth of coffeeshops which were also increasingly linked to the supply of harder drugs in 
media reporting23, the Dutch approach to cannabis had attracted widespread international 
criticism. From the outset of the revised Opium Act in 1976 the market separation policy 
angered the International Narcotics Control Board (see TNI 2014:50) and proponents of more 
prohibitive regimes, particularly from the US, France and Sweden. However, neighbouring 
countries Belgium and Germany also had cause for concern as it became evident that the 
Netherlands had become a hub of drug trafficking across Europe (MacCoun and Reuter 2001). 
Claims that 90% of illicit drugs in France had arrived through the Netherlands led to the 
accusation by French President Jacques Chirac that the Netherlands had become a ‘narco-
state’ (Ossebaard and van der Wijngaart 1998). As state borders deteriorated following the 
Schengen Treaty of 1985 and the creation of the European Union in 1993, fears surrounding 
Dutch cannabis policy continued to dominate discussions both internally and externally. 
Moreover, as MacCoun and Reuter (2001) point to, this also manifested itself in the form of 
an interweaving of local complaints surrounding coffeeshop-related noise and disorder and 
increases in ‘drug tourism’. 
 These factors conditioned the context in which a new ‘purple’ coalition came to 
power in 1994, representing a distinctive policy window for a more progressive and liberal 
approach to drugs policy (see Chapter 2). Not only was this coalition promising for further 
liberalisation based upon their philosophical ideologies, but was also supported by the fact 
that both PvdA and D’66 had openly called for legalisation prior to winning the elections 
(Boekhout van Solinge 1999). 
 The culmination of these internal political shifts and external pressures led to the 
1995 policy paper Continuity and Change (MacCoun and Reuter 2001; Ministerie van 
Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport et al. 1995). For many international commentators, this 
was indicative of the failure of cannabis tolerance and the need to change course (Boekhout 
                                                          
23 As one experienced drugs agency worker reflected: ‘I saw all the information by the newspapers, 
heroin, criminal people, people without passports, in the coffeeshops… how did it look so good the last 
10, 20 years, I saw a completely other picture. But the police say that, and the journalists write it 
down, it must be true… we found out that from the 86 coffeeshops they were closed down, there were 
only 6 real coffeeshops, the rest were Turkish coffeehouses, with heroin, butchers…’ (NL-A-NGO1). 
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van Solinge 1999). In some regards, the policy proposals signalled a tightening of controls 
surrounding cannabis regulation. For example, the entrance age was increased and 
consolidated local practices into a national guideline of 18 years of age24. Also, one of the 
major changes was a reduction in the maximum amounts coffeeshops could sell to a 
customer on a daily basis, from 30g to 5g. Additionally, and largely in response to 
international concerns, greater attention was paid to organised cannabis cultivation to 
prevent importation and exportation to neighbouring countries.  
However, there were also signs that this represented a reaffirmation of the original 
goals of the drugs policy which solidified the gedoogbeleid in a more explicit fashion (Pakes 
2003). For example, the total stock coffeeshops were allowed to hold at any one point in time 
was increased from the rather absurd limit of 30g to a more feasible 500g. Prior to this 
change, the police had considerable power in being able to close down coffeeshops which 
transgressed the 30g rule (which it is safe to assume almost all did given that they could sell 
that amount in one transaction). Ultimately, further measures which would have liberalised 
the back-door were abandoned due to the international pressures being exerted upon the 
Netherlands (Boekhout van Solinge 1999). However, by focusing on large-scale production 
and making low-scale cultivation a low prosecution priority by tolerating individuals growing 
up to 5 plants each, it instilled the notion that coffeeshops were to be low-scale local facilities 
serving local customers. 
Moreover, and in keeping with a broader pattern of decentralisation in the 
Netherlands, local municipalities were given considerable powers in deciding whether to 
allow coffeeshops, how many could be established, and restrictions on where coffeeshops 
could operate (Wouters et al. 2010; Pakes 2005; van der Gouwe et al. 2009). In 2009, 77% of 
municipalities had chosen the ‘zero option’ (Bieleman and Nijkamp 2010). Furthermore, local 
mayors were given the power to close coffeeshop premises that were causing ‘nuisance’25. 
Such trends correspond with developments more broadly in the socio-political sphere 
which saw a return to the ‘myth’ of the ‘polder model’ during purple cabinet rule. In relation 
to Garland’s thesis then, it would appear that although there were was a tightening of the 
rules concerning coffeeshops, such developments do not easily fit into notions of a culture of 
control. The changes instigated in 1995 do not appear to be about economic managerialism 
or punitivism, but an example of Dutch policy-makers navigating an extremely rocky policy 
domain to search for a middle-ground between ideals of back-door liberalisation and 
                                                          
24 Some municipalities previously allowed those aged 16 years and above entrance (Pakes 2005). 
25 ‘Nuisance’ refers to a collective of public order incivilities. With regards to coffeeshops, this 
predominantly relates to parking, noise, and loitering, but can also be extended to include drug dealing 
and other illicit activities located around the vicinity of coffeeshops. 
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international pressures for tighter regulation. Compared to other aspects of illicit drugs and 
crime control that were occurring during the same period, cannabis policy seemingly fared 
relatively well in not succumbing to the same pressures, demonstrated in the support given 
by national politicians for regulating the production and supply of cannabis to coffeeshops.  
Thus, whilst other domains of the criminal justice system were being questioned in 
their raison d'être, belief in the virtues of the coffeeshops as a vehicle to separate cannabis 
from other illicit substances remained relatively intact. Moreover, the continued belief in the 
positive function of coffeeshops, in spite of increased rates of use, were further substantiated 
by the findings of MacCoun and Reuter (1997; 2001) who argued that the Dutch approach 
had relatively little effects on consumption. They do, however, point to the effect of 
increased commercialisation26 during the mid-1980s to early 1990s as a factor in increasing 
rates of use; an effect which the 1995 changes aimed to quell (Room et al. 2008). 
Following the 1995 policy paper, there was a marked effect on the total number of 
coffeeshops in the Netherlands. From the early approximation of 1500 coffeeshops in the 
early-1990s (Bieleman and Goeree 2001), from the mid-1990s this number significantly 
declined and continues to do so. In 1999, the number of coffeeshops was recorded at 846 
(Bieleman and Nijkamp 2010). 
The focus on drug-related nuisance and cannabis cultivation (‘hennepteelt’) 
continued throughout the late-1990s and into the early 2000s and further powers were 
granted to local municipalities to allow them to impose sanctions on, or closure of, 
coffeeshops that transgressed the tolerance criteria. Notably, the Damocles law (Article 13b 
of the Opium Act) was introduced in 1999 which allowed mayors to close coffeeshops ‘…if 
they infringe the terms of the local coffeeshop policies, even if no public nuisance occurs’ 
(van der Gouwe et al. 2009; Ministerie van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport 2003). 
Additionally, a raft of measures have been granted to municipal councils to aid in the 
detection and prosecution process with regards to the financial rewards of the drug trade. 
For example, the pluk ze (squeeze ‘em) (Criminal Confiscation Measure) law allows for the 
confiscation of criminal assets, and under the Disclosure of Unusual Transactions (Financial 
Services) Act and the Identification (Financial Services) Act it grants more powers to 
investigate monetary irregularities (van der Gouwe et al. 2009). 
                                                          
26 As the authors note, commercialisation ‘…involves the heightened salience and glamorization (in the 
youth-cultural sense) that results from widespread, highly visible promotion – in shop signs and 
advertisements but also in countercultural media ads, postcards, and posters.’ (MacCoun and Reuter 
2001:260). However, others have contested the credibility of the ‘glamorisation hypothesis’ due to 
methodological weaknesses in comparing data across cities and countries (Abraham et al. 2001; Room 
et al. 2008). 
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The need to be clearer with how the cannabis gedoogbeleid worked and the 
regulations surrounding coffeeshops was also spurred on by a wider development within 
Dutch society at the end of the 1990s. Again, within a broader context of heightened fears 
centred on issues of crime, disorder and immigration amongst others, the rise of Pim Fortuyn 
signalled a discomfort with ‘grey’ policy responses such as the gedoogbeleid, with greater 
calls for clearer policies across all policy areas, including drugs policy. 
It would appear then that by the turn of the millennium there had been a distinctive 
change in both the reality of the coffeeshop phenomenon, in terms of producing unwanted 
effects of nuisance and links to organised criminality, but also a shift in the conceptualisation 
of cannabis and coffeeshops. In 2003 an interdepartmental policy paper on cannabis was 
presented which outlined the intentions of the cabinet of how to address cannabis policy. As 
with previous policy documents there was a reinstatement of the primary goal of the policy 
as being public health-led, coupled alongside the prevention of public nuisance and the 
combating of drug-related crime. 
Moreover, the government advocated a stricter and more criminal justice-oriented 
approach with integration between different agencies such as the police, prosecution, 
housing associations and tax authorities (see Tweede Kamer 2006). Thus, the cannabis letter 
of 2003 set out further measures to reduce and restrict cannabis regulation further, but it 
again confirms the status of coffeeshops as having a useful social function in Dutch society. 
The changes were premised upon the ideals of the original policy goals of 1976, emphasising 
that tolerated outlets should be there to serve local demand, and not to become over-
commercialised premises functioning both as a front for organised criminal groups and to 
rationalise a growing exportation of nederwiet27 to surrounding countries. 
An important theme running throughout this policy paper is the reaffirmation that 
local municipalities should be primarily responsible for cannabis policy, to ensure that policy 
is coherent with local circumstances. In one sense, the state was increasingly positioning itself 
as a paternalistic ‘steerer’ of policy, changing national policy based upon concerns which 
threaten the whole society, with municipalities doing the ‘rowing’. The extent to which these 
powers are utilised however, is premised upon the problems that arise in local settings. 
 This can be seen with responses to cannabis-related nuisance, whereby there have 
been numerous attempts to pragmatically deal with problems emanating particularly in the 
south of country, such as relocating coffeeshops from the inner-city to the borders (e.g. 
Intraval 2005). However, the success of such experiments has largely been marred by local 
                                                          
27 Nederwiet is domestically-produced cannabis from the Netherlands. See also Chapter 6. 
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and national politics both within the Netherlands and with neighbouring countries28 
(MacCoun and Reuter 2001). So whilst policy innovations at a local level are an important and 
fundamental part of policy evolution with regards to cannabis, it is significant to remember 
that such experiments are constrained by a number of multi-dimensional forces at local, 
national and international levels.  
Moreover, in 2007 under the Balkenende IV cabinet, municipalities were given the 
power to close coffeeshops that were within 250m of schools (van der Gouwe et al. 2009). 
Whilst this is not a mandatory rule, after discussions within the Association of Dutch 
Municipalities (VNG) most municipalities who have coffeeshops have integrated this policy 
into existing practices (Bieleman et al. 2012). However, there is again flexibility granted to 
local municipalities in how this is applied and this again demonstrates the complex 
relationship between national politics and local implementation and the variation that 
coexists between these different levels of governance. 
 Alongside developments which have placed more responsibility and power in the 
hands of municipalities, there has also been firmer centralised responses. For example, in 
response to growing evidence of large-scale cultivation (see van Ooyen-Houben 2006; van 
Ooyen-Houben et al. 2009), a national specialist programme entitled Taskforce 
Georganiseerde Hennepteelt (Taskforce Organised Cannabis Cultivation) was established in 
2008. The unanswered problem of the back-door has been met with increasing recourse to 
criminal justice-led approaches, seemingly chiming with dominant strategies utilised 
elsewhere. 
 But despite numerous attempts over the past 20 years to counter the negative 
effects of cannabis policy, the perception and reality of problems still remained, and this then 
takes us up to the moment in 2009 when the Balkenende IV government announced a new 
impetus in drugs policy, with the instalment of an expert commission to examine ways in 
which to proceed with illicit drugs, and specifically, cannabis. Following the van der Donk 
Commission, a series of policy changes were announced in 2011 under the Rutte I 
government which forms the substantive focus of empirical analysis. 
 Relating the developments of the 2000s back to the culture of control, and it appears 
as though there has been an acceleration of pressures which have put Dutch cannabis policy 
under strain. The continued decline of coffeeshops, coupled with stricter enforcement 
against cultivators and traffickers, has shifted the emphasis away from public health and 
towards the remit of criminal justice. Placed within the volatile political environment, 
                                                          
28 For example, the relocation of coffeeshops in Venlo was in part due to co-operation from German 
mayors, but such experiments were unable to be replicated in Maastricht due to opposition from 
Belgian mayors. 
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cannabis policy has not been an exception to overall tendencies which have seen tougher, 
and less tolerant, approaches manifest. This could suggest that the Netherlands is slowly 
converging towards types of response strategies which attempts to affirm the ‘myth’, to both 
internal and perhaps more importantly, external audiences, that they are capable of 
controlling and managing undesirable social behaviours and conditions. However, as has 
been consistently stated, whilst the trajectory is one pointing to the decline and potential end 
of coffeeshops (Garretsen 2010), with their numbers continuing to decline (Bieleman et al. 
2012), there is still a pervasive belief amongst policy actors that the coffeeshops are socially 
beneficial and are a desirable alternative to criminalisation and marginalisation with public 
health arguments still a driving rationalisation of their existence. 
 
 
3.5 Summary 
 
Overall, The Culture of Control is useful in illuminating the broader ‘master patterns’ of crime 
control which could be said to have been felt in various guises and degrees within the field of 
illicit drugs and cannabis policy in England & Wales and the Netherlands. Changing social, 
economic and political conditions over the past forty years have produced shared pressures, 
strains and political anxieties, to which cannabis policy has not been exempt.  
As a result, there have notable points of convergence – especially regarding 
responses to cultivation and supply – but also, there are clear indications that the coffeeshop 
system is under significant pressure and has slowly eroded away by a creeping set of ever-
stricter compliance measures which has shifted the focus away from public health and more 
into the remit of criminal justice and security. And yet, specificities in the development of 
political responses to cannabis, especially in the Netherlands, contrast in important ways with 
the experiences felt in England & Wales. This can be very overtly seen with the curious 
resilience of coffeeshops and somewhat official protection of users. 
The discussion of this chapter leaves significant questions about the ways policy is 
constructed, resisted and/or reworked by different actors and agencies. Powerful factors that 
can be observed already relate to the way in which problems are constructed at particular 
socio-political moments, the utilisation of research and expertise, and abilities to negotiate 
and carve policy between central and local authorities. In regards to the latter aspect, the 
role of local municipalities appears to have played a key role in the development and 
sustenance of cannabis policy in the Netherlands, an element distinctly lacking from a more 
centralised form of control in England & Wales.  
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Set within the confines of this research, this opens up a clear avenue of exploration: 
to gain an in-depth understanding of the complex processes of policy-making between 
national and subnational levels and comparatively across these jurisdictions. Next, we move 
on to outline the methodological approach of the research, to tease out how such queries 
were robustly examined. 
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Chapter IV 
Methodology 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to reflect on how the research was conducted whilst also 
linking together the various facets of the research, from research aims and questions, to 
design, methods and analysis. The central aim of the research was to assess how a culture of 
control presents itself across two advanced European societies through examining the nature 
and extent of convergence and divergence in cannabis policy. The research set out to provide 
an empirically-grounded comparative analysis of the policy ‘process’ in relation to two recent 
changes to cannabis policy (2009 reclassification from Class C to Class B; 2012/13 
amendments to coffeeshop ‘tolerance policy’) at the levels of ‘talk’ and ‘decisions’ in two 
national contexts (England & Wales and the Netherlands) and in two subnational case sites 
(Cardiff/Wales and Utrecht). 
 
 
4.2 Research Aim, Objectives and Questions 
 
To assess how a culture of control unfolds across England & Wales and the Netherlands 
through an examination of convergence and divergence in cannabis policy 
 
The preceding chapter demonstrated the usefulness of using a ‘Garlandian’ framework to 
understand developments in the way in which both England & Wales and the Netherlands 
have shifted in their approach to crime and drugs control. Certainly, recent developments in 
cannabis policy in both jurisdictions appear to suggest a toughening approach towards 
cannabis which may indicate convergence towards non-adaptive strategies of control. 
However, as outlined in the introductory chapter, despite the clear usefulness of such 
meta-narratives for describing and explaining broader currants in the criminal justice sphere, 
a central presupposition is that such theories have a tendency to conceal the multifaceted 
and variegated nature of responses across differing national and local levels of decision-
making (Edwards and Hughes 2005). As Garland (2001:vii) himself openly forewarns, ‘[i]n our 
attempts to make sense of social life, there is an unavoidable tension between broad 
generalization and the specification of empirical particulars’. This suggests the possibility that 
if countries appear to exhibit signals of punitivism, there is the potential for policy to be 
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reworked and resisted in a way which counters its ‘determinedly dystopic’ properties (Zedner 
2002). Thus, there is a need to empirically clarify how a culture of control unfolds through 
examining the nature and extent of convergence and divergence across and within different 
jurisdictions. Garland himself (2001:vii-viii) further confirms this research deficit: ‘Sweeping 
accounts of the big picture can be adjusted and revised by more focused case studies that 
add empirical specificity and local detail… [they] should be in a better position to confirm, 
disconfirm, or otherwise revise these findings’. So arising out of these considerations, and the 
preceding two chapters, are two central propositions: that despite clear continuing points of 
difference, it is both possible and expected to observe some degree of convergence inter-
nationally; and that equally, we can expect some degree of divergence intra-nationally 
between national and subnational levels within each jurisdiction. 
In order to test and explore such propositions, the research examined two specific 
policy changes: the reclassification from Class C to Class B in 2009 in England & Wales; and 
the amendments to the public prosecutor’s guidelines for coffeeshops (gedoogbeleid) that 
occurred in 2012/2013 in the Netherlands. The study sought to answer four key research 
questions: 
 
RQ1: How did the policy responses come into existence? 
 
RQ2: To what extent is there intra-national convergence/divergence between 
national and subnational levels of   governance? 
 
RQ3: To what extent is there inter-national convergence/divergence in the responses 
to cannabis? 
 
RQ4: What factors and mechanisms conditioned how the policy responses unfolded? 
 
The analytic focus of the study revolves around two interlinking facets regarding policy, that 
of policy ‘levels’ and policy ‘process’. In the first instance, there is recognition that policy can 
be dissected into distinct constitutive elements of policy as ‘talk’, ‘decisions’ and ‘action’29 
(Brunsson 1989; Pollitt 2001). Given the scale and scope of the project, the thesis is primarily 
                                                          
29 Here it is worth noting that whilst there is an appreciation of ‘action’ in the broader sociological 
sense in that any human action projects meaning and requires interpretation, in relation to policy this 
is taken to be the implementation of a given policy as opposed to the actions of civil servants drafting 
policy documents, or politicians debating in parliament etc. 
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interested in convergence and divergence in policy responses to cannabis control at the levels 
of talk and decisions across national and subnational levels of governance. 
 However, the main organising framework for the thesis is centred on an inter-, and 
intra-, national comparison of the policy ‘process’; of how and why these policy changes 
came into being and were translated into the subnational sphere (Jones and Newburn 2007; 
Kingdon 1995). Thus, the research aimed to generate knowledge on the nature and extent of 
convergence and divergence, and under what conditions policy responses are resisted and 
reworked across two national and local ‘geo-historical’ contexts (Edwards and Hughes 2005). 
 
 
4.3 Research Strategy 
 
4.3.1 Towards a Critical Realist Framework in Comparative Research 
 
Before going on to discuss the particular qualities of the research design, I shall first account 
for the overall research strategy broadly guiding the study which draws upon ideas associated 
with critical realism. 
In carving out an appropriate research strategy and design for the comparative 
research, it was important to recognise the pitfalls of the traditionally constructed dichotomy 
between searching for generality and specificity, or ‘nomothetic’ and ‘idiographic’ 
explanations, which have tendencies to root themselves to the epistemological positions of 
positivism and interpretivism respectively. However, these orientations and approaches 
experience distinctive problems30 specifically in relation to comparative case study research. 
On the one hand, ‘nomothetic’ explanations ‘…necessarily obviate contextual understanding 
of the uneven, diverse and therefore non-general qualities of social objects’ (Edwards and 
Hughes 2005:348, emphasis in original), and ‘idiographic’ explanations are so contextually 
                                                          
30 Moreover, these issues are intimately connected to methodological approaches and how best to 
capture social phenomenon. Broadly, the problem with positivism is that by not recognising the 
socially and politically constructed nature of criminological research, such research falsely assumes 
that crime and its properties can be defined unproblematically and measured through particular types 
of methods (see Sherman et al. 1998; Farrington and Petrosino 2001; Sherman 2009). Best knowledge 
is purported to be generated through methodological rigour, to remove subjective bias through 
emulation of natural scientific methods. However, as Hope (2009) and Tilley (2009) point to, an illusion 
is created about the social world which fails to take account of the methodological framing of social 
phenomenon. We therefore have to recognise how methods such as the RCT are themselves socially 
constructed as a method of knowing and question the conditions of its existence. On the other hand, 
however, the problem with an interpretivist approach is that treating everything as context-dependent 
and ‘random’ (in the sense of not being able to draw general conclusions) avoids issues of structural 
relations. Thus, the notion of cross-national research is inherently problematic, with researchers faced 
with the impossible task of attempting to find a common referent which gravitates beyond the unique 
tendencies of specific cultures and individuals in constructing reality (Sheptycki 2005). 
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relative that comparisons are inevitably limited to the specific qualities of a given location or 
culture. 
In order to move beyond these static boundaries, the study broadly aligned itself with 
a critical realist position which attempts to understand the ‘diverse determinations’ of social 
phenomena (Marx 1857/1973). This is made possible through the acceptance of two key 
facets: first, that there is an objective ‘intransitive’ reality of social structures, relations and 
phenomenon; and second, that we must take account of the ‘open systems’ of the social 
world in which the landscape is not only constantly shifting and producing variegated 
conditions of human existence, but so too are our experiences and conceptualisations of it 
(Sayer 2000; Bhaskar 1978). In this latter sense, a critical realist position does not claim 
objectivity in the representations it constructs, but rather that they are ‘second best’ 
interpretations of extremely complex realities. 
Instead of focussing on the search for generality or specificity, the task of this 
research was to illuminate the messy contingencies of policy development emanating in 
particular geo-historical contexts that exist within broadly similar social, economic and 
political structural shifts (Sayer 2000; Edwards and Hughes 2005). This was supported 
through identifying factors and mechanisms which influence how policy is understood and 
performed by differing actors and agencies within particular structural frames of acting. 
Demonstrating this, previous chapters (2 and 3) argued that both countries have 
experienced similar broad forces associated with a transition to late-modernity (such as 
migration and technological change which have facilitated new ‘threats’ to state sovereignty 
in cannabis control) which have contributed towards a more expressive and politicised 
approach to cannabis policy. However, in the Netherlands such tendencies hold more 
potential to become ‘mellowed out’  (or even be more punitive) at a subnational level due to 
the combinations of political representation found at the municipal level and greater abilities 
to shape cannabis policy than is found in England & Wales. This glimpse at a core research 
finding also demonstrates the value of moving beyond state-centric research, to go beneath 
the surface to examine how issues are contested and resolved between competing actors at 
national and subnational levels of governance. 
 
 
4.3.2 An ‘Adaptive’ Approach to the Theory-Method Relationship 
 
Following the notions set out by Bottoms (2008) that engagement with both theory and the 
real world is inevitable and necessary, Layder’s (1993:203) development of ‘adaptive theory’ 
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is useful for this purpose, which sees ‘…general theories as potentially open, revisable and 
partial discourses rather than ones which are perfected, closed and hermetically sealed’. 
Adaptive theory provides a middle ground between inductivism and deductivism and 
can be considered as ‘middle-range’ in that ’…its primary focus is on a set of activities (or 
events) and the social relations and organization which constitute its immediate 
environment’ (Layder 1998:148). In this sense, theoretical notions can be treated as a 
‘scaffold’ which is open to change and adaption based upon the generation of new data. 
Within this, the nature of adaptive theory is variable, and as such, includes concepts, 
conceptual clusters/networks/frameworks, and typological models. Each grouping reflects 
the extent of theorising, with concepts being used as the essential building blocks emanating 
from coded data or borrowed from existing theoretical frameworks. 
Relating these ideas to this study, Garland’s culture of control is treated as a master 
theoretical scaffold. A key component of the culture of control thesis is that the process of 
making policy has become based less upon expert liberal ‘platonic guardians’, and more upon 
a knee-jerk reactionary style emanating from the ‘electoral anxieties’ linked to the purported 
growth of populist punitivism (Garland 2001; Loader 2006). Although the creation of policy 
has received relatively little attention within criminology, with preference usually to look at 
the effects of legislation, it is an area which is growing in importance to understand how and 
why policy takes the direction it does (Jones and Newburn 2007). Given the relative lack of 
criminological precedents, there has been a tendency to borrow conceptual frameworks from 
political science. Rather than taking the substantive manifestations of policy at its face value, 
Jones and Newburn (2002:180) set out a distinction between policy ‘process’ and ‘levels’: 
 
‘First, it is important to emphasise that policy making is a process involving a number of 
analytically distinct elements. Second, policy can be considered substantively at a number of 
different ‘levels’… [t]hese may range from ideas and rhetoric on the one hand to more 
concrete manifestations such as instruments and practices on the other.’ 
 
To empirically and critically build upon Garland’s grand narrative, the research utilised two 
‘middle-range’ analytical frameworks which took into account both of these aspects. The 
empirical groundwork is based upon the policy levels of talk and decisions, whilst Kingdon’s 
(1995) Multiple Streams model of the policy process is used as an organising framework of 
the analysis to understand how policy was both made and translated across and within nation 
states. By doing so, it was possible to decipher the nature and extent to which both 
jurisdictions (nationally) have converged around non-adaptive strategies of crime control. 
The findings critically built upon Garland’s culture of control theory through the indicative 
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identification of factors and mechanisms which facilitated, mediated, or resisted such 
tendencies between this level and the subnational level. In terms of building upon, and 
raising further questions, about the two analytical models, Chapter 8 further discusses this 
element and a number of issues that came to the fore during the research. Next, I discuss in 
more depth these two analytical frameworks. 
 
 
4.3.3 Analytical Frameworks: Policy Levels and Process 
 
Policy Levels: Talk, Decisions, and Action 
 
Often in criminology there are assumptions held about what policy is, and this unhelpfully 
lumps together actors, agencies, discourses and social behaviour into one category. However, 
policy can be demarcated in various ways with a main difference posited between the ideas 
and substance, or politics and administration, of a policy (Brunsson 1989; Jones and Newburn 
2002; 2007; Colebatch 2002). A useful framework for taking forward this divide has been 
developed by Brunsson (1989), and later Pollitt (2001), who suggest that policy can be 
distinguished in terms of policy as talk (rhetoric and symbolism), policy as decisions (concrete 
manifestations of policy such as legislation), and policy as action (the behaviour of those 
implementing policy ‘on the ground’). 
 When considering what is operationally meant by these different policy levels, it is 
worth providing some clarity. In some ways, empowered actors involved in all realms of 
policy are capable of producing policy talk, decisions, and action. Taking a literal definition of 
these terms, and we can observe that local practitioners are just as able to produce policy 
talk as much as a politician. For example, within the local sphere of governance in the 
Netherlands, council members are capable of decision-making in crafting local cannabis policy 
and there was certainly strong evidence of counter-talk in opposing national measures. 
Moreover, the concept of ‘action’ could also be taken at any level of governance, be that 
local, national or international. For example, action concerning the 2009 reclassification at a 
national level could consider the actions of national police services, such as the now defunct 
Serious and Organised Crime Agency. 
Whilst the inclusion of all three of these components is a desirable task, given 
practical limitations in conducting research it is always necessary to bracket off lines of 
inquiry to ensure a rigorous study within finite time and resources. The focus on policy talk 
and decisions was justified on the basis that the primary focus of the thesis was an 
examination of the policy making process, to test and examine how the features of a general 
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culture of control, and particularly non-adaptive strategies, have been felt, mitigated, or 
resisted across different national and subnational settings in the ways in which policy is made 
and translated. An in-depth examination of the policy process is fairly neglected in both 
Garland’s analysis and in wider accounts of drugs/cannabis policy which have tended to look 
at the effects of policy on issues such as drug prices, availability, and contact with the criminal 
justice system (e.g. May et al. 2007; MacCoun and Reuter 2001; WODC 2013; Shiner 2015).  
Whilst acknowledging that it would have been desirable to also empirically consider 
the implementation of cannabis policy, for the primary intentions of this study, in highlighting 
policy convergence and divergence, it sufficed to concentrate on the policy talk and decisions 
at a national and subnational level through the organising framework of the policy process. In 
this sense, this does not serve to either simply accept or reject Garland’s thesis, but the 
empirical focus was premised on being able to provide an in-depth perspective of how 
strategies of control are performed in variegated fashions. As will be demonstrated, this 
opens up a raft of identified factors which could be adopted in further research on policy 
action. 
The concentration on talk and decisions requires an important distinction to be 
made. The former is quite a broad concept, encompassing the ways in which social actors 
discuss and conceptualise policy. But to provide a more workable definition, the focus here is 
on the perspectives of those involved in the policy-making process, and includes political 
rhetoric and symbolism. This is an important component in relation to the policy process, in 
the sense of constructing cannabis as a policy problem and articulating preferred policy 
alternatives. For example, in the Netherlands, at a national level the talk was partially 
focussed on the issue of nuisance caused by foreigners. However, at a subnational level there 
was counter-talk which rejected this as a significant problem in the specific municipality. 
This contrasts with policy decisions which are taken as the ‘concrete manifestations’ 
of policy. Following Tregidga’s (2011:55, emphasis in original) distinction, this can further be 
clarified as ‘…tangible mechanisms of enforcement which necessitate some form of 
organisational and/or institutional compliance’. In the context of this study, this principally 
refers to the legislative changes of the 2009 reclassification in England & Wales, and the 
amendments to the public prosecutor’s guidelines in the Netherlands which formed the basis 
of comparison. Both decisions involved the granting of further powers to law enforcement 
agencies which were bestowed into existing laws (Misuse of Drugs Act 1971; Opium Act 
1976). 
Whilst the framework of talk, decisions, and action is not a perfect hermetically-
sealed device, and is open to interpretation and use in varying ways, it does provide a useful 
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analytic purpose in illuminating the existence of policy in a number of distinct ways, not only 
between these forms of policy at the same level of governance, but also between national 
and subnational tiers. Again, this is consistent with the broader critical realist approach, to 
generate empirical data on the multifaceted and contested shapes of policy that exists 
between different types of actors and across varying spatial and institutional contexts. 
The importance of policy level demarcation is that convergence between these 
different levels does not always exist uniformly, especially across different tiers of 
governance. In assessing the usefulness and explanatory power of macro theories such as the 
culture of control in explaining cannabis control, taking a prima facie perspective that surface 
changes in both England & Wales and the Netherlands represent a perpetuation of the 
punitive turn may only be capturing a partial element of policy change. As research in other 
areas has documented, the role of practitioners and institutions in resisting this punitive turn 
is very important (Cheliotis 2006; Fergusson 2007), thus creating, in Brunsson’s (1989) terms, 
‘hypocrisy’ between tough rhetoric and symbolism espoused by politicians, and the more 
pragmatic decisions of practitioners. 
 
 
Policy Process 
 
The substantive organising focus of the research is premised upon the policy ‘process’. It is 
acknowledged that a plethora of policy-making models exist in the literature which are 
relevant to drugs policy (Ritter and Bammer 2010; Monaghan 2011), including, 
‘incrementalism’ (Lindblom 1959; 1979); ‘technical/rational’ (Easton 1965; Bardach 2005); 
‘enlightenment’ (Weiss 1977); ‘evolutionary’ (Stevens 2007); and the ‘advocacy coalition 
framework’ (Sabatier 1988). 
However, in this research a different analytical device was used to try and capture 
the processes and events by which the two policy movements31 came into being, that of 
Kingdon’s (1995) Multiple Streams model. The selection of this model was based upon an 
acceptance that the policy process is complex and messy, and whilst approaches, such as the 
incremental and technical/rational, are useful in identifying a set of stages, these often fail to 
take into account the more ad hoc features of policy-making. Moreover, whilst the advocacy 
                                                          
31 An issue worth addressing from an analytic point of view is that there are two clear policy ‘moments’ 
that are being analysed in the Netherlands (changes under Rutte I and Rutte II due to trials and 
planned introduction dates) but only one in England & Wales. However, it is important to treat 
changes in both jurisdictions not simply as ‘moments’ that are static in time, but rather as policy 
‘movements’ and opportunities in which policy is made. In this way, the changes undertaken by Rutte 
II were heavily linked to the problems and solutions articulated in Rutte I and as such should be 
considered within the same ‘movement’. 
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coalition framework is a useful framework in establishing types of policy communities and 
the values which drive forward policy agendas (e.g. Monaghan 2011), there was a pragmatic 
element involved in choosing Kingdon in that the study was premised on two specific changes 
at particular moments in time, rather than the optimal period of observation of a ten year 
span which is suggested with the advocacy coalition framework (Sabatier 1988). Moreover, 
set within the context of testing and utilising the culture of control, which suggests that policy 
making has become less rational and more prone to policy swings and incident-driven 
agendas, Kingdon’s framework provided an apt device in which to represent the dynamic and 
sometimes unpredictable elements of the policy process. 
However, this is not to disregard the particular features of these models as they all 
contain useful components of the policy process and this is usefully captured with the 
Multiple Streams model. For example, the role of different sets of  ‘policy entrepreneurs’, 
which links with the notion of ‘advocacy coalitions’, in putting problems on to the agenda and 
resisting change was seen to be important. This element requires further clarity. It is argued 
throughout the thesis that policy development and change was partly triggered by the 
influence of two main oppositional positions on cannabis policy. There is of course a variety 
of positions and perspectives on cannabis policy which should be seen on a constantly 
shifting and mutating scale rather than a simplistic dichotomy. Such viewpoints emanate 
from a variety of different philosophies and values, such as liberalism, libertarianism, 
neoliberalism, conservatism, neoconservatism, social democracy etc. 
However, the broad polarisation of perspectives follows the findings across both 
jurisdictions that debates on cannabis policy were largely demarcated across two positions: 
those who supported the measures which strengthened current positions through the 
deployment of repressive measures; and those who positioned themselves against the policy 
changes. 
Returning to the Multiple Streams model, Kingdon suggests that there at least four 
processes involved in policy-making: agenda setting; specification of alternatives from which 
a choice is to be made; an authoritative choice among those specified alternatives; and 
implementation of the decision. Following Kingdon’s approach, this research focuses on the 
first three processes, on how the idea of reclassifying cannabis and the amendments to the 
prosecutor’s guidelines became accepted and advocated policy responses to a set of 
perceived problems within a politically feasible landscape. 
 Kingdon argues that policy change is most probable when three distinct ‘streams’ 
come together in critical ‘windows of opportunity’. First, is recognition of a problem to which 
a response is required. The construction of what is considered a problem is innately 
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important, as social phenomena in themselves are not necessarily problematic: ‘conditions 
become defined as problems when we come to believe that we should do something about 
them. Problems are not simply the conditions or external events themselves; there is also a 
perceptual, interpretative element’ (Kingdon 1995:109-110). Second, there is the formation 
and refining of policy proposals. Such ideas often exist independently of recognised 
problems, floating around in a ‘primeval soup’. When policy proposals meet a set of criteria, 
such as fitting with dominant values and are technically feasible, then the list of policy 
alternatives to recognised problems is narrowed down for selection. Finally, the ‘political’ 
stream consists of ‘…swings of national mood, vagaries of public opinion, election results, 
changes of administration, shifts in partisan or ideological distributions in [government], and 
interest group pressure campaigns’ (Kingdon 1995:87). When the political dimension 
combines with the problem and policy streams, the possibilities for policy change are greatly 
enhanced. Further detail on how this framework was adapted for data analysis is discussed in 
section 4.6. 
Although this model appears to be an apt device for capturing the processes existing 
at the level of policy change (i.e. national), it is important to clarify how the subnational level 
was incorporated into this framework for analysis. In essence, the focus was on how policy 
problems were perceived and constructed at a subnational level; how the measures enacted 
at a national level were supported, adapted or resisted in local policy arrangements; and the 
political factors which contributed towards this process. Importantly, this allowed the 
research to identify structural and cultural factors and mechanisms operating at different 
levels of governance which led to both the genesis of policy and translation into the 
subnational sphere. 
 
 
4.4 Research Design  
 
4.4.1 A Comparative Qualitative Case Study 
 
The comparative case study was chosen as a suitable research design through which to 
provide a dynamic examination of convergence and divergence in contemporary responses to 
cannabis. It is a hybrid mix of different elements to reflect the need to compare both across 
national contexts and within them (see Figure 4.1). There are many types of comparative 
designs to suit the needs of research projects, and given the nature of the study, the research 
took the form of a ‘focused comparison’ and a ‘most different’ technique which aimed to 
examine the applicability of theory in a range of contrasting settings (Pakes 2010). The case 
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study element is useful in order to ‘…uncover multiple layers of meaning and subtlety’ 
(Heidensohn 2008:208) in how and why particular policy responses developed as they did 
(Yin 2014). As Schramm’s (1971, in Yin 2014:15) definition suggests, ‘…the central tendency 
among all types of case study, is that it tries to illuminate a decision or set of decisions: why 
they were taken, how they were implemented, and with what result’. As noted, given the 
dual nature of the research in both comparing across and within jurisdictions, the design is a 
‘multiple-embedded case study’ (Yin 2014). 
Thus, through building an empirical representation of how policy was both created 
and translated at different levels in specific localities in different countries, it is possible to 
clarify and build upon Garland’s culture of control thesis to take account of mechanisms 
which, for example, support or resist a shift towards populist punitivism. The purpose of the 
study then is not to generalise or be representative of a given population, but instead to 
generalise back to theories of punitive and adaptive cultures of control. This resonates with 
Stenson and Edwards’ (2004:219) suggestion that there is a ‘…need for further accounts of 
the uneven ways in which political rationalities and governmental technologies are 
configured in different localities by competing coalitions of actors’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Another important dimension of the research design is that because it is focussed on the 
relationship between policies created at a national level and translated (back) to a local level, 
there is a potential danger of obviating governance above the state as a potential catalyst for 
change and development in cannabis control. Whilst it would be favourable to have a truly 
multi-level governance study, given the scope and nature of the project there inevitably has 
to be a cut-off line. That said, European/international influence was an important, and a 
somewhat fundamental, component of the policy process (in the sense of ‘technical 
feasibility’ and international pressure). As such, participants’ reflections on this sphere were 
England & 
Wales 
The 
Netherlands 
Cardiff Utrecht 
Figure 4.1 Comparative Case Study Design 
79 
considered as part of the analysis as an influential factor upon national and subnational 
decision-making. 
 
 
4.4.2 Comparative Research: The Researcher Role and Issues of Interpretation and 
‘Translation’ 
 
In conducting comparative research there are several aspects that need to be accounted for. 
Most pressing is how researchers attempt to understand and interpret social structures, 
agency and meaning in a foreign country. Of course, such issues are not specific to 
comparative research, but are particularly enhanced by cross-national research. 
In terms of how one approaches the field of study in comparative research, a primary 
concern is how to define and measure crime and its control and the potential danger of 
assuming likeness through concepts used across different countries (Lacey and Zedner 1995; 
1998). Similarly, Cain (2000) draws attention to two common dangers in comparative 
research; that of ‘occidentalism’, of assuming a different society is necessarily like the host 
one, or that of ‘orientalism’, of assuming that they are fundamentally different.  
This can be further obscured through what Zedner (1995:13) calls ‘criminological 
tourism’: ‘[t]he danger is all the greater if one travels abroad with the same misty-eyed vision 
of the traveller who sees only the picturesque and the good’. This relates to the ‘role’ of the 
researcher (Heidensohn 2006; 2008), with some arguing that to truly understand a foreign 
culture it is necessary to embed oneself through ‘living there’ (Nelken 2007). A danger is that 
by simply ‘researching there’ there is the potential for misunderstanding and the over-
reliance on certain actors, as Franke’s (1990) critique of Downes (1988) illuminated. 
Moreover, these issues are compounded because researchers have to ‘translate’ 
conceptual tools and frameworks to a different country. Where the country uses a different 
language this presents significant issues of understanding, and consequentially, explanation 
(Pakes 2010). Melossi (2004:80) argues that ‘…the problem of comparison is first and 
foremost a problem of translation. ‘Translation’, however, strictly speaking is impossible. 
Conversation between different cultures is possible, but not translation from one to another’. 
But Heidensohn (2008) takes a more positive view, arguing that translation is at least partially 
possible, but it is the interpretation which is laden with danger. 
Many of the potential issues outlined above were mitigated due to a range of 
techniques employed in the research. This is not to say that the research was in any way 
perfect and un-criticisable, but that measures were taken to ensure that a rigorous study was 
conducted and meaningful comparisons made within available timescales and resources. 
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 In terms of what role was adopted, the most feasible was that of ‘researching there’.  
Consequentially, the research involved two substantive trips to the Netherlands for three 
months and one month respectively and this served a number of purposes. First, it allowed 
for initial contacts to be made in a country which was not wholly familiar to the researcher. 
Second, by punctuating the trips into multiple visits it gave greater flexibility to the project as 
a whole allowing for multi-tasking across a range of research activities. Finally, an advantage 
to this style of conducting research is that of corroboration. As trips abroad complemented 
periods of research ‘at home’, data fed off each other to produce more focussed lines of 
inquiry on trips. Moreover, with a significant amount of time between each research trip (5 
months), this gave the opportunity to reflect on the emerging themes of the data before 
returning for further fieldwork with both new participants and for several follow-up 
interviews. The second research trip also occurred immediately following a paper presented 
at the European Society of Criminology conference in which there was the opportunity to 
present with a panel (and audience) of Dutch academics, which provided further feedback 
and positive affirmation of the emerging analysis. 
 Whilst the language issue may have presented obvious difficulties, it was not seen to 
be a salient issue because of the wide-spread proficiency of English as a second language in 
the Netherlands. However, where encountering the Dutch language was unavoidable, as with 
the analysis of certain key documents, computer software was utilised to provide a broad 
translation of the main themes. These were then cross-referenced to other sources to check 
for authenticity, and aided by Dutch contacts to certify and clarify translations. In addressing 
issues relating to the use of culturally-specific concepts, the research had to take account of 
concepts constructed in the Netherlands, as they may represent different ways of framing the 
cannabis problem, thus having implications for its governance. Most obviously, the whole 
construction of gedoogbeleid is a concept loaded with meaning and history which is alien to 
those outside of the Netherlands, but significant attempts were made in understanding such 
concepts, both through a thorough reading of the literature, and through the interpretation 
and cross-corroboration of accounts given by participants. 
 The notion of corroboration was a fundamental aspect of the research, to pull 
together various actors to build a representation of the objects of social inquiry. As suggested 
earlier with regards to Downes’ work, Franke (1990) critiqued Downes on the basis of relying 
upon certain coalitions of actors which constructed a particular picture of the Dutch criminal 
justice system which perhaps did not fully reflect the Dutch response to crime. Thus, in 
‘touching base’ in another country, it was necessary to reflect critically on who the research is 
conducted with, and to attempt to gain ‘meaningful access’ across a range of participants 
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(Pakes 2010; Leishman 1999). This is further explored below in the section on ‘sampling’. But 
overall, the amount and quality of participants, coupled with cross-referencing to 
documentary sources, allowed the research to effectively off-set potential limitations of 
misunderstanding and misrepresentation. 
 
 
4.4.3 Case Selection 
 
The strategy behind selecting case sites was guided by the overall aim of critically assessing 
the extent of convergence and divergence around non-adaptive strategies of cannabis 
control. In this sense it was fruitful to include cases which both exemplified, and had the 
potential to resist, punitive tendencies. Following Pakes’ (2010) taxonomy of different ‘cases’, 
the Netherlands’ can be seen as a ‘deviant’ case, or in Yin’s (2014) terms, a ‘critical’ case. 
Much in the same spirit as Downes’ (1988) classic study, the Netherlands has followed an 
alternative path in responding to cannabis whilst seemingly having lower overall rates of use 
than England and Wales (see Room et al. 2008) – a broadly recognised goal of drugs policy. 
But with increasing tendencies across Europe and in the Netherlands to employ the punitive 
turn and culture of control discourse to describe developments in the landscape of crime 
control, this warranted an empirical investigation to shed light on the nature and extent to 
which they have experienced a punitive shift in cannabis control as evidenced in recent shifts 
in policy at the national level. England & Wales on the other hand can be seen as an 
‘exemplary’ case, having been used as one of the cases in Garland’s own work, and again the 
recent changes at the national level seem to indicate the applicability of the culture of control 
in explaining developments. 
 However, this is not to suggest that this implicitly suggests a ‘top-down’ approach in 
the formation of policy, and it is important to recognise the opportunities for policies to 
travel ‘upwards’. Indeed it is possible for policies to travel between the local without 
surfacing at the national, or for practices at a local level to turn into national policy (Stenson 
and Edwards 2004). This aspect is very pertinent in cannabis policy across England & Wales 
and the Netherlands. Much of the Dutch approach is based initially upon local practices 
before being made national policy (e.g. the gedoogbeleid), whilst in England & Wales there 
appears to be a much firmer centralised control from the Home Office. So, to take account of 
such factors situated at a subnational level is a component that is necessary in understanding 
the nature of the policy process. 
As such, the research chose two sites of local governance (municipality/local 
authority area) within both national jurisdictions: Utrecht from the Netherlands, and Cardiff 
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from England & Wales. Similar to the selection process for the national comparison, these 
case sites were chosen on the basis of being potentially ‘deviant’ cases in which to test and 
clarify the culture of control thesis. The municipality of Utrecht, which at the time of writing 
had 13 operating coffeeshops and is located relatively centrally in the country, poses 
interesting questions with regards to the research agenda. One of the main justifications for 
the introduction of new stricter coffeeshop measures was as a means to remove nuisance 
created by drug tourism. As Utrecht is not located near where such activity is likely to occur, 
it begged the question of how these new regulations were accepted or resisted by local policy 
administrators. Furthermore, Utrecht has a strong liberal (left-wing) political tradition, and as 
such served as an interesting case to examine the relationship between a firm left-wing 
municipal council, and the more right-wing national cabinet of Rutte I where the initial 
measures were introduced. 
In comparing cannabis policy between national and subnational levels of governance, 
it is necessary to recognise the often chaotic and ‘messy’ realities of condensing the social 
world into two simplistic heuristic categories. The analysis becomes particularly tricky in 
relation to the United Kingdom when considering the fact that its constitutive members have 
varying degrees of devolved powers. The coupling of England & Wales as a ‘national’ polity 
(and omitting Scotland and Northern Ireland) has been justified on the basis of these 
jurisdictions sharing the same legal system and are often grouped together in analyses of 
criminal justice processes (such as Downes’ seminal study).  
An exploration of how cannabis policy unfolds in other partially devolved polities 
within the United Kingdom would be an interesting and worthy endeavour, especially given 
that Scotland has a separate criminal justice system and Northern Ireland has distinct powers 
in some areas such as policing. In relation to the changes in cannabis classification over the 
past decade, although both legislative changes also applied in Northern Ireland and Scotland, 
there were less formal changes to out-of-court policing arrangements. For example, in 
Northern Ireland, a recorded possession offence leads to a reporting to the Public 
Prosecution Service, and in Scotland, it is referred to the Procurator Fiscal. In both cases 
following a police report, these bodies determine whether the offence should lead to a 
caution or prosecution (Stevenson 2012). 
Bearing in mind that the primary purpose of the research was to assess how a culture 
of control unfolds across and within different jurisdictions, it was necessary to draw some 
boundaries of scope. A specific focus on England and Wales served this function well, but 
leaves a space for further research to explore convergence and divergence amongst UK 
polities, which is an area lacking in empirical research.  
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Although criminal justice matters remain a non-devolved aspect of Welsh 
governance, meaning that the changes in law and to policing guidelines applied equally 
across Wales, other major aspects pertaining to cannabis and ‘substance misuse’ have been 
devolved since the Government of Wales Act 2006. These include health, education, social 
welfare, housing and local government, and since a referendum in 2011, the Welsh 
Government has the capability of full legislative powers in these areas. The Welsh emphasis 
on substance misuse as primarily an issue of public health and not criminal justice suggests 
that at least at the level of talk and decisions, there lies potential for policy to be reworked 
through more adaptive strategies of control.  
Moreover, it has also been noted that Wales attempts to construct nation-building 
around more socially democratic values than in England (Drakeford and Gregory 2011; 
Mooney and Williams 2006; Rees 2005); again, serving as a critical site of potential resistance 
against more punitive measures. As such, Cardiff offered an interesting case site for the 
research as it is the capital of Wales and is a centre for political activity. As such, to 
understand the role of the subnational level in relation to the change in classification, we 
have to recognise that Wales is a site of policy-making as well as the specific local authority 
case site, and these are grouped together under the analysis of the subnational policy 
streams. Whilst this is not a perfect fit, such a definition serves the purpose of exploring 
policy convergence and divergence from the ‘national’ level of criminal justice policy-making.  
 A final element of case selection that was considered was the particular policy 
developments which were subject to empirical examination. Arguably, it may have been 
preferable to include a wider range of policy changes, either within the same area spread 
over a longer period of time, or several differing policy movements across the criminal justice 
sphere (exemplified in the work of Jones and Newburn 2007). However, there was a 
conscious decision to narrow the line of inquiry to the two specific policy movements in 
cannabis policy in England & Wales and the Netherlands.  
This was done for several reasons: first, that drugs, and cannabis, policy was a heavily 
implicated but under-examined topic in The Culture of Control (O’Malley 2002). Second, that 
a focus on two specific policy movements facilitated a more rigorous and in-depth empirical 
analysis to be possible, thereby allowing the research to cover in much greater depth the 
processes of policy change and the ways in which jurisdictions adapted to ‘…the new risks, 
insecurities and opportunities’ apparent in cannabis policy (Garland 2004:179). A broader 
scope of empirical inquiry would have potentially led to the thinning of analysis, and so depth 
was chosen over breadth in order to more robustly account for the specificities surrounding 
the policy changes. The purpose then, was not to abstract to other policy movements, but to 
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critically examine the possibilities and constraints in how cultures of control manifest 
themselves. However, this is not to discount the broader picture, which has been covered in 
some depth in the preceding chapter and alerts us to the broader trajectories of cannabis 
control. Third, both changes indicated the appearance of non-adaptive strategies of control 
at a surface level (as they both introduced stricter measures of control) thus serving as 
‘exemplary’ cases to test and apply the culture of control thesis. Finally, being the most up-
to-date policy movements, it allowed the research to build upon existing analyses which had 
not considered these changes (e.g. Downes and van Swaaningen 2007; Shiner 2015).  
Such a narrow focus does not serve to reduce the importance of the findings, but 
sufficed in fulfilling the primary purpose of examining processes of policy-making and how 
different geopolitical spaces manage policy change. The findings can therefore be used to 
further test, explore and critique how a range of policy movements are experienced across 
different governable places. 
 
 
4.5 Research Methods 
 
Following the research strategy outlined above, data generation methods were selected on 
their suitability to the research questions and the nature of the object studied. This 
principally involved conducting a series of elite semi-structured interviews with 62 
stakeholders in the cannabis policy network and an analysis of key policy documents. Thus, 
the interviews and documents provided valuable data about the talk and decisions of 
national and subnational agenda setting in the sense of how cannabis was problematised, 
policy alternatives selected (or resisted), and political negotiations resolved. 
 
 
4.5.1 Elite Semi-Structured Interviews 
 
In researching those involved in the creation and management of policy, there are a number 
of considerations worth paying attention to. Individuals involved in such endeavours have 
varied and privileged positions in terms of relations of power which presents unique 
challenges in researching these types of social actors. In defining what ‘elites’ are, Lilleker 
(2003:207) notes that ‘[e]lites can be loosely defined as those with close proximity to power 
or policymaking’. However, it is also important to recognise the varying degrees of power 
within elites, as there are ‘…important intersections among different types of elites, as well as 
between elites and other groups’ (Odendahl and Shaw 2002). The recognition of different 
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types of elites is an important one as the research also incorporated individuals who, 
although not directly in positions of power relating to the policy changes, could still be 
considered elite by virtue of their knowledge and contribution to policy debates. Most of the 
participants involved in the study fall into this broad definition, but it is also pertinent to note 
individuals who, whilst still holding positions of power (e.g. police officers), are distinctly 
different to other participants (e.g. politicians).  
There are three important stages in conducting elite interviews: sampling and access, 
the ‘doing’ of the interview, and the writing-up of the data. Each stage entails a number of 
pitfalls and considerations which will each briefly be considered before outlining how the 
research was actually conducted. 
 
 
Sampling and Access 
 
First, in terms of ‘getting in the door’, the very nature of elite respondents makes it difficult 
to gain access for an interview. Often those in positions of power have busy schedules and 
may be sceptical of researchers (Morris 2009). Furthermore, because there are a select 
number of elites in a given policy network, failure to access the key players could result in 
weaker data.  
The selection and invitation process for participants was based upon a logical 
strategy of purposive and reputational sampling followed by a process of snowballing. First, 
organisations and individuals from relevant ‘policy networks’ that were either directly 
involved or informed about the recent legislative changes in both jurisdictions at both 
national and local levels were identified based upon the literature (Cope 2001). The sampling 
strategy attempted to identify and include those representing a wide spectrum of 
perspectives, including those who supported and opposed the policy measures. 
Individuals were then sent formal emails or letters inviting their participation in the 
research. However, this is not to suggest a clean and neat process, because as Odendahl and 
Shaw (2002:305) suggest, such sampling techniques involve ‘…a mixture of ingenuity, social 
skills, contacts, careful negotiation, and circumstance’. In addition to formally identified 
individuals, participants were accessed through personal contacts as well as established 
academic and policy networks. 
Overall, a fairly balanced mix of participant types was attained in both countries. At a 
national level32, this included acting and former politicians, civil servants from key 
                                                          
32 A distinction is made here between participants considered to exist at either a ‘national’ or 
‘subnational’ level. The distinction is premised on the nature of participants in the sense of being 
86 
departments33, policy advocates from third-sector organisations and ‘think tanks’, expert 
committee members (from van der Donk; Garretsen; ACMD), and academics from the 
broader academic community who are relevant specialists in the drugs policy field. In total, 
there were 18 participants from England & Wales, and 24 from the Netherlands at this level. 
 At a subnational level, participants came from various backgrounds which reflected 
the differentiated nature of ‘doing’ cannabis policy. In the Netherlands, this included 
representation from the police, public prosecutor’s office, local politicians and alderman, and 
a member of the social cannabis club organisation. In a similar fashion, in the Welsh setting, 
there were representatives from the Welsh Government both as political figures and civil 
servants, as well as police officers, health representatives from the council and a third-sector 
drugs practitioner. In total, there were 9 participants from England & Wales, and 11 from the 
Netherlands (see Table 4.1 in Appendix for summary of participants). It is worth adding that 
although only current or most recent former position is reported, participants often had 
many years of experience spanning multiple organisations and sectors. In terms of how 
participants were represented in the writing-up, an anonymising participant key was used to 
indicate key attributes of their position (see Table 4.2a-c in Appendix). 
The exact spread of participant ‘positions’ is unclear due to the framing of the 
research around policy streams rather than advocacy coalitions which sometimes generated 
a lack of knowledge on the individual belief systems of participants. But from the numbers of 
those whose perspective was discernible, it was clear that individuals spanning a range of 
positions were represented in the research. 
 Whilst the technique of snowballing attracts similar criticism to how Downes 
conducted his study on the Netherlands, with insider participants potentially referring to like-
minded contacts, the more purposeful aspect of the sampling strategy to attract competing 
interests and actors served to off-set this. Moreover, the range of participants, working both 
inside governmental organisations and operating outside of it from different perspectives, 
helped to challenge and authenticate the various social constructions of participants. 
Interestingly, it was felt that this had been achieved more so in the Netherlands than in 
England & Wales, where access to governmental actors and prohibition advocates proved 
more difficult which is perhaps indicative of the closed nature of the debate in England & 
Wales. 
                                                                                                                                                                        
actors who primarily contribute towards policy discourses either at the level of England & Wales 
(national) or Wales and Cardiff (subnational). 
33 In the Netherlands, this included the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport; the Ministry of Security 
and Justice; and the Public Prosecutor’s Office. In England & Wales this included the Home Office. 
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However, being an ‘outsider’ in the Netherlands also seemed to be a distinct 
advantage, a lesser threat from a naïve foreigner wishing to learn about Dutch cannabis 
policy. This was epitomised by one particularly memorable experience where I was taken to a 
coffeeshop by a senior civil servant after the interview had concluded; such an event seems 
barely comprehensible in the UK. Another indication of such a difference was the length of 
time afforded for interviews in each country. In England & Wales, interviews ranged from 20 
minutes to 1 hour 30 minutes, with an average time of approximately 40 minutes. In the 
Netherlands, the shortest interview was approximately 45 minutes, the longest 2 hours, with 
the average interview lasting over an hour. 
 
 
Doing the Interviews 
 
Once access has been secured, there are further problems facing the researcher. A central 
issue of elite interviewing is that it is characterised by a switch of power from the elite to the 
researcher, which can lead to problems of elite respondents attempting to manoeuvre power 
by controlling the agenda (Burnham et al. 2004). Morris (2009) also raises the possibility of 
dishonest respondents. Due to the fact those in elite positions in society often have a public 
image to construct and sustain, there is a tendency for such actors to ‘skilfully employ tactics’ 
used in their everyday habitus to offset awkward questions and project images of events that 
they see as beneficial to themselves (Batteson and Ball 1995; Berry 2002).  
For the most part this did not appear to be an issue in the research, and particularly 
in the Netherlands there was an open willingness to discuss and defend participants’ views. 
However, in England & Wales there was some reluctance by some participants, particularly 
serving civil servants and politicians, who I felt were not truly open about particular subjects. 
Again, this perhaps reflects a core difference between the two jurisdictions which forms a key 
part of the policy process analysis chapters; that there is a restraining force within England & 
Wales which prevents individuals from putting their head ‘above the parapet’ [EW-P1], which 
is not the case in the Netherlands where the discussion is much more open. 
Additionally, elite individuals may have genuine issues of recall and given that 
participants were talking about events in the past, their accounts may be subjective post-hoc 
rationalisations. Given the raft of policy measures introduced in the Netherlands, and the 
technical mess created under the 2004 reclassification, it was not surprising that some issues 
lacked accuracy. However, the types of interview conducted, coupled with wider cross-
referencing and a ‘thematic’ style of analysis, meant that such issues were fairly well 
mitigated. Moreover, whilst there were some contestations about the nature of why policy 
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changes had occurred (e.g. reclassification as a correcting force vs. political deal for Gordon 
Brown), there was also plenty of instances of common ground found across actors from 
competing perspectives. This was particularly the case at the local level, when for example, 
there was agreement on the availability of cannabis in Cardiff, and the types of issues facing 
particular coffeeshops in one street in Utrecht. 
 Regarding the type of interviews used, a semi-structured format was used to allow 
for both focus and flexibility for participants (May 2001). Interview schedules were used as a 
means to direct the discussions and served as a marker for key issues to be covered when 
participants occasionally side-tracked. Whilst core components were covered across all 
interviews, the schedules were tailored according to the type of participant being interviewed 
to ensure that relevant and accurate representations were generated. In this sense, various 
parts of a much larger puzzle were pieced together, whilst simultaneously allowing for a 
questioning of participants’ perspectives across different interviews. In terms of the 
questions asked, these largely followed the organising framework of the policy process. 
Where relevant, participants were asked about how and why the policy changes had 
occurred, and the relationship between national and subnational levels of governance (see 
Table 4.3 in Appendix for an example). 
The strategy of punctuated research trips to the Netherlands interspersed with 
fieldwork in England & Wales had a clear advantage: the assumed naivety of my position as a 
foreign researcher granted access to territory which I had not originally even thought to have 
asked in England & Wales, which then initiated a reflective process of the fieldwork. This 
‘back-and-forth’ technique proved to be very useful in developing emerging findings but was 
also important for generating respondent validation. Whilst at the beginning of the first 
research trip the strategy was to take a more explorative approach, by the end of this trip and 
certainly in the second trip, there was a much clearer sense of my interpretations in which 
participants largely agreed with or offered further thoughts which were then used again to 
bolster the analysis. 
 This component was particularly useful given that the Dutch interviews were 
conducted through the medium of English. Almost all of the Dutch participants had an 
excellent grasp of English, and where some participants occasionally struggled, there were 
colleagues to assist. In addition to these techniques, the interviews were recorded and 
transcripts were provided to all Dutch participants to ensure that they had correctly said 
what they meant, again providing a mechanism to ensure validity. The vast majority had no 
comments to make, but some had minor alterations which were taken into consideration. 
This did raise an interesting question of whether what had been originally said could then be 
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used in terms of ethical procedures (see Warren 2002; Goldstein 2002), but overall the few 
amendments were rather negligible and did not affect the broader themes of the interview. 
 A final note to make about the conducting of interviews relates to the mode where 
there were some differences between England & Wales and the Netherlands. In England & 
Wales, most interviews at a national level were conducted via telephone (11/18), with the 
rest being conducted face-to-face. This contrasted with the Netherlands where all interviews 
were conducted face-to-face. This perhaps accounts for some of the differences in time 
afforded per interview in the different countries, as it was notably harder to establish rapport 
over the immediacy of a telephone interview, as opposed to visiting places and often securing 
vital pre-interview conversations which helped ‘loosen-up’ participants. Moreover, there is a 
more pressing point that the face-to-face interviews often produced richer insights, not least 
because I could see and read into participants’ body language and expressions, but also 
because they could do the same with me to feed off an enthusiasm which can be somewhat 
lacking in a telephone interview. 
 
 
4.5.2 Documentary Analysis 
 
Another important element of the methods used in the study was that of documentary 
analysis. Documents are published on a regular basis by state agencies regarding drugs and 
enforcement activities in both jurisdictions, but it is relevant to note that whilst crime control 
is a Home Office function which covers both England and Wales, there are different drug 
strategies for England and Wales as health is a devolved issue in the Welsh Government. With 
this in mind, a broad range of documents were reviewed and analysed. These included the 
most recent state drug strategies and official reports from advisory committees such as the 
Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs in England & Wales, and the van der Donk and 
Garretsen Commissions in the Netherlands. But in addition to this, specific documents 
pertaining to the policy changes were examined in more depth.  
In England & Wales, this included the announcement of the reclassification by the 
Home Secretary Jacqui Smith in the House of Commons on 7th May 2008 (House of Commons 
2008a); the Explanatory Memorandum to the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (Amendment) Order 
2008 which includes an ‘Impact Assessment’ (Home Office 2008a); the Home Office Circular 
001/2009 - Controlled Drugs: Reclassification of Cannabis (Home Office 2009); the 
Government Response to the Recommendations made by the Advisory Council on the Misuse 
of Drugs in its Report, Cannabis: Classification and Public Health (Home Office 2008b); and 
the ACPO Guidance on Cannabis Possession for Personal Use (ACPO 2009). 
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 In the Netherlands, four ‘drug letters’ formed the basis of the analysis which were 
central in the national dissemination of how and why new measures were being introduced. 
These were: the announcement of the Rutte I coalition agreement on coffeeshop policy on 
27th May 2011 (Tweede Kamer 2011a), two further drugs letters dated 26th October and 15th 
December 2011 which further clarified the new measures (Tweede Kamer 2011b; 2011c); and 
finally, the drugs letter of 19th November 2012 which outlined the revised coalition 
agreement on coffeeshops under Rutte II (Tweede Kamer 2012). Given that in the 
Netherlands the local level also publishes an explicit policy on coffeeshops, this also formed 
part of the analysis (Gemeente Utrecht 2013). 
The use of documents provided an account of the various ways in which policy is 
envisaged, constructed and performed at the national level. Documents are a valuable 
resource, often readily available to researchers and can provide an alternative insight into the 
meanings attached to particular policies. Documents do not simply reflect objective truths, 
but rather are situated accomplishments which are shaped by, and shape, other documents 
through ‘intertextuality’ (Atkinson and Coffey 2004; Prior 2004). In this sense, documents and 
narratives do not simply represent social realities, but also produce them. 
 In terms of potential weaknesses facing the use of documentary analysis in a 
comparative perspective, the main challenge was that most official documents published in 
the Netherlands are in Dutch. In responding to this problem as a non-Dutch speaker, it is 
helpful to recall Downes’ study on the Dutch penal system which has since been heralded as 
‘…a key contribution to comparative work’ (Heidensohn 2006:173). Downes, despite being 
unable to read or speak Dutch, produced an intricate insight into how social ‘shields’ 
protected the Dutch criminal justice system from expanding rapidly. He achieved all this 
whilst relying on accounts given by ‘key players’ and basing his study ‘…almost entirely on 
articles by Dutch lawyers and criminologists written or translated into English’ (Franke 
1990:82). But a key critique was that ‘[h]is selection of literature was determined not by what 
he wanted to know but rather by what was available in English’ (Ibid.).  
Thus, in order for this study to provide a more balanced account of how problems of 
cannabis and its control are produced and reworked, there needed to be some engagement 
with Dutch articles and documents. Returning to the issue of translation, much progress has 
occurred since Downes’ study in this area as well as the wide-spread availability of 
documents from various countries. Certainly the internet has been a key contributor to this, 
and coupled with a greater business ethos and professionalism of governments to openly 
publish documents, the task is considerably less burdensome than it was 30 years ago. 
Moreover, important Dutch documents are often produced with at least an English abstract, 
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and for major reports these are often officially translated. There appears to be a keen interest 
in policy-making circles to engage with the Anglophone world.  
In addition to several of the key documents being readily available in English, 
technological advancements have allowed for a growth in translation software, such as 
Google Translate, which in combination with access to virtual documents can allow for 
translation to occur in a relatively cheap and easy manner. Of course, a word of warning 
should be attached to the use of such software to translate highly technical documents from 
a country whose language is not widely spoken globally (in comparison to French and Spanish 
etc.). Some linguistic inaccuracies do occur in such translations and as such it is hard to 
examine the intrinsic meanings of the language used. However, this does not render the 
technique useless, as it still provides a surprisingly accurate representation of the broader 
themes embodied within the texts, and in combination with interviews of ‘key players’ and 
academic experts, it was possible to articulate these ideas against an audience from the host 
country who could help clarify any understandings made. 
Overall, the methods utilised facilitated a rigorous form of researcher interpretation 
and respondent validation through cross-corroboration of methods and accounts across 
punctuated periods of fieldwork across the two countries. 
 
 
4.6 Data Analysis 
 
As was noted earlier, a key aspect of the research strategy in interlacing theoretical and 
abstract notions with empirical observations and interpretations was the adoption of an 
adaptive strategy. Rather than suppose that there is a linear and passive relationship in data 
analysis, an important method was to continually reflect and build upon the findings 
throughout the duration of fieldwork and analysis. In this way, there was no clean or neat 
hypothesis-to-findings relationship (or vice versa), but rather that through using a theoretical 
scaffold to initially aid in interpretation, it was constantly reworked according to the 
emergent data.  
Once interviews had been conducted and documents gathered, they were 
transcribed and analysed through a thematic approach. One of the biggest issues this 
research faced was the sheer quantity and richness of data. The total number of interviews 
coupled with the average length of time per interview produced an abundance and 
overwhelming volume of data. Given this fact, the use of Computer Assisted Data Analysis 
Software (CAQDAS) may have been an obvious solution to categorising the data. Whilst being 
trained in the use of NVivo, I opted against the use of such software in preference for a 
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manual coding approach. There were two primary reasons for this. First, that the 
development of codes was a lengthy process initially involving trial and error to see how the 
data ‘spoke’ to each other. It was felt that if a software programme was used for coding and 
retrieving, not much time would have been saved as I would have had to recode the whole 
data set several times. But perhaps more importantly, there is a danger that the use of code-
and-retrieve programmes too easily fragments data and removes the context in which data 
originates (Fielding and Lee 1998). By manually reading through and coding the data using 
traditional methods it was felt that this provided a more connected approach to the data 
analysis, despite the lengthy process involved. 
The data analysis revolved around the main analytic framework of the policy process. 
From transcripts, the interview data were coded into three broad categories of the ‘problem 
stream’, ‘policy stream’, and ‘political stream’, and were demarcated according to national 
and subnational levels. This organising framework provided a useful imposed structure from 
which a more inductive style of analysis proceeded. For the policy process, smaller meta-
codes were again adapted from Kingdon (1995) in each stream. For the problem stream, the 
principal interest was in the ways in which cannabis had come to be defined as problematic 
and in need of a policy response. For the policy stream, there was an interest in the ‘political 
feasibility’, ‘technical feasibility’, and use of ‘research and expertise’. In the political stream, 
coding evolved around ‘changes in administration’, ‘organised political forces’, and the 
‘national mood’. Within these codes, and across the broad codes of the policy levels analysis, 
further codes were inductively generated and refined iteratively as the research progressed 
(see table 4.4 in Appendix for simplified example of coding and themes). Regarding the 
documents, a looser form of analysis was conducted which interlaced the main themes with 
those generated through the interviews. 
Once these stages of data analysis had concluded, the findings were then placed back 
into the broader theoretical propositions of the culture of control to delineate the extent to 
which such forces have been felt in this policy area and the nature of its existence. Thus, the 
use of Garland’s work was used as an orienting theoretical scaffold and then the analysis 
utilised middle-range frameworks as a means to test and clarify the conditions of the culture 
of control’s existence. Whilst never claiming to be a perfect research process, as inevitably it 
cannot be given the messy realities of doing research, a logical and rigorous procedure 
generated comparative and meaningful data which produced a solid set of findings. 
 
 
4.7 Ethical Considerations 
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Ethics within criminological research is an important dimension which requires careful 
delineation. The nature of this study largely insulated itself from ethical quandaries due to 
the characteristics of participants and the type of work being done. However, there still 
remained important ethical issues which needed to be addressed to ensure principles of 
criminological research were abided by. Given that this research was concerned with ‘elite 
key players’ in the cannabis policy network, it was important to leave the field with the 
discipline of criminology intact, and thus not close off potential gateways for future research 
and access to influential paths of dissemination. A further important ethical dimension is the 
‘…responsibility to ensure that the physical, social and psychological well-being of an 
individual participating in research is not adversely affected by participation in the research’ 
(British Society of Criminology 2006). This was particularly important for those participants 
who are in the public eye, such as national and local politicians. A final major ethical issue 
within the research regards the nature of informed consent. Again, as participants are in 
positions of considerable power, there was a need to recognise how the research was 
presented to participants, and what they were consenting to participate in. 
With these issues in mind, several steps were taken in the research to abide by 
‘procedural ethics’ and to form a base for ‘ethics in practice’ (Guillemin and Gillam 2004). This 
study was granted ethical approval by Cardiff University’s School of Social Sciences Research 
Ethics Committee and follows the guidelines outlined by the British Society of Criminology. 
Contained within such procedures are agreements made by the researcher to not be 
deceptive about the work being undertaken, and to protect those involved in research. 
Participants were given an outline of the research prior to an interview taking place 
with the opportunity for any issues to be clarified in advance. Within the interview, before 
engaging in dialogue, the research project was again outlined with details given of how the 
interviews would be used. Participants then gave their oral consent to partake in the research 
and to have the interview digitally recorded. Whilst gaining written consent is considered the 
norm, this was not felt to be a productive mechanism given the power relations involved in 
elite interviewing. Such participants are often well versed in the interview process and as 
such it would serve more as a hindrance than an aid. 
For the vast majority of participants, the recording of interviews did not present any 
problems, but for two participants, notably one serving, and one former civil servant in 
England & Wales, there was hesitation about the nature of recording and what would happen 
with the data. To offset such fears, transcripts were provided to these participants and as 
noted earlier, transcripts were provided to all Dutch participants. Additionally, informal 
agreements were made that prior to the submission of the thesis, concerned participants 
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would be given an advance copy of extracts where their direct quotes had been used to 
ensure that they did not feel their views had been misrepresented. 
In terms of confidentiality, the research referred to participants in the text by an 
anonymising position reference. However, some participants, who due to the nature of their 
public position, may be identifiable either at a national level or at a local level. Where this is 
the case, further consent was granted by the ethics committee to allow for non-anonymised 
data on the basis that such individuals publicly offer their views on the subject matter and 
would therefore not suffer any harm as a result of the research. 
 
 
4.8 Summary 
 
The purpose of this chapter has been to outline the approach adopted with regards to the 
relationship between theory and method. It has been suggested that research entails the 
recognition of several interlinking parts which contribute to an overall approach which is 
suitable for the object of social inquiry and research questions posed. The primary objective 
of this research was to examine the nature and extent of convergence and divergence in 
cannabis policy to assess how a purported culture of control unfolds across and within two 
advanced Western European countries. This was done by looking at the policy process in 
respect of recent changes to cannabis policy in England & Wales and the Netherlands, both in 
how policy came into fruition at a national level, and how it was supported, resisted and 
reworked at a subnational level. 
 A broad critical realist position has been advocated as a useful orienting framework in 
which to appreciate the structural and cultural factors which condition how policy is created 
and translated. Appropriate methods of elite semi-structured interviews and documentary 
analysis were utilised to test the propositions that there was both inter- and intra-national 
convergence and divergence. Through an ‘adaptive’ approach, the findings were then used to 
test, build and clarify the broader ‘theoretical scaffold’ of Garland’s culture of control. This 
allowed the research to provide a more nuanced understanding of the complex realities of 
policy-making which are mediated differently across varying settings. Following this outline, 
the analysis chapters are based upon the comparative matrix which examines the policy 
process within each jurisdiction, before turning to a cross-case analysis across all the cases. 
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Chapter V 
The Policy Process in England & Wales 
 
‘…the 2009 one was going back to the default position of being moronic on drugs policies by all 
politicians, cowardice eventually took over. If you understand that political decisions are taken on the 
basis of perception, often very false perception, prejudice, and pressure. These are the three P’s of 
political decision-making, and the perception by law-makers was that they would be punished in the 
polls if they were seen to be soft on drugs and they would be rewarded if they were to be seen as tough 
on drugs.’ (EW-P2: Labour MP, Wales) 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The structure of the chapter follows a comparison between the national and subnational34 
levels of governance based upon the problem, policy and political streams. As with the 
following chapter, this substantive analysis of the policy process in England & Wales 
addresses three of the study’s research questions: to establish how the reclassification came 
into being (RQ1); to examine the extent of policy convergence and/or divergence between 
national and subnational levels of governance (RQ2); and to preliminarily identify factors and 
mechanisms which conditioned this policy response (RQ4). For a key denoting participant 
positions, please refer to Table 4.2b in the Appendix. But before turning to this intra-national 
comparative analysis, it is first worth briefly outlining the empirical focus, the change in 
cannabis classification from Class C to Class B that occurred in 2009. 
 
 
5.2 The Reclassification to Class B in 2009 
 
The 2009 reclassification to Class B was the reversal of a decision by the same government to 
reclassify cannabis downwards to Class C only 5 years previously. The 2009 reclassification 
instigated a number of changes. Primarily, the change in classification affected the maximum 
penalties that could be given for cannabis offences. For possession, the maximum penalty on 
indictment increased from 2 to 5 years with an increase in possible magistrate’s fine from 
£1000 to £2500; and for production and supply offences, the maximum penalties on 
summary conviction were up-tariffed from 3 months and/or a £2500 fine to 6 months and/or 
a £5000, with maximum penalties on indictment remaining unaltered (up to 14 years 
imprisonment and/or an unlimited fine) (Home Office 2009). 
                                                          
34 ‘National’ here refers to England & Wales as a single polity, whilst ‘subnational’ refers to both Wales 
as a distinct polity from ‘England & Wales’ and Cardiff as a local case site (see Chapter 4). 
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In addition to these changes, and in accordance with Jacqui Smith’s desire for an 
escalated approach towards cannabis possession offences, the Association of Chief Police 
Officers (ACPO) introduced revised policing guidelines which intended to affect how police 
officers would deal and record simple possession offences. Notably, for adults, Cannabis 
Warnings were retained as an out-of-court disposal, but in addition to this was the 
introduction of a Penalty Notice for Disorder (PND). Below sets out the escalated approach: 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
The changes outlined above all relate to a stricter process for adult offenders, but extremely 
significant is the fact that no changes were made in relation to young people: ‘…no change is 
proposed in the enforcement regime towards individuals under 18 years of age’ (Home Office 
2008a:10). 
 Thus, the change in reclassification, which as will be seen was predicated on both 
protecting youth and tackling ‘cannabis factories’, predominantly targeted adult users 
through a more expansive use of police and criminal justice powers, and did little to alter 
existing police mechanisms in tackling commercial cultivation. This seems to suggest a large 
degree of divergence between the symbolic rhetoric embodied in the policy talk, and the 
actual manifested decisions. Therefore, the change in classification appears to have been 
premised more upon its tokenistic appeal to be dealing with a set of problems rather than to 
resolve the policy concerns. But that said, the changes that were made do have 
consequences for the policy action of cannabis control, with the potential of ‘extending the 
net’ of cannabis users caught up in the criminal justice system. 
 The particular facets of the reclassification outlined above bear importance in further 
sections and support the main contention that the decision was predominantly a political 
move to establish the credentials of an incoming Prime Minister. This is not to say that 
problems did not, and do not, exist in relation to cannabis, but rather that the reclassification 
did little to address these set of concerns and nor was it really intended to do so. It is to the 
construction of cannabis as a policy problem at the national level which we turn to first. 
 
 
Cannabis Warning 
PND 
Arrest 
Figure 5.1 Escalation Policy. Source: ACPO (2006; 2009) 
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5.3 The Problem Stream 
 
5.3.1 The National35 Problem Stream 
 
As highlighted in Chapter 3, cannabis has been constructed as a problem for a considerable 
period of time prior to the 2009 reclassification and so it is important to recognise that 
problem definition is comprised of both immediate factors, such as ‘focussing events, crises 
and symbols’ (Kingdon 1995), as well as more longstanding perceptions and obligations 
towards illicit drugs (for example, international conventions and the historical criminalisation 
of cannabis). The analysis highlighted the construction of cannabis as a problem in three main 
areas at the national level: as a criminal justice problem, a health problem, and a social and 
moral problem. At times these problems interlinked, but at other times these issues operated 
rather more independently. Such developments ‘fertilised the ground’ (Kingdon 1995) for 
policy alternatives and political drivers to take shape, ultimately facilitating the decision to 
reverse the previous reclassification back to Class B. 
 
 
Cannabis as a Criminal Justice Problem 
 
The first area in which cannabis became problematised was in relation to the sense of a 
threat to social order. One of the main themes that arose was the legacy of the 2004 
reclassification which left the public and police largely confused about its legal status. This fed 
in to a wider perception that the reclassification was a mistake and had failed, thus 
constructing a new problem. Alongside these developments was a noted change in cannabis 
cultivation, whereby there was a reported increase in the scale of so-called ‘cannabis 
factories’36 which were linked with organised criminal networks. Prevailing narratives centred 
on the infiltration of such ‘external threats’, thus adding to the sense that cannabis had 
become indefensible, widespread and dangerous.  
The way in which the 2004 reclassification occurred is of significant importance to 
later developments. As noted in Chapter 3, an influential factor in lending support for the 
downwards reclassification was the ‘Lambeth experiment’. However, it was noted that the 
responsible commander, Brian Paddick, conducted this experiment without the full-support 
                                                          
35 National here refers to the jurisdiction of England & Wales overall. 
36 Intensive large-scale cultivation sites. 
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of senior officers in the Metropolitan police37. Without this support, the police had no overall 
consensus on the issue, which thus contributed to antagonism from the police towards full 
implementation38. The evidence of the ‘Lambeth experiment’ was quickly picked up by the 
Home Secretary David Blunkett and used as a justification to reclassify to Class C. However, 
the actual involvement of ACPO in these discussions was limited: 
 
‘…we are sitting outside the Home Office waiting to be pulled in there… we hadn’t had much 
part to play, and it was basically told, right tomorrow we don’t want to embarrass you, 
tomorrow there is going to be an announcement in the House about the reclassification of 
cannabis… I remember saying to the minister, look we haven’t really been engaged on this, is 
it really worth me trying to challenge that? And he was like, no it’s not. We were in and out of 
that meeting in 5 minutes… 
 
…It was shed loads, absolutely shed loads of work… I think it was an absolute dogs dinner, so 
when it then came back on the table to go back to where we were, I wasn’t at all surprised… 
I’m pretty convinced that actually, sadly the operational side got itself in a right mess. So what 
practical operational cops do when policy doesn’t help them on the street they just ignore it.’ 
(EW-POL1: Former Chief Constable and ACPO Lead on Drugs) 
 
The political urgency to reclassify within a suitable window of opportunity for Blunkett led to 
major oversights of the actual significance of changing classification. The exclusion of senior 
police officers and the immediacy in which they had to respond by producing guidelines 
ultimately contributed to widespread confusion on how it was to be operationally managed. 
Fears that cannabis possession would have no longer been an arrestable offence caused 
concern within the police that it would remove a useful tool which can be used as a gateway 
for detecting other offences. Perhaps more importantly though, were the perceived fears 
over a loss of respect: 
 
‘…there was a concern amongst the police that this actually was limiting their authority on the 
street, that young people or cannabis users generally would be defiant and would be smoking 
cannabis and wouldn’t be responding to the police and that the police had somehow lost 
authority.’ (EW-A5: Academic Expert in Criminology) 
 
                                                          
37 ‘…the way he went about it was a bull in a china shop. He didn’t consult his boss, he half consulted 
the local council and stakeholders, but it was gun-ho.’ (EW-POL1) 
38 ‘… he probably put so many different people’s backs up because of the way he went about it, not 
because of the idea, and that’s why it got grounded in the rocks.’ (EW-POL1) 
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These factors contributed towards widespread confusion amongst police officers, the public, 
the media, and politicians. The influence of the police lobby ultimately led to cannabis 
possession remaining an arrestable offence, which together with the increase of trafficking 
penalties for Class C drugs all but removed the distinction between Class B and Class C. The 
policing guidelines introduced a ‘street warning’ (later termed Cannabis Warning) but still 
allowed officers to arrest an individual for possession under certain circumstances (ACPO 
2003), and this contributed to the view that police officers would do whatever they saw fit, 
rather than follow a prescribed route of sanctions39. 
 But with the introduction of Cannabis Warnings and a ‘perverse incentive structure’ 
[EW-A5] linked to centralised performance targets (see Sosa 2012), there was a rapid 
increase in police detections for possession offences (see Figures 5.2 and 5.3 in Appendix, and 
May et al. 2007). The importance here is not the policy action (which is interesting in its own 
right), but the effect of these trends on perceptions surrounding fears of cannabis, illicit drugs 
and criminality more broadly. Significantly, with more cannabis being recorded and seized, 
this coincided with a focussing on so-called cannabis factories. This was solidified in 2008 
following the emergence of police data from a National Baseline Assessment and the 
establishment of a National Co-ordinator for Cannabis Cultivation (ACPO 2010). Data 
suggested that there had been an increase in cannabis factories found per year from an 
average of 800 between 2004-2007 to over 3000 per year in 2007/08 (Ibid.). Such police 
intelligence highlighted the link between these activities and organised criminal networks, 
particularly Vietnamese groups, who were capable of supplying the investment required to 
establish a large-scale cannabis plantation:  
 
‘…there was a recognition that there was a growing problem of commercial cannabis 
factories. We did acknowledge that there was big investment to set up a cannabis factory with 
all the ventilation systems, the hydroponics, and tending to the farm, needs a big up-front 
capital investment, big cash. Now that has got to come from organised crime. It’s not coming 
from someone doing it for local reasons.’ (EW-POL4: Former Chief Constable and ACPO Lead 
on Drugs) 
 
                                                          
39 ‘…because the power of arrest has been retained and it’s under aggravating circumstances, if I’m a 
cop who loves enforcement of cannabis possession nothing changes for me because they will make the 
circumstances fit if they want to, providing the evidence is there. On the other hand, if you are 
someone who is much more liberal in your outlook on cannabis, and you saw there was a chance of 
not doing anything about it, you could make their alleged actions fall outside of the aggravating factors 
and therefore you don’t have to do anything… the majority of people can’t be bothered with either 
one of those and to just ignore it, because at the end of the day the cop has got discretion to deal with 
things however they want.’ (EW-POL1) 
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The prevailing image was that cannabis was not as innocent as was once thought, and 
according to experts from the media and the police, was portrayed as a dangerous menace to 
social order and wellbeing which was underpinned by illicit networks run by threatening 
‘outsiders’ and ‘dangerous others’ (Garland 2001): 
 
‘From about 2007-08 you begin to get quite a lot of stories in the media, particularly in the 
press, about the police coming across so-called cannabis factories in surburbia… you get this, 
it’s almost a link between immigration and drugs… you’ve got foreigners who are exploiting a 
lax situation growing a vast amount of cannabis hydroponically, it’s strong stuff.’ (EW-A3: 
Academic and Former BBC Home Affairs Correspondent) 
 
A dominant and popular narrative that started to take shape was that the growth of cannabis 
factories was linked to the 2004 reclassification. A perception grew amongst sceptics and the 
media that the 2004 downgrading had signalled a ‘laissez-faire’ attitude towards the policing 
of cannabis, which encouraged the growth of production in the UK40. This added to the wider 
critique that the 2004 reclassification had failed and caused more problems to occur: 
 
‘…it was part of a creation of a completely new industry, because until that point we hadn’t 
had much home-grown cannabis, we hadn’t had what are called cannabis factories… not only 
did it not save police time [2004 reclassification], it increased because the cannabis industry in 
the UK is now massive.’ (EW-NGO1: Former UKBA and Member of National Drug Prevention 
Alliance) 
 
However, this is not to suggest that there was a dearth of counter-perspectives, as more 
critical participants alluded to the simultaneous processes of international law enforcement 
activity, technological changes, and market competition as factors shaping changing market 
conditions [EW-A1]. But importantly, these types of narratives did not become influential in 
the official construction of a problem. 
 The emerging evidence of a problem, primarily emanating from ACPO and the large 
increases in police-recorded seizures, was utilised by opponents of the 2004 reclassification 
to legitimise the perception of worsening conditions which required state intervention. 
Whilst these issues in isolation may have been potentially pacified through non-legislative 
change, they became intertwined with other fears, predominantly those relating to the 
health risks of cannabis consumption by young people, which is where we turn to next. 
                                                          
40 ‘The other thing that was bounded about in the press was that the whole reason that cannabis took 
off in terms of cannabis farms in this country is precisely because cannabis has been reclassified and 
there was some big massive new market for cannabis.’ (EW-NGO2) 
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Cannabis as a Health Problem 
 
The links between cannabis and health issues has received much attention over the past 
century, and from the turn of the millennia these arguments received renewed interest for a 
number of reasons. First, the emergence of new evidence linking cannabis to the onset and 
triggering of mental health conditions; second, the reconstruction of cannabis as ‘skunk’41; 
and third, the problematisation of youth cannabis use. 
A series of research studies, particularly from the discipline of psychiatry, emerged 
throughout the 2000s, with increasing claims of a causal link between cannabis and the onset 
of schizophrenia (see van Os et al. 2002; Zammit et al. 2002; Arseneault et al. 2002). 
However, the link was downplayed in the decision to reclassify in 2004, with both the Home 
Affairs Committee and the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs concluding that no such 
link existed (Home Affairs Committee 2002; ACMD 2002). However, the pressure continued 
to mount as more studies surfaced and were being reported in the media with the discovery 
of skunk. This became linked to the purported surge in domestic cannabis cultivation, with 
these stronger strains being facilitated by technological and breeding advancements which 
were exploited on a large-scale by criminal networks. 
By the time cannabis was reclassified in 2004, media outlets such as the Daily 
Telegraph and the Daily Mail questioned the decision to reclassify, with a ‘huge media 
hysteria’ [ED-A-AC-H1] and ‘…full-blown moral panic about the relationship between 
cannabis and schizophrenia’ [EW-A3]. There have been tangible changes in the types of 
cannabis now available, but it is important to recognise the difference between the 
ontological reality of change and the social reconstruction of cannabis. The use of the media 
construct skunk allowed for cannabis to be reconstructed as a new, different type of cannabis 
from that which had preceded it which was much more dangerous and pervasive in society. 
Such discourses infiltrated the political talk, with Jacqui Smith stating that: 
 
‘I am concerned to ensure that the classification of cannabis reflects the alarming fact that a 
much stronger drug, known as skunk, now dominates the cannabis market’ (House of 
Commons 2008a) 
 
                                                          
41 ‘Skunk’ describes a multitude of typically domestically-produced cannabis which tends to have a 
much higher proportion of the main psychoactive ingredient THC, and lower levels of the anti-
psychotic component CBD, than imported traditional herbal cannabis and resin. For further 
information see footnote in Chapter 6. 
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The notion that skunk was a problem was further confirmed through a Home Office funded 
research study which suggested that as much as 81% of the cannabis market is now 
sinsemilla42, which typically contains higher levels of the psychoactive component THC (see 
Appendix Figure 5.4). As will later be alluded to, this Home Office study became an important 
means of legitimising the existence of a policy problem, that high-strength cannabis was a 
widespread issue in need of a policy response. Moreover, the dangers of skunk became 
particularly associated with youths using this ‘new’ type of cannabis, a particular medical 
threat to the still-developing brains of young people. 
However, as with issues pertaining to criminal justice, there were conflicting 
perspectives amongst participants about the evidence base and what it suggested about the 
‘problem’. Again, critical perspectives questioned the causal link to mental health problems. 
Thus, certain types of evidence became prominent in the policy debate, whilst other voices 
and explanations were quashed. Participants suggested that narratives concerning the 
mental health issues of cannabis became embedded in political perceptions through high-
profile media campaigns which depicted cannabis as a dangerous substance and through the 
relaying of personal experiences by constituents suggesting widespread problems [EW-NGO-
AC]: 
 
‘The focus was on individuals, individual stories of young men who’d taken cannabis and had a 
terrible psychotic breakdown… tragic stories, and that was politically highly significant and 
was playing out in the tabloids and so politicians were having to think about what they would 
do in reaction to those fears.’ (EW-A2: Academic Expert in Criminology and Former Home 
Office researcher) 
 
In both instances, the types of stories being told were highly tragic and emotional, with young 
people reportedly having turned psychotic after using cannabis. In this way, a sense of an 
impending crisis was constructed, that cannabis had previously unknown risks which could 
destroy people’s lives, and especially young, vulnerable individuals. Interestingly, the role of 
‘concerned mothers’ played a central role in these debates and were depicted more as the 
victims than the young people involved: 
 
                                                          
42 Sinsemilla (‘without seeds’) cannabis refers to the growing of the female plant without being 
pollinated by a male plant. The result of such growing practices leads to the blossoming of flower tops 
on the female plant without any seeds. These flowering tops contain the most psychoactive 
ingredients of the cannabis plant, and such selective breeding strategies have been combined with 
advanced modes of growing which encourage stronger strains of cannabis to develop. Here the term 
sinsemilla is used interchangeably with ‘skunk’. 
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‘…if you look at the examples of cannabis users who have got lots of press attention, the 
mothers of cannabis users, the Mary Bretts of this world, it was the idea of victims. The idea 
that your middle class… people that the Daily Mail readers could aspire to be like and they 
were the ones who were suffering most from their children’s use of cannabis. It was very 
rarely the users who were interviewed, it was the mothers’ (EW-A1: Academic Expert in 
Criminology) 
 
Such depictions of cannabis as a threat are further confirmed through the prevailing 
framework of control. The criminalisation of cannabis activities serves as a reference point to 
justify and legitimise its harmfulness and subsequent need for greater control. In this sense, 
critical participants argued that illegality is a shaper of how cannabis is constructed as a 
health problem in the political realm: 
 
‘It’s illegal because it’s harmful, and then you say well, alcohol is harmful but isn’t illegal. And 
then the politician says you can’t compare alcohol to cannabis, and then the scientist says 
why, and the answer by the politician is, because it’s illegal.’ (EW-A1: Academic Expert in 
Criminology) 
 
Such depictions of harm (and lack of medical benefit) are heavily ingrained into the 
international conventions on illicit substances, and so in terms of constraints upon the 
conceptualisation of cannabis, it is important to consider that narratives reproduced at a 
national level do not lie separately from powers and mechanisms lying above the nation 
state. 
Thus, cannabis was implicitly conditioned as a problem by virtue of its criminalisation, 
but specific health issues were elevated due to the (re)emergence of research indicating links 
to mental health problems. Moreover, this fed into the idea that cannabis had transformed 
into a different substance distinct from the cannabis adjudged in the 2004 reclassification and 
earlier, and that the effects of its use upon young people were causing significant problems.  
Negative stories were utilised by the media, opponents of the 2004 decision, and felt in the 
common lived realities of concerned parents. This created a pressure and need for the 
government to be seen to be doing something about an apparent epidemic problem, to 
protect its citizens from an unwelcome threat. 
 
 
Cannabis as a Social and Moral Problem 
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The construction of cannabis as criminal justice and health problems were also shaped by, 
and shaped, an interlinked perception of cannabis as a social and moral problem. Following 
the arguments above that the use of cannabis by youths became problematic, the focus on 
youths became embroiled in a wider critique of New Labour, with one ‘conservative’-leaning 
participant claiming that ‘Blair’s feral youth’ were creating vast problems with cannabis seen 
to be playing a key role in this social antipathy43:  
 
‘…we had a whole generation of kids quite seriously damaged… there were social problems 
created by this vast number of kids not getting into employment at a time of a booming 
economy’ (EW-NGO1: Former UKBA and Member of National Drug Prevention Alliance) 
 
Whilst there has been some evidence of increasing admissions to treatment for cannabis-
related mental health problems (see Department of Health 2011), the attention brought by 
the media may have adversely led to cannabis being treated as a scapegoat for unruly 
behaviour and other social ills, an easy target for parents to pinpoint why their teenage 
children were behaving in an undesirable way. This lent itself to a growing perception that 
the reclassification had been a political mistake, with the government being careless over its 
young citizens’ health. Given that cannabis is the most widely used illicit substance in England 
& Wales (Home Office 2013b), fears about its increasing harms became coupled with the idea 
that ‘the place is awash with drugs [and] everybody has ready access to them’ [EW-POL4]. 
Thus, it is possible to argue that a ‘moral panic’ emerged centred on the view that cannabis 
was more dangerous, and was particularly problematic given its widespread use (Cohen 
1972). 
 Such perceptions were further conditioned by underlying socio-historical moral 
constructions of cannabis which solidify a distinction between culturally tolerated substances 
and illicit substances. At the heart of the debate surrounding illicit drugs are moral 
standpoints towards its use with those of a more conservative and religious disposition taking 
the position that it corrupts the mind and body. Such standpoints are interlinked with 
distinctions in legality, which supports a superficial ideological divide between what one 
participant characterised as ‘my drugs’ and ‘your drugs’ [EW-A1]. In this sense, there is a 
grouping together of substances into two dichotomous categories which are loaded with 
meanings of both safety and morality: 
 
                                                          
43 This of course coincided with a recent drive by New Labour to address problems of ‘anti-social 
behaviour’ which effectively led to a whole plethora of behaviours, previously hidden from the criminal 
justice sphere, into focus thereby amplifying problems particularly with deviant youth behaviour (see 
Squires 2008). 
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‘…everyone knows that alcohol is much more harmful than most of the drugs controlled, and 
that would make life difficult for the government because they would have to do something 
about it. They would have to admit that the Misuse of Drugs Act is not about harms, it’s about 
some other morality which says that alcohol is acceptable and cannabis isn’t, and that would 
be a much more difficult break for them to have because they would have to admit that there 
is no science in the Misuse of Drugs Act. It’s all about morals, or bias or prejudice...’ (EW-A-AC-
H1: Former Chair of the ACMD) 
 
Cannabis did not fit into the dominant schema of New Labour, which were ‘…still stuck in 
their unreconstructed beer and fags and not drugs’ framing [EW-A-AC-H1]. But significantly, a 
‘puritanical view’ [EW-POL5] towards illicit drugs has fed into the problematisation of morally 
dubious behaviour. The increasing reported dangers of cannabis helped reconstruct the view 
that cannabis was a moral evil44: 
Such values helped reconstruct cannabis as a problem at the national level, that the 
2004 reclassification had transgressed acceptable political and moral boundaries and had 
fuelled a widespread crisis. Notions that cannabis had transformed and had become more 
dangerous fed into this view, which was conflated by perceptions of harm and criminality. 
Next, we turn to critically compare such problematisations of cannabis with the subnational 
level.  
 
 
5.3.2 The Subnational Problem Stream 
 
Overall, findings from the subnational level highlight points of cross-over with the way in 
which cannabis was constructed as a policy problem at the national level, particularly in 
recognition of the abundance of commercial cultivation and health problems attributed to 
the consumption of cannabis. However, there is a sense in the policy talk that cannabis, and 
particularly low-level possession offences, lie under the radar with greater importance given 
to substances which are perceived to generate much greater harms, predominantly alcohol 
and Class A drugs such as heroin. Before turning to examine the local case site in more depth, 
it is first necessary to explore the broader context of Wales and how drugs, or ‘substance 
misuse’, have been framed. 
 
 
                                                          
44 Referring back to Chapter 3, this perspective draws clear parallels with former Home Secretary and 
Prime Minister James Callaghan’s views and justification against instigating the recommendations of 
the Wootton Report in the late 1960s. 
106 
Wales 
 
As will later be seen, the role of Wales in the reclassification process was largely absent, 
primarily due to the fact that criminal justice legislation remains the remit of the Home 
Office, and therefore the Welsh voice in framing the issue appeared to be inconsequential, or 
even missing. But that said, to understand the local response to cannabis and the 2009 
reclassification, the context of Wales and the policy talk and decisions of Welsh Government 
still provides a broader conditioning role. 
In several regards, drugs policy discourse in Wales demonstrates a more rational and 
pragmatic approach than can be found in England. The framing of issues regarding substance 
misuse is seen to be more ‘sympathetic’ [EW-P1] in Wales towards the individual substance 
user than in England: 
 
‘We are more likely to use the softer language of, these could be people you know, these 
could be people like you, and if they fall into difficulty we ought to be able to help them 
because you might be in difficulty one day’ (EW-P1: Senior Political Figure) 
 
One of the most historically distinguishing aspects of Welsh drugs policy is that all substances 
(both licit and illicit) that can potentially cause addiction and harm are placed within the 
same strategy, and have been since before its establishment as a government and well before 
England had even produced a harm reduction strategy on alcohol (Welsh Office 1996; 
National Assembly for Wales 2000; Cabinet Office Strategy Unit 2004). This is not least due to 
an overt recognition of the high levels of harm emanating from alcohol45, but that there are 
also shared factors which contribute towards, and are consequences of, different forms 
substance misuse (National Assembly for Wales 2000; WAG 2008). 
One major contributory reason for the development of this ‘Welsh approach’ relates 
to the technical feasibility to formally shape certain policies and laws in Wales. Even prior to 
the establishment of the Welsh Assembly Government in 1999 it was noted that the Welsh 
Office had freedoms to shape policies around health that it did not have with criminal justice, 
and a health-led framework became further solidified following devolution of powers in this 
area46:  
                                                          
45 The harmful use of alcohol in Wales is far more widespread than that of illegal drugs and other 
substances’ (WAG 2008:12) 
46 ‘…the Home Office always had ownership and stranglehold on criminal justice matters, those people 
working in the Welsh Office at the time were in a sort of health division which was always much more 
decentralised and much more Wales, unlike the Home Office and criminal justice… it was through the 
health and through the local authority systems, that in Wales they had a degree of control over… much 
more than crime and justice and policing matters’ (EW-NGO-AC) 
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‘…we like to think we are independently minded, and we have got health devolved so I think 
the emphasis on treatment and prevention is certainly stronger than enforcement because 
the policing isn’t devolved and neither is the law… so I suppose the way we’re geared in terms 
of the democracy and the set-up is twisted towards what we can do about drugs.’ (EW-POL-
CS1: South Wales Police and Welsh Government) 
 
Thus, the technical inabilities to shape criminal justice matters has led to the sharpening of 
those areas in which policy movement is attainable. This is further shaped by a belief that law 
enforcement efforts are not effective in tackling illicit drugs markets, signalling an adaptive 
acceptance of the limitations of the criminal justice system in responding to illicit drugs 
(Garland 2001). As such, there is recognition that law enforcement efforts have ‘…made less 
impact in this area’ with illegal drugs ‘…easy to access and the prices have continued to drop’ 
(WAG 2008:48). Moreover, enforcement should be prioritised on ‘those who supply drugs to 
children and young people’ (ibid:52). Consequentially, there is an implicit framing of the law 
enforcement lens away from applying punitive responses to users (qua simple possession 
offences), thereby contributing to an aim of ‘not stigmatising misusers’ (ibid:21). 
Combined together, these factors indicate the preference for a harm-reduction 
approach which minimises the impact of law enforcement on individual users through a 
dominant health-led narrative. This provides an important broad environment in which local 
authorities in Wales conceptualise problems, especially in the Capital. 
 
 
Cardiff 
 
Drilling down into the local case site, and the policy talk further evidences the centrality of 
the provision of treatment and harm reduction services in responding to substance misuse. 
Predominantly this appears to refer primarily to alcohol and injecting drug users which are 
seen as being the biggest problem with cannabis seen as a prevalent, but side issue. Such 
feelings were shared across a variety of participants from the police47 to health: 
 
‘[Cannabis] is one of the drugs that is less-focussed on. From a criminal justice perspective we 
have got the Class A drugs, and from a public health perspective alcohol, so cannabis is stuck 
                                                          
47 ‘I can say alcohol is a lot worse than cannabis because I see a lot more alcohol-related violence, I see 
a lot more alcohol-related self-injury… personally I would rather deal with a suspect who was off his 
face on cannabis than off his face on alcohol, purely because of the different effects of the drugs’ (EW-
POL2: Police Constable, South Wales Police). 
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there in the middle… public health-wise alcohol is going to be a bigger concern for us.’ (EW-
CS-H2: Substance Misuse Action Team, Cardiff) 
 
However, despite the conception of cannabis as a less harmful substance, there was still a 
wide recognition and perception across a variety of participants that cannabis is widely 
available, especially for young people: 
 
‘…the drug of choice in Cardiff is cannabis… It is everywhere across the city regardless of 
deprivation or privileged areas.’ (EW-NGO3: Third Sector Substance Misuse Worker, Cardiff) 
 
‘…we have got to be tolerant of the fact that in society cannabis is available as it has been for 
many many years and what we need to do instead of just being blinkered in our approach to 
dealing with it we look at a range of options such as education’ (EW-POL3: Neighbourhood 
Team Supervisor, South Wales Police) 
 
In relation to this latter quote from a police officer, there was also a sense that the 
inevitability of cannabis consumption sits uneasily with a purely law-enforcement driven 
approach, which was coupled with a wide recognition that the policing of possession offences 
is a cause of harm, and therefore a problem in and of itself48. But whilst the consumption of 
cannabis is largely seen as unproblematic by the police, the other aspect of cannabis as a 
criminal justice problem which largely correlates with the national problem stream is in 
relation to cannabis factories which are seen to be widely prevalent: 
 
‘South Wales I know over the last 5 years has had an amazing number of cannabis factories 
found and before then the technology wasn’t really around for that to be done and then all of 
a sudden it just sort of boomed’ (EW-POL-CS2: South Wales Police, Welsh Government and 
ACPO Cymru) 
 
 Whilst there is some contestation about the nature of what constitutes a cannabis factory in 
terms of the scale and amount of cultivation, larger operations were linked to organised 
crime and other problems related to these practices, such as property damage, human 
trafficking and other serious forms of criminality: 
 
                                                          
48 ‘Cannabis warnings… there were loads and loads of them issued and then that was seen as maybe 
not the best way of tackling the problem because you’re criminalising somebody for having a little bit 
of cannabis on them and that stays with them their whole life. It could stop them travelling abroad and 
getting jobs and everything.’ (EW-POL-CS2). 
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‘…it’s certainly connected to organised crime… [It’s] connected to drugs and cannabis is one of 
the most common. Houses have been rented and houses have been ripped apart, electricity 
has been stolen, people are getting injured… you have got people from the far-east, Vietnam, 
who have been associated with growing cannabis in houses.’ (EW-POL-CS1: South Wales 
Police and Welsh Government) 
 
Finally, there were mixed views at the local level in terms of the construction of cannabis as a 
health and social problem. On the one hand, the consumption of cannabis did appear to be 
presenting problems for young people which were identified by participants across health, 
criminal justice and in third-sector organisations. Exemplifying this perception, a substance 
misuse worker argued: 
 
‘What tends to happen as a person progresses through their teens and they carry on smoking, 
then you get entrenched dependency on cannabis, particularly among disadvantaged young 
people… I think in a way the biggest problem with it is that they switch off to other activities 
or learning or education, and some young people will smoke to the exclusion of all else. I have 
seen some very very heavy cannabis habits, it is as detrimental to them as heroin would be.’ 
(EW-NGO3: Third Sector Substance Misuse Worker, Cardiff) 
 
However, contrasting with this view was a conflicting perspective that suggested that the 
purported increases in problems, which was heavily suggested at the national level, was not 
due to an actual change as such, but rather was due to greater reporting, recognition, and 
perception that cannabis was causing mental health and other social problems which accords 
with a labelling perspective (Becker 1963): 
 
‘I wouldn’t be able to make an association between an increased strength of cannabis and an 
increased level of use or an increased prevalence of cannabis-related diagnoses occurring in 
the services… I think the competent skills of the mental health workforce have improved to 
enable them to make the association more often… Because we weren’t asking the question, 
you don’t know the extent to which it proliferated before.’ (EW-CS-H1: Substance Misuse 
Policy Worker, Cardiff and Welsh Government) 
 
‘…often it is a convenient cause that a parent or relative or whoever can pinpoint and say it is 
the drugs, whereas there might be a whole raft of things going on and perhaps the drug use 
isn’t helping but it’s certainly not the root cause’ (EW-NGO3: Third Sector Substance Misuse 
Worker, Cardiff) 
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Thus, in some ways the experiences and construction of cannabis as a problem at the 
subnational level corresponds with its national problematisation preceding the 2009 
reclassification. But whilst problems are perceived to exist with cannabis, the context of a 
more ‘sympathetic’ [EW-P1] Welsh context towards substance misuse and a greater focus on 
alcohol and Class A drugs has meant that low-level possession is not considered the 
significant problem at hand. Where cannabis is concerned, the focus is predominantly on 
supply and cultivation which is connected to organised crime, or through a health perspective 
seeking to reduce harm to young individuals.  
Even so, the widespread availability and use of cannabis presents an issue of resource 
allocation, for as one substance misuse policy worker noted, if cannabis was to be placed 
higher up the list of policy concerns, ‘I don’t think we have the resources to cope with the 
potential volumes’ [EW-CS-H1]. Such factors which condition the construction of cannabis 
have an important role for the way in which policy responses are supported, adapted, 
resisted or created at the subnational level. But before examining this, we shall return to the 
national level to explore how the policy choice of the 2009 reclassification came to be a 
preferred ‘alternative’. 
 
 
5.4 The Policy Stream 
 
5.4.1 The National Policy Stream 
 
The process of determining policy options appeared to counter the suggestion that a plethora 
of possible alternatives are considered before being narrowing down (Kingdon 1995). The 
option of reclassifying to Class B was ready-made and advocated as the only acceptable 
change, to return cannabis to its rightful position. Nevertheless, the reclassification met a set 
of underlying criteria which in combination with political factors allowed for it to come into 
force. As soon as cannabis was reclassified to Class C in 2004 the option to reverse the 
decision was placed in the ‘primeval soup’, where it developed and attached itself to the 
concerns in the problem stream. Importantly, the reclassification was politically feasible and 
chimed with dominant political values, it was supported through the selective ‘marshalling’ of 
research and expertise, and it was technically feasible. 
 
 
Political feasibility 
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The political feasibility of policy change in drugs policy at a national level is conditioned by a 
series of interlinking factors which more readily facilitate punitive responses to problems 
surrounding illicit substances. One of the major themes arising from the analysis concerned 
the notion of ‘political currency’. Drugs policy is viewed as a ‘toxic third rail issue’ [EW-A1] in 
the political sphere which is not seen to be profitable for a politician to engage with. The 
reluctance to engage with the subject is driven by a concern that there is no simple answer to 
drugs policy with ‘no obvious gain’ [EW-A3]49. 
From a senior political figure’s perspective, drugs policy is an area which for many is 
not worth the risk of ‘sticking your head above the parapet’ [EW-P1]. The types of responses 
that are favoured are largely influenced by perceived public attitudes. Liberal reforms are 
purportedly difficult due to the ‘culture and background of the country’ [EW-POL1], with the 
two main parties, Labour and the Conservatives, being traditionally very resistant to change 
in the drugs policy sphere50. However, this is not to over-emphasise the lack of ‘counter-
doxic’ (Garland 2004) perspectives in England & Wales, but that the number of politicians 
willing to take a publicly-known position outside of the political norm appears to be few.  
This alludes to an important conditioning factor in the selection of policy alternatives, 
that of the cultural and historical role of criminalisation. The treatment of cannabis as a 
criminal justice matter, and led by the Home Office, has reinforced the notion that cannabis is 
a criminal problem (rather than social or health problem for example). In a broader political 
context geared towards punitive action, problems in the criminal justice realm are given 
ready-made labels and solutions (e.g. being weak on crime, must punish more). As suggested 
in the preceding problem stream section, the status of an illegal drug then serves as a self-
justifying mechanism of its harmfulness which blocks off alternative paradigms. Thus, 
appropriate policy responses are aligned with further repression as corroborated in the 
reflections of a former ACMD member and in the policy talk of Jacqui Smith: 
 
‘…there is a mind-set and a paradigm set that the way we can influence behaviour is through 
legislation, control… the default position I think of the country, of the population, is punish… It 
is based on a model of behaviour change and punishment, this is the prevailing paradigm.’ 
(EW-NGO-AC: Independent Drugs Policy Organisation and Former ACMD Member)  
 
                                                          
49 ‘When you are in government all you can see is the downsides, and you would rather focus on the 
things where you might get an easier win that drugs policy which is very complicated and there is no 
obvious gain.’ (EW-A3) 
50 Although it is worth noting that other, small political parties do overtly campaign for different 
approaches, such as the Liberal Democrats and the Green Party, but up until 2010, these parties had 
little influence on official decision-making. 
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‘My decision to reclassify cannabis is part of the relentless drive to tackle drugs and the harm 
they bring to families and communities… This is the right action to protect the public, 
particularly the future health of young people and the most vulnerable.’ (Jacqui Smith, House 
of Commons 2008a, emphasis added) 
 
Part of the justification for reclassification was the ‘consequences for policing priorities’ 
(House of Commons 2008a). As Jacqui Smith stated in relation to the purported growth in 
commercial cultivation: 
 
‘This cannot be tolerated… Reclassifying cannabis will help to drive enforcement priorities in 
shutting those farms down’ (ibid.) 
 
In this sense, the option of reclassification back to Class B became a politically feasible way to 
respond to the perceived failures and criticisms levied at the 2004 reclassification which 
construed New Labour as being weak on crime, and given the culture of policy-making in this 
area, this blocked alternative options from being considered. 
The problematisation of cannabis resonated with a set of dominant political values 
that guided the selection of a policy alternative. As previously mentioned, the dominant 
orthodoxy in drugs policy (at least) up to the 2009 reclassification was shaped by a desire to 
protect citizens from dangerous substances. The way in which such protection is granted is 
through the proliferation of responses which attempt to change behaviour through 
punishment and control. This is confirmed in the lead role of the Home Office in creating and 
implementing policy.  
Moreover, the notion that cannabis is a problem because it is illegal is then fed into 
what is considered as appropriate responses to such a problem. It is ‘…based on this 
combination of morality and power with people donating their own moral preferences with 
the benefit of the power they have to back them up with’ [EW-A1].  
The particular moral preferences of key decision-makers in the process allowed for 
the option of reclassification to Class B to manifest itself as a plausible response to a set of 
concerns. In particular, those of the then Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, were particularly 
salient given his powerful and influential position. Brown became Prime Minister with a 
strong religiously-guided view towards morally dubious activities and sought to mark an 
impression upon a set of policy areas (e.g. ‘super casinos’ and alcohol licensing). Cannabis 
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became part of these concerns which was reinforced by its problematisation in the public 
sphere51: 
 
‘I suspect with Gordon Brown that he was making a break from the past. Again, I don’t think 
you can look at it out of context with what else that [that] incoming new Prime Minister was 
trying to do. If you cast your mind back there was lots about gambling and mega casinos. This 
was seen as a liberal elite in the Labour Party, is the new leader of the Labour Party willing to 
exert some of his Presbyterian philosophies.’ (EW-NGO-AC: Independent Drugs Policy 
Organisation and Former ACMD Member) 
 
Thus, individual preferences of key decision-makers are an important shaper of what policies 
are advocated as possible responses to a recognised problem. This is not to suggest that 
Brown’s Presbyterian beliefs were widespread or dominant, but that they paralleled a set of 
public anxieties on the issue of cannabis at that time. Thus, reclassification was not only 
preferable in terms of Brown’s own value system, but that it was congruent in terms of other 
criteria, such as satisfying public and political pressures. Thus, it became the only politically 
realistic ‘choice’.  
Furthermore, what this analysis demonstrates is a deep tension between 
democratically-elected representation and rule of non-elected experts (Loader 2006). 
Referring back to the opening quote of the chapter, the conditions of doing cannabis policy 
during this period highlight the ‘three p’s’ of political decision-making: ‘perception, prejudice, 
and pressure’ [EW-P2] which seemingly placed greater emphasis on populist and media-
driven fears, facilitated through the power and ability of powerful elected leaders, than on 
the advice of experts. Next, we assess the role of research and expertise in the policy stream. 
 
 
Research and Expertise 
 
A further aspect that is of relevance for how the reclassification to Class B became the 
preferred policy option is in relation to research and expertise. This is a significant area given 
the statutory responsibility for the Home Secretary to consult with the ACMD prior to making 
any changes to legislation. The relationship between the ACMD and the government was 
tested several times during the 2000s, culminating in the eventual dismissal of its Chair, 
                                                          
51 ‘You would have to look at Brown’s background, almost a puritan in a way, so there is that. I think he 
was quite swayed by this notion that the long-term effects of cannabis are unknown, so he is sort of 
playing the precautionary card in a way.’ (EW-A4) 
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Professor David Nutt, and the simultaneous resignation of several members in the aftermath 
of the reclassification. 
 Over a period of 6 years, the ACMD were asked to review cannabis classification 
three times (ACMD 2002; 2006; 2008). This in itself highlights the political urgency attributed 
to cannabis throughout the 2000s. As the pressure mounted to immediately revisit the 
classification of cannabis after the 2004 reclassification, the then Home Secretary Charles 
Clarke initiated a second review in light of new evidence that had emerged. The ACMD 
concluded that ‘…the Council does not advise the reclassification of cannabis products to 
Class B’ (ACMD 2006:1). The advice was accepted by Clarke, and for reasons detailed in the 
political stream the issue was ‘kicked into the long grass’ [EW-NGO2]. However, this moment 
was significant as it was the first window of opportunity for the 2004 decision to be reversed. 
As discussed earlier, the individual characteristics of those involved are hugely important. It 
was noted that Clarke was respectful of the role of civil service and advice, a characteristic 
which later Home Secretaries lacked: 
 
‘He was a very very thoughtful politician… he very much respected the advice of civil servants, 
the role that civil servants play, and the role that advisers play. Then I think you see 
subsequent Home Secretaries coming in who are less influenced and shaped by that… I think 
the latter ones very very very much so, they are going to get crucified on the cross of public 
opinion.’ (EW-NGO-AC: Independent Drugs Policy Organisation and Former ACMD Member)  
 
Despite Clarke accepting and utilising the ACMD’s conclusions to justify keeping cannabis as a 
Class C substance, the issue remained on the political agenda. By 2007, the third review was 
called for under the auspices of Jacqui Smith. By this time, the ACMD had slightly shifted its 
position towards the link between cannabis and mental health, but again concluded that 
cannabis should remain a Class C drug, stating that since the last review ‘…the evidence has 
become more, rather than less confused’, and suggested that ‘cannabis – in the population as 
a whole – plays only a modest role in the development of these conditions [psychotic 
illnesses]’ (ACMD 2008:33). According to participants who were ACMD members at the time, 
their decisions surrounding cannabis classification were largely supported by a broad 
consensus within the council.  
Despite the recommendations of the ACMD, the government ultimately chose to 
ignore their scientific advice and reclassified cannabis to Class B. But even so, the ACMD 
report was used alongside the Home Office study on cannabis potency to justify the political 
decision. As Jacqui Smith’s announcement in the House of Commons stated: 
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‘Today I am publishing the results of a study undertaken with 23 police forces across England 
and Wales. This provides clear evidence that skunk now makes up 80 per cent of street-seized 
cannabis, compared with 30 per cent in 2002... The advisory council’s report confirms that 
cannabis use poses a real threat to health. The council is concerned about its use among 
young people, and points to growing evidence of a causal link, albeit a weak one, between 
cannabis use and psychotic illness… 
 
…There is a compelling case for us to act now rather than risk the future health of young 
people. Where there is a clear and serious problem, but doubt about the potential harm that 
will be caused, we must err on the side of caution and protect the public. I make no apology 
for that. I am not prepared to wait and see.’ (House of Commons 2008a, emphasis added) 
 
A major contention is that the decision to reclassify was already at the forefront of the minds 
of those in power at the time. The announcement of the government’s intent to reclassify 
was made in the House of Commons even before the advice of the ACMD was sought, 
immediately closing off other, potentially more beneficial, policy solutions.  
In 2007, Gordon Brown stated that the Home Secretary would ‘…consult on whether 
it is right that cannabis should be moved from Class C to Class B’ (House of Commons 2007). 
The problematisation of cannabis had put pressure on the government to respond to its own 
earlier decision to reclassify downwards, with supporters waiting with a suitable response, 
and evidence was utilised to legitimise their chosen policy response which fitted more with 
political desires than to introduce the most rational, evidence-based response: 
 
‘At the time he asked us to reclassify, or the Home Secretary did ask to have a look at it again, 
he sent his minders out on the street saying he is going to reclassify to B, even before we told 
him what the evidence was… I did actually write to the Home Secretary and I wrote to the 
Prime Minister, and said if you have already made your mind up what’s the point of asking our 
advice?’ (EW-A-AC-H2: Former Chair of the ACMD) 
 
In the midst of conflicting evidence, it would appear then that the tendency has been to base 
policy decisions on other criteria. In this sense there is no ‘scientific’ logic behind responding 
in a particular way, but rather scientific evidence was used as a means to highlight a problem, 
and the processes inherent in deciding how best to respond were tied to punitive 
rationalities. This self-justifying paradigm alienates responses which fall beyond the pale of 
prohibition, and the unwillingness of politicians to ‘think outside the box’ (due to political 
ramifications of appearing ‘soft’) has meant that evidence has been used in a self-serving 
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manner, to justify the common, well-known ‘fact’ that a more punitive display of policy is the 
most appropriate measure to ‘protect the public’. 
This is further facilitated through cultural practices within politics and the civil service 
which ultimately lead to preferable policy options that fit within dominant frameworks of 
prohibitive control. The political currency of adopting a ‘law and order’ approach is much 
more valued in the rationalities of politicians within drugs policy, and as a result, has a 
trickling down effect on the types of evidence utilised and the policies which civil servants 
and ministers will propose: 
 
‘There is not much political benefit… People get marginalised. Young politicians in their rising 
career are not going to do anything to upset their future career prospects and put themselves 
on a huge collision course with their whips and leaders.’ (EW-NGO-AC: Independent Drugs 
Policy Organisation and Former ACMD Member) 
 
 Thus, civil servants wishing to please their political masters ‘marshal’ evidence to suit policy 
initiatives which give it a label of scientific legitimacy: 
 
‘Sometimes, dare I say, you might have to marshal the evidence in such a way that it supports 
the decision, and I think over time that became more and more the scenario, that you got a 
decision and your task was to find the evidence to support that decision, rather than find the 
evidence which demonstrated what the most sensible way forward would be.’ (EW-CS-CJ2: 
Former Senior Home Office Civil Servant) 
 
This corroborates the view that Charles Clarke was much more willing to accept the advice of 
the ACMD in spite of heightened media and public pressure, whereas when Jacqui Smith 
assumed power under Gordon Brown the advice of the ACMD became secondary to other, 
more political, concerns. But whilst politicians’ ‘perceptions, prejudices and pressures’ [EW-
P2] to act in a given situation lends itself to a more punitive direction in drugs policy, there is 
a fundamental ambivalence between desiring tougher policy whilst counterbalancing the 
potentially huge administrative burden that stricter action would create upon agencies. This 
takes us on to the final part of this section, to explore the ‘technical feasibility’ of the 
reclassification. 
 
 
Technical feasibility 
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A final component that has been adapted from Kingdon (1995) refers to the ‘technical 
feasibility’ of policy change. The reclassification was not a proposal to subvert the 
classification system or attempt anything radical. Rather, it was a simplistic but symbolic 
move within the already-established framework. For some, including a former Chair of the 
ACMD, the Misuse of Drugs Act has become an outdated veneer which does not accurately 
represent its intended purpose of scheduling drugs according to harm: 
 
‘The Misuse of Drugs Act is no longer fit for purpose. I mean that’s bloody clear. A lot of the 
drugs are in the wrong places… It just shows there is no relationship between harms and their 
position in the Act. The Act is wrong, it is flawed, and if it is flawed it is unjust. It determines 
penalties and the penalties are incorrect.’ (EW-A-AC-H1: Former Chair of the ACMD) 
 
However, the Misuse of Drugs Act provides a rationale for politicians to attempt to establish 
legitimacy that they are responding to issues of drugs in a punitive fashion. Through a 
dominant perspective that behavioural change is through punishment, the ‘politico-logic’ 
follows that increased problems surrounding cannabis should be accompanied by an 
upgrading in its classification. As such, the 2009 reclassification did not challenge any 
legislative orthodoxies, but instead reproduced the already dominant philosophies and 
discourses surrounding cannabis, and by doing so fulfilled the criteria of being technically 
feasible. 
The ‘policy predicament’ (Garland 2001) facing the government appears to be 
particularly salient in the case of cannabis. On the one hand, there is a view that firm action 
needs to be taken to counter the reported negative consequences of consumption, but on 
the other hand there is a benign acceptance of its consumption in society and that being too 
tough would be counter-productive. The policy ‘alternative’ of reclassification to Class B fitted 
both these needs – it did little to change existing practices which have arguably allowed for 
the de facto decriminalisation of low-level cannabis offences52, but the change signalled that 
the government was somehow taking action and responding to public and media fears. In this 
sense, the political value of reclassification was not based in its evidence-based problem-
solving capacity, but rather was premised on its symbolic value. 
 
 
5.4.2 The Subnational Policy Stream 
 
                                                          
52 As indicated in the numbers who actually receive a custodial sentence for possession (308 in 2009). 
See Sentencing Council (2011). 
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So how do such tendencies in the selection of a policy alternative compare to the subnational 
level in the partially-devolved setting of Wales and Cardiff? On the whole, it is telling to note 
that there was very limited impact from the subnational level both in terms of how the 
reclassification was selected as a preferable policy ‘alternative’ and in how it unfolded into a 
local case site. Moreover, there appeared to be little sign of official attempts to carve 
alternative criminal justice responses to cannabis. But despite this, it is argued that cannabis 
policy is still reworked in more unofficial ways at the local level which accord with a more 
distinctive and divergent health-oriented approach in Wales as a whole. 
 
 
Wales 
 
Whilst much of the way in which issues regarding substances are framed in Wales appears to 
be based on a more rational and pragmatic understanding of the problems that affect 
individuals and communities, it is still locked into broader dominant frameworks of how drugs 
should be controlled and responded to. In this sense, there is a lack of debate, or even 
acknowledgement, of alternative ways in which illicit substances could be managed which 
could potentially allow for their harm-reductive aims to be more readily achieved. For 
example, rhetoric such as ‘…making sure that services are equipped to meet the health needs 
of substance users is our top priority’ and ‘developing policies and strategies we know work’ 
[EW-CS-H1, emphasis added] are all based within the current paradigm of thinking. This then 
affects the types of evidence sought and utilised, all of which exist within the same modus 
operandi53.  
The nature of policy-making in Wales is one which involves a fairly narrow set of 
policy-makers. The benefits of a dominant political tradition, in the shape of social democracy 
(see Chapter 2), and relatively close networks of policy actors, is that policy goals can be more 
readily achieved. However, one criticism levelled at the Welsh system is that there ‘isn’t 
enough grit in the oyster’ [EW-P1], signifying a lack of critical debate. With criminal justice as 
a no-go area, dominant philosophies and discourses are accepted and re-performed:  
 
‘…this fatuous idea that if you get lots of people sitting around a table you pool their wisdom, 
you don’t, you pool their stupidity and their prejudice, and you don’t get sense you get 
prejudice.’ (EW-P2, Labour MP, Wales) 
                                                          
53 ‘from our point of view the messages to people is almost irrelevant to their classification in that 
respect because we’re looking at prevention, education, the risks associated, and the treatment of… so 
we have not got dragged in to that … which is not actually a welsh government responsibility’ (EW-CS-
H4) 
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As such, there appears to be little willingness to look beyond prohibition for political 
decisions around illicit substances, with seemingly a range of individuals from politicians to 
civil servants, experts (in the form of the Welsh advisory group APoSM) and practitioners not 
engaging in the debate: 
 
‘…it’s like the debate doesn’t happen at all, so I get very straightforward advice within the 
parameters of the way that policy is currently configured… people like that [APoSM] who are 
not in the government machine but are there to advise it, even there they don’t raise it as an 
issue at all. They simply talk within the tram lines.’ (EW-P1, Senior Political Figure) 
 
‘I don’t see any pressure on the Welsh Government to lobby the Westminster Government in 
opposition to any of the decisions around classification, and I don’t see there currently being 
any appetite for them to do that either… having worked supporting and briefing ministers for 
some time around this, it’s just not on the radar at all.’ (EW-CS-H1: Substance Misuse Policy 
Worker, Cardiff and Welsh Government) 
 
In relation to the 2009 reclassification there were no attempts to resist or challenge the 
policy change from the Welsh Government, with the issue seemingly not making it on to the 
political radar of Welsh politicians. This can be partly explained by the issues addressed 
above, but further elements pertaining to the political system and relations between the 
Welsh Government and Westminster are discussed in the subnational political stream. But 
whilst Welsh talk and decisions were absent from the national (England & Wales) policy 
process, implicit points of divergence were exhibited in how the reclassification unfolded at 
the local level. 
 
 
Cardiff 
 
Following the patterns exhibited at the broader level of Welsh decision-making, there was a 
distinct lack of official challenge exhibited by the local level in the reclassification of cannabis. 
Whilst it was suggested that ‘…they have a different set of freedoms in all sorts of areas’ [EW-
P1], such powers are not utilised due to the belief that either they cannot, or are not willing 
to, seemingly confirming a caricature of local authorities as ‘delivery organisations’ which 
follow the broader discourses exhibited at the upper level of governance: 
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‘…they’re not encouraged, the way they’re configured, the powers that they’ve got, the way 
that they are thought of, it’s inimical to that in any case. So even if they really wanted to do it, 
they wouldn’t find it easy… I don’t think you’ll find it in substance misuse.’ (EW-P1: Senior 
Political Figure) 
 
‘I’m not sure they would want it, it’s a bit of a toxic area to be responsible for, and I’ve never 
heard of any local authorities calling for the power to influence that [cannabis] either’ (EW-P3: 
Liberal Democrat Politician, Wales) 
 
But whilst official tendencies appear to lie in tandem with a commitment to prohibitive 
paradigms, there are ways in which policy is reworked along more unofficial lines to fit local 
and pragmatic needs of those involved in service delivery.  
The perception at the local level that cannabis consumption is an endemic 
phenomenon has led to an informal pragmatic ‘adaptation’ to its control in the way in which 
resources are directed and managed. Within the police especially, there is an acceptance of 
the deficiencies of a purely law enforcement driven approach towards individual users. The 
appreciation that ‘….the fight in respect of cannabis is lost’ [EW-POL3] has implicitly shifted 
the focus of police resources away from dealing with low-level possession offences to other 
offences deemed to be more important. In this sense, for cannabis offences more priority is 
attached to the cultivation and supply of cannabis. The large amount of discretion given to 
police constables in dealing with possession offences means that there is a great deal of 
flexibility in approaches. For most police participants, the reclassification back to Class B 
made little difference to how the police strategically approach cannabis offences, which are 
much more influenced by other factors, such as time and resources54: 
 
‘The arrests that are generated as a result of drug possession generally will create paperwork 
and obstructions at key points in time when you have got a limited number of officers… that 
can be a real factor in the minds of middle managers and sergeants who will give that clear 
direction.’ (EW-POL-CS1: South Wales Police and Welsh Government) 
 
This further confirms the argument that the reclassification was more of a symbolic policy 
move rather than a meaningful, tangible change. Further to this, participants from the police 
                                                          
54 ‘…when it comes to cannabis, a lot of it is purely down to how busy you are… you don’t let anything 
go in a sense, it’s just how you actually deal with it on that street level which might be sticking it in the 
drain or it might be bringing them into the police station to go to court… a lot of it is discretionary and 
in the scale of things police officers have to deal with, it’s down there at the bottom a bit of cannabis 
for personal use’ (EW-POL2). 
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often saw themselves as being protective agents, in the sense that there was recognition of 
the potentially harmful effects of criminalisation combined with a paternalistic rhetoric: 
 
‘…in many areas drugs policy can be murky, clear messages will always come out of the Home 
Office, stamp all over these people, and the reality is, how would you like your kids to be dealt 
with? And that’s how we try to police’ (EW-POL-CS1: South Wales Police and Welsh 
Government) 
 
This lies in tandem with the widespread perception across all participants that the 
classification of cannabis ‘doesn’t make a great deal of difference’ [EW-POL6], and so there is 
an underlying tone of pragmatic acceptance that people will use cannabis, and so rather than 
have a stringent approach that fully enforces the law, it is more beneficial to deal with 
circumstances flexibly and in combination with actors and agencies supporting a harm-
reduction agenda. 
But more broadly, the removal of centralised targets which encouraged a ‘perverse 
incentive structure’ to develop around out-of-court disposals for cannabis possession also 
contributed to the idea that this was not an appropriate use of police time and not a useful 
way to evaluate performance. As a result, attention then shifted towards cannabis factories: 
 
‘…more focus then went on finding cannabis factories, finding who the farmers were, who 
was financing it, how the money was being laundered from it and tackling it that way… 
cannabis warnings are easy, they’re easy pickings, whereas managers in the police would 
rather an officer properly and thoroughly investigate a burglary and get a detection with that.’ 
(EW-POL-CS2: South Wales Police, Welsh Government and ACPO Cymru) 
 
Thus, a more influential change than the reclassification in the policing of cannabis at a local 
level relates to the removal of centralised police targets which skewed police performance. 
Local performance targets regarding illicit drugs now relate only to recorded instances of 
drug trafficking (South Wales Police 2011). As such, the incentive for officers to bring 
cannabis possession offences ‘to justice’ has gone, with imperatives to improve ‘community 
satisfaction’ and ‘value for money’ of police activities (ibid.). This clearly demonstrates 
divergence between the political pressures found in the national policy realm and the 
pragmatic strategies of managing issues at a subnational level. 
So the national introduction of the Penalty Notice for Disorder is but another means 
for the police to deal with cannabis users without resorting to arrest and processing through 
the courts – another tool in the toolbox of policing. Moreover, the change in classification 
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made no difference to the ability to police cannabis factories, and whilst this is a policy 
concern that has grown in importance at the local level, the general remit of ‘reducing crime’ 
allows the police to be flexible in its enforcement regimes. 
Further to this, in relation to the broader response to cannabis from other agencies, 
the relative risks of cannabis as well as pressure on resources has led to an acceptance that in 
relation to other substances, particularly alcohol and opiates, cannabis poses far less risks 
and harms to the individual and society. This means that resources are more heavily directed 
at such substances rather than cannabis. Problematic cannabis users usually do not require, 
or do not present themselves, for clinical treatment or services, and do not pose the same 
risks in the way that the alcohol-fuelled night-time economy does. As such, policy selection 
and management is more about education and prevention at the local level: 
 
‘…we are struggling in order to cope with managing the substances that put a much greater 
degree of pressure on public services… as far as cannabis is concerned we make all services 
available, we provide the education and prevention, but we’re not going out proactively trying 
to identify more people to come into services because of their cannabis use when our 
resources are already as stretched as a result of the other substances.’ (EW-CS-H1: Substance 
Misuse Policy Worker, Cardiff and Welsh Government) 
 
The reality is that there exists a paradox in the policing and management of cannabis and 
cannabis-related issues. That is, to follow a strategy of proactive law enforcement and 
treatment with cannabis users would create a huge burden across the criminal justice system 
and treatment agencies which are largely seen as ineffective and wasteful. The perception of 
the 2009 reclassification at the local level is that existing practices were not affected 
significantly. Placed within the context of a health dominated substance misuse field in 
Wales, the talk and decisions suggest that the police act as ‘street level bureaucrats’ (Lipsky 
2010) who bend and rework official policy and guidelines to fit the circumstances they face.  
Thus, whilst there was no official resistance against the 2009 reclassification from the 
local level, again correlating with the broader Welsh position, the possibilities for resource 
management within relevant agencies is still an important component in understanding the 
overall significance of the reclassification. It is suggested that unofficial talk and decisions 
have channelled cannabis policy decisions in a way which accords with the political and 
technical feasibilities of policy in Wales and at a local level. However, what is less clear (due 
to the research design) is whether other subnational polities in England deflect punitive 
forces in a similar fashion despite the lack of a Welsh ‘buffering’ mechanism. 
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5.5 The Political Stream 
 
5.5.1 The National Political Stream 
 
The final component of Kingdon’s model concerns the political stream. Already, several 
themes have been developed which have touched on innately political aspects such as the 
fears and needs of politicians to appear tough on cannabis. The purpose here is to 
contextualise these characteristics through an examination of political factors existing at the 
national level that were concurrent during the run-up to the 2009 reclassification, notably, 
‘changes in administration’, the ‘national mood’, and ‘organised political forces’. 
 
 
Changes in Administration 
 
One of the most obvious and significant aspects concerning the reclassification relates to 
those who were in power during New Labour’s tenure in government. As has been noted, the 
individual characteristics of ruling politicians are a fundamental component in the decision-
making process. But importantly, this is arguably further bolstered in a political system where 
one party takes office, and this point becomes sharper after considering developments in the 
Netherlands. 
Returning to the 2004 reclassification, which was the key catalyst for its eventual 
return to Class B, much importance was given to the role of David Blunkett in driving forward 
the change to Class C55. The ability of Blunkett to push forward his preferred policy was made 
possible under the leadership of Tony Blair for varying reasons. The Labour Party had come 
into power under a reinvented guise having been out of power for 18 years with the self-
projected image that they had made a break from the old ‘soft’ Labour on issues of law and 
order. This is again conditioned by an adversarial political culture and a politicisation of law 
and order. 
When Labour came into power in 1997, an intensive focus was on the link between 
drugs and crime, and especially with Class A substances such as heroin and cocaine that were 
causing significant amounts of harm (see Chapter 3.3.2). The reclassification to Class C 
became acceptable under Tony Blair because of favourable media pressure for reform and 
the rationale that this would allow police forces to redirect resources away from what was 
                                                          
55 ‘…almost one of the first things he said was, I want to reclassify cannabis from B to C, or I’m going to 
more likely was his phrase’ (EW-CS-CJ2) 
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considered as a relatively benign substance at the time, and towards tackling Class A 
substances. In addition, Labour had safely secured a landslide majority in the 2001 general 
election56, thus giving room for more controversial policies to take shape, and other 
significant events started to occur at around the same time, with Blair distracted by the 
hugely controversial Iraq war. 
Whilst it is almost impossible task for a social scientist to unravel the entire inside 
workings and deals that occur in government, it is very significant to note that the 2004 
reclassification was done without the full support of New Labour, with the perennial political 
fear of appearing ‘soft’: 
 
‘I think it was messaging more than anything else, what is this saying about Labour’s approach 
to crime and order. It looks as though we’re being soft and therefore we’re giving the Tories 
their rightful position as many have seen as being tough on law and order issues, and 
something like that, it confirms the caricature that people have got of New Labour on law and 
order, and Tony Blair in particular, I think wanted to be seen as being tough and law and order 
was one of his main interests, and within that, he had a strong focus on drugs policy.’ (EW-CS-
CJ2: Former Senior Home Office Civil Servant) 
 
The importance of this is that without the full support of those in power, and drawing upon 
dominant norms and values inherent in drugs policy, the reclassification to Class C was never 
based on secure foundations. Thus, when suitable actors occupied key positions, the 
classification of cannabis was used as political cannon-fodder: 
 
‘I think what changed was the political climate. This was never a reform that New Labour was 
particularly committed to. It wasn’t something that New Labour particularly wanted to do in 
the first instance… Not reclassifying cannabis became an embarrassment… When the political 
situation changed, and they needed a quick win and they wanted to be seen as being in 
control of things, and the whole tough on crime thing, I think it was just a hostage to fortune 
to that to be honest.’ (EW-A5: Academic Expert in Criminology) 
 
Before, it was mentioned that when Charles Clarke became Home Secretary the possibility of 
reversing the 2004 decision manifested itself, with Ed Balls stating on the election night of 
2005 that the government had to learn from its ‘mistakes’ of ‘cannabis… Iraq’ (Sare 2009). 
However, Clarke chose to keep the classification the same. This decision was seen as partially 
                                                          
56 The Labour Party won 413 seats, Conservatives 166, Liberal Democrats 52, and other parties 10 
seats. 
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fuelled by his own characteristics in the sense of respecting advice, but wider political 
developments were viewed just as, or if not more, important in influencing the decision.  
The timing of Clarke’s call to review the classification in 2005 in the midst of pressure 
to respond to growing problems was in the context of an upcoming general election. 
According to some participants, Clarke’s decision to follow the ACMD’s advice was a close 
one, and given Clarke’s earlier feelings towards the downwards reclassification it seems 
apparent that he was in favour of reclassifying to Class B: 
 
‘When I handed in the report in 2005, we declined to reclassify, he said this wasn’t the report 
that I wanted, but he said that you made the case so strongly and so clearly that I have to 
accept it.’ (EW-A-AC-H2: Former Chair of the ACMD) 
 
However, with more politically urgent issues going on such as the Iraq war and issues 
surrounding immigration policy, it was possible for Clarke to defer the reclassification, and 
could use the recommendations from the ACMD as scientific legitimacy that this was the right 
decision to make. 
 After Clarke was replaced by John Reid as Home Secretary in 2006, the classification 
issue did not surface again until there were further changes to the Cabinet following Tony 
Blair’s resignation and the rise of Gordon Brown and Jacqui Smith. Before examining in more 
detail the precise nature of this new dynamic, the rapid turnover of Home Secretaries during 
New Labour’s term in office is noteworthy. The consequence of having so many Home 
Secretaries is that with a political desire to make a mark on policy, the focus is on short-term 
quick fixes rather than longer-term strategies.  
This is particularly pertinent within the Home Office, a governmental department 
which was seen as chaotic, disorganised and resistant to change, and as a result, received 
much negative attention to the point where it was declared as ‘not fit for purpose’ by John 
Reid (Mulholland and Tempest 2006): 
 
‘…this is one of the problems with policy-making in this field, that we have had so many Home 
Secretaries over the last decade, that none of them follow through on things that need long-
term longitudinal studies… that’s the nature of policy-making I think to a certain extent in this 
country, that Home Secretaries come in almost with a blank slate… I think it’s partly when 
ministers come in and they don’t want to be captured by the civil service. The Home Office 
has got a particular reputation in this field I think of having an ethos which radical ministers, 
whether they are of the right or centre-left, find particularly suffocating, and they want to 
break. They see themselves almost as against their officials… With that kind of culture, you 
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are not going to get very much continuity of policy, quite the opposite.’ (EW-NGO2: Third 
Sector Organisation) 
 
This need to try and distinguish oneself from what happened before is a key element of 
political manoeuvring and is further compounded by the relatively short terms of office which 
politicians serve, thus indicating how such mechanisms, generated through the structural and 
cultural environment of governmental decision-making in England & Wales, can facilitate 
knee-jerk reactions within a hostile political setting.  
Such tendencies became extremely relevant when Gordon Brown became Prime 
Minister in 2007. The tension and disagreements between Blair and Brown became a focal 
point of New Labour’s rule during the mid-2000s, and when Brown eventually succeeded 
Blair this created a slight sense of a dearth in political legitimacy given that Brown was not 
democratically elected as Prime Minister. For many participants, the change in power opened 
a space in which Brown had to show and prove that he was a strong and capable leader. This 
was in the context of much media criticism levelled against Brown and pressures to hold a 
general election. 
Gordon Brown assumed power on the 27th June 2007, and in the following month he 
made the announcement to revisit cannabis classification. The immediate focus on cannabis 
classification could be seen as a way of ‘making a break from the past’, and as noted 
previously, this coincided with reversals on other morally-pungent policy concerns of ‘super 
casinos’ and alcohol licensing. Alongside Brown’s own personal moral preferences, 
concentrating on these issues became a way in which he could distinguish himself from Blair, 
to redefine the contours of the Labour Party: 
 
‘I think he probably wanted to distance himself from Tony Blair and New Labour. Gordon 
Brown was an architect of New Labour but perhaps never as comfortable with it, certainly 
because basically New Labour became Tony Blair’s bag not his.’ (EW-POL5: Former Chief 
Constable) 
 
‘You look at the issues that he chose to try and reverse what had been done, they were issues 
that he didn’t have a huge amount of involvement with at the time, and this was to put a 
stamp, a rebranding on what his version of New Labour was like.’ (EW-NGO-AC: Independent 
Drugs Policy Organisation and Former ACMD Member) 
 
Trying to establish political legitimacy through the reclassification was important for Gordon 
Brown, and it is worth examining the relationship between Brown and Jacqui Smith who 
127 
became Home Secretary at the same time Brown became Prime Minister. Importantly, it was 
noted that Smith was characterised as being a weak Home Secretary who simply followed the 
wishes of Gordon Brown and was more prone to media influence than those that had 
preceded her: 
 
‘I thought Jacqui Smith was a deficient Home Secretary… she was unable to project complex 
arguments or even to withhold it I think.’ (EW-CS-CJ: Former Senior Home Office Civil Servant) 
 
‘…the one Home Secretary whom I found particularly unhelpful was Jacqui Smith… She wasn’t 
really interested in the evidence, she was wanting to do the bidding of the Prime Minister.’ 
(EW-A-AC-H2: Former Chair of the ACMD) 
 
‘…you have got a Home Secretary, Jacqui Smith, who was not very self-confident… media 
influence was always going to play quite an influential role.’ (EW-A3: Academic and Former 
BBC Home Affairs Correspondent) 
 
Indeed, such depictions were later substantiated, both by Gordon Brown who suggested in 
the Leveson Inquiry that ‘…I may say that probably I used my position to persuade members 
of the government who were not as keen on that policy as I was’ (Leveson Inquiry 2012:72), 
and by Jacqui Smith who after leaving public office broadcast a radio programme entitled 
Stoned Again (2012) where she suggested that the reclassification may have been a mistake. 
In attempting to explain why Brown as Prime Minister became, and to an extent was allowed 
to become, so involved in the cannabis issue, it was suggested that by the time these events 
were unfolding, the government was ‘old’, and as such it became more prone to orders from 
the top: 
 
‘…when governments get old… they become less functional. Ministers become of a lower 
quality and more compliant to direction from the very top.’ (EW-CS-CJ: Former Senior Home 
Office Civil Servant) 
 
Whereas Tony Blair seemingly gave more room to Home Secretaries, Brown was much 
stricter. So with Brown’s strong moral convictions and utilisation of power, there was little 
resistance. That is not to say that there should have expected to have been resistance at this 
moment in time given the favourable context in which these developments were occurring. 
This was an ‘easy’ ‘quick win’ policy for an old government in decline and in need of popular 
support after critical changes in administration. Sensing a critical ‘national mood’ towards 
cannabis, the New Labour administration took advantage and sought to maximise their image 
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as being tough on drugs. There is a crucial factor that bears relevance here, and which will 
become more apparent when considering the comparison with the Netherlands, that such 
developments allude to the powers to govern in a majoritarian political system that tends to 
lead to single-party government. With a majority in government, the Prime Minister was able 
to play a fundamental role in the shaping of policy with little political opposition. This 
contrasts with a system of proportional representation which guarantees coalition 
governments, effectively forcing a more balanced share of power between coalition parties 
which at particular moments can serve as a protective factor against punitive forces. 
 
 
The National Mood 
 
Turning to look at the national mood and many of the themes have already been touched 
upon. It seems that the national mood had turned against cannabis following the 2004 
reclassification, and a fundamental component of this was situated in the confusion that had 
ensued (see Warburton et al. 2005). In a broader sense, there is pressure from the public and 
media to produce simplistic policy solutions which tackle difficult and complex problems. In 
light of the perceived failures of the 2004 reclassification and the growing problems 
attributed to cannabis, the reclassification back to Class B was seen as a simple decision 
which prima facie attempted to deal with the ‘ontological insecurities’ of the public (Giddens 
1990; Garland 2001).  
In the midst of increasing concerns, it was seen as an attractive option due to the 
potential support from the public and the increasingly critical media. The problematisation of 
cannabis seemingly had split opinions, with even the Independent newspaper (which started 
a campaign to decriminalise cannabis in 1997) saying that they had got it wrong (The 
Independent 2007). As such, the lack of critique towards the proposed reclassification to 
Class B reduced the political damage (or increased the political feasibility) of such a move. 
Significantly though, and given the somewhat mixed views of the public towards 
cannabis, the issue of cannabis classification became a way for the New Labour 
administration under Brown to attract the voter confidence of a key demographic, that of 
‘middle England’57: 
 
‘It probably served the broader purpose of trying to connect with middle England or that base 
that Tony Blair had in his pocket, just by virtue of who he was and how he looked and came 
                                                          
57 See McLaughlin (2002:52-54) and Stenson (2002) for some discussions around New Labour and 
‘middle England’. 
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over. He had that constituency wrapped up, Brown never did. Brown was an outsider, he was 
a Scot, he appeared to be morose and gruff. If he could pursue a policy on drugs that was 
somehow in tune with that Daily Mail middle England constituency then clearly it did, for him 
anyway, it had a broader purpose.’ (EW-A3: Academic and Former BBC Home Affairs 
Correspondent) 
 
In this way, the reclassification of cannabis was used for political means to gain support after 
Brown came to power. In particular, it chimed with the feelings of conservative voters and 
the right-wing media which had been critical of Brown and the 2004 reclassification. New 
Labour was predicated on finding a ‘third way’, of tapping into a section of voters which it 
had previously alienated due to class allegiances, whilst retaining its core. Blair had 
successfully done this in many regards (‘tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime’ for 
example), and with Brown in power he felt it necessary to appeal to such a demographic.  
In this sense, the national mood was not one of a general consensus towards 
cannabis, but reflected the fears and concerns of particular segments of the population. The 
tabloid media is seen as a key driver of policy concerns within this context, with policy being 
much more reactive than following a rational process: 
 
‘…newspaper readership has been very high in this country and therefore has thought to have 
a strong influence… there is still a hangover within government, that view remains, if the Daily 
Mail takes a particularly strong line on an issue, then this is something we have got to take 
very seriously in terms of policy.’ (EW-A3: Academic and Former BBC Home Affairs 
Correspondent) 
 
‘…one of the difficult things to get across is just how illogical some of the [policy] processes 
are. A view from outside is that a government creates a manifesto in opposition, comes in, has 
got firm ideas on how it’s going to deliver them, either it delivers it or it doesn’t… they don’t 
really understand just how frail the underpinning processes are at times, and how it is that 
people can influence at a political level can pop in and out and change the process.’ (EW-CS-
CJ2: Former Senior Home Office Civil Servant) 
 
Importantly, given that cannabis and drugs policy is marred by a hugely complicated, and 
sometimes contradictory, evidence base, the contested nature of evidence opens up a space 
for criticism to foster from the opposition (again fuelled by political needs in an adversarial 
and conflict-driven style of government). Moreover, this then gives the media a greater role 
in influencing the issues to respond to, and the ways in which they should be responded to: 
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‘It does infect the public discourse on issues that are very tricky like drugs issues… particularly 
issues where there is a lack of robust, reliable evidence… There is a lot of polemic, but there is 
not a lot of really solid data. In a situation like that, I think the media can have a very strong 
influence.’ (EW-A3: Academic and Former BBC Home Affairs Correspondent) 
 
In talking about these developments with participants, one controversial narrative emerged 
which suggested that Brown made a deal with the editor of the Daily Mail, Paul Dacre, that if 
certain policies were pursued then such media outlets would be softer towards Brown: 
 
‘…when Gordon Brown took over from Blair, Brown is reputedly done a deal with the Daily 
Mail that the Mail would support him’ (EW-A-AC-H1: Former Chair of the ACMD) 
 
‘It was too neat, and the speed at which the Daily Mail responded with its editorial saying 
what a brave man’ (EW-A2: Academic Expert in Criminology and Former Home Office 
Researcher) 
 
‘Paul Dacre of the Daily Mail had a fairly close relationship with Gordon Brown for a time, and 
I think they both had this strong moral view that drugs were an evil, and that they were going 
to form an unholy alliance to make sure that there was no further liberalisation on drugs 
policy.’ (EW-A3: Academic and Former BBC Home Affairs Correspondent) 
 
These claims are virtually impossible to verify or falsify without an unlikely confession from 
either party, with such deals ‘done in restaurants we never go to’ [EW-A2] as one academic 
noted. Indeed the relationship with the Daily Mail as an influencer over cannabis 
classification was denied by Brown in the Leveson Inquiry in favour of his own moral beliefs 
(see Leveson Inquiry 2012:71-72). 
But whether it is true or false is not the point of interest here; rather, it is clear that 
such a move had political ramifications in that it was a policy which was supported by the 
right-wing media58, and in that sense, it served the political purpose of establishing Brown’s 
credentials amongst a demographic which was highly contested. Interlinked with this 
particular demographic is the notion and role of concerned mothers which was highlighted 
previously in the construction of policy problems. Appealing to these moral entrepreneurs 
was thus of central concern for New Labour, to appease their fears about cannabis: 
 
                                                          
58 See a piece in the Daily Mail (2008) published one day after the announcement by Jacqui Smith in 
the House of Commons, entitled ‘Gordon Brown made a brave and justified decision on cannabis’. 
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‘I think the issue of classification became totemic. I think it became totemic for people on my 
side of the debate… People like Mary Brett for instance. They were so angry at the down 
classification that they had to really push, and of course the press correspondence got louder 
and louder, and the government really got into some difficulties.’ (EW-NGO1: Former UKBA 
and Member of National Drug Prevention Alliance) 
 
In some senses, the reclassification had a very cynical angle to it. The reclassification was not 
targeted at cannabis users per se, who are largely disenfranchised and marginalised from the 
political process, but it was more important as a symbolic gesture for concerned parents and 
the right-wing media: 
 
‘Ultimately these conversations about saying that the strength of cannabis, that sort of stuff, 
the politician will do his press release, do his TV, and maybe a bit of parliament, and then very 
self-consciously hoping for favour of courage in certain media outlets which is read by the 
parents of the people taking the substances, and the young people themselves aren’t part of 
that conversation, so it’s a really futile exercise. It’s not impacting on behaviour, it’s not 
reaching into their lives and experiences, it’s a two-dimensional farce really.’ (EW-CS-CJ: 
Former Senior Home Office Civil Servant) 
 
There was recognition by critical participants that drug classification makes little difference to 
young individuals, and often those who have experimented with illicit substances have 
different realities to the harms projected by the state. So whilst one of the dominant 
purposes of reclassifying was to send a ‘message’ to young people, the real message was to 
be sent to worried parents that Gordon Brown’s New Labour was responsible and 
authoritative on difficult issues. Importantly, it appealed to those who are more likely to vote, 
rather than the politically disinterested youth. Moreover, the importance of policy symbolism 
(talk) over substance (decisions) can be further evidenced in the fact that the changes to 
legislation and police guidelines made no difference to the treatment of young ‘offenders’. So 
for all the policy talk emphasising the need to protect young individuals from cannabis, it 
seems that the change in legislation was designed as a reassuring mechanism for parents’ 
ontological insecurities regarding cannabis. 
 
 
Organised Political Forces 
 
Thus far it has been argued that the role of the media was extremely significant in putting the 
issue of cannabis classification on the policy agenda, but it was the combination of a variety 
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of individuals and groups which formed a loose set of policy entrepreneurs, and the lack of 
influential critique, which allowed the reclassification to Class B to occur without major 
contestation: 
 
‘In the end the power of the conservatives prevailed, and it’s not because those 
commentators had the most power, it’s because those were the sorts of stories, the sorts of 
stories that were being told by the conservative advocates fitted with the ways that politicians 
wanted to use the power that they have, to sure up their own political and ideological 
positions.’ (EW-A1: Academic Expert in Criminology) 
 
This set of actors was at least comprised of the Conservative party, mother’s groups such as 
those headed by individuals such as Mary Brett and Debra Bell (see section 5.3.1), doctors 
and psychiatrists, and ACPO. Latterly, ACPO broadly supported the reclassification, but it is 
important to note that ACPO is a relatively disparate organisation consisting of a ‘broad 
church’ of views towards the policing of cannabis with the general perception that the effect 
of the reclassification was fairly negligible: 
 
‘…the view was reclassification may send out a clearer message to young people that this is 
not a drug without consequences, without harm, and that broadly we supported the direction 
of travel. Would we have lost any sleep at all if it hadn’t been reclassified? No. Would it have 
made a lot of difference to how we operate? No, to be perfectly candid.’ (EW-POL4: Former 
Chief Constable and ACPO Lead on Drugs) 
 
Located within the ‘institutional rationalities’ (Townley 2008) of law enforcement, the 
reclassification did not challenge or serve as a detriment to existing practices, but only 
increased their power as legitimate owners of the problem. The combination of all these 
‘political’ factors – changes in administration and the need to appear tough on drugs; the 
personal characteristics and views of those in power; and the support (or lack of influential 
critique) for reclassifying by a wide range of influential individuals and agencies who 
campaigned to put (or retain) the issue on the policy agenda – contributed towards the 
decision to reclassify.  
Cannabis had been sufficiently problematised to warrant a reversal on a policy 
introduced by the same political party, and this fitted with dominant values and moral 
preferences which was politically beneficial for Brown and his colleagues. In this way, the 
2009 reclassification could be considered as a knee-jerk type reaction from the government 
against a perceived mistake of downgrading to Class C. The ‘process’ was not about searching 
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for the most rational, evidence-based solution to a set of concerns, but rather was intended 
to send a message, to a key demographic, that the government was strong in the face of 
perceived adversity. The government were antagonised by a ‘rapacious’ [EW-NGO2] and 
adversarial media and political context which tormented Labour’s capability of being tough 
on law and order, a domain traditionally occupied by the Labour Party’s nemesis, the 
Conservative Party. 
 
 
5.5.2 The Subnational Political Stream 
 
The final section returns to examine how the political stream operated in relation to the 
subnational level. Due to the fact that local authorities are in many ways incapable of 
affecting official change to cannabis policy, the discussion is focussed more on the political 
dynamics between the Welsh Government and Westminster. As was suggested in the 
subnational policy stream, the role of Wales in the 2009 reclassification was largely absent, 
with the change being directed by the then Prime Minister Gordon Brown. But alongside a 
lack of an influential voice willingness to speak against the change, it is also possible to point 
to another factor which conditioned the overall response and lack of official resistance 
towards it from the Welsh setting. 
 Due to the ingrained acceptance of cannabis as an illicit substance, the politics of 
crime control evident in England is in some ways equally applicable to the sensitivities and 
anxieties of Welsh politics. This is not so much in relation to pressures from the Welsh media, 
with one senior political figure noting that ‘…the media reaction in Wales doesn’t matter very 
much because there is almost no in-Wales media’ [EW-P1], and that there is very little 
attention paid from national newspapers to Welsh Government issues. However, the political 
anxieties relate to the potential threats to the legitimacy of the devolution project if one was 
to attempt to divert from the orthodox position, thereby further blockading the potential for 
policy movement beyond the options contained within the dominant approach. 
 Of course, such movement would not be viable anyway given that laws cannot be 
amended on substance classification in Wales, but the point is that even if policy movement 
was available (for example, through an explicit policy of non-enforcement), such policies are 
not advocated as potential policy solutions that are seriously considered by decision-makers 
at a strategic or political level in Wales. This is particularly conditioned by the relationship 
between Welsh Government and Whitehall, and so there is a sense that the Welsh 
Government has to be ‘tentative’ in the ‘fights to fight’: 
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‘…we have a series of difficult discussions that go on between ourselves and Westminster 
Government, would we choose to add this one [substance misuse] to the list? I think probably 
not, because the other things that are on the list, are, you could argue in some ways are more 
pressing… you always worry that if you introduce another argument into that you will lose 
ground on some more important ones… How could you possibly give those people those 
powers to do that when they’re asking for this mad thing over here?’ (EW-P1: Senior Political 
Figure) 
 
The transferral and utilisation of powers from London to Cardiff is still in its relatively early 
stages, and so there is a lack of willingness to engage in a highly contested area which could 
compromise the granting of powers and laws in other areas. A further political aspect worth 
considering in the context of the 2009 reclassification was the relationship between the 
specific administrations of Wales and the UK. At the time of reclassification, both 
governments were controlled by Welsh Labour and New Labour, and so to challenge such a 
policy measure would have resulted in political problems for both governments, creating the 
suspicion of in-fighting: 
 
‘…when there was a labour government at both ends, it was trying to find ways of explaining 
difference that minimise what was sometimes genuine differences of view behind it… If the 
Tories are in charge who cares?’ (EW-P1: Senior Political Figure) 
 
In sum then, the place of Wales and local case site in the political stream was largely as a 
passive observer, with little interest in ‘rocking the boat’ with regards to the reclassification. 
In one way, a lack of apparent interest was conditioned by similar political pressures not to 
put its head above the parapet, with bigger priorities and ‘fights to fight’ in relation to 
devolution. There is an important aspect that Wales is attempting to construct and build a 
reputation as a legitimate political enterprise, and anything which might be seen as too 
contentious could potentially threaten this project, even if policy alternatives outside of 
current paradigms may lie in greater accordance with the health-oriented projection of 
substance misuse policy in Wales. 
 
 
5.6 Summary of the Policy Process in England & Wales 
 
Kingdon’s Multiple Streams model has allowed us to reconstruct how the reclassification of 
cannabis to Class B in 2009 was made possible through a coupling of the problem, policy, and 
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political streams. The coupling of the three streams occurred within a suitable window of 
opportunity. The policy ‘alternative’ to reclassify back to Class B was immediately placed in 
the primeval soup once cannabis had been reclassified to Class C and simultaneously became 
attached to a set of emergent and resurfaced problems regarding criminal justice, public 
order and mental health. Such problems were driven forward by a series of policy 
entrepreneurs which campaigned to keep the issue of cannabis classification on the policy 
agenda and accused the government of being soft and reckless. The policy and problem 
streams then became coupled with the political stream in which suitable actors occupied 
positions of power who instigated the change in classification. It is contended that such a 
move was beneficial in generating perceived legitimacy for an incoming Prime Minister (and 
Home Secretary) lacking support and credibility with a key demographic, conservative ‘middle 
England’, at a crucial time for New Labour.  
The reclassification was not the culmination of a search for the most rational and 
pragmatic response, but instead it was a policy change which was constructed as a correcting 
force and a break from the past under the leadership of Gordon Brown. In sum, the 2009 
reclassification of cannabis in England & Wales illuminates the somewhat erratic nature that 
the policy process can assume. Such a knee-jerk response was facilitated by a series of 
factors: cultural (political values and politicised environment), institutional (adversarialism 
and short-term posts) and situational (agency of key actors). 
In terms of how this policy change unfolded into the subnational sphere, it is notable 
that because the reclassification was arguably largely symbolic, there were hardly any 
discernible changes. More important was the removal of centralised performance targets 
which perversely incentivised police officers to target simple possession offences.  
At the subnational level there are key points of convergence and divergence. In the 
former sense, this predominantly refers to the proliferation of problems articulated at a 
national level and the narrow-minded politicised field that cannabis policy operates in. 
Alongside a very clear point that Wales, and local authorities, do not have the capability to 
overtly resist or challenge policy change in this area in a meaningful way, there is a sense that 
doing so in the context of Wales and devolution would be potentially damaging for political 
legitimacy. However, this is not to say that policy is not reworked at a local level, with 
evidence that there is a ‘tacit’ acceptance of the possession and consumption of cannabis, 
with services being more pragmatic towards its use and diverting resources to other 
problems deemed more pressing. The more ‘sympathetic’ and health-oriented approach 
apparent in participant and documentary narratives could be an important mitigating factor 
off-setting the effects of repressive policy changes. Although, as will be discussed in Chapter 
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7, further research is required into this claim given the lack of comparison across subnational 
sites in England & Wales. 
The lack of official policy contestation between national and local spheres is a 
primary point of difference across England & Wales and the Netherlands, and in the latter 
case, the role of the local is seen as a fundamental component of the overall policy process. 
Next, we turn to examine these dynamics in the analysis of the policy process in the 
Netherlands. 
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Chapter VI 
The Policy Process in the Netherlands 
 
‘De soep wordt nooit zo heet gegeten, als zij wordt opgediend’ 
[The soup is never eaten as hot as it is served] (Dutch proverb) 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to critically assess the role of each of Kingdon’s (1995) 
problem, policy and political streams in accounting for policy change at the national level in 
the Netherlands, whilst also providing an ‘embedded’ case analysis of how each of the policy 
streams related to a subnational case site. This again relates to three of the study’s research 
questions: to reconstruct how policy responses came into existence (RQ1); to examine the 
extent of policy convergence or divergence between national and subnational levels of 
governance (RQ2); and to preliminarily identify factors and mechanisms which condition 
current policy responses (RQ4). This then provides an apt context in which to provide a cross-
case analysis of the extent of policy convergence or divergence across two polities as a whole 
(RQ3), which shall be the substantive focus of the final analysis chapter. For a key denoting 
participant positions, please refer to Table 4.2c in the Appendix. 
 
 
6.2 Amendments to the Gedoogbeleid in 2012/13 
 
The empirical focus of the Netherlands is in many ways vastly more complex than that of 
England & Wales, which included a number of stricter coffeeshop measures, introduced 
under the Rutte I government and then revised under a second government, Rutte II. 
Although considerations were given to revising coffeeshop policy under the preceding 
Balkenende IV government, it was under the Rutte I coalition, comprised of VVD, CDA, and 
PVV, that proposals to introduce three new coffeeshop criteria were formulated (see Table 
6.1). These changes refer to a series of modifications made to the Opium Act through various 
directives which affected the Public Prosecutor’s ‘Instructions’ (Aanwijzing). In other words, 
these are the ‘tolerance policy’ rules by which coffeeshop proprietors can be exempt from 
prosecution.  
As can be seen, the proposed changes to the coffeeshop tolerance policy were quite 
complex, with a packet of measures, two of which were to be trialled in the three southern 
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provinces with a later national introduction (private club and residency), and then a further 
measure (school’s distance) to be introduced in 2014. 
 
 
Table 6.1 Summary of planned modifications to public prosecutor’s guidelines, 2011. Adapted from: Tweede 
Kamer (2011a; 2011b; 2011c) 
 
But after the fall of the Rutte I Government during 2012 following the withdrawal of support 
from Geert Wilders’ PVV over proposed economic cuts (van Holsteyn 2014), a new 
government was formed between the centre-right VVD and the centre-left PvdA. At the time 
that Rutte I was dissolved and Rutte II established, the private club and residency criteria 
were being trialled in the three southern provinces whilst the school’s distance criteria, whilst 
it was contained within the prosecutor’s guidelines, was not due to come into force until 
2014. 
 With the shift in government, greater flexibility was granted to municipalities in 
enforcing the revised coffeeshop policy, as signified in the intentions to allow for ‘[p]hased 
enforcement and an approach tailored to local circumstances’ (Tweede Kamer 2012:2, official 
translation). Additionally, the Ministry of Security and Justice requested that municipalities 
send in their plans for enforcement of the residency criterion, as well as any other plans for 
cultivation experiments. This marks a slight retreat from the rhetoric of Rutte I and in some 
ways suggests a loosening of the original approach. But whilst there were signs of a retreat 
from repressive measures, the Rutte II cabinet also announced its intention to classify high-
potency cannabis as a ‘hard drug’ under Schedule I of the Opium Act. 
 The actual policy decisions of the Rutte II cabinet largely followed the rhetoric of a 
‘mellowing out’ of the original policy measures. At the time of writing, the plans to reclassify 
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certain forms of cannabis as a hard drug have not yet come into fruition and face significant 
challenges in passing through legislature. The school’s distance and private club criteria were 
removed from the tolerance policy, which left only the residency criterion intact which was 
introduced nationally on 1st January 2013. 
 
 
6.3 The Problem Stream 
 
6.3.1 The National Problem Stream 
 
The construction of cannabis as a problem in the Netherlands shares many similar features to 
that of England & Wales, but also differs significantly due to the historic policy of tolerating 
coffeeshops. The main issues that came to the fore in Rutte I are centred around four key 
problematisations as a: criminal justice problem; public order problem; health problem; and a 
social and moral problem. However, following the introduction of the closed club and 
residency criteria trial and the change in government in 2012, problem definition shifted 
which positioned the policy changes as themselves problematic.  
 
 
Cannabis as a Criminal Justice Problem 
 
Problems relating to cannabis as a criminal justice problem stem from the legacy of existing 
policy and practice which allowed for organised networks to become heavily involved in the 
production and supply of cannabis to coffeeshops and abroad. By effectively allowing for the 
growth of a de facto legal selling point in the shape of coffeeshops, there was little 
consideration of growing European harmonisation and migration following the erosion of 
border checks after the Schengen agreement. The growth of foreign visitors has become 
problematic by creating pressure on coffeeshops to supply increased demand, which fed into 
an entrepreneurial spirit of coffeeshop owners looking to maximise profits. The increase in 
demand, especially in some southern border municipalities, meant that coffeeshops such as 
Coffeeshop Checkpoint in Terneuzen, which according to some reports had approximately 
3000 daily customers (Volkskrant 2008), ‘…became an illegal criminal paradise’ [NL-P2]. As 
such, the consensus across participants and in the expert committee van der Donk was that 
organised crime has gradually become the dominant force in cannabis cultivation since the 
late 1990s: 
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‘It is not that they wanted, but they are forced to do it because if you sell, you have a big 
coffeeshop and have a lot of customers, you need a lot of cannabis and those criminal 
organisations can give that to you.’ (NL-A-NGO2: Independent Research Organisation) 
 
‘Drug tourism in the border areas and in large towns and cities… has risen sharply, fostering 
large-scale cannabis production and trafficking in this country. Such operations have also 
developed into major, innovative enterprises.’ (Advisory Committee on Drugs Policy 2009:19 
official translation) 
 
But what is also important to consider in the purported growth and dominance of organised 
crime in cannabis cultivation are activities relating not only to coffeeshops, but more broadly 
with importation and exportation. It was postulated by the police that due to the vast 
amounts of cannabis estimated to be grown in the Netherlands it was inconceivable that this 
was all destined for coffeeshops and Dutch users (see van der Giessen et al. 2014): 
 
‘…we said there is around 25,000-30,000 plantations at this moment. We dismantle about 
5,500 every year only in the Netherlands… In the approximation we made, and it is always 
difficult because there is no scientific proof for it, we said that between 60-90% of cannabis is 
going for export.’ (NL-POL2: KLPD and Organised Cannabis Cultivation Taskforce) 
 
However, to some extent this is not a new problem given the historical importation of 
hashish, but the problematisation of cultivation and supply has risen in part due to the 
changing nature of the ‘threat’. Whereas in the earlier days of cannabis gedogen threats 
related to cannabis were largely seen as exterior to the Netherlands in that domestic 
cultivation was small-scale, conducted by the stereotypical image of the peaceful hippie, with 
most cannabis, and harms, coming from abroad. However, with the transition to greater 
domestic cultivation the threat became enlarged; no longer was the problem an 
uncontrollable element of globalisation, but the Netherlands was now encountering an 
internal and domestic challenge. 
These activities are seen to be conducted by social ‘undesirables’59 and one of the 
central problems with the shift towards serious criminal organisations and networks is the 
associated activities, effects and symptoms that are present in society. It was noted that this 
new shape in the backstage of the cannabis industry was characterised by ‘tough criminality’ 
                                                          
59 ‘When you see what they find it is quite shocking, a lot of money, they find weapons, and there is a 
lot of gypsies, those parts, strong family structures and almost every park is related to cannabis in 
Brabant’ (NL-A-NGO3) 
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and ‘strong individuals’ [NL-POL1], prominently associated with violence and other illicit 
activities such as human trafficking and ‘hard drugs’: 
 
‘…we have a lot of murders, we have a lot of torturing, we have a lot of assaults just around 
cannabis… organised crime isn’t only cannabis plantations, it is also synthetic drugs, ecstasy, 
cocaine, human trafficking. But all these facts are together in organised crime, and cannabis 
plantations are most [of the] time used to earn money to support the other organised crime.’ 
(NL-POL2: KLPD and Organised Cannabis Cultivation Taskforce) 
 
Media representations and police activity emphasised the seriousness of the problem, but 
effects were also felt in the public sphere. No longer was cannabis seen as an innocent drug, 
but one associated with hardened criminality and violence. Another risk associated with 
serious organised crime is highlighted, that of corruption: 
 
‘…they are also influencing our society, our living. They put money in all kinds of stuff… We 
had a big coffeeshop in the south, it was closed. It had 2300 customers a day [Coffeeshop 
Checkpoint]… it is strange that the local government is earning a lot of money out of it, they 
make special parking places. So in the end they were even accused of being a part of the 
criminal organisation.’ (NL-POL2: KLPD and Organised Cannabis Cultivation Taskforce) 
 
Another important aspect in relation to the problem of cannabis cultivation is the manner in 
which such activities are conducted. Similar to the situation in England & Wales, the 
development of advanced agricultural growing techniques, combined with less risks of 
domestic cultivation, knowledge of selective breeding of cannabis strains, and an 
entrepreneurial and globalising spirit of growers and coffeeshop owners, has led to the 
development and growth of stronger, domestically produced cannabis. However, it was 
noted by many participants that such developments are not new60. 
                                                          
60 ‘In 1991 for the first time in Holland we grow nederwiet. Before it was only the foreign hashish from 
Morocco, Afghanistan. In the ‘70s and the ‘80s many people were growing their own weed but it was 
nothing… then the commercial production of Dutch wiet became that quality that the coffeeshops 
started to take it in their menu. For me, that was also a sign of the time… you saw the pubs, the 
neighbourhood pub, the pub for the gay, the pub for the lesbo, the pub for the football fanatics, a 
huge change in choices of beer, wine, cocktails, genevas, whiskey. That change was also part of the 
multicultural society, we want to have more choices… The modern coffeeshop, he wants to have 
different types of cannabis from Afghanistan to two streets further where it was grown in the garden.’ 
(NL-A-NGO1) 
 
‘When I started my career in drugs in 1988 we already had at that moment cannabis plantations only in 
a small amount… you see that there is a change of course. What has changed is the amount. Of course 
the technique has changed, but if I am looking to the last 5, 6 years, it technically hasn’t changed that 
much.’ (NL-POL2) 
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In addition to this, cultivation is perceived to exist across the whole country in various 
different types of locations (e.g. underground sea containers; secluded farm land), creating 
difficulties in police detection. The relative ease of cultivating cannabis has led to a threat 
which potentially exists anywhere and everywhere. The way the problem is framed to citizens 
is in a way which affects their crime consciousness. It is seen as a safety issue, drawing 
attention to potential fire hazards involved in cultivation. This concern is particularly 
enhanced given the relatively condensed population to living space ratio in the Netherlands. 
 This brings us to the final element of how cannabis is problematised as a criminal 
justice problem. With the unavoidable and intimate connection between some coffeeshops 
and large-scale growers, the image of the coffeeshop has been tainted from what was once 
considered a ‘normalised’ tolerable outlet to being as so far as intrinsically criminal 
organisations. But an unresolved issue remains with how coffeeshops acquire the products 
they are to sell. With the ‘burden’ [NL-A-AC-CJ] of foreign visitors creating more demand for 
cannabis, the ability to keep within the stock limit of 500g is difficult to achieve, usually 
leading to the creation of a series of stashes and regular topping-up of supplies: 
 
‘…in 2008 we had 14 coffeeshops in Maastricht. We had 2.1 million visitors. From that 2.1 
million was 70% coming from abroad, there was 46 from Belgium, 10 from France, 10 from 
Germany, and it was calculated that there was about 3.9 million visits to coffeeshops so you 
can imagine that 500g is never enough.’ (NL-PP3: Policy Worker, Public Prosecutor’s Office 
Limburg) 
 
This has put significant strain on the gedoogbeleid. Having to restock in this way has 
contributed to nuisance and criminality around coffeeshops, such as ‘rips’61 by rival criminal 
gangs. The increase in foreign visitors has also raised concerns about other forms of 
coffeeshop criminality, namely non-tolerated dealing of cannabis and other substances 
around coffeeshops, and ‘drugs runners’ operating between the Netherlands and bordering 
countries. 
 It has been suggested here that the construction of cannabis as a criminal justice 
problem is not a new phenomenon, but has developed over time, taken on new meanings, 
and presented more visible threats in the public sphere.  In the build up to the initial changes 
to the coffeeshop criteria in Rutte I, and a trend which has notably been shifting over the past 
two decades, is a change towards viewing cannabis through the lens of criminal justice and 
law enforcement. For some, there has been a shattering of the ‘innocence’ of cannabis, with 
                                                          
61 ‘Rips’ refer to cannabis stocks being stolen by rival groups or individuals. 
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greater attention by the police and more public awareness and concern. Notably, the 
establishment of the Taskforce Georganiseerde Hennepteelt [Organised Cannabis Cultivation 
Taskforce] in combination with the national police force, KLPD, has generated increasing 
evidence of the significant threat that cannabis cultivation poses to national security through 
a series of reports (KLPD 2008; KLPD 2012a; KLPD 2012b). These are important signifying 
‘indicators’ of a policy problem in need of addressing. 
However, one factor influencing the construction of a criminal justice problem was 
the effects of greater labelling and reacting to a problem. Those from a more critical 
perspective suggested that the nature of police activity had led to more opportunities for 
organised crime to develop by focussing on small-scale growers: 
 
‘…the individual growers of small plantations in their attics or in their cellars became a very 
specific point of danger for police and the public prosecutor’s office.’ (NL-POL3: KLPD) 
 
With more attention and concern paid to small-scale cultivation, often in houses or 
apartments where there are safety hazards to other citizens, it is suggested that there has 
been a broader shift towards a tougher approach to cannabis cultivation of all scales. In this 
way, there is a degree of conflation in the connection between coffeeshops, cannabis 
cultivation, and organised crime. The problem is constructed as potentially anywhere and 
everywhere, a lurking threat previously unknown which the government must protect its 
citizens from. 
Despite official attempts to tackle organised crime prior to the changes made under 
Rutte I, such as the establishment of a specialist taskforce, greater powers for seizing assets, 
and the proliferation of multi-agency intelligence-led policing efforts, the problem still exists, 
and if anything, is constructed as having  worsened. Problem recognition came from a range 
of sources, from negative media and public opinion, municipality lobbying, and increased law 
enforcement efforts which helped solidify cannabis as a policy problem. 
 
 
Cannabis as a Public Order Problem 
 
The problematisation of cannabis as a public order issue surrounds the notion of nuisance 
(see Chapter 3). On the whole, coffeeshops are not seen to produce much nuisance due to 
the tight regulations and possible sanctions if coffeeshops were to transgress the rules. But it 
seems clear that there is local differentiation of problems which mainly occur as a result of 
excessive numbers. The ‘burden’ [NL-A-AC-CJ] of accommodating increased numbers of 
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visitors to coffeeshops which are often located in the inner city of a municipality has created 
traffic and parking issues. Although contested as an issue by liberal-leaning participants62, for 
others this was seen as a significant problem for mayors of affected municipalities: 
 
‘…in these border cities here, Rosendaal, Bergen op Zoom, small cities, the mayors came here, 
we can’t sustain this anymore… all these Belgians and French foreigners who come to our 
small cities, they are really burdening us in many ways… they just closed down the 
coffeeshops after years of discussion and years of police efforts to reduce, to limit, to master 
the problems linked to the huge crowds who came over the border to go to these coffeeshops 
but buying everything they wanted. And of course the dealers and the pushers around these 
coffeeshops, they try to sell everything, they are market people.’ (NL-A-AC-CJ: Academic 
Expert in Criminology and Member of van der Donk Commission) 
 
Again the link between cannabis, coffeeshops and criminality is made, with the notion that 
coffeeshops serve as a centre for deviant and criminal activities. But important to note is that 
it was only a small proportion of municipalities with coffeeshops that were affected: 
 
‘…it was only for 6, 7 cities in the Netherlands… Most of the cities in the Netherlands, the 104 
cities at the moment that have coffeeshops, and I think that most of them, three quarters or 
even more, say they don’t have any problems with the coffeeshops.’ (NL-A-NGO2: 
Independent Research Organisation) 
 
In accounting for why there is such a stark differentiation of public order problems in a small 
minority of coffeeshops located in southern municipalities, it is relevant to take into 
consideration the cross-border issues in the Euro-region ‘Maas-Rijn’, which is a ‘densely 
populated area...one of the most urbanised [in Europe]. It goes through 3 state borders’ [NL-
A-AC-CJ]. This compact area, coupled with ease of mobility across borders, has created a hub 
of dense movement which has contributed to worsening public order issues. The erosion of 
borders under European arrangements is a key factor in accounting for these changes, but it 
was noted that the numbers of foreign visitors were not seen as problematic until the turn of 
the millennium where it is argued they increased rapidly: 
 
                                                          
62 ‘Was there a problem? Yes there was a parking problem with traffic jams… The citizens were only 
complaining about the parking situation. They didn’t complain about any other acts of the users of 
cannabis.’ (NL-POL1) 
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‘Before that [2008], let’s say 2001, 2000, there were only hundreds of people… you see in 
those beginning years that there were 10,000 people, 100,000, and now in the millions.’ (NL-
PP2: Public Prosecutor, Limburg) 
 
So whilst the problem of drug-related nuisance has existed for some time, its political 
importance at a national level has accelerated over the past decade due to rising concerns 
from affected local mayors that the sheer volume of visitors was creating problems. Thus, the 
issue rose in importance and came to be defined as problematic due to the local inability to 
control or ‘master’ the issues arising from drug tourists in the south. This is an issue which 
will be explored further in the consideration of policy options and alternatives in the policy 
stream, but a key reason underpinning national policy change under Rutte I was the pressure 
and call for help by local, and even liberal, mayors who could not deal with these issues 
within local means of governing. It was the inability of affected local municipalities to deal 
effectively with problems related to cannabis and coffeeshops that served as a ‘focussing 
event’ to capture the attention of national government to exert some power from above. In 
other words, the ‘crisis’ being experienced in these southern municipalities served as a 
symbol, which ‘…catch on and have important focusing effects because they capture in a 
nutshell some sort of reality that people already sense in a vaguer, more diffuse way’ 
(Kingdon 1995:97-98). These negative effects correlated with a deeper and broader set of 
public and political anxieties concerning cannabis and coffeeshops. 
 
 
Cannabis as a Health Problem 
 
As discussed earlier, developments in cannabis cultivation have led to the growth of stronger 
strains of domestically produced cannabis. The development of so-called nederwiet63 (‘Dutch 
weed’) again is not a new phenomenon, but concerns arose with knowledge that the potency 
of these types of cannabis were increasing rapidly at the end of the 1990s and in the early 
2000s (see Appendix, figure 6.1). This period saw a rapid increase in the average THC content 
of cannabis, with the average THC percentage in nederwiet surpassing 20% in 2004 (Niesink 
and Rigter 2013). This period saw a boost in potency across a variety of different types of 
                                                          
63 Nederwiet has a far less stigmatising name than the equivalent use of ‘skunk’ in England & Wales 
(both describing domestically produced cannabis). Interestingly, the term skunk was first used to 
describe the odour of early versions of domestically produced cannabis, whose seeds and farming 
knowledge were first imported from the USA to the Netherlands in the 1980s, with the genetic 
development and introduction of ‘Dutch’ strains such as ‘skunk #1’ and ‘northern lights’ (Niesink and 
Rigter 2012:13). 
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cannabis, especially in extremely potent forms of Dutch-made hashish (nederhasj) which have 
been shown in some samples to contain over 60% THC (see Appendix, figure 6.2). 
The perceived problem of these developments was very similar to that in England & 
Wales and occurred at around the same time. This is perhaps not all that surprising given the 
exportation not only of cannabis itself, but also of growing techniques, seeds, and knowledge. 
But fears and concerns grew that the use of more THC-potent cannabis was linked to mental 
health conditions, such as the onset of psychosis and schizophrenia64. 
Among the participants in this study there was a mixture of views about what 
developments in cannabis potency signify and the harms that are produced forthwith. For 
one public prosecutor, the description of this new type of cannabis is indicative of the 
reinvented and reconstructed fears surrounding cannabis: 
 
‘…one of the developments of the last year is that the hennep [cannabis] has increasing THC, 
so when you blow [smoke/consume] and you think you are blowing soft drugs and it has a 
high THC amount then it has almost the effect of hard drugs… they say this is very dangerous 
stuff, you must not misuse it’ (NL-PP2: Public Prosecutor, Limburg) 
 
The view of immediate danger, that this is a continuing, ever-increasing problem with ever-
increasing THC, is prevalent here despite trends indicating a longer-term decline in the 
potency of nederwiet since the high point of 2004. This influenced the desires to reclassify 
cannabis with a THC content of over 15% as a hard drug, with government rhetoric 
attempting to delineate cannabis according to the artificial legal constructions: 
 
‘Soft drugs must stay soft… Hard drugs do not belong in coffeeshops, and in future these 
establishments will only be permitted to sell cannabis with a THC content of under 15%.’ 
(Tweede Kamer 2012:4) 
 
Furthermore, and also drawing parallels with developments in England & Wales, there was a 
specific focus on youth consumption as particularly problematic. This was symptomatic of a 
broader and growing negativity surrounding cannabis, supported by a growing research 
evidence base and changing trends in public opinion towards cannabis: 
 
                                                          
64 ‘…we know more and more from the literature that cannabis is, especially for some groups, 
dangerous and harmful. So it’s not that innocent as we thought it was… that is connected to the much 
higher THC level in cannabis now. We did that ourselves because we are producing this nederwiet 
which we cultivated and cultivated in a very nice and more strong product.’ (NL-A-AC-H1) 
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‘We concluded, point one, cannabis is not so innocent as once had been thought. There have 
been several studies that say if you use cannabis at a very young age it is damaging to the 
brain’ (NL-CS-AC-CJ: Senior Civil Servant in Ministry of Security and Justice and Member of van 
de Donk Committee) 
 
‘…public opinion changed also because of the constant stories about how bad marijuana is for 
young people and that it is stronger than what it was... it is not your parent’s weed anymore, 
now it is really a hard drug.’ (NL-NGO1: Drugs Policy Reform Organisation and Psychiatrist) 
 
Moreover, the acceptance of increased health risks to young people was combined with a 
reported decline in the average age of first use, creating the sense of an emerging crisis. 
The recognition of a problem by government was evident in the drugs letter of 2003, 
spurred on by studies suggesting links between cannabis and mental health (see van Os et al. 
2002; Zammit et al. 2002; Arseneault et al. 2002), but there have also been links made to 
poor educational attainment (Verweij et al. 2013), and increasing evidence since then of 
more cannabis users seeking treatment (see Appendix, figure 6.3): 
 
‘…the Ministry of Health was always leading in the drug debate but now there were more 
negative aspects of health in the debate so the Ministry of Health was also changing its 
attitude towards cannabis and thinking about more repressive measures.’ (NL-CS-AC-H2: 
Senior Civil Servant in the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport and Member of the van der 
Donk Commission) 
 
The mounting evidence articulated about the risks of cannabis challenged a fundamental 
aspect of Dutch drugs policy: that cannabis is a ‘soft’ drug, one whose harms are relatively 
benign. However, there existed a significant difference in participant views in the extent to 
which claims of increased harm are accepted as legitimately being associated or caused by 
cannabis. 
One of the primary arguments against the problematisation of cannabis as a health 
issue is due to the existence of high-strength cannabis prior to the introduction of nederwiet 
onto the market. Imported hashish was the main and most popular form of cannabis up until 
the early 1990s, thus challenging the notion that this is a ‘new’ problem: 
 
‘I said to the government, if that is true this warning has to be started in the ‘60s because 
when the foreign hashish came into the market it was already stronger than the nederwiet of 
1994 so fuck off’ (NL-A-NGO1: Independent Research Organisation and Drugs Worker) 
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As can be seen in figures 6.1-4 (see Appendix), the trends in nederwiet are not wildly different 
to that of imported hashish which has had an average THC potency of between 12-20%, with 
evidence of imported hash containing more THC than the ‘strongest’ and ‘most popular’ 
variants of nederwiet in 2012/13 (Niesink and Rigter 2013). Critical perspectives suggest then 
that the increase in problems is in part due to greater public awareness and labelling of a 
problem, causing more people, and particularly concerned parents to associate deviant or 
undesirable characteristics of youth with the use of cannabis: 
 
‘What happens? All the parents who went to their work and saw that in the train station and 
you can phone 06 blah blah, and they had children, 12, 13, 14 years old… from the moment 
you make cannabis that dangerous by such public campaigns what happens is that parents 
don’t start talking anymore about cannabis, they went to the clinic, yes my child, something is 
wrong...’ (NL-A-NGO1: Independent Research Organisation and Drugs Worker) 
 
‘More in treatment, although by now there is quite some evidence that about half of those 
who start treatment, outpatient treatment for what is called cannabis problems, more 
objectively, cannot be diagnosed as cannabis-dependent. They are depressed and so on.’ (NL-
A2: Academic Expert in Criminology) 
 
It could be argued then that the evidence base on the harms of cannabis is deeply contested. 
Whilst research has increasingly sought to clarify the relationship of cannabis to mental 
health problems and a range of socially ‘abnormal’ characteristics, in many ways this is still 
not clear given the blurry and sometimes difficult transition from adolescence to adulthood 
where individuals attempt to mould an identity. Adding to the critique of the 
problematisation, some participants alluded to the role of psychiatry in medicalising issues: 
 
‘It has been reframed by, I would say, a new generation of researchers typically from the 
clinical and medical field… all the issues in the cannabis debate are readdressed with new 
evidence, so the cannabis psychosis, schizophrenia, those terms, shift over time that typically 
dominated the debate at the beginning of last century.’ (NL-A2: Academic Expert in 
Criminology) 
 
As demonstrated, despite the fact that there has been clear changes in the nature of 
cannabis over the past couple of decades, the relationship to health is rigorously contested. 
Whilst there is a broad overall consensus that cannabis does have the potential to cause 
significant health problems, it is the taking up of this as a problem in connection with 
developments in the policy and political streams, which has led to the ongoing plans to put all 
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cannabis with over 15% THC in schedule I of the Opium Act. But the construction of cannabis 
as a hard drug has clear symbolic appeal that has challenged the traditional image of cannabis 
as a relatively safe and innocent substance and helps justify repressive measures towards an 
unwanted threat. 
 
 
Cannabis as a Social and Moral Problem 
 
As problems with criminality, nuisance and health seemingly increased and were brought 
more into the public realm during the 2000s, this co-existed with growing anxieties 
surrounding cannabis and coffeeshops. Placed within the political context at the end of the 
millennium, there was a growing dissatisfaction with the gedoogbeleid not only because it 
had created tangible practical issues, but also in the sense that it had allowed for coffeeshops 
to become too ‘normalised’ in Dutch society and challenged the moral tolerance of cannabis. 
This has been particularly driven by the religious parties who believe that coffeeshops 
are ‘bad examples’ [NL-P4] for young people. There is a clear moral imperative behind such 
thinking which depicts the use of cannabis as morally wrong, and this is confounded by a logic 
which suggests that increased visibility of coffeeshops is linked to levels of use by young 
people: 
 
‘…if something is visible, we don’t say when it is open they are more likely to go in, but they 
see it, they see other people going in and out so probably they get more enthusiastic towards 
trying to find a way to get a joint from somewhere and to try it themselves.’ (NL-CS-CJ: Civil 
Servant in the Ministry of Security and Justice) 
 
‘…because they look lovely, they make restaurants, they are not these dark, nasty, illegal back 
corners… People say this is an innocent thing, this is nice, why shouldn’t we go there?... they 
do everything to accommodate to the normal world’ (NL-A-AC-CJ: Academic Expert in 
Criminology and Member of the van der Donk Commission) 
 
The concern runs parallel to young people, health risks and the side effects of coffeeshops, 
and as such, a perception grew that ‘young pupils… need to be protected from the sight of 
coffeeshops’ [NL-A-NGO3]. Moreover, there is again a paradox between the accepted 
normality of alcohol but a ‘negative societal feeling’ towards cannabis [NL-A-AC-H1]. This 
dominant narrative was further driven by the coupling of cannabis to problematic social 
conditions and actors. Cannabis became connected to youth delinquency and exclusion which 
was intimated by both the van der Donk Commission and by a critical participant: 
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‘Problematic use of cannabis appears to be particularly prevalent among young people who 
are disadvantaged by their background and/or situation. These youngsters display a 
combination of characteristics: they use cannabis, play truant, are likely to have frequent 
contact with care services or spend time in youth detention centres, have no stable home 
situation, and may even live on the streets.’ (Advisory Committee on Drug Policy 2009:18) 
 
‘in the mid-90s it became more and more popular among the lower level of the society… 
young people with the monkey on their shoulders, young people with no future, the poor 
people, no school, no job… so the cannabis use as a fly-away… But they connected that with 
coffeeshops and with the Dutch weed and that started from the second part of the ‘90s… 
wow the soft drugs are not soft drugs anymore and the dealer is the coffeeshop.’ (NL-A-
NGO1: Independent Research Organisation and Drugs Worker) 
 
Similar to England & Wales where cannabis was associated with ‘Blair’s feral youth’  and 
‘broken Britain’, it had attributed a new meaning as a threat and risk to society, with the 
government employing paternalistic rhetoric to protect ‘vulnerable youth’ (Tweede Kamer 
2011b:1, author’s translation). This has led to a questioning of cannabis policy along moral 
and ethical lines: 
 
‘The ethical debate is back in the drugs policy and it is better for young people not to use 
drugs and they accuse us of not confirming that idea. Of course we don’t want people to use 
drugs from a health perspective or another perspective, but it is better to be pragmatic about 
it than ethical. But right now the ethical people are using almost vengeful rhetoric, are 
winning this debate’ (NL-CS-AC-H1: Senior Civil Servant in Ministry of Health, Welfare and 
Sport and Member of Garretsen Commission) 
 
Following the moral and ethical logic that cannabis use should no longer be tolerated, a 
greater emphasis is paid to law enforcement as a means of instilling values. 
However, for some there is a complete rejection that coffeeshops are a problem for 
young people because they are too normal due to the age criterion that exists. Thus, there is 
a sense that such problematisations are ‘…more of a moral discussion and it is fed by more 
stories than facts and figures I think… there are politicians who think that cannabis is the 
worst of all. I think that is more a moral point.’ [NL-A-NGO3]. 
 So in sum, the notion that cannabis is a social and moral problem is again a deeply 
contested area which is as much about philosophies of human rights and morality as it is 
about prevention of youth consumption. Similar to other aspects of cannabis policy 
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problems, there is a divide between two broadly polarised positions which either associate 
cannabis with the causation of social and medical problems, or those which believe that 
cannabis and coffeeshops have in some ways been victimised and reconstructed in a way 
which is more open to punitive measures. 
 
 
Cannabis as a Problem from Rutte I 
 
A final component relates to how cannabis came to be defined as a problem after the 
introduction of the residency and closed club measures in May 2012. The trial of these 
measures in the three southern provinces occurred in a rapidly changing context, with 
widespread criticism of the new and planned coffeeshop criteria. Problems centred on the 
apparent increases in criminality and nuisance, and the related threat to the separation of 
markets which became encapsulated around the so-called wietpas65. 
 As part of the trial measures, an evaluation study66 was conducted to investigate the 
effects of the new measures. Whilst it was recognised that there had been serious declines in 
foreign visitors to coffeeshops, this also co-existed with increases in cannabis purchasing 
from non-tolerated outlets, such as ‘06’ dealers (telephone), street dealers, and home 
networks (WODC 2013:157). Significantly, it was felt that the new measures had created a 
‘shadow economy’ with serious negative side effects which was recognised both by 
participants and in the policy talk of the Rutte II coalition agreement statement: 
 
‘…suddenly there is this wietpas and that has had some terrible effects in the south where you 
see now that there is a shadow economy that didn’t exist before and after 3 or 4 months of 
this pass situation people start looking outside the coffeeshop… so there were people on 
motorbikes from Rotterdam going to the cities in the south and just starting to sell and there 
is an instant market and they became very aggressive against foreigners, very aggressive 
against people living there, so it actually took 3 or 4 months at most to destroy 30 years of 
good practice.’ (NL-CS-AC-H1: Senior Civil Servant in Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport and 
Member of Garretsen Commission) 
                                                          
65 The term wietpas (‘weed pass’) came to signify the closed club measure which required users to 
register at a particular coffeeshop, with initial suggestions from the Rutte I government that 
‘[m]embership is granted in the form of a club pass by the coffeeshop operator’ (Tweede Kamer 
2011b:3, author’s translation). 
66 Whilst the interim evaluation report depicts quite negative consequences of the new measures, it is 
important to bear in mind that the publication of this report was not until 2013, months after the 
Rutte II coalition was formed and altered the policy measures. But whilst this report was not able to be 
influential in problem construction or deconstruction, in many ways the sentiments contained within it 
were felt at the time. 
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‘…fewer people than expected have registered with coffee shops; residents of the 
Netherlands oppose becoming members of coffee shops and that in certain municipalities a 
large proportion of these residents have turned to criminal channels to obtain drugs’ (Tweede 
Kamer 2012:3, official translation) 
 
The increase in criminality and nuisance became a major concern for local mayors and 
citizens, who whilst before were complaining about footfall and relatively low-level nuisance 
issues were now feeling more insecure with greater negative effects of cannabis policy: 
 
‘When you talk to the mayors of the 8 cities who have coffeeshops they say altogether that 
there is a lot of increased dealing activity with criminality and the public experienced a lot of 
bad effects of those aggressive dealing activities.’ (NL-PP2: Public Prosecutor, Limburg) 
 
The increase in ‘aggressive dealing activities’ is not only linked to the diversion of foreign 
users to non-tolerated sources, but also due to declines in the numbers of Dutch cannabis 
consumers who chose not to register at a coffeeshop. The need to register at a coffeeshop 
(closed club criteria) created significant resistance from users due to fears over what would 
happen to the information given that cannabis remains prohibited in a legal sense. It thus 
questioned the fundamental philosophy behind coffeeshops to protect cannabis users from 
other illicit drugs markets. The resistance against registration also occurred within the 
context of more recent fears of government67. 
The emergence of these problems following the introduction of the trial measures 
was also bolstered by significant municipality resistance. The ‘problem’ was that the new 
measures lacked policy legitimacy with key and powerful local mayors who rejected the 
necessity of implementing the new measures. Importantly then, the introduction of stricter 
measures for coffeeshops immediately caused a negative backlash towards the government 
leading to a re-problematisation of cannabis policy with protests against a perceived threat to 
the idealised separation of markets philosophy underpinning Dutch drugs policy. Such 
sentiments were certainly felt within the subnational case site which shall be considered 
next. 
 
                                                          
67 ‘…at the same time there was an issue with our passports and biometric fingerprints on passports, 
and at that time it was known that all this information was not well kept by the government, so that 
came out, and at the same time it came out that we are going to register your names and all those 
identity things in the coffeeshop and then people said well no, we don’t trust the government in 
having all that information.’ (NL-P3: PvdA Politician, Utrecht). 
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6.3.2 The Subnational Problem Stream 
 
Overall, findings from the local level suggest that there were points of convergence and 
divergence in the ways in which cannabis and coffeeshops were conceptualised as policy 
problems. First, in relation to cannabis as a criminal justice problem, there have been similar 
increases in awareness, incidents, and responses to illicit activities operating around the 
back-door of coffeeshops. Whereas in former years the issue of cannabis cultivation was not 
perceived to be an issue and received relatively little attention by the police, there has been a 
shift in attention aided through more rigorous data analysis and national prioritisation: 
 
‘…for 4 or 5 years it didn’t get any attention, just getting the cannabis out of the houses and 
that was it... Many times we sent memos, put it on paper, have told what we saw on the 
streets, but it didn’t change the thinking of our staff... Some people will tell you this story of a 
mother with her child, no husband, no money. Get rid of it because that isn’t the scene 
anymore.’ (NL-POL4: Utrecht Police) 
 
The perception that cannabis cultivation was a small-scale enterprise meant that police chiefs 
had little interest in pursuing cultivation cases. However, over the past couple of years there 
has been a definite shift with more resources being put into investigations at a local level. 
Certainly, national attention aided in the construction of a serious issue, but reports from 
inside the police also started to shift the internal culture to accept the negative aspects of the 
cannabis trade. For example, it was noted that there were serious problems such as a death 
threat to the mayor, violence, arms trading, gang wars and ‘rips’ [NL-POL4].  
But what is noteworthy is that a participant from the police suggested that such 
changes in enforcement priorities had not started to occur until early 2013, well after the 
Rutte I government decided to introduce new measures, and so until this point the problem 
was hidden and not brought into the local police sphere due to being blocked by senior 
officers turning a blind eye to the increasingly dark realities encountered by detectives 
working cannabis-related cases. 
 In relation to cannabis as a public order problem, the case site had experienced 
problems predominantly relating to parking which appeared to be one of the most 
substantive concerns at the local level. The city’s coffeeshops are mainly located in the inner-
city area, which are characterised by narrow streets. The flow of customers coming and going 
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constantly parking in bicycle lanes presents points of nuisance for local residents68. For a large 
part, the more visible problems of cannabis and coffeeshops are of central concern for the 
local population because these are the aspects which impact on the daily lived experiences of 
residents. As one politician suggested: 
 
‘It is not that it is about the health issue, it is not about the huge black circuit of criminality 
behind it because people actually say, do we care if people shoot each other whilst they are 
both criminals trading with each other? No, I am more irritated by the fact that there is dog 
poo on the street or I can’t park my car… As a representative of Utrecht… I am more focussing 
on these inconvenience problems.’ (NL-P2: VVD Politician, Utrecht) 
 
Issues of image and visibility do not only relate to parking problems though and in some ways 
correlate with national concerns about cannabis as a social and moral problem. Such issues 
were well articulated by a CDA politician, but were also generally shared by most participants 
to varying degrees, who argued that some of the coffeeshops present problems which 
degrade the area: 
 
‘…nearly all of them [are] structurally a problem causing trouble in the neighbourhood, 
attracting the wrong people, attracting hard drugs, dealers, attracting rowdiness in the night... 
We have had [in *straat]… a lot of trouble with people selling all kinds of drugs on the street 
also to under-18s.’ (NL-P4: CDA Politician, Utrecht) 
 
A perception exists that coffeeshops and the public consumption of cannabis serves as a bad 
example for young people, and this presented itself in a ‘not in my backyard’ syndrome in 
relation to the opening of new coffeeshops, again confirming fears surrounding coffeeshops, 
nuisance and degradation to the local area69. But despite the construction of policy problems 
outlined above, on the whole coffeeshops in Utrecht were not seen to be overly problematic, 
especially in comparison to the purported problems being felt in the southern municipalities 
with regards to drug-related tourists: 
 
                                                          
68 ‘…people are not using inside of coffeeshops, they are using it at home, and they are using the 
coffeeshops for just buying the weed… People are parking their car, or scooter etc., leaving it there for 
10 minutes and coming back and driving away. That is the main inconvenience now from cannabis.’ 
(NL-P2) 
69 ‘…it is not so much the public opinion that is opposed to coffeeshops in general, but it is just the… 
not in my backyard. People might be okay with having coffeeshops in Utrecht or even having more 
coffeeshops, just make sure that it is not in my neighbourhood because they are worried about the 
nuisance.’ (NL-PA4) 
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‘…the drug problem in this city was a homelessness hard drug problem, and the coffeeshops, 
well they just functioned, there was not much public nuisance of the coffeeshops, not 
comparable to what you have in Maastricht near the border or in other cities.’ (NL-PA1: Policy 
Advisor, Utrecht) 
 
Conversely, coffeeshops were valued as a useful social outlet. This is particularly noteworthy 
from representatives from the police and prosecution who argued that the visibility of 
coffeeshops is a positive aspect for managing issues: 
 
‘I think it is a good system… because you regulate, you see where it is sold, you can as the 
police, you can manage what is going on about that building, the people that come. Most of 
the time we don’t have complaints about the people around the coffeeshops… we also know 
that we never get rid of it because you know it’s here and it always has been.’ (NL-POL4: 
Utrecht Police) 
 
There is an acceptance of the inevitability of cannabis consumption, and so the coffeeshops 
provide a useful and relatively unproblematic outlet whereby the situation is more 
controllable and manageable than when it is being sold through non-tolerated sources, thus 
affirming the market separation philosophy. 
 In comparison to the construction of problems at a national level, there are points of 
overlap, but importantly, the issues being felt at a local level were not considered to be 
overly problematic at the time of the Rutte I and Rutte II governments coming into office. The 
looming threat of large-scale cannabis cultivation and interrelated activities of organised 
criminal groups has, as with at a national level, been a longstanding concern, but in terms of 
police attention it only started to trickle upwards into the considerations of senior police 
officers in 2013 whereby more serious attempts to tackle such problems have taken shape. 
However, in comparison to the broader national conceptualisation of problems, there is more 
of a separation between cannabis cultivation and coffeeshops. At a national level, there is a 
heavier coupling of coffeeshops and cultivation which groups them together as criminal 
enterprises. However, in the local case site there is greater distinction, with coffeeshops 
largely valued as social institutions encountering minor problems of nuisance which could be 
dealt with through existing tools, and cultivation seen to only exist due to failures of the state 
to regulate the back-door.  
Such viewpoints bear important implications for the way in which the new national 
policy measures played themselves out at the subnational level. But prior to examining this, it 
is now appropriate to turn back to how such policy measures came to be made preferable 
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through an examination of political feasibility, research and expertise, and technical 
feasibility at the national level of the policy process. 
 
 
6.4 The Policy Stream 
 
6.4.1 The National Policy Stream 
 
The taking-up of cannabis problems were connected to a whole series of largely 
interconnected forces and factors which have tugged at, and shaped, how the Dutch have 
responded to cannabis. The changes to the coffeeshop criteria and planned introduction of a 
THC division represent a long struggle between competing agendas and alternatives, usually 
resulting in some form of compromise and ‘middle of the road’ stalemate [NL-A-AC-CJ]. This 
section examines the various factors that have shaped how policy alternatives were selected 
from the primeval soup. 
 
 
Political Feasibility and Political Values 
 
As a result of the changes in the political climate of the Netherlands, there has been a broad 
shift towards more punitive ways of framing problems and solutions. Where health 
dominated discussions of drugs policy up to the early 1990s, this is now contested with 
greater law enforcement imperatives. Similar to England & Wales, the perception of greater 
harms has resonated with desires for greater punishment and more repressive measures70. 
With a dominant narrative of cannabis as a reinvented threat, the shift to criminal justice-
driven values has not only shaped problem construction, but is also an important shaper of 
policy alternatives. A consequence is that the pragmatic tool of gedogen has come under 
pressure. As one participant remarked, the benefits of the separation of markets policy 
became lost in the face of increased threats: 
 
‘It became more fashionable to be drug free than drug controlled. The separation of the 
markets, that idea has already been in place for 30 years so people start to lose sight of the 
                                                          
70 ‘…they were also influenced by this, it is really dangerous, it is better to prohibit this… the more 
health risks the more reason to regulate it and not to prohibit it, but that is an argument you don’t get 
other people, they never react to that argument. They think it is automatic that if it is dangerous it 
should be forbidden.’ (NL-NGO1) 
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benefits that it provides’ (NL-CS-AC-H1: Senior Civil Servant in Ministry of Health, Welfare and 
Sport and Member of Garretsen Commission) 
 
The particular values of the political parties in power is of extreme relevance, with all three 
parties in the Rutte I coalition adopting a repressive standpoint towards coffeeshops (see 
Appendix, Table 6.1). More will be discussed on this political constellation under the political 
stream section, but here it is worth highlighting the values and role of one ‘key player’, 
Minister Ivo Opstelten from the VVD, who held the position of Minister for Security and 
Justice over both Rutte governments. A common theme pertaining to Opstelten was that he 
is (or was) seen as a somewhat respected, charismatic and ‘successful crime fighter’ [NL-A2] 
lying more on the conservative than liberal side of the VVD. Indeed it was postulated that he 
learnt a ‘very visible yet selective approach’ [NL-A3] whilst mayor in Rotterdam where he had 
to compete with Pim Fortuyn’s populist right-wing party, LPF, on issues of law and order: 
 
‘I think there [Rotterdam] he learnt the acting, no words but acting… every day quotes, 
quotes, quotes, we have to tackle this, have to tackle that, so it’s an image thing I think, harsh 
on crime. I think it is the language of our time, one-liners.’ (NL-A-NGO3: Independent 
Research Organisation) 
 
Thus, the types of policy measures preferred by the VVD were ones which attempted to not 
only display symbolic value that the VVD is the rightful party for law and order, but also ones 
which attached themselves to beliefs that a tougher approach will reduce problems. The key 
point here then is that the political values of the three parties in power in the Rutte I cabinet 
became coupled with particular policy preferences for responding to issues of cannabis 
through a law enforcement lens. This can be seen with the recent establishment of a new 
nationalised police force which is solely under the remit of the Ministry of Security and 
Justice71. 
 Set in the context of an increasingly hostile public and political perception towards 
cannabis, coffeeshops have become a suitable enemy for which stricter policy measures have 
become a politically feasible way to demonstrate the state’s capacity of providing law and 
order: 
 
‘NL-A-NGO3: Optstelten is a minister who always says in those words, we are going to get 
them and a very aggressive style of speech, especially on crime nowadays, it’s we’re going to 
                                                          
71 Prior to the Rutte I government, the police were accountable to both the Ministry of Interior (for 
funding and organisational matters) and the Ministry of Justice (due to responsibilities of working with 
Public Prosecution), in order to ‘guarantee democratic governance’ (van Steden and Huberts 2006:14). 
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get them, punishment has to be harsher, harder, crime cannot pay off, that kind of rhetoric. 
It’s the same with drugs, especially cannabis. 
 
D: Why so? 
 
NL-A-NGO3: Maybe it is an easy target.’ (NL-A-NGO3: Independent Research Organisation) 
 
This can also be seen in reference to ‘strengthening and broadening the fight against 
organised crime’ and employing a ‘vigorous approach’ to dealing with nuisance (Tweede 
Kamer 2011a:2, author’s translation). Such views are strengthened by a political desire to be 
symbolically seen to be responding to policy problems. 
The developments outlined above have contributed to a shift in the political 
feasibility of introducing tougher measures towards cannabis. Such moves confirm a similar 
caricature of crime control in other advanced late-modern liberal democracies. This links to a 
degree of ‘westwind’ [NL-A1] policy influence that has occurred from such countries as the 
US and UK due to these countries ‘dominating the debate’: 
 
‘…the UK is very active in where this cooperation occurs, so they are very influential. They are 
more influential than any other country in Europe except perhaps for Germany.’ (NL-POL3: 
KLPD) 
 
Thus, not only are policy problems influenced by punitive international discourses which have 
attempted to securitise and medicalise cannabis, but also that similar forces are in existence 
in the selection of policy proposals which narrow down alternatives to follow the more 
repressive moral authoritarian style of doing crime policy which dominates the US and UK. 
 The role of the international sphere in this respect is extremely pertinent not just for 
explaining broader penal currents, but also for its role in blocking particular ways of 
responding, thus shifting policy proposals towards those which are acceptable for 
neighbouring European countries. It has been noted earlier that the Dutch have consistently 
faced pressure to bring its policy on cannabis in line with European and global practices ever 
since it decided to de facto legalise the selling and consumption of cannabis (see Chapter 3). 
However, the sustained tensions created by Dutch drugs policy were ‘cultivated’ by Dutch 
politicians and has contributed to an ‘internalisation of criticism’ [NL-A2]: 
 
‘I think they [Rutte I] wanted to end this pressure, they didn’t want to be the odd one out 
anymore, they didn’t want to explain, and that’s why they said let’s not sell to foreigners 
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anymore so then we only have cannabis for the Dutch people’ (NL-CS-AC-H1: Senior Civil 
Servant in Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport and Member of Garretsen Commission) 
 
Such international pressure and dynamics have created significant barriers in introducing 
liberalising reforms, which again has contributed to plausible solutions being found in 
measures which from an international point of view attempt to ‘tackle’ and reduce the 
problem rather than simply tolerate it. This can clearly be seen with the national introduction 
of the residency criteria.  
Thus, the turn to a more repressive view towards cannabis advocated in Rutte I was 
conditioned by a historically restrictive set of international dynamics which have shaped the 
internal image towards cannabis. Over time these sustained criticisms have contributed 
somewhat to a crisis in the image projection of the Netherlands. On the one hand, there is a 
desire and pressure to not be the odd one out in the context of growing European 
harmonisation and international reliance, but on the other hand there is still a deep-rooted 
desire to project an image of tolerance and Dutch exceptionalism which is seen to be now 
overtaken by other countries in cannabis and drugs policy. 
So despite an apparent shift to a tougher criminal justice-oriented perspective, a key 
contrasting point between England & Wales and the Netherlands is the political openness to 
more liberalising approaches to cannabis. Whereas such perspectives were found to be fairly 
maligned in England & Wales, there are still deep-rooted attachments to the benefits of a 
market separation policy which challenge stricter policies towards cannabis: 
 
‘…it is much easier here, D’66… they are the legalisers. There is legalisers in the UK as well but 
you never find 50% of the population for that. So that makes it easier in a way to have a 
differentiated approach and more differentiated opinions from the very strong against to the 
very strong pro legalisation.’ (NL-A2: Academic Expert in Criminology)  
 
Although internal and external critiques have been posited towards Dutch drugs policy, the 
‘list’ of possible policy proposals is much more diverse than in England & Wales, primarily due 
to the resilience of beliefs in the market separation policy, which support notions for greater 
regulation of cultivation and the protection of coffeeshops as a valuable social institution: 
 
‘…the basic principle of ’76 that it is good to counteract a social stepping stone process, this is 
still the principle under this system… nobody wants to close down all the coffeeshops in the 
Netherlands. Maybe sometimes someone thinks this, but in all the policy documents you 
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always read, also in the advisory committee it is concluded that the system makes sense.’ (NL-
A-CS: WODC) 
 
Harm reduction and health-oriented goals remain the core of cannabis policy, with 
coffeeshops seen as an ingrained way of achieving such goals. This speaks to whether there 
has been an erosion of penal-welfare ideals. Most participants recognised that there has 
been a broad shift away from such ideas as being ruling discourses on crime, deviancy and its 
control, but there was some differentiation in the degree to which such perspectives have 
diminished. For some, notions such as resocialisation still exist within a ‘large minority’ [NL-
PP4], but for others, concepts such as gedogen have transformed and moved away from 
being centred around humanitarian ideals to being much more about pragmatism: 
 
‘…I would say that tolerance as an ideal, as a humanitarian ideal, has disappeared, but 
tolerance as a pragmatic strategy is alive and kicking. We still solve problems that way.’ (NL-
A3: Academic Expert in Criminology) 
 
In this sense, traditional liberal beliefs have undergone a transformation and ‘recoding’ 
(Garland 2001) to become embedded within narratives of pragmatism. Such sets of beliefs 
are entrenched in most institutions and agencies that deal with cannabis, predominantly 
from those in health, but it is also seen across the public prosecution, Ministry of Security and 
Justice, police, and many local municipality governments. Contrary to England & Wales where 
arguing for liberal reforms is putting one’s head ‘above the parapet’, in the Netherlands it is 
suggested that the same feeling exists for advocating the complete removal of the 
coffeeshop system: 
 
‘I imagine if someone would stand up and say, let’s close down all the coffeeshops, that would 
be putting his head above the field here… this is not an option, there would be a lot of 
opposition and also on a local level the mayors would not do it I don’t think… in most 
municipalities the situation is under control, so why would you change it? So it is not an 
option.’ (NL-A-CS: WODC) 
 
These dominant beliefs in the positive role of coffeeshops lead to the advocacy of policy 
alternatives such as the regulation of the back-door. As such, the policy primeval soup in the 
Netherlands is not as restricted as in England & Wales. 
 There are a whole host of political parties largely existing on the left-hand side of the 
political spectrum that advocate a more liberalised and/or pragmatic approach towards 
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cannabis (notably D’66; Groenlinks; SP; PvdA). Given that the Rutte II cabinet included the 
PvdA, it is again worth noting that their political values had an influence on the political 
feasibility of policy measures within this coalition (see Appendix, Table 6.1). Thus, when 
considering the changes in policy under Rutte II, it is important to consider the political values 
underpinning the particular parties involved in national governance which allows certain 
policy alternatives to become preferable over others. 
 In addition to differing political value systems, a resilient set of actors and 
organisations opposing the stricter policy changes were also an important factor in the 
progression of measures from Rutte I to Rutte II. The result of these struggles between two 
dominant positions is that the end result of the policy movement was much less strict than 
originally intended, ultimately leading to further stalemate: 
 
‘…it is a very difficult thing for policy-makers I think. They really have to balance between 
these two things. The citizens have the feeling that the government is acting right, and on the 
other hand they want to continue with this system. We are stuck in a paradox.’ (NL-A-CS: 
WODC) 
 
The juxtaposition between a shift toward a tougher approach to crime and drugs precariously 
balanced with a counter perspective which reaffirms the necessities of a market separation 
policy is one which, in combination with particular characteristics of Dutch political culture, 
lends itself to policy compromise to find a ‘middle of the road’ solution [NL-A-AC-CJ] for all 
interested parties. Whilst the types of policy options that are politically feasible are wide-
ranging, the narrowing down and selection of choices is one which is suited towards an 
incremental style of policy-making rather than sweeping reversals as can be the case in 
England & Wales. Next we turn to examine the role and influence of research and expertise 
upon the construction and selection of policy alternatives. 
 
 
Research and Expertise 
 
Compared to England & Wales there has been significantly more impact on cannabis policy in 
the Netherlands from expert committees. In the political context of fragmented and polarised 
positions on cannabis policy across varying coalition governments, the results and 
recommendations of pragmatic, problem-solving committees legitimise a way to find ‘middle 
ground’ in coalition policy (Jones 1995). However, the relationship between research, 
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expertise and policy is not purely evidence-driven, with similar accounts to England & Wales 
of using research to fit particular political agendas and needs. 
  The problematisation of cannabis as a criminal, public order, and health issue came 
to a head in the late 2000s which led to the ruling government of 2008, Balkenende IV, 
seeking to create a ‘new, integrated policy document on drugs’ (Advisory Committee on 
Drugs Policy 2009: Appendix I). This heavily involved the use of research and expertise to 
inform the debate, with an evaluation of drugs policy commissioned (van Laar and van 
Ooyen-Houben 2009) prior to the establishment of an expert committee. This committee was 
tasked with ‘…as to whether all or part of the Netherlands’ policy on drugs must be reviewed 
and, on the basis of the understanding it has gained, to make recommendations… for a drugs 
policy that is future-proof from a broad social, national and international perspective’ 
(Advisory Committee on Drugs Policy 2009: Appendix I).  
Interestingly most of the findings and recommendations of both this commission (van 
de Donk) and a later one (Garretsen) were taken up by successive coalition governments 
(Rutte I and II), demonstrating the utilisation of expertise. The first committee was formed 
under the chairmanship of Wim van de Donk, and according to participants, the challenge, 
much as it was in the political realm, was to try and find a common shared position or ‘golden 
angling’ [NL-A-AC-CJ] between two broad factions representing health and criminal justice 
perspectives.  
There was an extremely pragmatic and compromise-based approach written into the 
purpose of the committee, and the way in which consensus was found was through the use 
of a policy matrix (see Appendix, figure 6.5) which opened up mutual and multiple solutions 
to the problem72. For the van de Donk committee, the most rational policy option was to 
move from option II (open, one-sided regulation) to option IV: a closed type of coffeeshop 
which serves the local market. As the report suggests: 
                                                          
72 In total, six possible policy options were proposed which ranged from complete legalisation (option 
I), to a complete ban on coffeeshops (option VI) (see Appendix, figure 6.5). These two extreme options 
were rejected by the committee on the basis that prohibition would ‘…mean the loss of the quiet, safe 
environment they offer adult cannabis users’, thus attracting such users to a more harmful and 
damaging environment of the black market, and alternatively complete legalisation would ‘…only serve 
to attract more foreign users, and possibly also producers, since they could grow cannabis for export in 
this country freely and without risk’ (Advisory Committee on Drug Policy 2009:43-44). Ruling out these 
two options then, the committee sought to find consensus on an approach within existing parameters. 
Option II describes the starting point prior to the introduction of new measures, that ‘coffeeshops are 
open to the general public but subject to one-sided ‘regulation’’, which was seen as unsatisfactory due 
to the ‘crime-inducing nature of a non-regulated supply side’ (ibid:44). It was suggested by the 
committee that one option would be to regulate the back-door which would give local authorities 
more power over production (option III). But this was not seen as an ‘automatic step’ (ibid:45), and 
was rejected by the committee due to the involvement of organised crime in supplying large 
coffeeshops, and as such, ‘[g]iven the problems currently associated with this, the risks would be too 
great’ (ibid). 
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‘Measures to restrict flows of customers to coffee shops are needed, as a matter of priority in 
regions where coffee shops systematically serve a cross-border market. Restricted access to 
coffee shops for cross-border consumers would reduce the influx of foreigners, many of 
whom come because coffee shops give them a quiet, safe environment in which to consume 
cannabis. If they were to stay away, the coffee shop market would shrink, and the associated 
side-effects (drug runners, street dealing – including in hard drugs – and traffic nuisance) 
would be reduced.’ (Advisory Committee on Drug Policy 2009:46) 
 
The need to restrict foreign visitors was also imagined in a more ‘radical’ policy within this 
option which would make coffeeshops private clubs (ibid). This would require that local users 
become members of a club which could be restricted to a particular region. These ideas were 
adopted by the Rutte I coalition with the introduction of the residency (ingezentenen) and 
closed club (beslotenclub) criteria. 
It was on these lines of thinking that a ‘communis opinio’ [NL-A-AC-CJ] was found in 
the committee, with joint recognition that to move beyond the current situation and 
problems, the only way is ‘damage control’ [NL-A-AC-CJ] by coffeeshops returning to their 
‘origins’ as a ‘local facility’: 
 
‘…the only way to reduce [in] any case, let’s say the burden of our own policy, because we are 
organising our own mess, and if you want to keep the coffeeshops alive then we have to 
reduce them to what they were originally meant to be. Local facilities for Dutch people, and 
the framework of public health.’ (NL-A-AC-CJ: Academic Expert in Criminology and Member of 
van der Donk Commission) 
 
The way in which the committee framed solutions to the problems was with a fundamental 
acceptance of coffeeshops. As already said, the option to completely ban coffeeshops was 
not conceivable due to the threats to what is dominantly seen as the beneficial separation of 
markets. But in addition to a need for more central direction, an important recognition was 
‘…to allow for tailor-made approaches’ (Advisory Committee on Drugs Policy 2009:49). Local 
experimentation is advocated, much the same as the original intentions underlying the 
committees of Baan and Hulsman, to develop and test pragmatic solutions. 
 Overall then, we can see that the van de Donk commission was very influential in 
producing recommendations that were used in the creation of new coffeeshop criteria under 
Rutte I. The proposal to limit foreign visitors was seen as a prerequisite before any further 
changes should be made and this came to fruition in the shape of the residency criteria. 
Moreover, we can see that the closed club criteria also came out of this report as a way to try 
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and better control the size of coffeeshops and therefore also the cultivation supplying them. 
The whole premise of the recommendations was to return to an idyllic state of affairs, before 
things went wrong, and the only conceivable way to do this within existing parameters was to 
try and limit the coffeeshop market. 
 The van de Donk committee was primed with looking at the future direction of Dutch 
drugs policy, but a major point of consideration related to the overall drugs legislation and 
the system of classification which is used to control illicit substances. The committee 
concluded with the suggestion to establish a new committee to look at the Opium Act list 
system and whether moves should be made to introduce a single list of illicit substances. In 
response to this, a new committee was established, led by Professor Henk Garretsen, who 
suggested that: 
 
‘…we don’t take over that recommendation. We really think that it is very useful to have a 
distinction between hard drugs and soft drugs. It is not very right terms but we know what we 
mean then. So this committee really thought unanimously that we should retain the 
distinction.’ (NL-A-AC-H2: Academic Expert in Health and Chair of Garretsen Commission) 
 
Whereas the van de Donk committee was more of a balanced discussion of health and 
criminal justice concerns, the framing of the Garretsen Committee was very much health-
driven. However, one of the points most picked up on from the Garretsen Committee was the 
recommendation to divide cannabis according to high and low potency which would place 
stronger forms in Schedule I of the Opium Act, or as a hard drug (Expertcommissie 
Lijstensystematiek Opiumwet 2011). Doing so would make all offences related to cannabis 
the same as those of other hard drugs such as cocaine, heroin and ecstasy. 
 From these two commissions then, a number of potential policy options were 
presented, which lies in stark contrast to the limited advice given by the ACMD in England & 
Wales. The search for policy alternatives in the Netherlands had a much broader remit, and 
as such the list of policy proposals to be seriously considered were wide, but were also 
narrowed down through a process of rational and logical discussion amongst differing, and 
somewhat polarised, perspectives. 
 In one way then, research and expertise appears to have a very pragmatic ‘content 
driven’ problem-solving capacity [NL-A-AC-H2]. The construction of committees prior to the 
installation of new policy measures is a clear example of this, with most of the measures that 
were introduced under Rutte I (with the exception of the school’s distance criteria) relating to 
proposals made in these committees. Moreover, whereas in England & Wales expertise and 
advice from the ACMD was drawn upon as a statutory obligation prior to policy change and 
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then swiftly rejected, in the Netherlands research continued to play an important part in 
policy discussions and development. This is evident in the evaluation of the residency and 
closed club measures which has been an important shaper in the debate (see WODC 2013). 
But not only does research serve as a pragmatic tool to solve policy problems, it also 
provides legitimisation for a coalition government to follow a particular direction or proposal. 
Expert committees are seen to provide a way to find solutions which are seen to represent a 
wide variety of interests. This was apparent in the views of both those working in the 
commissions73 as well as by politicians: 
 
‘…because a coalition system really needs to have a basis, someone will always have to move 
in their position to get a decision, that means they should have reason to change which they 
cannot get from their manifesto because they are changing from this. So there is some 
necessity for facts or expert judgement or something like that to support the moving of the 
political position.’ (NL-P4: CDA Politician, Utrecht) 
 
Again, this presents somewhat of a distinction from how and why research and expertise was 
utilised (or not) in England & Wales in relation to the 2009 reclassification. But similar to 
England & Wales, participants also noted that research more broadly is also used for political 
means to support ideological viewpoints: 
 
‘It is very ideologically-driven so it is very difficult to see the research outcome in a neutral 
way. People use it for their own point of view.’ (NL-CS-AC-CJ: Senior Civil Servant in Ministry 
of Security and Justice and Member of van de Donk Committee) 
 
In this sense, the taking up of recommendations to ban non-Dutch residents and enforce 
stricter rules against coffeeshops fitted within the dominant right-leaning ideologies of those 
in power at the time the measures were initially introduced under Rutte I. Moreover, after 
the residency and closed club measures were trialled and evaluated in the south of the 
country, for Minister Opstelten and proponents of the new stricter measures, they were 
heralded as a ‘success’ which must be pursued with even more rigour (Tweede Kamer 
2012:3). For others, the evaluation was used to highlight the failures of the experiment, to 
demonstrate its catastrophic effects on the separation of markets. 
                                                          
73 ‘…because this topic is so controversial, that because of that they follow more the content of these 
reports… in these 2 cases the policy is to a quite a large extent content-driven and not politically-
driven. But perhaps that is just because that is so controversial and they couldn’t come to a solution 
themselves and that was the reason to form a committee.’ (NL-A-AC-H2) 
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Also important is the challenge to expertise from the growth of populism and 
sharpening of ideology towards cannabis which has driven short-term political point scoring 
and choosing a ‘standpoint’ over ‘facts’ [NL-POL1]. Such trends have questioned the 
fundamental use of research and expertise in guiding decisions. Indeed, it is within the very 
essence of populism to move away from elitist forms of governing and placing democratic 
power into the hands of the demos. As one politician noted, ‘the PVV don’t believe in 
research’ [NL-P1]. 
Thus, there is some evidence to suggest that there is sometimes a dubious 
relationship between research, expertise and policy, with the prioritisation of ‘fact-free 
politics’ over one based upon scientific advice [NL-A3]. This can be seen with the planned 
introduction of the school’s distance criteria. Despite there being no evidence to support 
such a policy measure, and no clear and logical rationale for its effectiveness, this measure 
was still advocated under Rutte I: 
 
‘…there was one research project in Rotterdam, they applied such a distance criterion already, 
250m not 350m, and the research showed that it did not have any effect on the youngsters, 
not any’ (NL-A-CS: WODC) 
 
‘I think the [school’s distance] criteria is an example of the Christian Democratic way of 
looking at the drugs problem… that is a criterium that has never been proven that it works.’ 
(NL-A-NGO3: Independent Research Organisation) 
 
This was primarily an item favoured by the Christian Democrats and Minister Opstelten to 
reinforce a moral and ideological position that attempted to denormalise cannabis and 
coffeeshops as a whole, rather than introduce measures which would more effectively 
reduce and prevent youth consumption. 
 But even with the use of research and expertise in this way, it clearly continues to 
perform an important function within Dutch politics, and so whilst the presence of populist 
forces may drive policy to a degree, research and expertise also serves as a correcting force 
for measures which ‘are not successful in practice’ [NL-PP4], as has been the case with the 
evaluation of the closed club and residency criteria. 
 
 
Technical Feasibility 
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Alongside political feasibility and the use of research and expertise, a fundamental aspect in 
the selection of policy alternatives in the Netherlands was their technical feasibility. Dutch 
drugs policy is awkwardly positioned between regulation and prohibition, and one of the 
main reasons for this is the fact that international conventions and regulations are seen to 
limit the extent to which cannabis can be further liberalised. As with much of the debates 
surrounding cannabis and drugs policy, the exact limitations are contested, with a divide 
between those who believe that there is room to experiment with policies which would 
regulate the back-door problem within existing frameworks74, and those who believe that the 
conventions are set in stone with little variability available beyond the already strained 
gedoogbeleid. From the government’s position, it has been clearly and repeatedly stated that 
experiments which would bring into question the Netherlands’ allegiance to the spirit of the 
international conventions are not feasible: 
 
‘The core of our policy is that any kind of cultivation of cannabis is illegal and remains 
prohibited. Experiments such as the municipality of Utrecht represent conflict with applicable 
legislation and international obligations’ (Tweede Kamer 2011a:5, author’s translation) 
 
The presentation of the impossibility of full regulation in itself further justifies the need to be 
more repressive as the only logical solution within the given context.  
But not only are international UN conventions an obvious and important shaper, but 
also noted were the problems with trying to introduce policies which would restrict foreign 
visitors. Local municipalities have attempted to introduce such measures prior to their 
national introduction but were faced with law suits by coffeeshop owners who argued that 
the policy unfairly discriminates against other Europeans and unfairly affects coffeeshop 
businesses in selected areas (see Chapter 3). Such challenges have continued since the 
residency criteria has become part of the coffeeshop criteria, but there is a very important 
technical aspect in why the government chose, or had to, introduce new national criteria as 
opposed to allowing  municipalities to add it to their local rules and regulations. That is, the 
                                                          
74 It was noted that recent developments in global policy movements, especially in cannabis policy, 
were seen to be gradually opening up a space for policy alternatives that stretch more into liberal 
reforms such as regulation: ‘…you see Americans lose their moral high ground, all the states making 
their own drug policy on cannabis etc., things are happening… it could easily happen if there is some 
momentum on the international level, and Holland won’t be the last.’ (NL-CS-AC-CJ). Indeed, pressure 
has continued to mount particularly from a coalition of local mayors who wish to start experiments on 
the back-door, culminating in the ‘Joint Manifesto’ signed by 35 mayors arguing for back-door 
regulation (see NRC 2014). 
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rules had to comply with international and European regulations, the Grondwet (Dutch 
constitutional law), and the Opium Act75.  
So in this way, the technical feasibility surrounding the introduction of new policy 
measures is a crucial element which constrains possibilities within existing approaches. 
Legalisation and regulation of the back-door is not seen as an option but neither is the 
complete prohibition of cannabis and the closing down of coffeeshops. However, within a 
political context which more readily facilitates a punitive shift towards cannabis, the technical 
feasibility of policy options has been used to fit particular agendas. Minister Opstelten’s 
reluctance to consider cultivation experiments is in part shaped by technical feasibility, but 
such a policy would go against his and the VVD’s commitment to tackling crime. For such 
individuals, the solution is not in regulation but in tougher and stricter measures. 
Next, we turn to consider how the policy preferences selected at a national level 
were translated into the subnational domain of Utrecht which has been one of the 
forerunners in resisting national measures and advocating alternatives. 
 
 
6.4.2 The Subnational Policy Stream 
 
The broad perspective concerning coffeeshops in Utrecht was that they are largely 
unproblematic, with cultivation considered a problem due to policy failures to address the 
back-door. The national changes to the gedoogbeleid were seen as counterproductive – 
contributing and creating problems which either were not serious, or which exacerbated 
them – and as a result created resistance towards the measures initiated under Rutte I: 
 
‘…we don’t have any problems with tourists in coffeeshops so we don’t see the idea of 
installing permits or something, and 350m, we don’t have any problems yet and we don’t see 
the advantage of that, only that we have to close down a lot of coffeeshops and only a 
problem that we have too few coffeeshops, that is not of any help.’ (NL-P5: D’66 Alderman, 
Utrecht) 
 
A further policy problem is highlighted here, that ironically it was considered by this 
participant that there were not enough coffeeshops in the municipality. In relation to the 
                                                          
75 Following a test case, one participant noted that: ‘…the outcome was that the rule complied with the 
European rules, it also complied with the Grondwet, the basic law of the Netherlands, but it did not 
comply with the Opium Act, so this rule could not be applied that way so they said this was not allowed 
to be a local rule, so if you want to do such a thing you should do it on a national level’ (NL-A-CS: 
WODC). 
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school’s distance criterion, the main objections were centred around the fact that it would 
have led to most coffeeshops being closed down and that it was not based upon any sound 
evidence that it would be effective in reducing use by young people: 
 
‘I would not be in favour of a small shop standing in front of a school but I don’t think a 
criterium will make a difference for children starting to smoke soft drugs.’ (NL-P6: D’66 
Politician, Utrecht) 
 
‘It is not solving a problem. We see that it is creating problems and it is not solving the big 
problem we see’ (NL-P5: D’66 Alderman, Utrecht) 
 
In the latter quote, again it is emphasised that the ‘big problem’ is not with coffeeshops and 
nuisance, but with production and supply of cannabis to coffeeshops. The main issue with the 
planned introduction of the private club and actual introduction of the residency criteria is 
that the local case site does not experience problems related to drug tourists, with estimates 
that only approximately 10% of coffeeshop visitors are from abroad. As such, there were 
fears that the introduction of this measure would cause rises in street dealing due to the 
necessity of checks and registering of information from users: 
 
‘...people don’t like to have their identity being registered, certainly not in the coffeeshops, 
and we were very afraid that that rule would start up dealing in the streets again’ (NL-P3: 
PvdA Politician, Utrecht) 
 
‘…it’s not only not a problem but we cause a problem by introducing it and by enforcing it.’ 
(NL-PA3: Policy Advisor to the Mayor, Utrecht) 
 
The reaction of the local municipality towards the measures introduced under Rutte I was 
that they were all seen as unnecessary and would actually create problems as a result. Whilst 
the residency criterion remains in the national guidelines, there is no current intention to 
enforce it, which is evidenced both in participants’ views, as well as in the official response 
and local coffeeshop policy which was published in July 2013: 
 
‘The Residents Criterion which is part of the national tolerance criteria (AHOJGI) will be listed 
in the Utrecht enforcement strategy Hotel and Catering indicating that enforcement in hand 
will be taken as objectively determined that the visit of non-residents at the Utrecht 
coffeeshops leads to trouble.’ (Gemeente Utrecht 2013, author’s translation) 
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‘We think it is necessary if people who can’t show they live in our country are causing 
problems, but they don’t at this moment so we don’t implement it now, and we will 
implement it as soon as that is the case… As long as we don’t have that problem there is no 
duty to implement it.’ (NL-PA3: Policy Advisor to the Mayor, Utrecht) 
 
Thus, whilst the residency criteria is recognised in the decisions of the local policy, there are 
no intentions to enforce it until foreign consumers are considered a problem. Interestingly 
though, despite the refutations of the school’s distance criteria, the local coffeeshop policy 
has partially included this into its guidelines, stating that 250m applies in the inner-city, 350m 
in residential areas outside the inner-city, and no distance criteria in the outskirts of the city 
(Gemeente Utrecht 2013). This could be seen as a result of the growing ‘broken windows’ 
perspective and negative stigma that has come to circulate perceptions of coffeeshops, to 
protect families and children from the threat of cannabis. But the resistance fostered towards 
the residency and school’s distance criteria was premised on the belief that they were not 
considered suitable policy measures, grating against the political feasibility of introducing 
other preferred options. 
 Alongside dissatisfaction with measures initiated at a national level, an important 
(and contrasting to England & Wales) aspect at the subnational level is the ability and 
possibility to create policy solutions to the problems that are experienced76. Perhaps one of 
the most important developments at the local level in addition to the large resistance 
towards the stricter national measures is the proposals to start two ‘experiments’ concerning 
regulation and provision of cannabis. The first experiment concerns the provision of low-
THC/high-CBD77 cannabis to approximately 80 dependent users experiencing psychiatric 
problems, and serves a similar purpose to heroin prescription; to stabilise and reduce 
cannabis use that could be exacerbating problematic disorders. But the most contested 
proposition is based upon introducing a cannabis social club.  
Under the prosecutor’s guidelines it is possible for individuals to grow up to 5 plants 
without being prosecuted, and under a club model, the idea is that collectively, 200 
individuals would be able to grow up to 1000 plants which would then be shared amongst the 
                                                          
76 For example, one possible policy alternative that has been aired (but yet to come to fruition at the 
time of writing) is to establish ‘drive-in’ coffeeshops on the outskirts of the city to address parking and 
nuisance problems experienced in the inner-city: ‘…we have to go towards a new concept for 
coffeeshops, and that is a drive-in coffeeshop… you can diminish those Inconvenience problems by 
closing down some coffeeshops in the centre… if you move them to the parts where there are no  
people living there and people can go there by scooter, bicycle or car, and pick up over there and use it 
at home, then at least the inconvenient pressure in the inner-city will be diminished, and also in some 
areas where the main focus is living with families etc.’ (NL-P2) 
77 CBD (Cannabidiol) is an anti-psychotic cannabinoid found in cannabis which has been demonstrated 
to be promising in the treatment of psychiatric disorders (see Campos et al. 2012). 
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club’s members. The plans, originating from the Alderman for health, carve a clear rationale 
behind the experiment, drawing upon research and evidence, which is argued along the basis 
of benefitting health (College van B&W 2011). Indeed, such an experiment aims to serve a 
purpose alongside the intentions to control THC content through regulation of the plants that 
are being grown. This would thus ensure that they comply with national legislation rather 
than leaving the production in the hands of those existing outside of regulatory frameworks 
and placing culpability upon coffeeshop owners who are expected to be responsible for the 
THC content of the products they receive and sell. Interestingly, the plans suggest that such 
experiments are possible within existing national and international frameworks, on the basis 
that these plans are for scientific and medical purposes for the benefit of public health, 
thereby contesting national policy talk that such experimentations are not technically 
feasible: 
 
‘…all treaties, international and national law, is saying that if you want to do science you can 
do that, so this is the way we are now making steps forward’ (NL-P5: D’66 Alderman, Utrecht) 
 
So there is some purported degree of manoeuvre available to local municipalities in the 
translation of national policy and the creation of new policy as can be seen with the recent 
coffeeshop measures and proposed cultivation experiments. Cannabis policy can be seen as a 
deeply contested ground, with dichotomies constructed between the technical and political 
feasibility of policy alternatives. At the national level, regulation of cultivation was not 
considered an option because it did not fit with the particular values and ideologies of those 
in the Rutte I government, but at the subnational level alternative discourses and plans 
suggested that such policy measures were possible and desirable. 
 
 
6.5 The Political Stream 
 
6.5.1 The National Political Stream 
 
The final section discusses the final stream in Kingdon’s framework which affected how and 
why the changes to the gedoogbeleid were introduced and then later revised, with a drilling 
down into how the local case site served as a point of resistance in national debates as has 
been alluded to here. Of particular relevance in this section is the importance of ‘changes in 
administration’ which shifted the political representation of national government, ‘organised 
political forces’, and the ‘national mood’. 
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Changes in Administration 
 
A key aspect in accounting for national policy change in the Netherlands is the fact that there 
were decisive changes in government which shifted the political constellation first from a 
balanced centrist coalition between two religious parties (CDA; CU) and the PvdA under 
Balkanende IV, to a right-leaning cabinet of CDA and VVD with parliamentary support by the 
PVV under Rutte I; and second, from this back to the centre with a balance between VVD and 
PvdA under Rutte II. 
Following the conclusion and report of the expert commission van de Donk and the 
elevation of policy problems into the political sphere, a window of opportunity was opened 
allowing the government of Rutte I to introduce a stricter set of measures which would have 
heavily reduced the overall number of coffeeshops and limited their use to residents of the 
Netherlands. However, with a further change in the political colours of government, the 
window remained open, with the proposed and trialled measures then revised under a new 
coalition agreement which removed the measures which were seen as a ‘step too far’ [NL-CS-
AC-CJ] (i.e. school’s distance and closed club), and gave greater flexibility to local 
municipalities in how and when to implement the residency criteria as a national rule. Given 
the importance of such changes in administration in altering the policies, consideration is 
given to the politics of coalitions. 
 Set within the context of increased voter volatility and mobility since depillarisation 
(Aarts and Thomassen 2008), political parties necessarily have to adopt clear standpoints on 
issues. In the case of cannabis, this has largely led to a polarisation of views between the 
‘right’ and ‘left’. This is seen to be due to an ingrained acceptance that no one party will hold 
a majority in a system of proportional representation, and so there is a political need to have 
a party ‘profile’ in a plethora of available viewpoints78. With the growth of law and order 
populism and a disdain for gedogen, this presents a ‘danger’ for policy-making in crafting 
policy responses which are based more upon popular appeal than on rational problem-
solving: 
 
‘…we feel more and more pressure as politicians, we have to get very clear and tough on 
progressive or repressive or conservative issues. You have to do your best to be a more 
distinctive politician because we also have to look at the polls, we also have to look at the 
                                                          
78 ‘…all these political parties need their own profile… there is true awareness in every political party 
[that] they will never have the majority, so they need to profile.’ (NL-A2) 
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voters, we also have to look at the media… to distinguish yourself you sometimes have to be 
focussing on a distinctive policy than really the best policy. That is one of the dangers and 
risks’ (NL-P2: VVD Politician, Utrecht) 
 
Indeed, the rising popularity of the PVV (which became the third largest party in the 2010 
election, see Aarts and van der Kolk 2011) was crucial in creating competition with the CDA 
and VVD for voters on such issues (also see van Kessel 2011): 
 
‘For a long time Geert Wilders, he was the guy of the big statements on crime etc. and we 
noticed here that even a minister of the Christian Democrats who was very in the middle, he 
was getting signals from his party that he had to be stiff on crime to get the wind out of the 
sails of Mr Wilders. So when it became clear that crime was going down tremendously, we 
had to work for a year to get our minister to say it out loud. He said it is not politically 
convenient for me to say it.’ (BL-CS-AC-CJ: Senior Civil Servant in Ministry of Security and 
Justice and Member of van de Donk Committee) 
 
‘There is the VVD, in reaction to PVV and Pim Fortuyn, has become a more right-wing party 
than they were. They are more strict towards crime. So there is a shift towards the right-wing 
in Holland… the middle parties have become more right-wing.’ (NL-PP1: Policy Worker, Public 
Prosecutor’s Office) 
 
With cannabis policy a deeply politicised issue, there is pressure and tension for politicians to 
respond quickly, clearly and authoritatively, allowing for a reactionary knee-jerk style politics 
to foster. The types of responses generated in such a climate are seen to be ‘incident-driven’ 
[NL-PP1] with a quick turnover of policy measures which is directly related to the instability 
and turnover of coalitions in the Netherlands. Instead of looking to build longer term 
strategies and policies, participants noted that the quick turnover of governments had 
contributed towards short-term policy solutions and policy movement between different 
coalitions79. 
The need to be seen to be responding over and above the actual quality of policy 
response has meant that each party and government attempts to make their mark whilst in 
power. Some measures are introduced more on the basis of their symbolic prowess rather 
than their ability to tackle content-driven problems. To a degree, this was exemplified in the 
measures initiated under Rutte I. The rules had symbolic appeal and appeared to show that 
                                                          
79 ‘…because they were changing every couple of years and that goes for a lot of national policy, we 
will see it when it gets here, because things really change quite quickly, it’s never clear how things will 
be worked out’ (NL-P4) 
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the government was taking some action against recognised problems. This was particularly  
the case with regards to the school’s distance criteria, but can also be seen more broadly as 
the tighter measures offered little in the way of effectively addressing the back-door problem 
other than tough rhetoric emphasising a ‘vigorous approach’ and ‘strengthening and 
broadening the fight’ against criminality (Tweede Kamer 2011a:2, author’s translation). 
But importantly, it was the combination of political parties within the Rutte I coalition 
and the particular values which they held that helped shape the chosen responses and reject 
alternatives. Overall, the distinctive shift to further repression was made possible because of 
the ‘unique’ situation of having a completely right-leaning cabinet: 
 
‘Rutte I was a unique cabinet because it was completely right-wing, or centrist-right-wing, but 
it was a unique coalition for getting through policy measures in one direction and I think that 
was unique over the past 40 or 50 years, I don’t think it will come back very quickly.’ (NL-P4: 
CDA Politician, Utrecht) 
 
However, despite the idea that extreme positions are taken by political parties at first, 
especially in the election campaigns, in many ways the Dutch political system follows a 
process which necessarily churns out a more balanced approach. This is due to the very 
nature of having to form a coalition. There are loyalties and preferences to working with 
particular coalition partners, but compromise and agreement has to be made between at 
least two parties on how they are to govern the country. By taking an initially more extreme 
position, this becomes politically useful in negotiations as less ground is politically lost than if 
you were to start bargaining at the centre: 
 
‘One thing, that is campaigning, and secondly, that is also negotiating. I was quite fierce in the 
media about, for instance, the wietpas, then you get a sort of pressure always that the others 
are getting fiercer and in the end I don’t have to move this much but I only have to move this 
much because I already took a very radical position in the beginning… so what you have to 
give in in the negotiations is always less than if you are straight away starting in the middle of 
the road. So it is both campaigning and negotiating with the other parties.’ (NL-P2: VVD 
Politician, Utrecht) 
 
In Rutte I, the combination of parties meant that much of the political goals could be 
achieved with a relatively shared vision of more repression as a policy solution. However, 
where compromise cannot be readily found then a process of ‘wheeling and dealing’ [NL-A-
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NGO2] is required80. Where compromise can be found it is made, where it cannot it may 
traded for another item, or it may be that the issue is too contested that it creates a 
stalemate and is left to one side until a future coalition can find some form of agreement on 
how to proceed. This latter option seems to be used fairly often with a subject as contentious 
and volatile as drugs policy. 
Part of this political culture relates to a fundamental value of the Netherlands, which 
is to be inclusive, a desire not to let any one side dominate: 
 
‘Even if you are on other sides of the political spectrum you have to deal with each other. You 
have to try and find common positions and don’t let the majority dominate.’ (NL-CS-AC-CJ: 
Senior Civil Servant in Ministry of Security and Justice and Member of van de Donk 
Committee) 
 
The result of this process is that policy change is relatively slow and incremental with initial 
positions retreated from in order to find a balance. Linked in to this, there is an acceptance 
that new coalitions cannot completely undo the decisions made before it, providing some 
continuity81. This can be clearly seen in how cannabis policy has unfolded, with initial 
movements started under Balkenende IV to introduce a revised drugs policy, which were 
carried on and introduced under Rutte I, and then revised under Rutte II, where the more 
contested elements were softened down. Thus, the nature of policy-making in this instance is 
that they were relatively small steps within existing boundaries which were then 
counteracted by further changes in government. In this way, the politics and policies of the 
Netherlands aimed to ‘please the right with tough talk’ but satisfy liberal practitioners with 
more pragmatic and flexible policy [NL-A3]: 
 
‘This is the way how things go. There is national legislation which is either carried out or very 
explicitly or less explicitly rejected. Then there is some kind of fight over who is the owner of 
the problem and there is some compromise and some condoning and the problem is slightly, 
                                                          
80 For example, within a political portfolio, a party will ascribe more value to some issues than others, 
and in the ‘backstage’, deals will be made over which issues are to be given to which parties to lead on:  
‘We call it the backstage. Every party has 10 or 20 goals they want to achieve, and from that 10 or 20, 
some of them you could say they are characteristic of my party, I don’t want to lose them. For the 
Social Democrats, drugs is not one of the characteristic items. So if they have to change items, one of 
that is drugs.’ (NL-POL1) 
81 ‘I think in general Dutch politicians accept that with coalition-building you cannot just go into a 
coalition or a government and change everything because it will lead to chaos, no judgement on the 
English system. And also, there are always parties, it very rarely happens that a completely new 
coalition comes in. So those parties continue from one coalition to the next.’ (NL-P4) 
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slowly disappearing and the media lose their interest and then it is no longer a political issue.’ 
(NL-A3, Academic Expert in Criminology) 
 
The second change in administration is of key importance in this regard, in that the VVD’s 
new coalition partner, PvdA, had a completely different perspective than the CDA and PVV on 
how best to respond to cannabis, and so reaching a compromise and bargaining on this issue 
was a key aspect of being able to form a coalition. Consequently, notable changes were made 
in the Rutte II coalition agreement regarding cannabis policy which saw the removal of both 
the school’s distance criteria and also the closed club criteria. The remaining criterion 
introduced under Rutte I, residency, was loosened to allow local municipalities greater 
freedom in how and when to enforce the rule (Tweede Kamer 2012). 
 The impact of the change in administration then, is that it has brought more balance 
between the polarised right and left back into the same coalition, and as a result, there has 
been a shift from repression in Rutte I to ‘water treading’ [NL-CS-AC-CJ] in Rutte II. It was 
noted that without the ‘threat’ and pressure from the extreme right-wing PVV in 
government, this allowed coffeeshop policy to become less strict and more flexible than 
originally intended: 
 
‘…now there is a new government and they consist of left and right. The right-wing extremists 
[PVV] are smaller, the threat is less I think on that side of politics, and they [VVD] made a deal 
to govern and they, not by always finding compromise on the main issues, but by wheeling 
and dealing… Part of the deal was, I think, more liberal, more tolerant approach of the 
coffeeshop policy.’ (NL-PA3: Policy Advisor to the Mayor, Utrecht) 
 
This has created an interesting situation for Minister Opstelten, who on the one hand is more 
flexible with compromising with his PvdA counterparts, but there is also a political desire to 
‘save face’ and keep up his own image and political appearances as being a crime-fighter: 
 
‘He is a hard-liner, he has strong support, a man that gains a lot of respect… he would lose his 
face if he was to stop with the wietpas’ (NL-A2: Academic Expert in Criminology) 
 
‘He is becoming more lenient whenever he encounters real opposition, then he adjusts his 
plan. But not from the start. He is not open for discussion from the start so he will try to get 
things done as long as he can, his way.’ (NL-PP4: Policy Worker, Public Prosecutor’s Office) 
 
So there is evidence of ambivalent crime control strategies within Rutte II. On the one hand, 
there is an acceptance of the negative side-effects of the measures of Rutte I coupled with 
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support for the beneficial role of coffeeshops and pressure from the PvdA, but on the other 
hand, political imperatives that are influenced by a broader shift in political climate have led 
to a continuing belief in repression and tougher law enforcement as a solution. 
The result of these negotiations is that much less change has occurred than originally 
envisaged, with the sense that cannabis policy has returned to a stalemate between differing 
views on how best to proceed. The politics of coalitions, coupled with timely and decisive 
changes in administration, provided a powerful mechanism by which more extreme or 
contested policy measures were rejected or revised. 
 
 
The National Mood 
 
The nature and role of the ‘national mood’ is as schizophrenic and polarised as the political 
parties. Greater media coverage of policy problems arguably increased public and political 
support for tougher measures against cannabis. However, following the suggestions above, 
once the new measures were introduced there was a severe backlash from a liberal 
community who felt their rights were under threat. Whilst it was broadly recognised that 
Dutch media is not as febrile as the tabloid press in the UK82, the media still plays an 
important role in shaping debates and informing political opinions, increasingly influencing a 
more responsive and immediate type of politics. 
 As has been already alluded to throughout this chapter, over the past few decades 
there has been growing fears surrounding crime, nuisance, and particularly immigrants which 
have been accompanied by toughening attitudes towards penal-welfare ideals such as 
resocialisation with growing preferences for tougher approaches: 
 
‘The support of the public for resocialisation has gone from 70% in the ‘70s to only 30% now… 
Do you support incarceration policies or something like this, and this had a steep increase 
from 20 to 70%’ (NL-A1: Academic Expert in Social Sciences) 
 
Notably, it is suggested that cannabis and coffeeshops became one of the targets that was 
interlinked with these concerns. As in England & Wales, participants noted that these 
concerns and fears were primarily driven from the conservative middle class, in response to 
                                                          
82 ‘I think it is rather calm, much more calm. Our right-wing tabloid, de Telegraaf, but comparing de 
Telegraaf to The Sun it is very calm. But I think the mechanisms of what I call the political-media 
complex are moving in a direction that… the dramatization, images instead of facts etc., are working 
here in that direction which makes it more difficult to get a relaxed policy.’ (NL-CS-AC-CJ) 
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perceived threats and risks from outsiders83. But despite seemingly demonstrating a more 
punitive framing of cannabis policy, the issue of cannabis divides people sharply, and whilst 
overall responses to crime have hardened, there is still strong support for liberal policies 
regarding cannabis: 
 
‘There is a tough on crime climate, a punitive turn, also more rhetorically than fact, but, the 
Netherlands is still so a liberal country, this is a paradox. Most people in the Netherlands are 
still in favour of the use of soft drugs, 70% or so, maybe 80… The same people voting for 
Wilders, PVV, are in favour of soft drugs.’ (NL-A1: Academic Expert in Social Sciences) 
 
Overall it was suggested that the media views on cannabis policy are fairly balanced, again 
between two dichotomised positions, but liberal values really came to the surface as a 
dominant counter-narrative when it became apparent coffeeshops were under threat, with 
strong public and media critiques of the wietpas which has seemingly only served to further 
fuel the desire to regulate the back-door: 
 
‘…it has provoked a response and now people are really waking up, they are seeing in the 
streets the result of this prohibitionist policy and they say we don’t want it.’ (NL-NGO2: Drugs 
Policy Reform Organisation) 
 
‘…from the media it has become clear that this wietpas has been strongly criticised and has 
negative side effects in those cities which had these tourists’ (NL-A2: Academic Expert in 
Criminology) 
 
The role of the national mood then, is that it propelled concerns into the political sphere, but 
also served to counter what was seen as overly-repressive set of measures which helped 
influence the revision of the measures introduced in Rutte I. Whilst not capable of fully 
reversing policy, which is rather uncharacteristic of Dutch policy-making, the national mood is 
a key contributory factor in accounting for how and why policy took the direction it did. 
 
 
                                                          
83 ‘…people who are reshaping themselves as somewhat modern conservatives. They had a lot of 
privileges and rights in the last decades of the last millennium when it went very well, and they are 
afraid to lose them due to globalisation or due to foreigners coming in or whatever. There are political 
parties in the Netherlands, three specifically, who are investing on it, dragging the right-wing liberals 
more to the right because they have to respond, and people are afraid so what do you offer them? Law 
and order… cannabis is an easy topic to do because the cannabis users don’t vote for those kinds of 
parties so it is a free ride for them to have it law and order and they are supported by the Christian 
Democrats because the Christian Democrats never really like liberal tolerant drug policies.’ (NL-PA1) 
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Organised Political Forces 
 
The final component of the national level analysis of the policy process relates to the role of 
organised political forces existing within, beyond and below the state which both contributed 
towards the initial policy changes and served as a major point of resistance which influenced 
the ‘mellowing out’ [NL-NGO2] of measures in Rutte II.  
First, it is important to note that there are still strong liberal and welfarist values 
entrenched within practitioners and civil servants involved in drugs policy. Given that drugs 
policy is driven by a health-oriented harm reduction perspective, there was particular critique 
of the repressive measures against cannabis and coffeeshops from elite actors working within 
health, such as academics represented on the two commissions, and from civil servants 
working in the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Support. In addition to a more humanistic 
conceptualisation of drug users, it was suggested by civil servants working within the health 
ministry that there were clear cultural divides between the Ministry of Health, Welfare and 
Sport, and the Ministry of Security and Justice. This can be seen, for example, in terms of 
discussions with stakeholders. Whilst the Ministry of Security and Justice does not engage 
with coffeeshop owners under the current Minister, purportedly due to the notion that 
coffeeshop owners are in themselves criminals and therefore should not be at the political 
table, it was suggested that the health ministry is more open-minded to being inclusive: 
 
‘…the ministry that is responsible for security and justice does not talk with anyone having a 
coffeeshop or producing cannabis because for them they are all criminals and they say it like 
this… They have their closed circuit, we try to be open-minded and talk with everybody but 
it’s very difficult to break their circle, their kind of dimension.’ (NL-CS-AC-H1: Senior Civil 
Servant in Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport and Member of Garretsen Commission) 
 
Compared to England & Wales, where the Home Office dominates the debate in a closed-off 
and dogmatic way, the impact of opening the space up and placing responsibility to the 
health ministry provides a valuable political voice which appears to be more grounded in 
reliable research data and evidence and less prone to the all-too-familiar emotional and 
expressive display of power with criminal justice. Whilst its effectiveness of preventing 
criminal justice measures may only be limited, it served as a disgruntled voice which was 
aired against the coffeeshop measures introduced in Rutte I: 
 
‘…the problem with the wietpas, the whole night we were discussing this of course with our 
colleagues before it was implemented, and we said it is going to be a big problem because 
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markets are going to be diffused, a lot of people do not want to be in a database… We said if 
you are going to do it like this nobody will come and they [Ministry S&J] said oh no these 
people are way too stoned they are not going to care. Really, that was the answer… And oh, 
what a coincidence, when the pass was introduced we saw a dramatic decrease in people 
going to coffeeshops because they had to be in a database’ (NL-CS-AC-H1: Senior Civil Servant 
in Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport and Member of Garretsen Commission) 
 
The worries encapsulated in the notion of having to register for an activity which was 
technically illegal came to be signified in the social construction of the wietpas. This served as 
a suitable target for counter policy communities to join together to object to the new 
measures, and so resistance against the residency, and particularly the closed club criteria, 
came ‘…from users, coffeeshop owners, politicians, the local, everyone’ [NL-A-AC-H1]. The 
wietpas came to embody a critical and suspicious fear that the government was over-
extending its powers in the civil liberties of its citizens, particularly in relation to plans to 
create a membership list84.  
Moreover, in addition to resistance and contestation from the Ministry of Health 
towards the residency and closed club measures, there was also resistance from the Public 
Prosecutor’s Office particularly in relation to the proposed introduction of the THC divide: 
 
‘…we often say inside here that we are busy doing the prevention of new measures, policy 
prevention, instead of developing or formulating new policies, because there are so many 
new ideas and a lot of them don’t make much sense so we try to stop them instead of further 
development.’ (NL-PP4: Policy Worker, Public Prosecutor’s Office) 
 
In relation to the THC divide, those working within the Openbaar Ministerie (Public 
Prosecution) suggested that this was not going to be a meaningful policy change because of 
the difficulties involved in enforcement. Samples of cannabis from each coffeeshops for each 
type of cannabis sold would feasibly have to be tested for its THC content, but the resources 
available to do this are nowhere near sufficient enough to handle the operation. It was 
estimated that there is room for approximately 1600 tests per year, but the requirements of 
enforcing this change in legislation would require 20,000-40,000. So the chances would be 
that on average, a coffeeshop would be tested once every two years. 
                                                          
84 As an official policy letter states: ‘The list is controllable and contains the name, postcode and date 
of birth or residence of a member. The member list also contains a start date and an expiration date of 
any membership. The list of members must have an appearance so that it can be displayed or may be 
handed over to check physically.’ (Tweede Kamer 2011c:1-2, author’s translation). 
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 Despite a rather crude image of the Ministry of Security and Justice which I have 
constructed, it also salient to note that whilst there appears to have been a decline of 
influential ‘platonic guardians’ in favour of knee-jerkism and policy immediacy, it became 
apparent from interviews with a senior civil servant working there that liberal notions such as 
resocialisation are ‘underlying, you can’t get rid of it.’ (NL-CS-AC-CJ). 
Across a range of institutions and agencies there appears to be signals of a more 
vocal and influential liberal orientation towards policy as compared to England & Wales. The 
inclusion and necessity of different actors and organisations (in the sense of the power to 
govern) to be involved in drugs policy allows for preventative ‘buffers’ from populist-driven 
values. This allows for different, and more rational, pragmatic and evidence-based opinions, 
to surface which becomes more evident once you move past the policy talk. 
 A final component of vital relevance in the political stream relates to the role of local 
municipalities in creating, adapting or resisting policy. Already, certain characteristics have 
been discussed in the preceding subnational policy process sections, but here the purpose is 
to highlight the mechanisms and processes evident at a broader national level which led to 
both advocacy and resistance towards the introduction of new national policy measures 
under Rutte I and II, before returning to a comparison with the local case site. 
In many ways, cannabis policy is very much grounded in the needs and experiences of 
the local level, with the gedoogbeleid originating out of existing local practices, and whilst 
there have been indicators of greater centralisation (e.g. police force restructuring), it was 
also argued that decentralisation has also occurred. 
 The importance of overtly ‘giving room’ to the local level is that local municipalities 
have to deal with the ‘daily problems’ [NL-A-NGO2] which are not experienced in The Hague. 
As one participant noted, ‘…there is always a distance, and we need that because when there 
is no distance I am a dictator’ [NL-A-NGO1], reaffirming the notion of a perversion towards 
over-zealous state paternalism. As suggested in previous sections, another important reason 
for allowing local differentiation in policy is that municipalities can experience vastly different 
issues and problems which are specific to that area or region, and therefore require tools 
which respond in an adequate way.  
 A structural mechanism which grants the local level a considerable voice can be 
found in powers of governance relating to cannabis policy. Primarily, issues concerning 
coffeeshops are a public order and health issue, which is under the governance of the local 
Mayor, Aldermen, and council85. Such relations of governance, in a wider socio-historical 
                                                          
85 ‘It is to do with the basic idea that the drugs problem should not be treated as a crime problem in 
the first place. It should be considered as a matter of public order, public health. So it is outside of the 
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context of a ‘regent mentality’, have granted considerable power to the local level and to 
mayors which has become extremely significant in giving them a voice in advocating or 
resisting planned measures at a national level.  
Although municipalities do have an influential degree of power within the 
Netherlands (which will be further discussed in due course), it is pertinent to also remember 
the technical inabilities of local mayors within an international context to carve policy 
solutions to the influx of foreign visitors in affected southern municipalities. The effect of this 
was to bring together a loose coalition of local mayors who lobbied the national government 
to intervene. The calls of these mayors, from varying political backgrounds, for support 
tackling a salient problem was coupled with the political desires and needs of the right-wing 
political parties who took power in Rutte I: 
 
‘…the report [van der Donk], this one and the other reports, they gave a reality shock. And the 
reality shock, not from one of these strange academics in an ivory tower thinking about the 
world, but my arguments were fortified by mayors, liberal mayors, left-wing mayors, who said 
we can’t handle it anymore we just close it down… this gave a lot of discussion in these 
centre-left, left-wing parties because their own mayors close down. It was not just these awful 
right-wing extremists who are using the fear of crime… they are just mayors of flesh and blood 
who are doing it’ (NL-A-AC-CJ: Academic Expert in Criminology and Member of van der Donk 
Commission) 
 
Whilst mayoral and municipal pressure was a factor in advocating more repressive measures 
in Rutte I, we see a rather different picture emerge once the new measures were announced 
and began to be trialled which centred on resistance in their national implementation. One 
key factor contributing towards this resistance concerns differences in political colours found 
at a local level. The types and combinations of parties involved at a local level are much more 
varied than one would find at a national level and can lead to divergences between national 
and local levels even within the same party across different municipalities: 
 
‘There is also a gap between the national politicians within a certain party and at a local level. 
Maybe because they are in different coalitions, but the liberal party [VVD] has the reputation 
of a bit more liberal in the left-wing sense, more tolerant towards deviance.’ (NL-A2: 
Academic Expert in Criminology) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                        
judicial authorities primarily. So the judicial authorities are only taking part in the whole discussion 
once there are certain lines crossed.’ (NL-PP4). 
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It was noted that broadly speaking, rural areas are more characterised by conservative 
political coalitions, whereas urban cities are more heavily dominated by liberal coalitions and 
mayors. This is a pertinent issue given that municipalities with coffeeshops have over four 
times more inhabitants than municipalities without. In other words, coffeeshop density is 
positively associated with urban density, with 53% of the total number of coffeeshops being 
in municipalities with over 200,000 inhabitants (Bieleman et al. 2012). Significantly, out of the 
top 11 largest municipalities, 9 of these were governed by ‘progressive’ parties (most often 
PvdA) (Wouters et al. 2010): 
 
‘…from the bigger towns, [they] are much more dominated by the Social Democrats [PvdA], 
and they are more lenient, tolerant, and they don’t want to hamper the consumption of drugs 
and they want to regulate the growing of wiet [cannabis]’ (NL-CS-AC-CJ: Senior Civil Servant in 
Ministry of Security and Justice and Member of van de Donk Committee) 
 
This is especially important given the political dynamics of the VVD being in a national 
coalition with the PvdA. But asides from coffeeshop density, the grote vier (’big four’: 
Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Den Haag, Utrecht) occupy a ‘special position’ [NL-P2] in the political 
realm as they are experience the bulk of problems found in urban environments: 
 
‘The opposition was coming from the large cities mainly, and that was strong opposition, and 
cities have rather strong positions in our country… Our local government has become stronger 
over the years, more tasks, more money, and a rather good position in our own community.’ 
(NL-PA3: Policy Advisor to the Mayor, Utrecht) 
 
Moreover, in larger municipalities such as Amsterdam, mayors often have a ‘political history’ 
and ‘…they still have a lot of influence so they don’t take anything for granted and they are a 
force, they can speak against the minister’ [NL-PP1]. These facts mean that they are given 
more political relevance in directing and influencing policy change at the national level. Even 
within this, Amsterdam has an even more privileged position, especially concerning 
coffeeshop policy. Amsterdam by itself accounts for most of the coffeeshops in the 
Netherlands with over a third of the total number (222 out of the 651 in 2011, Bieleman et al. 
2012).  The measures proposed under Rutte I would have had devastating effects on the total 
number of coffeeshops in Amsterdam and would have threatened an economic interest86 by 
                                                          
86 Economic interests associated with the cannabis trade do not only pertain to municipal councils, but 
also to the coffeeshops and other parts of local economies. For example, coffeeshop owners have 
attempted to challenge the measures, most notably in Maastricht where the local coffeeshop owners 
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banning tourists from visiting one of its liberal spectacles. But also, there was a sense of 
powerful municipalities ‘acting out’ against the arm of control from The Hague. 
 Importantly then, the proposals to introduce a nationwide policy which required 
these large municipalities to apply rules to a situation in which they were not experiencing 
cannabis-related nuisance problems created significant tension and resistance in 
implementing the new measures. In reaction to the new measures, the grote vier rallied 
against implementation, with serious objections vocalised: 
 
‘…the problems in the south of the Netherlands are completely different to the problems in 
Amsterdam for example… if they come to Amsterdam and they are not allowed in the 
coffeeshops it will cause a lot of nuisance and criminality, the selling of drugs on the streets 
instead of in coffeeshops, in Amsterdam it’s not a good idea at all. The mayors of the big 
cities, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, are against this wietpas and asked the minister not to 
introduce it in these big cities.’ (NL-A-AC-H1: Academic Expert in Health and Member of van 
der Donk/Garretsen Commissions) 
 
The power of the grote vier in rejecting policy proposals raised serious questions of 
government legitimacy, and as such there was a need to reconcile and compromise with 
these municipalities and others in order to proceed. If Opstelten did not listen and 
compromise with the municipalities, it would have given him ‘political problems’ and so he 
needed to give room ‘…to show that he is not a centraliser’ [NL-CS-AC-CJ]. 
 To briefly summarise then, organised political forces lying dormant reacted strongly 
to the planned introduction of a set of measures which were largely seen as 
counterproductive and ineffective. They threatened the liberal values and practices which, on 
the whole, largely existed without serious nuisance and youth problems, as well as the 
economic interests of predominantly Amsterdam and of the coffeeshop owners. In some 
ways Minister Opstelten was put under severe pressure, and whilst insubordination could 
have been dealt with through an enforcement order, this is not characteristic of the nature of 
Dutch politics which is still premised on some of the fundamental ideals of the polder model. 
Moreover, it would have created unsustainable political tensions between the VVD and the 
PvdA, who were represented in most of the largest municipalities with most of the 
coffeeshops. These dynamics are extremely important when considering the policy 
movements that have occurred in Rutte I and II because the ‘force field’ [NL-CS-AC-CJ] of the 
                                                                                                                                                                        
have joined together to take legal action against the government. But so far, courts in both Holland 
and in Luxembourg have failed to accept any wrongdoings by the Dutch government. 
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local provides a significant political force in raising problems, setting agendas, and reworking 
policy. 
 
 
6.5.2 The Subnational Political Stream 
 
This brings us on to the final intra-national point of comparison, to examine the specific role 
and attributes of the subnational case site in the political stream. Already, it has been argued 
that the municipality of Utrecht was a strong opponent of the measures introduced under 
Rutte I. They have effectively chosen a policy of non-enforcement regarding the residency 
criteria and even advocated the initiation of other, more radical, policy alternatives which 
they felt would address the substantive policy concerns (of cannabis cultivation) more 
appropriately. 
 But despite this being the case, it is worth noting that municipal politics follows 
relatively similar dynamics in the processes of coalition-building and governance as at the 
national level with much contestation in policy-making at the subnational level. For example, 
the proposal to start a cultivation experiment was not universally agreed upon in the city 
council, with parties such as the CDA heavily against the plans87. 
Moreover, it was suggested that there is increasing pressure in the local council to 
counter nuisance problems which is slowly shifting attitudes towards being tougher against 
coffeeshops that transgress the rules. In some cases, this has been successful in the sense of 
granting extra resources to police troublesome streets and areas.  
However, a further point is of relevance here: that even though there may be 
pressures exhibited at a local electoral level, there is a demarcation between locally elected 
politicians who form the municipal council, and the executive body consisting of the Mayor 
and Alderman (College van B&W). Thus, whilst the remit of the council is to decide the 
municipality’s broad policies and oversee their implementation, the administration of policy 
falls to individuals who are not directly elected88. This is particularly complex regarding 
cannabis policy, which at a local level is considered both as a health and public order issue, 
thus falling into the remit of an Alderman and the Mayor. Such structures of governance may 
potentially provide some counterbalance to negative feelings towards cannabis and 
                                                          
87 ‘…that is the one we really protested against, come on, the municipality is not a coffeeshop. Even if 
we accept that we have coffeeshops and people are going to use it, it does not mean that from this 
house we are responsible for organising it… I can see a lot of just practical problems and I think it is not 
the way the national law was intended to work’ (NL-P4). 
88 Alderman are appointed by the municipal council, whilst Mayors are appointed by the Ministry of 
Interior and Kingdom Relations, and validated by the Crown, with advice for preference given by the 
local council. 
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coffeeshops, with such actors being insulated from local electoral opinion and able to 
negotiate and carve alternative responses. 
The overarching policy regarding cannabis is decided upon in the council, but the 
Mayor has special duties requiring him/her to engage in ‘tripartite consultations’ with the 
chiefs of police and prosecution who negotiate and decide upon prioritisations and resource 
allocation set within mayoral, national and police/prosecution needs.  
In terms of accountability, the responsibility of Aldermen and the Mayor is at first to 
the local council rather than the national government, and this provides a mechanism 
whereby support is fostered for policy development and resistance against unfavourable 
national measures: 
 
‘They can’t control local governments. The highest level of government in your city is the city 
council, they decide and not a minister… I am responsible for health issues in my home town 
and there is nobody who can say if I have to do this or that. That is my way how I can go 
forward if I still have the majority in the city council who is supporting me.’ (NL-P5: D’66 
Alderman, Utrecht) 
 
This has a very important role in the development of policy, with most drugs policy initiatives 
starting at the local level before being made national policy, and this is facilitated by the 
ability (at least in theory) to trial and experiment as was enshrined under the 1976 Opium 
Act. With regards to the cultivation experiment, it was because it was justified as a health 
project which hypothetically removed it from the remit of security and justice. But 
manoeuvrings at the subnational level are allowed because it is recognised that the local level 
has to deal in pragmatic terms with surfacing problems which become abstracted at a 
national level of policy-making: 
 
‘All big changes always start at a local level. Why? Because we see the deficits of the policy, 
and we see the urgency of change and the problem with tackling this problem is that at a 
national level you have to have a really strong political will’ (NL-P5: D’66 Alderman, Utrecht) 
 
In terms of the specific direction of policy responses, this was due to a municipal coalition 
comprised of left-wing parties. It was noted that the ‘spirit of the people’ [NL-PP5] is one 
which supports a ‘real’ [NL-P5] and ‘full’ [NL-P2] left-wing political representation within the 
local council. Whilst there has been a degree of voter movement as experienced throughout 
the Netherlands, there is a large continuity in support for liberal parties. During the period of 
2010-2014 the municipal coalition was comprised of GroenLinks (Green Party), D’66 (Social 
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Liberals) and PvdA (Labour). When it comes to the issue of drugs and cannabis policy, all 
these parties support measures which would seek to regulate the back-door, none more so 
than D’66 for whom it is a central political item, and took issue with the direction of policy 
that was initiated in Rutte I. Moreover, there are local historical trends in support for liberal 
programmes with drugs policy, for example with the introduction of heroin prescription, 
which again was against the national grain of drugs policy at the time (see Central Committee 
on the Treatment of Heroin Addicts, 2002). 
So whilst cannabis policy is contested within the city council, it is predominantly 
controlled by left-leaning coalitions. The feeling even by right-leaning politicians was to 
accept the inevitability of cannabis consumption and the use of coffeeshops locally which 
prevents any radical changes from being considered such as the complete closure of 
coffeeshops:  
 
‘…we understand the market is going to be there anyway… you cannot say Utrecht is a drugs-
free zone because if you are going to the streets somewhere you cannot control it, our 
alternative has been to put a big drive-in coffeeshop in one of the industrial areas where it is 
out of sight and it can be easily controlled by the police… I believe that it will not solve the 
medical and those kind of issues, but at least it will solve the social effects of the coffeeshops.’ 
(NL-P4: CDA Politician, Utrecht) 
 
As such, political negotiations from the perspective of right-leaning parties within the city 
council are more fixated on dealing with the undesirable social effects that are associated 
with coffeeshops. This is particularly the case when a set of left-leaning parties, who all 
broadly agree on the position on coffeeshops, has control of the local council, and whose 
representatives occupy the positions of Aldermen and Mayor. 
But looking outward from the local back to the national, it is conceivable that it was 
the specific combination of parties in control in the municipal council at that moment in time 
which was very important in challenging the specific set of parties at a national level which 
represented a ‘full’ right-wing government. The national measures uneasily rubbed against 
the political preferences of the municipal council who wanted to move in a different direction 
with cannabis policy. But also, the coalition in Utrecht facilitated the advancement of 
alternative policy agendas (notably the cultivation experiment) which might not have been 
agreed upon had other parties been represented in the ruling coalition, thus highlighting 
finite windows of opportunity for moments of resistance or advocacy of policies. 
In an important way, resistance against the new measures transcended the issue of 
cannabis to represent a disdain with the politics of national government within a particular 
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political climate. The proposals for cannabis cultivation were seen by some as a symbolic 
attempt to confront the national approach, with Utrecht serving as the ‘spokesman’ of 
resistance: 
 
‘It is really symbolic to say locally, we are going against the national trend and we believe we 
as Utrecht can be the front runner and can do things which are on the edge of what is legally 
allowed to start moving this way’ (NL-P4: CDA politician, Utrecht) 
 
‘…we are the spokesman to at least put this on the table again and again and again, and even 
making progress in our own way to see if something could be done’ (NL-P5: D’66 Alderman, 
Utrecht) 
 
‘…everything that government [Rutte I] did was reflected here in the opposite way in Utrecht 
because it is the 4th biggest city and it has a full left government and at that time it was seen 
as a sort of, the opposition against the national government’ (NL-P2: VVD Politician, Utrecht) 
 
The intentions of Utrecht generated significant tensions between local and national 
government. As a policy advisor and official policy statement by Minister Opstelten noted: 
 
‘…when our alderman and mayor published the idea, within half an hour there was a reaction 
from our Minister Opstelten who told us there was nothing on it… Dismissed at once within 
half an hour. I’ve never seen it before, that such a rash and direct reaction.’ (NL-PA3: Policy 
Advisor to the Mayor, Utrecht) 
 
‘The core of our policy is that any kind of cultivation of cannabis is illegal and remains 
prohibited. Experiments such as the municipality of Utrecht represent conflict with applicable 
legislation and international obligations’ (Tweede Kamer 2011a:5, author’s translation) 
 
Whilst it remains the case that local plans for such experiments are firmly rejected by 
Minister Opstelten, there is growing support across many municipalities for regulation of the 
back-door. The important aspect here is not so much the substantive content of such 
programmes, but the feeling that the new measures inadequately tackled the major issue at 
hand of cultivation and supply to coffeeshops. Following decades of local grass-roots 
development of cannabis policy, these are, at the least, symbolic attempts to shift the 
direction of cannabis policy which may eventually make an impact when a suitable window of 
opportunity opens. 
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 Thus, the complex particulars of subnational spheres are an influential shaper not 
only of policy debates at a national level, but due to relations of governance which grant 
significant power to municipalities, also allow for resistance and policy alternatives to flourish 
at the subnational level of policy-making. The position of Utrecht as a member of the grote 
vier elevated its powerful status, which coupled with a firm political coalition of left-wing 
parties and liberal ‘spirit of the people’, has given it significant room for manoeuvre in both 
the non-enforcement of the residency criteria and attempts to move in a different direction 
with cannabis policy. 
 
 
6.6 Summary of the Policy Process in the Netherlands 
 
Changes to the coffeeshop tolerance policy in the Netherlands can be seen as a coming 
together of the problem, policy and political streams, which in combination with suitable 
windows of opportunity, allowed for the introduction, and subsequent revision, of new 
coffeeshop criteria. The window of opportunity regarding the first set of changes has 
arguably been open for some time, with the culmination of a series of longstanding and 
emergent problems which have remained largely unresolved. However, with policy 
entrepreneurs in the shape of dissatisfied local mayors in border regions lobbying the 
government for assistance, a window of opportunity firmly opened, reinvigorating the debate 
on cannabis policy. The problem stream became coupled with the policy and political streams 
following the conclusion and recommendations of the expert commission van der Donk. The 
policy selection process at a national level in the Netherlands was one which was relatively 
flexible and the primeval soup in the Netherlands was, and is, bustling with ideas and 
proposals which are ‘seriously’ considered within the political sphere. However, the direction 
of policy and the specific policy measures initially chosen was not just a logical sequencing 
based upon expert advice and technical parameters, but also resonated with dynamics in the 
political sphere. Here, the swing to the political right in Rutte I created a ‘unique’ opportunity 
and catalyst to press forward with a set of stricter measures. 
 However, the initial policy alternatives selected and partially implemented then 
immediately faced opposition and resistance from numerous actors and agencies operating 
within and below the state which forced the window to remain open. The measures posited 
under Rutte I were considered unsavoury, unworkable, and challenged the fundamental 
essence of the health-oriented and liberally-inspired separation of markets philosophy. Thus, 
there were evolutions in all three streams, whereby new problems emerged, the Rutte I 
policy measures were adjudged inadequate, and the Rutte I Government was replaced with 
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the more politically-centrist Rutte II. The result of this process is that the initial measures 
have been ‘mellowed out’, with flexibility given in how the remaining measure is to be 
introduced at a municipal level. In sum, the changes to the gedoogbeleid illuminated the 
complex myriad of dynamics involved in the policy process which led to a more incremental 
and reflexive style of policy-making. Similar to England & Wales, such policy movements were 
facilitated by a series of cultural, institutional and situational factors which will be further 
delineated in the following chapter. 
 In terms of how these changes unfolded into the subnational sphere, the relations of 
governance between central and local authorities facilitated dialogue and resistance towards 
the new measures. Although there was a degree of convergence regarding the proliferation 
of recognised problems, the types of issues considered problematic were deemed relatively 
minor in comparison to the experiences being felt in the south of the country. As such, the 
municipal council has adopted an official policy of non-enforcement whereby it will only be 
enforced if problems from foreign consumers are encountered. The local case site adjudged 
the Rutte I measures to be counterproductive rather than dealing with the ‘real’ problem of 
cultivation in a way appropriate to the political values of the local council. Thus, the counter 
voice emanating was made possible by a ‘full’ left-wing coalition and a strong history of 
support for liberal parties. This represented an opposite picture to the representation at a 
national level. Coupled with the ability to govern coffeeshop policy in a meaningful way, this 
has allowed policy alternatives to flourish and contest the national approach. 
Such patterns of negotiation and reworking of policy had a role in influencing the 
‘mellowing out’ of the original measures, and with growing support for regulation of the 
back-door from the local level, demonstrates the continuing role of the local level in policy 
development which has reaffirmed the beneficial role of the separation of markets. Referring 
back to the opening quote of the chapter, it would appear then that in policy terms, ‘the soup 
is never eaten as hot as it is served’. 
191 
Chapter VII 
Comparing Cannabis Control in England & Wales and the Netherlands 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides a cross-case analysis of the nature and extent of convergence and 
divergence towards repressive strategies of cannabis control across and between the two 
polities as a whole. First, there is a discussion of the ways in which convergence towards non-
adaptive strategies has been felt in cannabis control, with the transformation of cannabis, a 
shifting political environment, and the technical parameters of policy. Then, the chapter 
considers the ways in which England & Wales demonstrates divergence away from non-
adaptive strategies of control, examining differences between policy talk and decisions, the 
extent of contestation and resistance, the role of political institutions and relations of power, 
before finally highlighting the role and differentiated nature of policy at the subnational level. 
Through the identification of factors and mechanisms which support, resist or rework 
policy at national and subnational levels which were alluded to in previous chapters, the 
international comparison will draw these more into focus. This will allow us to further 
illuminate the contingently messy configurations and resistances apparent in cannabis policy 
responses in particular geo-historical contexts (Edwards and Hughes 2005; Hughes 2007). 
 
 
7.2 Convergence in Cannabis Control 
 
7.2.1 The Transformation of Cannabis 
 
Across both England & Wales and the Netherlands, the findings suggest that there has been 
converging tendencies in the emergence, resurfacing and projection of problems related to 
cannabis during the mid-2000s. This is not to state that alternative conceptualisations 
disappeared, but that narratives which centred on its dangerousness came to the fore in 
policy debates and became ways to justify policy change. Such trends are intimately 
connected to the place of cannabis in the political sphere and broader currants in the 
politicisation of crime, drugs and security (see section 7.2.2). 
In an important way, changes in the conceptualisation of cannabis can be partly seen 
as the emergence of strains and pressures that emanated from a transition to late-modernity, 
whereby developments in technologies, transportation, and communications have further 
192 
facilitated an unregulated illicit drugs market. There have been very similar points of 
convergence in the types of problems experienced and conceptualised as well as specific 
differences in each polity. Their recognition and framing as objects requiring a policy 
response alerts us to the presence of converging common factors shaping contemporary 
cannabis control strategies. 
First and foremost, cannabis has been conceptualised increasingly as a criminal 
justice problem. In both countries, large-scale commercial domestic cultivation has emerged 
as a significant threat. This is seen to pose an altogether different problem from that which 
preceded it; no longer does the risk exist beyond the borders of these nation states, but it has 
become embedded within them. This is considered a problem not least due to increased 
visibility and presence, whereby technological innovations have facilitated cultivation in 
virtually any setting, but also due to the scope of cultivation and the links between large-scale 
cannabis factories and organised networks who delve into a multitude of criminal activities.  
This concern was propelled onto the political agenda by law enforcement agencies 
who were spending more time tackling the issue and reporting a growing problem in relation 
to cannabis cultivation. The prevailing narrative prior to policy change was that law 
enforcement agencies in both countries were not adequately equipped to tackle the issues 
that had arisen in part from existing policy responses. In England & Wales, the 2004 
reclassification created a sense that the police had lost authority to manage cannabis users 
and had encouraged criminal entrepreneurs to cultivate cannabis in large-scale operations; 
and in the Netherlands, the perennial problem of not resolving the back-door problem had 
encouraged criminal entrepreneurs to take advantage of increased market demand. 
These issues were intrinsically linked to a further perceived growing problem, that 
cannabis had become associated with public (dis)order. With the erosion of state borders 
following the creation of the European Union and the Schengen Agreement, vast numbers of 
individuals from the Netherlands’ neighbouring countries took advantage of the more 
‘friendly climate’ [NL-A-AC-CJ] of buying cannabis in coffeeshops rather than in their more 
hostile native countries. This has led to municipalities lying on the borders of Belgium and 
Germany becoming inundated with cannabis-related nuisance. Increasing numbers created a 
demand for vast quantities of cannabis which only a network of large-scale organisations 
could provide. In England & Wales, the 2004 reclassification was also coupled with an 
association with fears over anti-social behaviour; that a relaxation in the laws would lead to a 
disrespect of police authority and an increase in public consumption.  
Furthermore, as concerns over cannabis-related criminality and public disorder came 
more into political focus from around the early 2000s onwards, this coincided with a further 
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shared problem that (re)surfaced: that cannabis transformed from being seen as a relatively 
harmless substance, to one which was extremely dangerous for mental health, particularly in 
relation to young people. Psychiatric studies provided ‘evidence’ of the link to schizophrenia, 
and such worries were amplified by the connection to high-potency cannabis, commonly 
found in domestic cultivation practices. Health institutions were confronted by more people 
entering treatment for cannabis-related issues. 
The medicalisation of cannabis over the past decade has focused on schizophrenia, 
but expert participants both within medical professions and further afield across both 
countries suggested that the growing political emphasis on the link between young people, 
cannabis and deviancy (both socially and medically) reflected a degree of biological 
determinism at the political level. This centred problematic behaviour around the 
psychopharmacological effects of cannabis, with reduced attention paid to wider social 
structures and developments which may also have contributed to problematic behaviour. 
Social abnormalities are blamed on the use of cannabis, and whilst it may indeed play a role, 
the types of explanation employ the ‘criminologies of the other’ (Garland 1996; 2001); in this 
case, the danger is the foreign substance in the pure body which causally affects the onset of 
perceived negative behaviours. Cannabis has become a ‘suitable enemy’ which has been 
further demarcated from socially accepted substances (Christie 1986). 
Taken together, the issues surrounding criminal justice, public disorder and health 
became all the more alarming in the public domain due to the fact that cannabis is the most 
widely used illicit drug. The threat does not lie just in the margins of society with undeserving 
social undesirables, but has permeated social strata in a perceptively widespread manner. 
The effect of this was that it also helped reinvigorate and reconstitute a moralistic position on 
cannabis in both countries: that its use is morally wrong, and is especially so given the range 
of harms that have emerged.  
So not only was cannabis linked with serious criminal activities and caused deviance 
in the sense of ‘illness’, it was also constructed as morally corrosive, reducing citizens’ 
productive participation in society, a threat to the common good. Importantly, the moral 
imperatives became heavily enshrined in medicalisation, which in an era of religious 
indifference has disguised traditional notions of drug-taking in the veil of medical deviance. 
As Conrad and Schneider (1992:1) note, ‘deviant behaviors that were once defined as 
immoral, sinful, or criminal have been given medical meanings… in many cases medical 
treatments have become a new form of punishment and social control’. 
But how the problems associated with cannabis have been recognised as such directs 
us to consider the changing nature of identifying risks and threats, which have been 
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facilitated by the rapid acceleration of technological and scientific developments. These, in 
and of themselves, are not just objective germ-free responses, but also contribute to the way 
in which social phenomena come to be understood, recognised and indeed evolve. 
In a globalised setting, and particularly that of the European Union, policy ideas and 
responses do not develop in isolation from other countries. Research and knowledge 
networks facilitate a global exchange of ideas; techniques of data generation and monitoring 
are expedited through computerisation; and communication has been made easier through 
the establishment of formal and informal international bodies and agencies such as Interpol, 
UNODC and EMCDDA. It is within such spaces that knowledge is transferred, as practitioners 
and experts meet, collaborate and share information. As Edwards et al. (2013a:378) note, 
there is ‘… a growing number of emergent actors, networks and occupational practices 
involving innovative but as often, ‘borrowed’ methods and technologies for both articulating 
and governing the new ‘problems’ of public safety and urban security’. 
The direction of travel does not appear to be a mutual process however, with certain 
key players informing and shaping debates more than others. It was alluded to by several 
Dutch participants (police and academics) that there had been a degree of ‘westwind’ [NL-A1] 
knowledge transfer, with the suggestion that the United States and the UK have been very 
influential in shaping discussions of crime control. Such patterns have been observed 
elsewhere in the area of policing with ‘policy learning’ between England & Wales and the 
Netherlands (Jones 1995; Jones et al. 2009). Whilst this is a tentative finding which requires 
more empirical examination, language accessibility and geo-political power on the global 
stage appear to be important aspects which have facilitated such developments. 
 Problem recognition then is not a neutral process, and involves the coupling to moral 
and normative judgements in a vacuum of power struggles in different spheres of 
governance. The definition of a problem serves to further legitimate power from definition-
givers, to diagnose and respond to behaviours in a way which justifies their own being and 
grants support for further action and control. This does not only pertain to national 
imperatives, but also in institutional settings. Law enforcement agencies require greater 
resources to tackle organised criminal networks involved in cannabis cultivation; medical 
professions seek more investment to treat cannabis-related illnesses. In both senses, 
deviance from the norm is not questioned in its fundamental basis, but is constructed 
through the lens of particular institutional and cultural settings. As Freidson (1970:208) notes, 
‘it is part of being a profession to be given the official power to define and therefore create 
the shape of problematic segments of social behavior’. With better identification of criminal 
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justice and mental health issues, it appears that a process of labelling and net-widening 
ensued (Becker 1963; Young 1971; Cohen 1985). 
The media and interest groups in both countries were also influential in shaping the 
debate, with a series of loosely connected policy entrepreneurs joining together to lobby for 
change. Some of these individuals and organisations were more firmly aligned in the 
traditional political sense (e.g. concerned constituents/lobby groups/parties), whilst others 
shared a common desire for changes to cannabis in pursuit of their own organisational 
interests (e.g. law enforcement; health professionals; municipal councils). 
Whilst it was suggested that in comparison the Dutch media are far less dramatic 
than British media outlets, similar pressures are facing media outlets to produce dramatic 
‘newsworthy’ stories. This has a discernible impact on the policy process, as problems and 
concerns become extrapolated beyond specific locales. As Garland suggests (2001:86), ‘risks 
and problems that were previously localized and limited in significance, or else were 
associated with specific groups of victims, increasingly came to be perceived as everyone’s 
problem’. In the Netherlands, coffeeshop-related nuisance and the relationship to criminal 
organisations became generalised to cover all coffeeshops in all municipalities; and the 
perception of damaging harm came to be present in every cannabis consumer. 
The effect of the emergence and projection of these problematisations contributed 
towards a ‘negative societal feeling’ [NL-A-AC-H1] in both countries which grew from the 
early 2000s. In England & Wales, for example, this was evident in an Ipsos MORI poll that 
found that 58% of the public wanted to see cannabis reclassified to a higher classification, 
with 32% suggesting it should be Class A, and approximately 75% thought cannabis 
contributed towards crime or social disorder (Ipsos MORI 2008). This is not to suggest that 
such perspectives permeated all sectors of society and across the citizenry (as 42% in the 
same poll wanted it to remain Class C or be legalised), but that influential policy 
entrepreneurs shaped the policy debate in a meaningful way that impacted upon the policy 
process in appropriate windows for such voices to be heard. Thus, an anti-cannabis climate 
was one present in particular communities, which, during a period of competitiveness over 
issues of ‘law and order’ and political instability, came to shape how issues were construed 
and projected with desires for repressive action.  
Thus, the prevailing representation of cannabis was one which was under attack on a 
number of fronts, triggering political anxieties and a sense of crisis that the respective 
governments were not adequate in addressing public concerns about ‘victims’ falling prey to 
a widespread and unwelcome threat (Cohen 1972; Garland 2001). This is where the problem 
stream became coupled with the policy and political streams, which has taken policy in a 
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specific direction; a direction which on the whole has seemingly converged towards the need 
and desire for both nation states to project an image of the paternalistic provider of 
protection from a reconstructed threat. 
 
 
7.2.2 A Shifting Political Environment and the Need to Act 
 
Alongside the transformations of cannabis, this existed within a broader social and political 
environment in which moral authoritarian values became a prevailing ‘currency’ in dealing 
with issues of crime, security and illicit drugs at a national level for those in power (and 
particularly so with key social actors such as Gordon Brown and Ivo Opstelten at the time of 
the changes). Based upon the empirical findings about these specific policy changes, this 
seemingly suggests that there has been some convergence around a decline of penal-welfare 
values, and a favouring of values which project an image of ruling governments as strong and 
protective. This suggests confirmation of desires to ‘deny’ state limitations and reaffirm the 
‘myth’ of sovereign political legitimacy through more repressive, and expressive, responses 
(Garland 2001). 
In both jurisdictions, broader patterns of political representation over the past few 
decades suggest a shift towards the political right (see Chapter 2) which has granted a more 
influential voice to the types of values which such parties hold regarding illicit drugs and 
crime. In England & Wales, New Labour under Gordon Brown reacted to the perceived 
mistake of their own earlier decision to reclassify cannabis to Class C which had been 
reconstructed as the government being irresponsible in the face of emergent problems 
associated with cannabis. With Gordon Brown coming to power, there was a political desire 
to demarcate himself from Tony Blair, which in addition to his own religious and moral 
values, appealed to a critical set of voters from conservative ‘middle England’ who had been 
so vocal in objecting to cannabis’ downgraded classification.  
Similarly, the VVD and CDA appear to have become more repressive concerning 
cannabis and criminality in a context where ‘grey’ responses such as the tolerance policy are 
found to be increasingly unpopular. The success of the extreme right, and particularly Geert 
Wilders’ PVV in the areas of crime control and immigration, has generated greater voter 
competition and volatility in an increasingly politicised environment with political parties 
keen to demonstrate their law and order credentials. Whilst the issue of coffeeshop policy 
has not been a central theme in this overall development, cannabis became an important 
symbolic issue in which battles for political legitimacy are to be won (or lost). 
197 
Such pressures and shifts in both jurisdictions are vital in understanding why 
particular narratives came to dominate the debate. The voices that mattered were intimately 
connected with key contested voting populations, predominantly lying broadly in the centre-
to-right hand side of the political spectrum. The combination and interweaving of problem 
projections and political interests meant that alternative counter-constructions and 
arguments were marginalised, which granted legitimacy in employing non-adaptive policy 
‘alternatives’ in responding to cannabis. 
This alludes to a further point: that the specific make-up of ruling administrations is 
of central importance in understanding the recent changes. The combination of parties in the 
Rutte I cabinet (VVD; CDA; PVV) and the New Labour party under the leadership of Gordon 
Brown facilitated the flourishing of particular values regarding cannabis policy and the 
preference for tough authoritative responses. Policy alternatives which would question the 
commitment of these political parties to a tough law and order position were maligned, with 
politicians not willing to ‘put their head above the parapet’ [EW-P1] in fear of appearing 
irresponsible and soft. 
Moreover, alongside internal struggles for establishing political legitimacy on issues 
of drugs and criminality, international pressures have remained a constant presence in the 
framing of debates. Whilst at the EU level there has arguably been a shift towards the 
embracing of a harm reduction approach in drugs policy, the Netherlands still remains an 
outlier in the sense of providing ready access to its coffeeshops, which in turn has generated 
continued complaints from her neighbours regarding nuisance and exportation. 
The result of these internal and external pressures has been that responding to 
cannabis-related issues in the Netherlands has seemingly witnessed the growth of a criminal 
justice-oriented lens since the mid-1990s. Whilst the voice of health remains a dominant 
force, criminal justice institutions are increasingly seen to be a logical device to re-establish 
social order and morally demarcate cannabis use as an undesirable social activity. Whilst in 
England & Wales (at a national level) the Home Office has always had a firm and dominating 
position in drugs policy, developments in the Netherlands suggest that the Ministry of 
Security and Justice has an increasing voice in directing policy, with Minister Opstelten from 
the VVD a domineering force who has been at the forefront of contemporary debates and 
policy movements.  
The desire for state paternalism is particularly enhanced given the shared concerns 
over youth consumption. In some regards, liberal notions of being the author of one’s own 
body are present in discussions over adult cannabis use (so long as the use does not harm 
others), but in relation to young people, to be seen as though the state is not taking action 
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risks the view that it is not fulfilling a primary duty of care towards its young citizens. So 
despite Dutch drugs policy still officially being the primary remit of the Ministry of Health, 
Welfare and Sport, the Ministry of Security and Justice has become more influential with an 
intrinsically more punitive perspective on how best to deal with emergent problems. 
 Thus, the culmination of problems provided the ‘fertile ground’ in which the 
government could react. Indeed, within a deeply politicised environment, there was immense 
pressure for politicians to at least be seen to be taking action against unwanted threats, 
appearing to confirm Garland’s (2001) notions of denial and subsequent acting out. In both 
settings, cannabis policy became a particular object through which to demonstrate 
governmental sovereignty in the provision of security and to translate dominant moral 
positions of the day into preferred policy responses. 
 
 
7.2.3 Technical Parameters of Policy 
 
Alongside convergence in the desirability of selecting more repressive measures to project a 
sense of authority in dealing with perceived problems, another point of convergence in the 
selection of policy measures can be found in the technical feasibility of policy. The 
overarching global framework of illicit drugs control remains a fundamental relation of 
control which complements other points of convergence. Whilst cracks are starting to appear 
in the global prohibition of cannabis, as exemplified by recent developments in Uruguay and 
the USA, the UN Conventions still provide a framework which neither England & Wales nor 
the Netherlands are willing to currently transgress.  
This is more pertinent in the case of the Netherlands where there is more appetite 
for alternatives to prohibition, but the existence of such homogenous mechanisms of control 
are important factors across both jurisdictions. Moreover, there were also other aspects 
regarding technical feasibility which shepherded the policy movements into a more 
repressive shape. In England & Wales, the consideration of policy alternatives took place 
within existing parameters enshrined in the Misuse of Drugs Act. When asked to review the 
classification issue, the ACMD was tasked only with looking at what class cannabis should be, 
and so alternatives which went beyond the model of prohibition were automatically filtered 
out. In the Netherlands, the seriously considered policy alternatives also existed within 
current parameters, with international frameworks frequently cited as a force blocking more 
liberalising options. But additionally, European and domestic legislation also forced the 
introduction of national measures (regarding the residency and closed club criteria), which 
again facilitated an overall stricter shift in cannabis policy. 
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Growing homogenisation in the governance of drugs policy is a feature which has 
steadily taken shape over the course of the 20th century, and demonstrates how states have 
attempted to deal with threats emanating from patterns of globalisation through the 
relinquishing of state sovereignty to supranational agreements and organisations. But such 
patterns are clearly not entirely homogenous, given the clear divergence in the Netherlands’ 
tolerance of coffeeshops, thus demonstrating the contingent and enduring power of the 
nation state in crafting policy responses. But since the Dutch departed from the global and 
European norm in the 1970s, the pressure to come back in line with surrounding countries 
has been a constant presence in policy debates. Again, this is particularly relevant given the 
geography of the Netherlands and the impact of easier cross-border movements. The recent 
changes to cannabis policy attest to such pressures, by trying to close the market off from 
non-Dutch residents, which in turn would relieve accusations that the coffeeshops supply 
cannabis to neighbouring countries. 
The result of these tendencies, in terms of political feasibility, values and constraining 
frameworks, was a reproduction of existing structures which attempted to further repress 
individual liberties under the guise of providing security. Although in the Dutch case some of 
the new measures were based upon a pragmatic rationale, a process of constructing 
problems and solutions through a control perspective, and conditioned by internal and 
external constraining pressures, restricted feasible options within existing templates. 
 
 
7.3 Divergence in Cannabis Control 
 
The picture presented above seems to suggest a rather smooth and flat adoption of punitive 
non-adaptive strategies in responding to issues of cannabis across both national jurisdictions. 
But whilst there are degrees of similarity in the problems experienced and the political 
environment in which policy responses are formulated, there are still a host of factors and 
mechanisms which facilitate ambivalence between policy talk and decisions, as well as 
demarcating England & Wales and the Netherlands in terms of policy outcomes. The nature 
of policy responses differs markedly across and within these jurisdictions, which can be 
explained with reference to the continued importance of national and local political 
institutions and cultures. In a very obvious way, we can see this by virtue of the fact that 
coffeeshops are still in existence, representing a vastly different approach to low-level 
cannabis offences. But in a more precise way, recent changes to policy demonstrate the 
structural and cultural abilities of the Dutch to reproduce an uneasy ‘middle-ground’ within a 
global framework of prohibition which more readily ‘mellows out’ overly punitive changes. 
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7.3.1 Divergence between Policy Talk and Decisions 
 
Whilst the substantive policy changes (i.e. decisions) do represent a more repressive shift to 
varying degrees (in the sense of restriction of liberties) which shouldn’t be understated, they 
still retained the core of pre-existing approaches. This suggests that the symbolic power of 
policy has become just as important as substantive responses. This attests to Garland’s 
notion that crime policy has become more expressive and emotional, with the findings 
suggesting that the language of cannabis policy change by Opstelten and Brown was deeply 
assertive, protective and expressive. For instance, Brown’s suggestion that skunk was ‘lethal’ 
(i.e. killing people) (BBC 2008), and Opstelten’s sustained sound-bites of the need to ‘attack’ 
and ‘combat’ criminality are indicative of how such politicians played into the media and 
politicised discourse of the situation. Such expressions are perhaps not so significant in 
influencing broader cultural trends given low levels of trust in mainstream politicians, but 
they can be considered important projections aimed at those who are engaged in politics and 
voting (i.e. older individuals who are more likely to have children, and thus are arguably more 
susceptible to cannabis-related fears). 
In both countries, there appears to be convergence in the nature of policy talk which 
represented symbolic attempts to demonstrate the state’s authority (and the credentials of 
particular individuals such as Brown and Opstelten) in protecting young people, and yet the 
actual policy decisions demonstrate actual and potential (in the sense of policy action) 
opportunities for divergence from non-adaptive strategies as they had very little effect on the 
desired populations.  
In England & Wales, the reclassification made no changes to how young people 
would be policed – as it further cemented a system of out-of-court disposals for dealing with 
adult cannabis users – and the notion of reclassifying for ‘policing priorities’ is a bit of a 
misnomer given police forces already have operational discretion in how resources are 
directed. In the Netherlands the initial three measures were reduced to one which was then 
given flexibility in its application at the local level: the school’s distance criteria aimed to add 
a further 100m to most existing practices, and coffeeshops already largely abide by the well-
ingrained criteria not to allow admission to under-18 year olds (see de Bruin et al. 2008). 
Moreover, whilst there were significant policy concerns over large-scale cultivation, the 
actual measures did little to effectively address these problems. Whilst the idea behind 
closing supply off from non-Dutch residents has a rational basis in reducing coffeeshop-
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related nuisance, it ignores the national police’s own estimations that between 48-97% of 
cannabis is exported (van der Giessen et al. 2014). 
The policy talk of acting tough on organised crime and tackling large-scale cannabis 
cultivation therefore seems to be largely rhetorical, and where substantive efforts are made, 
these are again done within existing paradigms premised on the traditional belief that law 
enforcement is capable of countering the illicit drugs trade – a fallacy which appears largely 
inconsistent with the actual success (or failure) of the global ‘war on drugs’ to reduce illicit 
drugs markets. 
Responses to cannabis are necessarily conditioned by a realisation that to be overly 
repressive would create serious administrative burdens, and as a result there is a pragmatic 
adjustment by control agencies working within available parameters. Thus, the construction 
of cannabis as a danger also lies in parallel with the implicit acceptance of cannabis use in 
contemporary society, which in Garland’s (2001) terms, has created a ‘policy predicament’ in 
how to respond.  
The sheer volume of cannabis users presents a set of administrative burdens in the 
application of repressive legislation. It is wholly unforeseeable that every one of the 
estimated 2 million past year users in England & Wales could be caught, processed and given 
a custodial sentence given the overcrowding problems with the current prison population of 
approximately 85,000. Similarly, the prospect of the Dutch relinquishing the coffeeshop 
system in favour of enforced criminalisation would create a whole host of additional burdens, 
not just on the courts and prison system, but also with police forces having to tackle 
increased dealing and possession offences. 
Contemporary responses to cannabis have to take account of this predicament, and 
in some ways the policy decisions adapt to the situation by either managing risks and threats 
or through minimal practice changes. There appears to be an implicit acceptance of the 
inability of law enforcement agencies to eradicate the problem, but this occurs within a 
broader symbolic stamp that the national government is acting on the problem, thus 
evidencing a simultaneous degree of denial and acting out (Garland 2001). It would appear 
that such an ambivalent relation allows different spheres to operate to different audiences 
and mandates; politicians can talk tough, and practitioners can pragmatically adjust, which 
according to Brunsson (1993), amounts to a form of ‘hypocrisy’89.  
 
                                                          
89 As Brunsson (1993:502) suggests, ‘hypocrisy’ is ‘…a way of handling the problem of the difference 
between what can be said and what can be done. Hypocrisy means that what can and should be said is 
said, not only by ordinary people but also by important people such as executives and actors, but 
without the talk leading to the corresponding action. What can be said is said, what can be done is 
done.’ 
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7.3.2 Divergence in the Extent of Contestation and Resistance 
 
Not only are there shared trends of divergence between the policy talk and decisions across 
both countries, but the actual policy outcomes represent vastly differentiated and uneven 
responses, both cross-nationally, and between national and local spheres. 
A major point of divergence exhibited in the recent changes was the degree of 
influential ‘counter-doxic’ (Garland 2004:167) voices in conceptualising and responding to 
policy problems. Whilst it would be unfair to suggest that there was little or no reaction from 
opponents of the reclassification in England & Wales90, the impact of such protests was 
largely in vain and did not impact in any meaningful way on the policy process. However, in 
the Netherlands a sustained resistance against the planned measures from various sectors of 
society ultimately contributed to a revisiting of the issue and the relaxing of the initial rules.  
In this way, the measures initiated under the Rutte I government were 
conceptualised in themselves as a policy problem which threatened the sacred separation of 
markets philosophy. The continued support for the coffeeshop system appears to indicate 
that the disappearance of ‘platonic guardians’ and the shift to a punitive public has not been 
fully realised, or is certainly not as extreme, in the Netherlands than it is in England & Wales. 
An important element which allowed criticism to flourish and take hold can be found 
in the nature of the policy process. In England & Wales, the process was a relatively short-
lived affair. The ACMD were asked to review cannabis classification in mid-2007, the decision 
to reclassify was announced in May 2008, and was swiftly introduced in January 2009 with 
fairly minimal changes to existing practices. 
However, in the Netherlands the process was conducted over a much longer time 
span. The plans to alter the gedoogbeleid were announced under the Balkenende IV 
government in 2009 which initiated the van der Donk Commission. The original measures 
were announced in the 2011 coalition agreement which included the trial of the residency 
and closed club measures in the south, with the further school’s distance criteria not 
scheduled to start until 2014. The trialling of the new measures, as opposed to mandatory 
national implementation, facilitated critique and debate to foster over the advantages, 
disadvantages and effects of the measures. As was suggested in Chapter 6, the trial of these 
measures in the southern provinces caused a huge backlash against the government who 
                                                          
90 Especially given the mass resignation of ACMD members following Professor David Nutt’s 
controversial sacking, with tensions between the advisory body and government increasing after the 
government rejected advice over the cannabis classification issue. Between late 2009 and early 2010, 8 
members of the ACMD resigned in protest over ministerial influence (see Laurence 2010). 
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were seen to be overstepping the mark by intruding into people’s lives through forcing 
people to register for an illicit activity. Moreover, it was felt that they had created more 
troublesome issues than mere nuisance by encouraging non-tolerated sources to flourish in 
catering both for Dutch users resistant to registering and non-Dutch residents who could no 
longer enter coffeeshops. 
The resistance generated in the public sphere against the new measures was also 
matched by counter-voices of municipal leaders (predominantly of the grote vier) and 
disgruntled civil servants and academics (predominantly from health) that saw the 
dismantling of the market separation policy. Such patterns further attest to the suggestion 
earlier that cannabis policy is highly polarised in the Netherlands, as it is in England & Wales, 
but support for progressive policies have a much stronger legitimate position whereby there 
is less fear to speak out against measures which are seen as counterproductive and repress 
individual liberties. 
An underlying support for coffeeshops has also been conditioned by the fact that 
they have been in existence for nearly 40 years and are largely seen to have been fulfilling 
their purpose of separating the markets between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ drugs. Moreover, whilst 
there have been overall increases in consumption over this period, these have not been any 
different to the trends experienced in most other advanced Western countries and rates of 
use still remain fairly average (MacCoun and Reuter 1997; 2001; Room et al. 2008; EMCDDA 
2014). Thus, the fear of the unknown (or options beyond blanket prohibition) is not present 
in the Netherlands having experimented with an alternative system for selling and 
consumption for a considerable period. Within this, the role of the health-driven aspect of 
the policy is again a strong underpinning mechanism which provides strong support for the 
coffeeshops and provides a counter-voice against policy options which threaten the 
separation of markets philosophy. 
Such undertones were very much present in the recommendations of the expert 
commissions of van der Donk and Garretsen, and the use of expert advice is another point of 
divergence between England & Wales and the Netherlands. Two points are pertinent here: 
the remit of expert committees differed vastly in scope; and the taking-up of key 
recommendations also contrasted. In England & Wales, the ACMD was primed with providing 
advice within the prohibitive framework of the Misuse of Drugs Act, to determine which 
classification (of illegality) cannabis should be placed; whilst in the Netherlands, the van der 
Donk Commission had a much broader remit and examined all policy options from complete 
prohibition to full legalisation, and the Garretsen Commission considered the whole drug 
scheduling system. Moreover, in England & Wales, the central recommendation not to 
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reclassify was rejected, whilst most of the key recommendations from the Dutch 
commissions were adopted (residency; closed club; THC division).  
Again, there are important reasons why the Dutch expertise was more influential 
than the ACMD in policy decisions which shall be discussed in more depth in due course. But 
the breadth of policy alternatives presented and the utilisation of such recommendations in 
the Netherlands demonstrates that the direction of policy does not necessarily have to be 
punitive or repressive in nature. There is still a key role of expert actors in the cannabis policy 
process, thus refuting claims that policy is purely driven by populist punitive demands for 
tougher courses of action. Indeed, the recommendations of Baan and Hulsman from the late 
1960s that Dutch drugs policy should allow for local experiments continues. The flexibility to 
modify policy over a longer period of time based upon such trials was evident in the 
modifications to the initial changes made under Rutte II. The new measures were found to be 
producing serious adverse side effects to a system still rooted in notions which seek to 
protect cannabis users from criminalisation and contact with other illicit drugs markets. 
Such values do not only lie in forces around the political system, but are also heavily 
embodied within a multitude of parties within it. Whilst a polarisation of views do exist and 
there is support for alternatives to current responses in England & Wales, these are relatively 
minor at the political level between the two major parties and had little influence in the 
direction of policy concerning the reclassification to Class B91. However, in the Netherlands 
there still exists a more balanced support for political parties which advocate a range of 
policy alternatives in cannabis policy. So whilst parties lying on the centre-to-right-hand side 
of the political spectrum (such as CDA and VVD) have shifted and become more supportive of 
punitive responses regarding cannabis, there are a multitude of parties on the centre-to-left-
hand side which have become more aligned with responses which would further regulate the 
coffeeshop system, particularly regarding the back-door of cultivation and supply (such as 
PvdA; D’66; GroenLinks; SP).  
Contrasting political institutions is a fundamental component which will be discussed 
more below, but here it suffices to make the point that there is an array of political parties 
holding various values in the Netherlands which does not necessarily constrain policy options 
within the status quo. So whilst recourses to criminal justice rationalities of control may occur 
within certain political parties which were in power during Rutte I, this does not necessarily 
or automatically dominate the political landscape in other ruling administrations as it does in 
England & Wales which have traditionally been largely restricted to two dominant parties. 
                                                          
91 Indeed, if we look at how the Misuse of Drugs Act Amendment Order passed through the House of 
Commons, 76.3% of the House supported the motion, with only a joint total of 6 MPs rebelling from 
the Conservative and Labour parties (see House of Commons 2008b). 
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Thus, the slowly evolving and incremental nature of Dutch policy-making more 
readily allowed a balancing-out of contested measures, as contrasted with the expeditious 
policy reversal in England & Wales. Relating such developments back to the culture of control 
thesis, and it would seem then that whilst the Netherlands has experienced similar pressures 
and strains associated with late-modernity, this has not automatically determined the 
conceptualisation of policy problems purely in terms of threats to state sovereignty in 
reaction to populist punitive sentiments. Rather, there has been a simultaneous rejection of 
overzealous state authoritarianism which problematises responses which are seen to impose 
restrictions on civil liberties and pragmatic strategies of cannabis control. Such tendencies not 
only emanate from contestations from civil society, but there is also continuing evidence of 
corporatist elite negotiations. These attempt to find balance and consensus across a variety 
of groups which aims to deal with arising problems through pragmatic strategies within 
available constraining frameworks. 
 
 
7.3.3 The Role of Political Institutions and Relations of Power in the Governance of Cannabis 
Policy 
 
Whilst the initial measures under Rutte I were made possible due to a change of 
administration which firmly placed a right-leaning political coalition in the cabinet, a second 
change of administration brought in more balance with the return of PvdA which, together 
with a broader contestation from civil society and counter policy networks, argued for 
greater leniency with the new measures. The change in government was a key catalyst in 
some regards, but the importance lies in the systems and histories of political organisation. 
This highlights a major point of difference between England & Wales and the 
Netherlands. In the Netherlands there is a much larger number of political parties 
represented in the Tweede Kamer and who seek to represent a wider spread of voters than in 
England & Wales. Under a system of proportional representation, this ensures that a mixture 
of views are often represented in cabinets on all issues. Indeed, this is seen as an important 
component which traditionally characterised Dutch political culture, that in the polder model 
there should be an inclusive process which does not let one side dominate the political 
sphere (Lijphart 1968). Such cultural tendencies are still evident, not only in spirit, but also in 
structural forms of political organisation.  
Given that the debate on cannabis policy is more open (which is partly due to its 
historical tolerance and political normalisation), political debates are much less static and less 
constrained than in England & Wales where the national political system has traditionally 
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been dominated by two parties who have no willingness to look beyond the status quo92. 
Such pressures are also mediated by existing within an adversarial style of politics, where the 
quintessential nature of being in opposition is to critically attack the government on its 
policies. Where two large parties dominate the political landscape, the pressure to be seen to 
be doing something is arguably more so than in a country where power is constantly diffused 
amongst several parties. In the former case, the media plays a stronger position in influencing 
debates. Research and expertise, however, is more likely to be utilised where it is seen to 
progress ideological and political agendas but can also be more readily discarded. This of 
course does happen in the Netherlands also, and similar patterns seem to be suggesting slight 
shifts towards a ‘political-media complex’ (Swanson 1992), with incident-driven events 
focusing policy concerns and swift short ‘sound-bites’ becoming commonplace in the rhetoric 
of Minister Opstelten for example. However, the shift does not appear to be as extreme as 
felt in England & Wales, and expertise still plays a vital role.  
The suggestion here is that the constitutional system itself mediates such forces. 
Having to find consensus amongst differing parties is a required facet of a ruling coalition 
government, and so whilst politicisation and populism may shape the noise around 
governments, there is still a very pragmatic element involved in generating agreement. It is 
worth returning to one particular quote by a politician which highlights this point: 
 
‘One thing, that is campaigning, and secondly, that is also negotiating.’ (NL-P2, VVD Politician, 
Utrecht) 
 
Written in to this cultural code of negotiation and consensus-building is the idea of 
developing policy over time. So whilst the formation of Rutte I signalled a right-leaning 
cabinet, the origins of the policy measures started in the Balkenende IV cabinet which also 
included PvdA. The same party then also returned in Rutte II. So whilst there has been voter 
volatility and mobility in recent decades, different parties come and go from national 
government. To completely reverse policy is considered counterproductive, ensuring a more 
incremental style of policy-making rather than the policy reversals that often occur in England 
& Wales between the Conservatives and Labour (and even within the same party when 
considering the 2009 reclassification).  
In this context, of needing to find agreement over time and across diverse political 
parties in a highly polarised policy area, the role of expert commissions appears to play a 
                                                          
92 Interestingly, with the third largest party, the Liberal Democrats, now in a coalition government from 
2010, there have been calls by Liberal Democrat Ministers for alternative approaches to cannabis (see 
The Independent, 2011; The Guardian 2014; Wales Online 2013). This supports the overall finding that 
broader political representation in government allows for marginalised voices on drugs policy to be 
vocalised, and demonstrates the potential for static closed paradigms of thought to be remoulded. 
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much stronger role than in England & Wales. Where decisions are difficult to make, 
commissions provide legitimacy in decision-making through pragmatic advice which allows 
parties to move from their original starting points, thus deflecting potential influences of 
populist punitivism. In England & Wales, where usually one party holds a parliamentary 
majority, the need to give consideration and room to other political perspectives is limited (or 
fairly non-existent), which thus facilitates the influence of populism into the political sphere. 
This is further accentuated through the role of key actors, with the Prime Minister in England 
& Wales having a much more pivotal role. 
In addition to such structural and cultural mechanisms which demonstrate the 
potential to resist the punitive turn, another major point of difference lies in the 
responsibility and power to govern in cannabis policy which again demonstrates divergence 
in how a purported culture of control unfolds across the two countries. In the Netherlands, 
there is a diffusion of responsibility in the governance of cannabis policy, both across and 
within the state.  
This latter element of municipal involvement will be discussed in more depth in the 
final section, but for now we shall retain our attention on the national level. The role and 
influence of health has already been mentioned several times in this chapter as an important 
counter-voice, and this cannot be understated. Through seeing cannabis use primarily as a 
health issue, and not a criminal justice problem, the tolerance policy removes the police from 
interference in coffeeshop issues in the first instance. Thus, the coffeeshops are in some ways 
protected from a pure criminal justice lens by the nature of organisational relations and 
responsibilities. The effect of this is that it provides actors across different agencies and 
ministries a powerful voice in raising objections to policies which are either 
counterproductive or administratively burdensome (as with the impending THC division). 
The spread of power and responsibility contrasts somewhat with England & Wales 
where control of cannabis and other illicit drugs is heavily centralised within the Home Office. 
This is not to ignore the fact that other departments are involved in the wider drugs strategy, 
but that policy is driven through a criminal justice lens in a notoriously stringent state 
department which holds most of the power and is thus more amenable to reproducing and 
performing prevailing orthodoxies in a closed policy arena. 
 
 
7.3.4 Cultures of Tolerance? ‘Convergent-Divergence’ in the Subnational Sphere 
 
Thus far, one of the central arguments that supports divergence between England & Wales 
and the Netherlands has been premised on differences in political institutions and culture 
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which more readily allow for the Netherlands to contest repressive responses to cannabis 
policy. This assertion is further bolstered when comparing how responses developed at the 
subnational sphere where the power to govern in the Netherlands provides further 
mechanisms of resistance and reworking of policy. However, the overall picture suggests 
patterns of ‘convergent-divergence’ (Levi-Faur and Jordana 2005) in that there is a broad 
similarity of both jurisdictions demonstrating degrees of divergence from the more punitive 
responses initiated at a national level. This again contests the notion that policy responses 
unfold evenly across different spaces, with the subnational level being a key site of 
resistance.  
 Just as there was ‘hypocrisy’, in Brunsson’s (1993) terms, between the policy talk and 
decisions, it is also possible to speak of the same between national and subnational levels of 
governance in how policy is created and translated in both countries. In some regards, this is 
a necessary component of policy-making in any society; the national level exists in an abstract 
reality, removed from the everyday realities of policy problems, and is required to formulate 
broad responses across diverse settings. The local level however is firmly rooted in concrete 
situations and encounters a set of issues in how to actually implement and react to situations 
that arise. The result of this is that pragmatism plays a much stronger role, supplanting the 
symbolic role of policy which is much more prevalent at the national level. 
 However, how local authorities address problems is dependent on a number of 
interlinking factors both structurally and culturally which varies over time and space. The 
ability to govern is a key aspect in this regard. In the Netherlands, structural empowerment of 
the local grants significant powers to municipalities and mayors. Despite trends which 
indicate some degree of centralisation (e.g. nationalisation and restructuring of the police), 
there has also been patterns of decentralisation which has granted local municipalities, and 
mayors, more powers in how social problems are governed. Cannabis policy evidences such 
ambivalent developments which has made governing arrangements more complicated and 
arguably has reduced the independence and separation of powers. 
However, compared to England & Wales, local municipalities in the Netherlands have 
been empowered as much as they have been responsibilised. Thus, power is not only 
conferred in the Dutch setting but also transferred thereby granting more potential to resist 
punitive pressures found at a central level of policy-making. 
This marks a significant difference to England & Wales, where although local 
authorities do have degrees of autonomy, especially when considering the devolved powers 
of health in Welsh responses to substance misuse and the operational independence of the 
police, it is a distribution of responsibility rather than power to govern. In the Welsh setting, 
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decisions are able to be shaped in a more differentiated way from the broader UK drugs 
strategy, but such decisions take place within a broader structure and paradigm of 
prohibition, with little movement beyond this framework possible. Moreover, the findings 
suggest that there is little desire to ‘rock the boat’ in this area given the early stages of the 
Welsh Government project which is seeking to prove to Westminster that it is a legitimate 
enterprise. In this context, drugs policy falls prey to the same fears and political pressures as 
it does in the wider UK context, with Welsh politicians unable and unwilling to look beyond 
pre-scribed policy alternatives. 
These relations of governance are also interlinked with socio-cultural facets which 
help shape policy responses. In both countries at the subnational level there are traditions of 
social democratic values which have remained fairly consistent over time. Such values have 
influenced how cannabis (and substance misuse) policy has evolved, with both seeking an 
approach which aims to reduce stigma and harm to marginalised groups whilst improving 
health outcomes. However, local empowerment in the Netherlands makes political 
representation more relevant, not only in how policy is translated from national to local 
spheres, but also in the role of the local in challenging national policy formation. This is not to 
suggest that this necessarily causes resistance to policy measures, but rather that powers 
located in particular geo-historical contexts present opportunities to rework policy in unique 
ways (Edwards and Hughes 2005). 
The specific relationship between subnational authorities and central government 
during the period of policy change is of central importance in this regard. Most of the largest 
municipalities with most of the coffeeshops were led by PvdA mayors and municipal councils, 
and this component combined with the fact that PvdA became a national coalition partner 
created political pressure for Minister Opstelten to be more flexible with the new 
arrangements rather than imposing an order of enforcement. For example, the school’s 
distance criteria which did not appear to originate out of any particular municipal concern, 
but more upon symbolism and ideology, was rescinded following pressure from the municipal 
level that it would lead to the closure of most coffeeshops; an effect which would be 
unwelcome in most urbanised municipalities who value the role of coffeeshops. 
Such differences highlight disparities in political culture: subnational governance in 
the UK has been described as ‘hypercentralised’ in comparison to European norms (Loughlin 
2001; House of Commons 2009), and there is a history of distrust that exists in the UK 
between central and local governments (Chandler 2001). Such factors are especially 
prevalent in the area of criminal justice where the Home Office remains a bastion of 
centralised control. Whilst efforts to decentralise and defer responsibilities were made during 
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New Labour’s tenure, most notably in the shape of statutory local partnerships, they still 
revolved around heavily centralised targets (Hughes 2007). Such targets were indeed present 
in the policing of minor cannabis offences which saw a perverse incentive structure emerge 
around sanction detections for performance management targets during the 2000s. 
Interestingly, since the removal of such targets it has become more evident that pragmatic 
strategies of cannabis control (at least for low-level offences) have more readily flourished. 
However, in the Netherlands there is a rather different approach to local governance 
which can be traced back to the historical formation of the country (from federal states 
operating with a ‘regent mentality’ and the ‘House of Thorbecke’ framework in which there 
are relatively independent layers of national, provincial and municipal government), and from 
more recent times of being wary of overzealous state authoritarianism following Nazi 
occupation.  
Here, another point is relevant, that larger municipalities have more influence than 
others; so whilst policy responses are contingently related to political representation at the 
local level, the ability to rework policy is also related to the size and geo-political power of 
municipal authorities. The local case site in question, Utrecht, is both a major city (and a 
member of the grote vier) and has dominant left-wing political representation. It is these 
facets which granted more influence in shaping the debates on the new coffeeshop measures 
and continues to serve as a springboard for propelling concerns and alternative responses 
into the political sphere (i.e. with regulated cultivation).  
Given the prominent role of some mayors in the larger cities, who often have political 
histories at the national level, this places more bargaining power in their hands. This is 
further bolstered through a detachment of important key players at the local level from 
electoral anxieties and pressures. Executive power rests with the College of Mayor and 
Aldermen which consists of appointed individuals who are separate from the directly elected 
municipal council. 
 Whilst the analysis of England & Wales indicated that the framing of substance 
misuse in Wales could be identified as a factor in allowing for the diversion of police 
resources away from individual cannabis users and subverting overly punitive policy 
responses, it is not clear whether such patterns exist in other subnational spheres. The 
waters become muddied in England & Wales given the apparent lack of governance 
capabilities in this area, whereas in the Netherlands there can be greater certainty that 
political representation at the subnational level is an important mechanism. When triggered 
(in this case from counterproductive national policy initiation), the authority and power 
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granted to the municipal level can react and rework policy in a more meaningful way than in 
England & Wales, where in the latter case it was somewhat of a submissive observer. 
 
7.4 Summary 
 
Overall, it has been argued that there are a number of features in both England & Wales and 
the Netherlands that have allowed for degrees of convergence towards reacting towards risks 
and threats posed by cannabis which have resulted in an overall stricter position towards its 
control. The culture of control thesis is useful in illuminating and linking these developments 
with broader ‘master patterns’ which on the whole, seem to indicate both denial and acting 
out, in the sense of ruling administrations projecting symbolic images of being tough on 
cannabis, and adaptation, which is more readily found in the policy decisions and at the 
subnational levels of governance. However, how such organising tendencies are realised and 
performed is not a ubiquitous and homogenous process, with a set of factors and 
mechanisms at national and subnational levels which have been found to support, resist and 
rework policy in uneven ways. The result of these movements has been that the Netherlands 
has been able to mitigate punitive forces in a more meaningful way than in England & Wales. 
This then takes us on to the concluding chapter of the thesis, to critically explore the 
implications of these findings, to reflect on the research process, and to offer future 
directions for research programmes. 
212 
Chapter VIII 
Conclusions 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
If we return to the original aim of the research, the purpose was to examine how a culture of 
control unfolds across different national and local spheres in two advanced Western 
European jurisdictions through an examination of convergence and divergence in cannabis 
policy in England & Wales and the Netherlands. From the outset, it was argued that recent 
changes prima facie indicated a degree of convergence around the employment of non-
adaptive strategies in cannabis control. However, it was also reasoned that the development 
and unfolding of policy has the potential to take a number of forms across and within 
different jurisdictions. As such, it would be reasonable to expect that there had been some 
degree of convergence and divergence existing both inter-nationally and intra-nationally. 
From these propositions, four research questions were identified which underpinned the 
investigation: 
 
1. How did the policy responses come into existence? 
2. To what extent is there intra-national convergence/divergence between national 
and subnational levels of governance? 
3. To what extent is there inter-national convergence/divergence in the responses 
to cannabis? 
4. What factors and mechanisms conditioned how the policy responses unfolded?  
 
The final chapter has a three-fold purpose: first, to recapitulate the main findings in relation 
to these core research questions and the broader aim of the research; second, to reflect upon 
the methodological approach underpinning the project and suggest future programmes of 
research; and finally, to consider the role and value of what it means to be ‘critical’ in social 
research, and the implications of this for policy-making in crime control.  
 
 
8.2 Culture(s) of Cannabis Control 
 
As much of the comparative work has been discussed in depth in the preceding three 
chapters, this section takes a briefer overview to reflect upon the culture of control thesis in 
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explaining changes in cannabis policy across and within England & Wales and the 
Netherlands. 
So what do the findings of the research suggest about globalising sociological 
theories of crime control? David Garland was heavily criticised for underplaying the influence 
of different national and local political institutions and cultures, and for failing to recognise 
the fundamental messiness, unpredictability and contestation involved in the policy-making 
process (Young 2002; Tonry 2009; Edwards and Hughes 2005; Matthews 2002). These 
critiques are not just pertinent to the work of Garland, but also especially to those who have 
overly concentrated on the punitive turn, producing ‘criminologies of catastrophe’, without 
considering the ‘...non-punitive modes of managing crime that these deep transformations 
make possible’ (Garland 2004:170). The challenge put forth was to examine how different 
societies have ‘…adapted and reacted to the new risks, insecurities and opportunities 
inherent in the social organisation of everyday life under late modern conditions’ (Garland 
2004:179-180). 
In both jurisdictions, the past 40 years or so have witnessed vast changes in the social 
and political landscape, with challenges to the sovereignty of the nation state from above, 
beyond, below and within. Responses to cannabis are the result of the exercise of power by 
social actors operating within the structural and cultural relations in which they inhabit 
(Foucault 1980; Giddens 1984). But whilst structural relations are extremely significant, we 
must be wary of how individuals navigate and make sense of their habitus in the performance 
of particular roles (Matthews 2014; Goffman 1969; Bourdieu 1990). 
As the findings of this research suggest, the culture of control is not a uniformly 
experienced phenomenon, but is constantly performed and reproduced, diversifying and 
mutating across varying structure-agency relations. The danger of reading off particular 
aspects of ‘policy’ misses the fine-grained complexities of the motivations, pressures, 
negotiations and power manoeuvres involved in agenda-setting, policy development and it’s 
unfolding across different geo-political spaces. 
An in-depth examination of the policy process helped illuminate such dynamics 
apparent in cannabis policy. This was made possible through the adoption of the Multiple 
Streams framework which was used to explain and compare the policy process through the 
coming together of the three relatively independent problem, policy and political streams in 
suitable windows of opportunity (Kingdon 1995). 
Taking into consideration both the empirical ‘snapshots’ of two specific policy 
movements as well as the broader trajectories of cannabis control across both jurisdictions, 
the utilisation of the culture of control has been shown to be fruitful. Arguably, the 
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Netherlands has in some ways shifted more ground than England & Wales towards a more 
conflictual and ambivalent set of control strategies. Yet, the residues of modern institutions, 
practices and cultures evident in each national and subnational setting bear importance for 
how particular responses are carved. Such factors help explain how non-adaptive and 
adaptive strategies take the particular shape they do across and within different levels of 
governance.  
Across both jurisdictions at both national and subnational levels there are clear 
points of convergence in the broad picture of cannabis policy which fit into Garland’s 
narrative well. Cannabis has undergone a series of transformations which have been 
problematised in terms of criminal justice, public disorder, health and morality. But how such 
societies have attempted to understand such risks has also evolved; more professionalised 
and skilled law enforcement bodies, an ever-present need to diagnose social problems as 
medical issues, and the re-introduction of quasi-religious moral arguments have all shaped 
what counts as a problem and provides ready-made solutions for its remedy. 
How problems were constructed also linked in to the political environment of policy-
making at the national level, whereby both jurisdictions exhibit a highly politicised policy 
arena in which there are pressures for politicians to be seen to be taking clear, authoritative 
decisions. For similar, but differently experienced, reasons, appealing to populist ‘law and 
order’ demands has become more vocal in both countries and this affected why particular 
representations of cannabis were taken up and placed on the policy agenda. 
In both cases, the role of non-state actors advocating for more liberal reforms, such 
as Release, Transform, and the TNI, was fairly negligible. This is not to say that such narratives 
were absent, but that the stories that were listened to and re-performed accorded with a set 
of dominant values at the time which favoured alternative, and more punitive approaches. 
Additionally, this is not to discount their role either in the past or in the future. As was the 
case in England & Wales, the Runciman Report gained significant traction and was used to 
partially justify the 2004 reclassification. However, the key is that particular narratives and 
evidence have to be provided at the right time to the right set of political actors within 
suitable windows of opportunity. 
Moreover, the responses were conditioned by the technical parameters of 
international conventions which have largely restricted options within the dominant 
structure of prohibition, with these countries currently unwilling to deviate from the 
international norm. 
But despite these points of convergence, the existence of divergence across and 
within nation states is perhaps more intriguing. Differences exist due to a range of structural 
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and cultural factors and mechanisms which seem to either facilitate or off-set overly punitive 
measures to varying degrees. Taken together, the identification of all these factors and 
mechanisms which have shaped the cannabis policy process is a substantive contribution 
towards original knowledge in the field of study.  
To reiterate these for clarity, this predominantly refers to the ‘structured 
ambivalence’ (Garland 2001) that exists between policy talk and decisions at national and 
subnational levels; the ownership of the problem;  the (dis)empowerment of the local and 
political representation at this level; political and constitutional culture which provides a 
more inclusive/exclusive and incremental/reactive policy environment; the role of research, 
expertise and the mass media; and relatedly, socio-historical values concerning cannabis and 
coffeeshops which produce varying degrees of policy support and opposition. To return to a 
telling Dutch proverb which aptly summarises the findings, it would seem that ‘the soup is 
never eaten as hot as it is served’; but some soup is able to be cooled more easily than 
others. 
As this research has demonstrated, such ‘empirical particulars’ are necessary for 
producing a more nuanced account of the way in which different national and subnational 
policy spheres react to many of the same fundamental structural shifts associated with late-
modernity. The development of punitive responses is not something objectively determined, 
but is the result of particular interests and situated decisions within broader structural 
constraints. However, the illumination of divergence from such responses, and the 
identification of conditions which support alternative modalities of control, opens up 
possibilities for progressive change. 
Indeed, taking a broader perspective on the specific issue of cannabis policy, there is 
increasing evidence of policy liberalisation across the globe, with a raft of alternative 
approaches to prohibition developing at local and national levels (TNI 2014). At the time of 
writing, four U.S states have fully legalised the sale of non-medical cannabis with more set to 
follow and Uruguay has become the first country to legalise the cannabis market (Room 
2014; Pardo 2014); a number of jurisdictions across Europe have adopted modes of 
depenalisation and informal regulation through cannabis social clubs (Hughes and Stevens 
2010; Decorte 2014; Christner 2013; see also encod.org); and many other jurisdictions across 
the world are considering options for liberalising reform (BBC 2013; Karam 2013; Tegel 2013).  
Even within both the Netherlands and England & Wales, pressure appears to be 
mounting, with local municipalities lobbying for back-door regulation and the commissioning 
of a report into cultivation regimes in the Netherlands (NRC 2013; Kilmer et al. 2013) and a 
raft of high-profile reports both inside and outside of government presenting a convincing 
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case for reform in the UK (Global Commission on Drug Policy 2011; All-Party Parliamentary 
Group for Drug Policy Reform 2013; UKDPC 2012; Home Affairs Committee 2012). 
What such changes signify with regards to debates about ‘control cultures’ is not yet 
clear. Perhaps, as van Swaaningen (2013) points to in relation to the decreasing use of 
imprisonment in the Netherlands, such developments support notions of ‘reversing the 
punitive turn’. Certainly, reducing the burden on the criminal justice system has been a key 
argument of advocates for reform (Caulkins et al. 2012; see also Proposition 47 in California), 
and set within the global economic crisis, the need to reduce costs through austerity 
programmes has been the predominant response by affected states. Thus, such 
developments could be seen as a form of ‘adaptation’ in Garland’s terms, of a gradual 
acceptance that prohibitive models have fairly limited effects on rates of consumption with 
resources better spent elsewhere (MacCoun and Reuter 2001). 
There is, however, a further element set within the context of austerity which 
appears to be a strong argument for reform: that legalisation of cannabis would generate 
significant revenues. Perhaps unsurprisingly given the neo-liberal climate, this argument has 
gained most traction in the United States (Caulkins 2014), and seemingly affirms that 
previously counter-capitalist symbols have been reinvented and amalgamated into the neo-
liberal capitalist machinery, with an economic reasoning supplanting previous moral positions 
(Sandel 2010). Again, rather than countering Garland’s thesis, this seems to further suggest 
its applicability in accounting for a gradual global ‘adaptive turn’ and supports the findings of 
this thesis as a significant aspect of these reforms appear to have been instigated beyond 
government with strong grass-roots movements93.  
However, other developments, most notably in the shape of cannabis social clubs 
which are taking hold across Europe, provide interesting examples which do not easily fit into 
Garland’s overall thesis owing to their communitarian and non-profit facets which merit 
further empirical attention as to their broader theoretical significance. 
 
 
8.3 Methodological Reflections 
 
Having summarised the main findings of the research, it is now time to reflect upon the 
research process in terms of what it has offered and what it has not. The research is not in 
                                                          
93 However, as a report by the Transnational Institute (2014) suggests, since the turn of the decade 
there has also been growing pressure at an international level to reform international frameworks. 
Indicative of this, is a UN General Assembly Special Session on drug policy planned for 2016, which has 
been spurred on by South American renunciations of a prohibitive ‘war on drugs’, and increasing forms 
of liberalisation found in the Western hemisphere. 
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itself isolated from the social environment in which it inhabits, and so the research does not 
claim to project an objective truth, but rather a ‘second best’ representation which remains 
open to adaptation and change on the basis of further developed knowledge.  
A key question in evaluating and ‘adapting’ conceptual and theoretical frameworks is 
whether they succeeded in comprehensively capturing the social phenomenon under 
question (Layder 1998). Invariably in the complex ‘open systems’ of the social world there 
cannot be full certainty or possibility that such tools are capable of explaining everything 
under its gaze, which therefore leaves space open for competing accounts. For example, 
Garland’s theory helps explain a lot of the developments in crime control, yet the counter-
orthodox struggles and points of difference which are glossed over have been shown to be 
important in this research. They help demonstrate and explain how punitive policy ‘mellows 
out’ from national to subnational levels and between talk and decisions within distinct 
moments. 
Thus, the research has adapted and built upon the theoretical framework of the 
culture of control through the identification of factors existing at national and subnational 
levels which mitigate the policy process as outlined above (for example, with local political 
representation coupled with powers to shape policy initiatives). Further work could then take 
forward these findings to test and corroborate how such factors impact upon the policy 
process in other areas of crime control and across different settings. 
Moreover, the same can also be said for more ‘middle-range’ frameworks adopted in 
this research regarding the policy process and policy levels (Kingdon 1995; Pollitt 2001; 
Brunsson 1989) in that they inevitably construct a particular representation and leave some 
questions unanswered. 
 In terms of the main organising framework employed in the research, Kingdon’s 
Multiple Streams model, this was a useful device to capture the dynamic relations between 
different social actors and events that form part of the policy process. Importantly, the model 
allowed for a variety of processes to be captured in comparative perspective, highlighting 
differences between the more incremental style evidenced in the changes to the 
gedoogbeleid in the Netherlands compared to the more reactive process which characterised 
the 2009 reclassification in England & Wales. Moreover, by taking into account the fluid and 
ever-changing possibilities of policy change, this allowed the model to consider broader social 
and structural influences and the choices of key individuals central to the developments. 
Additionally, through combining this with an appreciation and empirical focus on the policy 
levels of talk and decisions, this enabled the research to produce a nuanced and original 
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account not only of how the policy changes came into being, but also what they signified in 
substantive terms. 
 However, we must recognise that in utilising such analytical tools there is a need to 
be reflective over how the research managed to adapt the models and concepts and to 
suggest ways in which to refine and adjust such tools (Layder 1998). This is particularly 
relevant in using the Multiple Streams model in European comparative work as it was 
originally developed in relation to the US political system. 
 One way in which the research adapted and built upon this model relates to the 
concept of the national mood. On face value this seemed to indicate a homogenous societal 
feeling about an issue. However, the findings of this research indicated the prevalence of 
multiple ‘moods’ regarding the issue of concern. In this sense, it is more useful to think of 
how, and why, particular representations are taken up and projected as a dominant feeling. 
This also relates to the concept of a window of opportunity, which has been argued is not 
automatically opened in a logical and coherent way which accords with an objective notion of 
a problem; but rather that it can be forced open with issues used by influential actors and 
agencies to question rulers and strengthen positions of power. Thus, actors, groups, and 
networks seek to improve their standings and progress their belief systems and ideological 
agendas through projecting a collective national mood. 
 The research overtly took a broad adoption of the Multiple Streams model, but there 
needs to be greater attention paid to what particular concepts mean in different political 
settings. For example, organised political forces covers a vast array of individuals and groups 
which differs considerably across national jurisdictions. Whilst the concept was useful to 
convey the broad mobilisation of collective interests to advocate for policy change, questions 
remain over the ‘organisation’ of such forces and the constitution of such networks. 
Moreover, there are aspects of the research which could have been done differently 
or require further attention. A clear example of this is with regards to policy levels which 
were mapped on to ‘national’ and ‘subnational’ levels of governance. This was not the easiest 
of tasks, especially concerning the partially devolved setting of Wales which could be 
conceptualised as a national state in its own right. Thus, in developing such a framework, 
further consideration needs to be paid to the operationalisation of concepts and frameworks 
across varying geo-political settings. 
Furthermore, the decision to only empirically compare the two specific policy 
movements raises the potential critique that this does not adequately represent the breadth 
of responses that have developed over these two jurisdictions, which when taken into 
consideration, may serve to challenge or alter the conclusions of the thesis. This decision was 
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premised upon the belief that a clear and narrow focus would allow a more rigorous and in-
depth exploration of the processes of policy-making. Whilst it was felt that this was achieved, 
it is acknowledged that a broader historical time frame and wider selection of policy changes 
for empirical analysis could have provided the basis for more generalisable and critical 
findings. The danger, then, is that the findings of this thesis pertain only to those policy 
movements under examination and all too readily accept the culture of control as a mode of 
explanation, albeit with the nuances and means of variegation which have been documented.  
As was noted in Chapter 3, the history of cannabis control in both jurisdictions 
highlights points of convergence and divergence around a culture of control as a whole, with 
evidence that this policy domain does not always neatly follow the birds-eye perspective of 
Garland. However, placed within a historical context, it is still possible to see the relevance 
and applicability of the concept of ‘structured ambivalence’ in accounting for state responses, 
with a broad bifurcation between more pragmatic approaches towards users and more 
punitive strategies targeted towards cultivators and suppliers developing from the 1970s 
onwards. Certainly in the case of cultivation, such approaches have been strengthened 
further over the years, and it is only recently that alternatives to prohibition have made some 
progress in policy developments. Looking forward, further empirical research should seek to 
locate ongoing developments within historical patterns of cannabis control to further critique 
and test the validity of theoretical perspectives. 
Moreover, a further acknowledged limitation of the thesis was the explicit decision to 
focus on the policy process at the policy levels of talk and decisions, omitting the important 
level of policy action. Again, this decision was based upon providing a rigorous focus on 
processes of policy making rather than the effects or outcomes of policy, which have received 
much attention within studies of drug policy (e.g. MacCoun and Reuter 1997; 2001; Reuter 
and Stevens 2007; Room et al. 2008). An implication of this narrowed focus, however, is that 
it again fails to capture a fuller representation of the policy changes under examination, with 
inferences drawn only from the levels of talk and decisions without considering how actors 
‘on the ground’ perform (or resist) the policy changes. Moreover, it fails to account for non-
state actors which are active in cannabis control, both in the sense of service provision and in 
accomplishing points of contestation and alternative modes of control. For example, the 
growth of the largely unknown UK cannabis social clubs provides an interesting example 
where informal regulation of cannabis activities may be undertaken and offers a different 
mode of control to that of official control measures. 
Thus, at this level there are a whole host of possibilities which may further affirm or 
challenge the culture of control thesis. If one was to consider policy action through briefly 
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examining a snapshot of key national statistics on possession and cultivation offences, it 
would appear that patterns of official sanctions towards cannabis activities broadly accord 
with the overall arguments set out in the thesis. This is by no means a robust comparison but 
is used here simply to indicate apparent trends which should be explored in more depth. 
In the Netherlands, statistics on cannabis offences are quite difficult to ascertain with 
no specific information given about types of drugs or specific types of drug offences, with 
only a distinction made between ‘soft drugs’ and ‘hard drugs’ (WODC 2014). However, in a 
special report drawing upon police data in 2012, 38% (4594) of soft drug cases referred to the 
possession of cannabis, with 47% (5651) referring to cannabis cultivation (Kruize and Gruter 
2014). Other research has noted that the rates of arrest for cannabis possession are 
extremely low, due to the system of gedoogbeleid, with approximately 3 per 1000 of the past 
year cannabis-using population arrested. This compares to 20 per 1000 in the UK (Room et al. 
2008). Thus, the numbers being imprisoned for possession offences in the Netherlands can be 
estimated to be extremely low, if any, with ‘offenders’ in possession of less than 30g not 
being prosecuted under the gedoogbeleid rules. 
Thus it can be assumed that a greater number of cultivation/supply offences are 
brought to court and result in official sanctions. On the whole, soft drug cases constituted 
50% (4833) of court sentences for Opium Act offences in 2013, of which 506 received a fine, 
2489 received a community order, and 772 received a prison sentence (WODC 2014). 
In England & Wales, there is greater accuracy regarding the numbers sanctioned and 
imprisoned. In 2012/13, there were 142,618 recorded offences for the possession of cannabis 
which constitute approximately 70% of all drug offences. Out of this number, just under half 
(49%) were dealt with by a cannabis warning, and a further 11% were given a Penalty Notice 
for Disorder by the police (Home Office 2013c). Whilst not directly comparable due to 
differences in years, data from the Ministry of Justice (2015) indicates that the number of 
adults sentenced for cannabis possession in 2012 was 24,574. Of those, only 1.7% received 
immediate custody, with most (52%) receiving a fine. Police statistics on other cannabis 
offences is not directly available with limited data available covering all illicit drugs. For the 
year 2012/13, there were 29,746 police recorded drug trafficking offences. Sentencing data 
shows that the number of individuals sentenced for cannabis cultivation in 2012 was 5173. Of 
those, 24% received a community sentence, 29% received a suspended sentence, and 21% 
received immediate custody. 
Taken together, these statistics indicate both differences and points of similarity. 
First, there are large differences in the numbers and proportions of individuals getting 
through to the courts for possession as contrasted with cultivation offences. In England & 
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Wales, there is a much greater proportion of possession offences, which can be expected 
given the Dutch gedogen towards possession. However, on the whole, the numbers reaching 
this stage of the criminal justice system are relatively few compared to the total number who 
consume cannabis with most of those caught by the police being dealt with out-of-court, and 
those who are sentenced by the courts hardly ever receive a custodial sentence in either 
jurisdiction. For cultivation offences, there can be greater certainty that a larger proportion 
are processed by the police (and Public Prosecution) and brought before the courts. Longer-
term trends in both jurisdictions show an increase over the past decade in the numbers 
brought into the criminal justice system (Ministry of Justice 2015; WODC 2014). Moreover, 
cultivation offences are dealt with more severely than possession offences, although it should 
be noted that non-custodial sentences constitute the most common sentencing outcome. 
Reflecting on the potential significance of such a snapshot, it would seem that it 
prima facie corroborates how ‘structured ambivalence’ manifests itself, not only between 
policy rhetoric and substance, but also between different types of offences, whereby 
possession is dealt with more leniently than that of cultivation. However, key questions 
remain over trends over a longer period of time and how criminal justice responses are 
performed by practitioners across different subnational sites. 
 
 
8.4 Future Research Directions 
 
The reflections made above open up a range of potential research avenues requiring further 
empirical attention. First, there are tendencies to treat the somewhat disparate collection of 
states that comprise the United Kingdom as a single political entity. But as this research has 
demonstrated, divergence does exist between Westminster and Cardiff, and we can expect 
similar patterns in Edinburgh and Belfast regarding drugs control.  
A striking feature of contemporary British society is the perceived dearth of 
democratic legitimacy ingrained in the ‘Westminster political elite’ and the desire for further 
decentralisation, devolution, and particularly in the case of Scotland, independence. As the 
configuration of power shifts then alternatives to current regimes may become more 
feasible. Thus, as Stenson and Edwards (2004:219) suggest, there is a ‘…need for further 
accounts of the uneven ways in which political rationalities and governmental technologies 
are configured in different localities by competing coalitions of actors’. For example, Goldson 
and Hughes (2010) have usefully demonstrated such ‘intra-system’ diversification in the area 
of youth justice.  
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Second, whilst the research was useful in demonstrating convergence and divergence 
through the use of a ‘critical’ case site in each jurisdiction, there are further questions about 
whether the tendencies found in each subnational site are representative across subnational 
sites as a whole. In other words, is the approach in Cardiff or Utrecht indicative of the Cardiff-
‘ness’ or Utrecht-‘ness’, or is it a non-specific condition of the existence of current responses? 
Further research could seek to conduct a comparison of multiple subnational case sites to 
further our understanding of such issues. 
 Third, the need to refine criminological expertise on sites of the local also points to an 
important aspect which has remained hidden in this research. This refers to how the policy 
talk and decisions are acted out by practitioners ‘on the ground’. As the thesis has uncovered 
the potentiality for policy to be resisted and reworked across the levels of talk and decisions 
in national and subnational spheres, this further layer presents another point where actors 
can wrestle with, and contest, how policy is performed to suit a different set of agendas, 
values and social environments. As alluded to above, there are differences apparent in how 
different types of cannabis offences are processed by the criminal justice system, with 
possession ‘offenders’ more likely to be diverted away from incarceration. Whilst on the 
whole the findings suggest a ‘mellowing out’ of punitivism, it is entirely possible that in some 
subnational spheres more punitive responses to cannabis are employed. For example, the use 
of stop-and-search in London for low level drug offences is well noted (Eastwood et al. 2013). 
Fourth, the move away from a state-centric crimino-logic and the importance of 
governance in late-modernity also alerts us to the significance of taking account of structures 
existing above the state. Of course, this level has not been ignored in this research, and forms 
an important aspect of the cannabis policy process, but there was not the same level of in-
depth examination of the policy process, either at the European or global level. Given that 
the international conventions do provide arguably one of the most powerful mechanisms for 
the perpetuation of a prohibitive approach, research examining movements at this level are 
of central importance in seeing how future windows of opportunity may open or be blocked 
from imagining alternative approaches (see TNI 2014; Room et al. 2008; Global Commission 
on Drug Policy 2011). 
Finally, in moving forward with criminological inquiries, comparative research 
encounters a set of opportunities and challenges, which if met and mitigated respectively, 
could allow for criminological research to provide meaningful expert knowledge on 
contemporary responses to crime. The domain of crime and its control across different liberal 
democracies poses problems of how different actors and agencies recognise and place 
meaning upon social phenomena. This speaks to a perennial problem of comparative 
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research, and one which has been grappled with throughout this research, of how to talk 
across different cultural settings to address the nature of convergence/divergence in 
problems, and suitability of adopting particular approaches in addressing such issues. 
Certainly, this research has contributed towards this goal and the methods utilised served 
this purpose, but an alternative methodological technique which may address such issues is 
the ‘Delphi Panel’ method advanced by Edwards et al. (2013a; 2013b).  
Relating back to the core area of interest to this study, that of cannabis and 
substance policy, there are potentialities to combine this method with a harm assessment 
framework such as the one developed by Greenfield and Paoli (Greenfield and Paoli 2012; 
Greenfield and Paoli 2013; Paoli et al. 2013) to identify a shared understanding of the scale 
and severity of harms and attempt to generate consensus amongst expert participants on 
how substance policy ought to be governed. This latter notion that criminological research 
does not only deal with questions of what is but also with what ought to be brings us on to 
discuss, reflect and engage with the normative dimension regarding drugs policy and crime 
control. 
 
 
8.5 Reflexivity, being ‘Critical’ and the Normative Dimension of Criminological 
Research 
 
An important facet underpinning this research project is the notion of reflexivity. Jupp 
(2006:345) argues that this ‘…is concerned with the social production of knowledge. It 
involves reflecting on the various social roles, interactions and processes which resulted in 
the kinds of observations and conclusions that emerged’.  It is not unusual for researchers to 
engage in topics with which they feel connected to and have an interest in. It fact it would be 
strange for a doctoral study not to be on an area with which the researcher resonates with if 
they are to spend at least three years devoted to its study.  
In a reflexive spirit, whilst the works of Becker, Young and others writing at the time 
of the National Deviancy Conference now seem rather dated in criminological history, they 
have influenced the way in which I have thought about cannabis as a ‘drug’, as opposed to 
alcohol or tobacco, which are still largely seen outside the scope of what ‘drugs’ are, and how 
they should subsequently be responded to. Having been socialised into a culture of cannabis 
consumption, and been involved in the ‘other side’, it led to a critical thinking about the 
seemingly oppressive legislation on users concerning cannabis and how policy is made. 
 Similarly, throughout the thesis and wider criminological literature on developments 
in crime control there is an underlying assumption that the culture of control is negative, that 
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such ‘dystopic’ visions represent an undesirable set of conditions (Zedner 2002). The 
existence of an ambivalent duality between the loss of rationality in political decision-making 
coupled with particular bounded rationalities based upon economic reasoning and risk 
management presents a set of problems for the criminological academy and critical studies of 
crime control. It has been challenged on knowledge production and legitimacy by the rise of 
populist punitivism and ‘silenced’ by a managerialist ‘what works’ agenda (see Casey 2008; 
Sherman 2009; Hope 2009; Tilley 2009; Hillyard et al. 2004). Broadly, in British criminology 
(and further afield) there appears to be a general implicit feeling that views such 
developments as negative, and this suggests that, whether overtly admitted to or not, there 
are critical judgements made about virtue and vice in responding to criminality and drugs and 
the types of knowledge that should guide policy. 
 I would argue that being critical is a fundamental component of the criminological 
enterprise. This means that criminological knowledge should not be shackled to, and merely 
legitimise, governmental conceptualisations and framing of social behaviours. So this raises 
the question of what being critical in social science means, and what it can do. It does not 
merely suggest critique of the social world, but it should also entail a postulation about what 
we want fundamental societal values to be based upon. What is the point of stating that the 
social environment is unsatisfactory without some idea of what is desired? 
To conceptualise well-being also requires a need to think about ill-being; about 
practices and structures which discriminate, oppress, or harm individuals. Here, a realist 
understanding of a stratified ontology serves a worthy, if not extremely difficult, purpose 
which deserves future examination. Importantly, we must remain open to the task of 
explicitly attempting to identify powers and generative mechanisms which cause the 
existence of social phenomena. Doing so opens up the possibility for being critical in a 
transformative sense. Indeed, as Bourgois and Schonberg (2009:297) strikingly remark, 
‘…policy debates and interventions often mystify large-scale structural power vectors and 
unwittingly reassign blame to the powerless for their individual failures and moral character 
deficiencies’. 
Set in the context of crime and drugs control, the need for reimagining the landscape 
is necessary given that existing policy responses have seemingly given way to a plethora of 
approaches spanning economic reasoning, harm reduction and populist-driven response set 
which either attempts to displace moral and ethical arguments to cost-benefit analysis, or 
which is conceptualised around a morally-conservative ‘law and order’ politics which 
increases inequalities and contributes towards social exclusion.  
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In the context of the growing influence of populism and calls for greater democratic 
legitimacy and transparency in decision-making, criminology and the social sciences cannot 
afford to sit idly by. We should strive towards providing rational and critical observations 
which engages with problems both of concern to the government and public, as well as 
revealing hidden issues and wider oppressive structures. Certainly, with greater shifts 
towards liberalisation, we should be cautious of the effects of new structures and 
frameworks, and who the new ‘players’ are in cannabis regulation (Caulkins 2014). 
This involves communicating and informing individuals at different levels, be it 
political agents or lay citizens. If criminology cannot claim a monopoly on knowledge (and in 
some ways, rightly so), then it must engage in a type of ‘public criminology’ which 
disseminates and advances knowledge claims throughout society, not only by appealing to 
policy entrepreneurs, but also by captivating the imaginations of individuals and agencies in 
the public and private sphere (Burawoy 2005; Hughes 2007; Loader and Sparks 2010). 
If we are to move forward with criminology and social science in an era where expert 
knowledge is placed alongside popular conceptualisations, then it is necessary for criminology 
to ‘…acknowledge its often hidden or repressed premise – that its evaluations of practices 
imply a conception of human flourishing’ (Sayer 2011:245). Therefore, a social science which 
can reduce illusions of conceptual understandings of social phenomena can seek to reduce 
unnecessary harm and suffering (Bhaskar 1986). 
 
 
Policy Implications 
 
In relation to this research, through highlighting the contingencies of public policy making, 
this suggests that different societies are not inevitably heading in the same (punitive) 
direction. This opens up possibilities for progressive change both in the broader remit of 
crime control, but also specifically with cannabis and drugs policy. In the context of dispersing 
power and a ‘hollowing out’ of the state (Jessop 2004), there are opportunities for enhanced 
collaboration between experts and devolved governments in developing policy and 
legislation. Within Welsh Government, in the rhetoric at least, this has been consistently 
stated as an aim (Quinn 2002). 
Much of the valuable components contained in the Dutch approach to cannabis have 
spawned from the relations between municipalities and central government, whereby 
dealing with the pragmatic realities of cannabis and drug use provides an innovative 
environment in which to develop policy initiatives. However, as this research has 
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demonstrated, understanding policy requires an understanding of the geo-historical contexts 
in which events take place. For example, an approach that may work in Utrecht or the 
Netherlands will not necessarily translate equally in Cardiff and the UK.  
With drugs policy, the licit/illicit divide is fairly arbitrary, and as academic researchers 
we should not obfuscate the effects of the policy environment upon substance users in 
favour of a naïve acceptance of current paradigms. Instead, a more useful way to assess the 
impacts of substance use in society could be through the concept of harm. This has been 
attempted within the natural sciences in both England & Wales and the Netherlands, and 
such attempts have demonstrated the fallacy of the harm-criminalisation relationship (Nutt 
et al. 2007; van Amsterdam et al. 2009). Moreover, an innovative example of this type of 
work within criminology can be seen with Paoli et al.’s (2013) application of their harm 
assessment framework to cocaine trafficking, which took into account the effect of 
prohibition itself upon the production and severity of harms. The ‘Welsh approach’ to 
substance misuse has taken important strides forward, but remains locked into a restrictive 
paradigm. For an approach to be truly harm-reductive, this should embrace a wider definition 
of harm production, to inwardly look at the system itself and evaluate how it contributes to 
harm. 
However, we should be hesitant to presume that because the Welsh context 
currently exhibits a more ‘sympathetic’ perspective than England concerning crime and 
substance misuse that it should continue doing so following the transferral of more powers. 
With more power comes more responsibility, and more accountability to the public. As 
McAra (2006:142) has noted regarding developments in Scottish youth justice, ‘carrying the 
weight of political expectation’ has also coincided with a process of ‘de-tartanisation’ 
whereby politicians face similar pressures to that in Westminster because they have added 
responsibilities and are accountable to the public, thus falling prey to perceived calls for more 
punitive measures from the media and public.  
The real challenge therefore is how to protect institutions from more irrational and 
punitive forces which do more harm than good. This again relates to the issue of populist 
punitivism and how to engage the public to view issues beyond a culture of fear and 
intolerance. This goes way beyond the issue of cannabis or crime, but hits a root nerve of a 
crisis of collective solidarity and identity which neoliberal philosophies have deteriorated. 
Moreover, it also relates to a narrowing of problem construction which frames issues around 
‘problematic’ populations without a questioning of powerful actors and the structures which 
generate inequalities. It may not be possible to return to a former state of welfarist-based 
affairs (which was probably overly rose-tinted), but following Michael Sandel (2010), there 
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needs to be a (re)invigoration of a politics of the common good; one in which individuals 
operating across society think beyond their immediate environments to consider larger 
societal stakes. 
 
 
8.6 Conclusion 
 
In summary, this piece of research has sought to exemplify the worth of the sociological (and 
criminological) imagination in illuminating contemporary responses to the control of 
cannabis. The main findings echo other commentators’ concerns with grand sociological 
narratives which, although have been shown to be useful in mapping the broad transition 
from modernity to late-modernity, fail to take into account the contingent components which 
allow for policy to be resisted, reworked, or even refuted in preference for alternative values 
and policy directions (Tonry 2009; Edwards and Hughes 2005; Edwards et al. 2013a). 
Moreover, the research has highlighted how differences between policy at different levels in 
different spheres of governance is moulded in competing ways, again highlighting 
complexities and messiness in policy responses. 
Through a rigorous methodological approach which has recognised and supported a 
reflexive framework in the conducting of research, it has been possible to generate a more 
thorough understanding of a subject area which has increasingly crept into the public domain 
and plays upon emotional and moral tones. At a time where issues of crime and illicit drugs 
are hotly contested issues, it brings forth the question of how we want them to be governed, 
and what knowledge that governance is based upon. Through critically building upon 
Garland’s culture of control, it has been possible to identify how divergence from punitive 
strategies is facilitated. In attempting to advance the ‘flourishing’ of the human condition 
(Sayer 2011), it is of my view that criminology could, and should, be of central importance in 
informing such debates. 
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Appendix 
 
Chapter 2 
 
Table 2.1 The Pillarisation of Dutch Society c.1960. Source: Bryant (1981:57) 
 
 
Table 2.2 Pendulum Consociationalism. Adapted from: Pennings and Keman (2008:175) 
Rules of the game until 
1967 (Lijphart 1968) 
Rules of the game 
1967-1977 (Daalder 
1974) 
Rules of the game 
1977-2001 (van Praag 
1993) 
Rules of the game 
after 2001 (Pennings 
and Keman 2008) 
The business of politics Exposure of 
‘establishment 
ideology’; critical view 
of society 
The business of politics Exposure of 
‘Establishment’; critical 
view of bureaucracy 
and party cartels 
Agreement to disagree Conflict Agreement to disagree Conflicts enter inter- 
and intra-party politics 
and debates on 
particular issues (i.e. 
ethnic minorities, 
European integration) 
Summit diplomacy Self-determination at 
the base 
Selective summit 
diplomacy 
Selective summit 
diplomacy 
Proportionality Polarisation Proportionality Polarisation and catch-
all-ism 
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Depoliticisation Politicisation Symbolic politicisation Politicisation 
Secrecy Open government Selective publicity Dominant government 
with an ‘open’ image 
building 
The government’s right 
to govern with little 
interference from 
Parliament 
A critique of ‘the 
decline of Parliament’, 
‘the Fourth Branch of 
government’, etc. 
Pivotal role of 
governing party 
Pivotal role of 
governing party and 
tendency towards 
Monism in practice 
  A change in 
government 
composition is 
followed by elections 
A change in 
government 
compositions is not 
always followed by 
elections 
  The largest governing 
party appoints the 
Prime Minister 
The largest governing 
party appoints the 
Prime Minister and the 
other governing parties 
the Deputy Prime 
Minister 
 
 
Chapter 4 
 
Table 4.1 Summary of Participants 
 England & Wales The Netherlands 
National Local National Local 
Academics/Researchers94 
(Advisory Committee) 
8 
(3) 
0 8 
(4) 
0 
Non-Government 
Organisations95 
3 1 4 1 
Politicians 1 2 1 5 
Political Advisors 0 0 1 3 
Civil Service96,97 
(Advisory Committee) 
2 
(1) 
3 4 
(3) 
0 
                                                          
94 These including a broad group of academics and researchers operating in the fields of social 
sciences/criminology, health and media studies. 
95 Including ‘think tanks’ and third-sector drug agencies. 
96 In the Netherlands, this included the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport; the Ministry of Security 
and Justice; and the Public Prosecutor’s Office. In England & Wales this included the Home Office. 
97 Including working for the local authority at the subnational level. 
230 
Police98 4 3 3 1 
Public Prosecutor’s Office 0 0 4 1 
Sub-Total 18 9 24 11 
Total 27 35 
 
Table 4.2a Participant Key for In-Text References 
Key 
England & Wales/The Netherlands EW/NL 
Academics/Researchers A 
Advisory Committee (Criminal Justice; Health) AC (CJ; H) 
Non-Government Organisation NGO 
Politicians/Political Figures P 
Political Advisors PA 
Civil Service CS 
Police POL 
Public Prosecutor’s Office PP 
 
 
Table 4.2b England & Wales In-Text Participant Key 
England & Wales In-Text Participant Key 
EW-POL-CS1 South Wales Police and Welsh Government 
EW-POL1 Former Chief Constable and ACPO Lead on Drugs 
EW-A1 Academic Expert in Criminology 
EW-CS-H1 Substance Misuse Policy Worker, Cardiff and Welsh Government 
EW-A2 Academic Expert in Criminology and Former Home Office Researcher 
EW-A-AC-H1 Former Chair of the ACMD 
EW-NGO1 Former UKBA and Member of National Drug Prevention Alliance 
EW-CS-H2 Substance Misuse Action Team, Cardiff 
EW-CS-H3 Senior Civil Servant, Welsh Government 
EW-CS-H4 Senior Civil Servant, Welsh Government 
EW-NGO2 Third-Sector Organisation 
EW-A3 Academic and Former BBC Home Affairs Correspondent 
EW-CS-CJ Former Senior Home Office Civil Servant 
EW-P3 Liberal Democrat MP, Wales 
EW-POL-CS2 South Wales Police, Welsh Government and ACPO Cymru 
EW-P1 Senior Political Figure 
                                                          
98 At the national level this refers to current and former representatives from ACPO in England & 
Wales, and in the Netherlands this pertains to current and former representatives from KLPD and the 
Dutch Police Union. 
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EW-A4 Academic Expert in Criminology 
EW-A-AC-H2 Former Chair of the ACMD 
EW-A5 Academic Expert in Criminology 
EW-POL2 Police Constable, South Wales Police 
EW-POL6 Police Constable, South Wales Police 
EW-POL3 Neighbourhood Team Supervisor, South Wales Police 
EW-P2 Labour MP, South Wales 
EW-NGO-AC Independent Drugs Policy Organisation and Former ACMD member 
EW-A6 Academic Expert in Psychiatry 
EW-NGO3 Third-Sector Drugs Worker 
EW-POL4 Former Chief Constable and ACPO Lead on Drugs 
EW-POL5 Former Chief Constable 
EW-CS-CJ2 Former Senior Home Office Civil Servant 
 
 
Table 4.2c The Netherlands In-Text Participant Key 
The Netherlands In-Text Participant Key 
NL-A-NGO1 Independent Research Organisation and Drugs Worker 
NL-CS-AC-CJ Senior Civil Servant in Ministry of Security and Justice and Member of van de Donk 
Committee 
NL-A-NGO2 Independent Research Organisation 
NL-A1 Academic Expert in Social Sciences 
NL-A-AC-CJ Academic Expert in Criminology and Member of the van der Donk Commission 
NL-A2 Academic Expert in Criminology 
NL-PA1 Political Advisor, Utrecht 
NL-A-AC-H1 Academic Expert in Health and Member of van der Donk/Garretsen Commissions 
NL-NGO1 Drugs Policy Reform Organisation and Psychiatrist 
NL-A-AC-H2 Academic Expert in Health and Chair of Garretsen Commission 
NL-POL1 Former Chief of Police and President of the Dutch Police Union 
NL-PP1 Policy Worker, Public Prosecutor’s Office 
NL-POL2 KLPD and Organised Cannabis Cultivation Taskforce 
NL-CS-AC-H1 Senior Civil Servant in Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport and Member of 
Garretsen Commission 
NL-P6 D’66 Politician, Utrecht 
NL-A-NGO3 Independent Research Organisation 
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NL-P1 D’66 Politician, Tweede Kamer 
NL-P2 VVD Politician, Utrecht 
NL-POL3 KLPD 
NL-P3 PvdA Politician, Utrecht 
NL-A-CS WODC 
NL-PA3 Policy Advisor to the Mayor, Utrecht 
NL-PP2 Public Prosecutor, Limburg 
NL-PP3 Policy Worker, Public Prosecutor’s Office, Limburg 
NL-POL4 Utrecht Police 
NL-NGO2 Drugs Policy Reform Organisation 
NL-PA4 D’66 Policy Advisor 
NL-A3 Academic Expert in Criminology 
NL-CS-CJ Civil Servant in the Ministry of Security and Justice 
NL-PP4 Policy Worker, Public Prosecutor’s Office 
NL-P4 CDA Politician, Utrecht 
NL-P5 D’66 Alderman, Utrecht 
NL-CS-AC-H2 Senior Civil Servant in the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport and Member of van 
der Donk Commission 
NL-PP5 Policy Worker, Public Prosecutor’s Office, Utrecht 
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Table 4.3 Example Interview Schedule: Police, Subnational Level, the Netherlands 
Interview Schedule 
 
Section 1: The Police and Cannabis Policy in Utrecht 
 
1.1 Background information 
 
1.2 What are the problems with cannabis in Utrecht, if any? 
 
1.3 How are decisions made on cannabis policy at a local level? (probe about relationship between 
police, prosecution and mayor) 
 
1.4 What factors influence these decisions? (probe about political representation) 
 
1.5 Where does cannabis lie in police priorities? (cultivation vs. possession) 
 
1.6 What is the role of the police in Utrecht’s soft drugs policy? (checking coffeeshops; ‘back-door’) 
 
1.7 How are decisions regarding police resources/priorities decided? 
 
1.8 What is the (potential) impact of the nationalisation of the police? (probe about national vs. local 
agenda-setting – accountability) 
 
 
Section 2: Revisions to Coffeeshop Criteria 
 
2.1 What was the reaction from Utrecht to the policy measures announced in 2011? – Why? 
 
2.2 What was the reaction from Utrecht to the revised policy measures announced in 2012? – Why? 
 
2.3 What is the relationship between national and local levels of policy-making? How much room for 
manoeuvre is given? Why? 
 
2.4 How have the new policy measures been put into local policy? 
 
 
Section 3: On-Going Developments 
 
3.1 How will the introduction of the THC measure be put into local policy? What is the position of 
the police towards this? 
 
3.2 What is the situation regarding the Social Cannabis Club Domstad? What is the position of the 
police? 
 
3.3 What do developments in cannabis policy over the last few years say about the nature of Dutch 
drugs policy? 
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Table 4.4 Example of a Simplified Coding Framework and Main Themes: The Netherlands 
Problem Stream Policy Stream Political Stream 
Cannabis as 
a criminal 
justice 
problem 
i) problems with existing 
policy 
ii) organised crime – 
increase in demand; 
transformation of 
cultivation; 
characteristics/effects; 
importation/exportation; 
cultivation; law 
enforcement activity 
iii) coffeeshop criminality 
Reshaping 
of political 
values 
i) decline of 
gedogen 
ii) shift to criminal 
justice 
iii) international 
pressure and 
agreements 
iv) polarisation of 
standpoints 
v) resilience of 
market separation 
Changes in 
administration 
and political 
needs 
i) Rutte I 
ii) Rutte II 
Cannabis as 
a public 
order 
problem 
i) nuisance – 
definitions/characteristics
; growth in foreign 
visitors; local variation; 
geographical issues 
Party 
political 
values 
i) VVD 
ii) CDA 
iii) PvdA 
iv) D’66 
v) Left 
vi) Centre 
vii) Right 
National mood i) Rutte I 
ii) Rutte II 
Cannabis as 
a health 
problem 
i) mental health and harm 
ii) growth in strength 
iii) youth consumption 
Political 
culture 
i) the politics of 
coalitions 
ii) civil service 
culture 
iii) local power in 
policy-making 
Organised 
political forces 
i) mayoral and 
municipality 
resistance – 
Rutte I; Rutte II 
ii) 
health/criminal 
justice 
iii) polarised 
policy coalitions 
iv) coffeeshop 
owners 
v) alcohol 
industry 
Cannabis as 
a social and 
moral 
problem 
i) normalisation 
ii) moralisation 
Research 
and 
expertise 
i) research – van 
der Donk 
Committee; 
Garretsen 
Committee; other 
ii) relationship to 
policy – problem-
solving; political 
needs; coalition 
policy legitimisation 
  
Cannabis as 
a Rutte I 
problem 
i) policy success 
ii) criminality/nuisance 
iii) separation of markets 
iv) municipality resistance 
Technical 
feasibility 
i) international 
regulations 
ii) domestic 
legislation 
iii) policy legitimacy 
iv) accountability 
  
Factors 
shaping 
problem 
definition 
i) criminal justice – 
innocence of cannabis; 
shift to criminal justice; 
international dynamics 
and pressure 
ii) public order 
iii) health – cannabis as a 
soft drug; cannabis as a 
dangerous drug 
iv) social/moral  
‘Policy 
Primeval 
Soup’ 
i) general Rutte I 
ii) residency and 
closed club trial 
iii) school’s distance 
criteria 
iv) residency criteria 
(Rutte II) 
v) THC division 
vi) cultivation 
experiments 
vii) closure of all 
coffeeshops 
viii) coffeeshop 
outplacement 
  
235 
 
Chapter 5 
 
Figure 5.2 Out-of-Court Disposals as a Percentage of Offences Brought to Justice, 2002-2011. Source: Sosa 
(2012:3) 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3 Cannabis Seizures 2003-2012/13. Adapted from: Home Office (2013a) 
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Figure 5.4 Distribution of THC concentration in cannabis samples in England & Wales. Source: Hardwick and King 
(2008:12) 
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Chapter 6 
 
Figure 6.1 THC concentrations in Dutch weed (most popular variety) [‘nederwiet’]; strongest weed ['sterkste']; 
and imported weed ['geimporteerd']. Source: Niesink and Rigter (2013:25) 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2 THC concentrations in various cannabis samples: 'sterkst' [strongest weed]; 'populairst' [most popular 
nederwiet]; ‘geimporteerd’ [imported]. Source: Niesink and Rigter (2013:22) 
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Figure 6.3 Number of Cannabis Users Requesting Help 2002-2011 in the Netherlands. Source: Wisselink et al. 
(2012) 
 
 
Figure 6.4 THC concentrations in Dutch hashish ['nederhasj'] and imported hash ['geimporteerde hasj']. Source: 
Niesink and Rigter (2013:25) 
 
 
Figure 6.5 Policy Matrix. Source: Advisory Committee on Drug Policy (2009:42) 
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Table 6.2 Overview of Political Perspectives towards Cannabis Policy of Parties in Rutte I and II 
VVD The Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (‘People’s Party for Freedom and 
Democracy’) is a centre-right party which is an ardent support of libertarian values, such 
as being pro-euthanasia and pro-abortion, but one which has increasingly attempted to 
redefine itself as the ‘law and order party’. With regards to cannabis and drugs, this has 
brought to light a glaring divide and ambivalence even within the same political party. 
Liberal notions relating to free trade and consumption are ambivalently 
counterbalanced with a strong priority on safety (and security) which has become a 
‘main political issue’ [NL-A-NGO2]. 
CDA The Christen Democratisch Appel (‘Christian Democratic Appeal’) is a centre-right party 
and has traditionally been against liberal reforms to cannabis policy, instead advocating 
measures which reduce the numbers and visibility of coffeeshops, attempting to instil a 
moral perspective that the consumption of cannabis should be de-normalised on the 
basis that it limits meaningful participation in society. 
PVV The Partij voor de Vrijheid (‘Party for Freedom’) is a populist right-wing party which 
adopts a tough position on issues such as immigration and law and order. The preferred 
types of policy measures towards crime are clear-sounding, even adopting the rhetoric 
of US-style ‘three strikes and you’re out’ (see PVV 2010). Moreover, the PVV is distinctly 
against gedoogbeleid as a way of responding to problems; rather the solutions should 
be clear. In the realm of drugs, this translates into a disdain for distinguishing between 
‘hard’ and ‘soft’ drugs, and combined with a law enforcement focus, attention is on how 
to tackle drug-related crime. 
PvdA The Partij van de Arbeid (‘Labour’/Social Democratic Party) is a centre-left party which 
suggests that cannabis policy proposals should look at better regulation of coffeeshops 
rather than a tougher and more repressive approach. There is clear alignment with the 
belief that coffeeshops provide a beneficial way to separate markets. PvdA approach the 
issue from a health-led harm-reduction perspective, and whilst firmly agreeing with 
other political parties that cannabis has become a more harmful substance, it believes 
that state regulation of the problem would lead to better quality control of cannabis. 
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